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The United Service Magazine

Edited by

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C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

Assistant Editor

CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E.
(late Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, B.E.F.)

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

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

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
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CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E.
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
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
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# THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. I. NO. 1. OCTOBER, 1920

## EDITORIAL

IT is a common and a reasonable enough practice to usher in the opening number of a new periodical with some sort of apology for its existence. Reasonable enough, because in general so many and so sufficient are the reasons why a man should abstain from any extension of his already too wide acquaintance with periodical literature. In this the infant periodical differs from other infants, including the human, that the latter does not need—or often does not need—an apology for his appearance; his apologia is deferred till later in life. But the reason for this difference is that the infant periodical must, if it can, earn its own living from the very day of its birth, a consideration which admits of no delay in endeavouring to ingratiate itself with all on whom it may depend for the earning.

It seems desirable then, and indeed necessary, to say something about the *raison d'être* and the aims of the *Army Quarterly*, which makes its first appearance within two years of that armistice which brought to an end the war that was to end war and to make armies obsolete. Since then Hope has stood aghast at the contraction of her kingdom, though her flag still flies from the fortress which she will never surrender. It is, however, incontestable that, up to the time of writing, war has not been ended; nor are armies yet to be numbered among those instruments whose use progressive civilization has superseded and rendered liable to abolition or museum storage.

In the circumstances, the mere fact of the existence of a review devoted to military matters seems to need no apology. *Humani nihil alienum* . . . the purveyor of periodical literature—that word being used in its least restricted sense—may without blame base himself on any of the common and general forms of human activity.

* * * * *

But there is more to be said; there are other considerations.



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The outlook of a military review need no more be militarist than the policy of a tailoring journal need be to advocate the wearing of clothes. In the latter case, if there were more profit in woad . . . but the parallel need not be laboured. In any case the outlook of the present *Army Quarterly* will by no means be militarist. Nor, though it will doubtless at times express the views of anti-militarist contributors, will it be anti-militarist. Its policy will be to avoid advocacy on the one side or the other in any such matters.

Not to Use too many Circumstances ere one come to the Matter, which were Wearisome; (though "to use none at all is Blunt;") the aim of the *Army Quarterly* will be to provide a forum for the discussion, explanation and review of all military affairs. So long as navies and armies and air forces exist, and so long as the citizens of a State like ours continue to pay for and to employ them, so long is it right and useful for the citizen to know that his pipers are efficient to play such tune as he may be inclined or compelled to call. The business for which armed forces exist is by force to re-establish peace where the general body of the citizens, or the statesmen chosen to represent them, have brought about a state of war. War, as Clausewitz said, is "a political instrument, a continuation of political commerce." As long as this instrument is not absolutely obsolete, it is for the citizen to take sufficient interest in all that pertains to it to assure himself that the instrument shall be efficient if ever and whenever it shall be necessary to employ it.

Armed forces are still part of the machinery of States. It is for the citizen to keep himself informed as to what that machinery is and is not capable of performing; as to the relation between its horse-power, so to speak, and the work which may be required of it; as to the ideas, theories, forecasts which have determined the lines of its present development, and which are determining the lines of its further development. Even if all possibility of great wars between civilized nations were to be eliminated, States would still require armed forces for keeping order on the marches and for such purposes. To this extent, at the very least, the State's activities must continue to include military activities; and, the more that these are unproductive and costly, it is the business of the good citizen to have a sufficient understanding of them, and to interest himself in ascertaining that the instruments with which he will engage therein are rightly planned and proportioned, in rightly gauging their capacities, their limitations, and their potentialities.

* * * * *

This, then, is just as true for the citizen who believes that war is

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an anachronism and who looks upon all armed forces as wasteful evils, as for the citizen who takes a contrary view. It would not be difficult to produce arguments tending to show that the very cause of Peace itself has suffered almost as much in the past at the hands of those most anxious to promote it as at the hands of those who belong to the more militant schools of thought. But—and this should render such a statement free from any reproach of anti-pacifist bias—it would also be shown that the promoters of peace defeat their own object just in so far as they fail to understand the political and military implications and reactions of their proposals; just in so far as they fail to understand what is meant by war as "a continuation of political commerce"; just in so far as they fail to understand the machinery available for that continuation, and the effect on others as well as themselves of its inefficiency or insufficiency.

It is the mark of an optimist, and indeed of the essence of Christianity, to believe in the ultimate improvement of human nature and to work for the elimination of the cruel and bloody evil of war. It is also the mark of one species of optimist to believe that if, with head in sand, he cannot see his enemies he will also remain unseen by them and so immune from their enmity. But this latter form of optimism only evokes caustic comment on the intelligence of its possessor. It is alleged to be characteristic of the ostrich, by which even the patient Job was moved to irritation; "the ostrich . . . is without fear because God hath deprived her of wisdom, neither hath he imparted to her understanding." Optimism is a fine quality, and very English. Ignorance may be bliss—and very English too. But of all dangerous combinations the optimism of ignorance is the worst and most dangerous.

* * * * *

We remember within the last ten years reading three books, each excellent in its way, setting forth three several ways of putting an end to war. One pointed out that the spread of the true Christian spirit, and its general acceptance, must lead to the abolition of war in Christendom. One argued that there can never be any economic or true material advantage even in victorious war. The third indicates that war would simply break down owing to the general withdrawal of individual combatants, if the soldier's contract were no more stringent than that of the artisan and were not supported by the severe penalties of military law.

Now it is true that the universal acceptance of any of these three views, or of their implications, would, in fact, either abolish war and the will to war, or render the making of war impossible.

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But it all depends on those words "universal acceptance." The early Christian Church won through, it may be argued, by passive resistance; but the victory took centuries to achieve. An absolutely non-resistant State might also win through by the force of its ideas eventually conquering its conquerors; but how long would the process be? In any case such a State would almost surely have to submit to conquest at the outset. It is not to dispute Canon Crane's thesis to say that Christendom has yet to be converted to Christianity. Again, if the truth about material and economic advantage had been universally understood and accepted, Prussianism might probably have been universally recognized as based on a fallacy; there might have been no German attack, so no need of defence; and so no war. But even Mr. Norman Angell did not propose the disarmament of an individual State in a world wholly incredulous or careless of, or opposed to, his theories. Those theories are true if all agree with them; irrelevant otherwise. And, to take the third case, if all States allowed their soldiers to leave their work (the battle) with as little penalty as the artisan suffers on leaving his work, armies would indeed be very generally in no state to give battle effectively. But even Mr. Thurtle does not suggest that an individual State should adopt so entirely voluntary a system, unless certain that all its neighbours and competitors were doing likewise.

The truth is, unfortunately, that there is as yet no universal acceptance even of the fact that the abolition of war is a prime necessity of our civilization. Anything might be possible if even the League of Nations represented an idea of truly universal acceptance. As it is, it is but blindness to pretend that the military functions and machinery of the State are no longer of vital concern to the non-military citizen. Yet "these Things are commonly not Observed, but left to take their Chance."

* * * * *

The League of Nations; it is indeed in that direction that we must look for the long, difficult, and probably by no means direct road, which shall lead to the abolition of war. If the League were to develop beyond an existence "in a shadowy form in an atmosphere of tepid idealism," as Lord Grey of Fallodon expresses it, it would embody at least a general—if not universal—acceptance of the idea that war is one of the greatest of evils and of the dangers threatening our civilization. The realization of the League, to put it the other way round, depends precisely upon the extent to which acceptance of its ideals is general, upon the measure of approximation to universality of that acceptance. No other sanction is possible; no

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other source of power is necessary. There was much talk, during the five dark years, of the war that was to end war. Many died in the faith that their sacrifice would help to bring nearer the realization of that ideal. Surely, it is for us to be, in Abraham Lincoln's immortal words, " dedicated to the great task remaining before us . . . that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain." Yet the form is still shadowy, and the atmosphere is still to a great extent one of tepid idealism. The open enemies of the ideal, indeed, are less to be feared than the idealists who are tepid or who fail to grasp the essence of their ideal.

People are still found discussing such fantasies as a League of Nations army under a League of Nations General, wholly unable to free their minds from the idea of force in that form as the *ultima ratio*. We say " in that form " advisedly, because it would be folly to deny that the most real and effective League might have to use force at times in some form. But a real and effective League would not be any sort of dominant super-State, such as they who think of League of Nations armies and navies—whether consciously or unconsciously —visualize. The force of a League founded on general agreement would be exactly as strong as the measure of the agreement; no more and no less. If the members of the League really agreed as to the necessity or desirability of coercing a recalcitrant member or an outsider, they would equally agree to join their individual forces to that end. If not, not. The notion of the creation of some standing international force, dressed in sea-green and incorruptible, can only arise from a complete misunderstanding of the fundamental idea.

It is a pretty notion to toy with, too. Imagine the diplomatic negotiations, the pulling of wires, the rolling of logs, in the matter of the appointment of the commander. Lack of military competence, lack of energy and power of decision, senility, citizenship of a distant and obscure State, might well be considered " safe " qualities. Imagine, on the other hand, the antics of a Boulanger in such a position, or the power of a Napoleon. Imagine the discussions on the subject of the location of the army. Imagine . . . but even imagination almost fails to get beyond the nice new dress regulations instituting the nice new uniform—sea-green, by all means.

* * * * *

It is one of the most real difficulties in the way of the establishment of an effective League of Nations that there is so much confusion in the minds of those who vaguely think of force as the ultimate sanction of all things. Their theory has a substratum of truth in it, but it requires either exact definition or large qualification. It is common

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to point to force as the true basis of civil peace ; force, as represented by law, courts and police. As a matter of fact, however, this view is superficial and essentially fallacious. Actually, the basis of civil peace is general agreement that peace is desirable combined with general acceptance of the belief that it is attainable. The elements of force above-mentioned are, in essence, no more than the pooling of the means of that great majority of the citizens which is in general agreement on these matters, in order to support the majority view against the possibly subversive tendencies of recalcitrant minorities. In other words, it is the general agreement, not the force, which is essentially the ultimate sanction.

The distinction becomes perfectly clear to any one who considers the state of societies in which such general agreement does not exist. In Western Europe the basis of government is the consent, or even more the majority will, of the governed. A contrary instance may be cited from a certain West African colony of which we have knowledge. A native citizen of that colony had a grievance against the benevolent but alien administrator of his district. The aggrieved, therefore, as seemed perfectly right and reasonable not only to him but to the general body of native public opinion, hired an assassin —a very respectable professional—to remove the administrator. But the highest professional standing cannot ensure invariable professional success. Whether owing to imperfect co-ordination of hand, eye and arm, or to defective ammunition, the administrator, narrowly enough, escaped. So also, in spite of the hue and cry, did the assassin. A few months later, however, the latter reappeared ; this time bearing a petition to the administrator. The petitioner, when given audience, explained that he was an honest and hard-working assassin, and that he had recently been engaged at ordinary contract rates to shoot the administrator (not the kind of job he fancied most, but the administrator would agree that business was business). He had only been partially successful, the " removal " effected having been no more than temporary and no further than to the hospital. But he wished to point out that he had, after all, done his best, as would hardly, in the circumstances, be disputed. He, therefore, humbly prayed for redress against his employer, who was now refusing to pay him any part of the contract price or even out-of-pocket expenses.

Now in a society in which that sort of story can be true, force is truly enough the ultimate sanction, expressing the imposed will of a dominant alien power. There is indicated a state of affairs wholly dissimilar to that obtaining in Western Europe where the ultimate

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sanction is general agreement and consent, only backed by the force of law, courts and police so long as it expresses the majority view. Just so the League of Nations. Its power can only be based on those forces which give internal stability to the States of Western Europe; it cannot be based upon any external or superimposed force on the West African model. Its power, in fact, cannot reside in any force of its own; it can only reside in the willingness of its members to co-operate, pooling their individual forces—or so much of them as may be required—to act together if necessary in support of the decisions of the League; that is, in support of the concerted decisions of the League's members. Minor joint forces, indeed, for special and particular circumstances, might be placed at the disposal of the League; on the model, for instance, of the Macedonian gendarmerie. But no such thing as an international and supernational army or navy or air force is thinkable.

* * * * *

Another consideration arises in connection with this matter of war. Is war, in fact and in itself, the chief evil that threatens civilized communities? With the memory of 1914–1918 fresh and bitter, anyone would hesitate before saying it was not. Yet, is it? M.M. Lenin and Trotsky, mild leaders of the world's most advanced democracy, might say "No; Capitalism is worse; the Bourgeoisie is worse." M. Millerand, yet another democratic leader, might say "No; Bolshevism is worse." Even democratic thought is not always agreed. Abraham Lincoln certainly said "No; Secession and the theories underlying it are worse." Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey certainly said "No; to fail to meet engagements, and to submit to the doctrine of force, are worse." The Sheikh ul Islam or Mr. Belloc might (for aught we know) say "No; Heresy is worse." In any case, are not envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness worse, out of which war, among other things, arises?

Is not the real truth, then, to be found in this? That war is a ghastly and terrible evil, but that it is a symptom, not the disease. That to attack war, to try to abolish war, is to try to abolish a symptom, which, without attacking the disease, is probably impossible. That the disease to be attacked is the state of affairs in the modern world—the envy, hatred and malice—which renders war still possible. If this be the truth, the weakness of the pacifist case lies in the failure to realize it; just as the real justification for abhorrence of militarism lies in the fact that the militarist approves the continuance of a state of society of such a kind as renders the evil of war possible.

So the compass is boxed, and we come back to our starting point.

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It is hoped that the *Army Quarterly* will provide matter of interest and concern to all active citizens, whatever their views on war and military matters generally; especially since so many millions of citizens have recently been soldiers. For unless war and armed forces be shortly abolished under some greater international DORA, they must be reckoned with by active citizens. And in these matters, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing indeed; ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ.

* * * * *

It would hardly seem profitable at the present moment to attempt to embark upon any serious general discussion of current events. All the great States of the world, including our own, find their energies absorbed in dealing *ad hoc* with the immediate and importunate problems which have arisen as the aftermath of the war, or with the problems created by the wars still in progress. Until some approach to a solution of at least the chief of these problems is within sight, it is practically impossible effectively to discuss our own position or the European position in the matter of armaments and the tendencies of military policy. For instance, the policy or policies of Great Britain, France and Italy with regard to Central and Eastern Europe must have considerable influence upon the position of each of those Powers in military matters. But the policies themselves are as yet far from being wholly in line, and for the moment the prime necessity is to secure peace by the use of all means at disposal. Or, to take another instance; Mesopotamia is in ferment. Mesopotamia is not a British possession, but Great Britain has been entrusted with a mandate to set up some form of local government, and to assist with guidance and advice. The present consequence is an immensely costly military burden; yet what alternative is there? Peace must be established and kept before the work for which we have a mandate can even be begun. Instances might be multiplied, but not profitably. We cannot see where we are in this matter, nor whither tending, until policies are settled and known, until peace is by some means generally re-established, until the future of the League of Nations can be forecast with some measure of probability.

With general policy it is not the province of the *Army Quarterly* to deal, certainly not in its editorial pages and certainly not by way of discussion or criticism. There are ample periodicals dealing, and ready to deal, faithfully with such matters. With military policy in its relation to general policy it will be for the *Army Quarterly* to deal.

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But the necessary data are at present obscure, confused, fluctuating and insufficient. All that is clear is there are two prime necessities; first, the general re-establishment of peace, and secondly, the establishment of an effective League of Nations.

* * * * *

It is not noticeable that some of the high hopes built upon the new perfection of mechanical forces have been altogether realized, when tested in the work of restoring order on the marches of the Empire, or in such fields as Mesopotamia. Only a fool would deny the great value of modern engines, such as offensive aircraft, tanks and so forth. Only a fool would deny their great future possibilities. Yet the cry that little besides a few aircraft would be sufficient to secure the north-west frontier of India has also proved to be folly. A late campaign in that theatre seems even to have required the employment of unusually large forces. Reinforcements of the older-fashioned kind still have to be poured into Mesopotamia. The inventor of the *testudo*, the ingenious soldier who formed Alexander's Elephant Corps, the monk Martin Schwartz, all very likely thought that they had solved the problem of war. Yet the soldier remains as important as his weapons, and in the ultimate phase of the conflict there still appears the man armed with sharp steel—or the threat of him. Vision is good; but so also is a sense of proportion.

On another line of thought, it will be interesting to see what headway is made by the idea of a combined Imperial General Staff, to include naval, military and air force members in due proportions. Tactics vary according as they are employed on sea, on land, or in the air. But strategy is all one; and armed forces whether afloat, ashore, or in the air, are all parts of one whole, parts of one defence-machine. However closely and cordially three separate departments of State may work together, however much interdepartmental co-ordination and correspondence there may be, the result can surely never be the same from the point of view of maximum efficiency and minimum waste, whether of time or by overlapping, as complete or more complete unity. As things are the fullest measure of realization of each other's points of view, understanding of each other's methods and difficulties, correlation of military thought in its higher branches, is and must be exceedingly difficult to attain. Yet, without that fullest measure, what mistakes and misunderstandings, delays and failures in co-ordination, must arise in spite of the best will in the world to co-operate. To instance one difficulty, it is certain that—despite the most cordial and unselfish will on both sides to co-operate—the mere lack of knowledge of each other's staff

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methods sometimes hampered both the naval and the military staffs at the outset of the Dardanelles campaign.

The nature of staff work is very little understood outside the Services. Indeed in the Army itself, owing mainly perhaps to the small number of officers who received the special training required, it was, and probably still is, none too well understood. The staff officer in the Army in war has none of the responsibility and deserves none of the laurels of the commander; he faces far less instant danger and deserves none of the laurels of, say, the infantry soldier. But, despite uninstructed opinion to the contrary, his work is exceedingly arduous and absolutely unceasing. Probably any staff officer of considerable experience would agree that he fills a comparatively inglorious rôle. Yet on the efficiency of the staff depends the smooth running and efficient action of the whole military machine. It is a pity that the staff, in the Army at least, is prejudiced by two things; first, by being decorated beyond what it either desires or deserves—or beyond what it should desire and does deserve; and secondly, by being too much overworked to be able to spend sufficient time in close and constant personal contact with troops. Yet any justification for such prejudice against the staff notwithstanding, it is necessary to realize the vital importance of an efficient staff. And in the sphere of strategy and the greater defence problems, it is hard to believe that a combined Imperial General Staff, drawn from all the Services, would not form a more efficient instrument than can ever be provided under existing arrangements.

* * * * *

It is hoped that what has been said above, in conjunction with the articles contained in this first number, will sufficiently indicate the lines on which the *Army Quarterly* is intended to run.

The only thing to be added is that every endeavour will be made to secure periodical articles from the Dominions and India, so as to assist in keeping close touch with the developments of military thought, the tendencies of military policy, and military affairs generally throughout the Empire. And here, as elsewhere, the word "military" is used in its widest sense.

* * * * *

These pages would be incomplete without a reference to the noble and heart-stirring appeal of our great leader, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, on behalf of those whom he led to victory and their comrades who fought in other theatres, who have still to find in civil life the place to which their sacrifices on behalf of their country surely entitles them. It is inconceivable that such an appeal can fall on deaf ears.

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# SOME TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN IN 1917–1918

By Lieut.-General the Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

At the time of departure of the British Expeditionary Force to Italy in November, 1917, it was impossible to forecast what position the Italians would be holding, when the three divisions arrived in the plains of Lombardy. It was generally hoped and believed that the retreat from Caporetto would come to a full stop on the Tagliamento, or, at any rate, on the Piave; but there was a possibility of a hostile attack down the Guidicaria pass, threatening Milan and the rear of the retreating armies. Further, the time-tables of the troop trains were quite uncertain, owing to the fact that the French reinforcements for Italy took precedence of ours.

It was not an easy problem, therefore, to decide on the position of detrainment and concentration. The first duty allotted to the British staff on its arrival in Italy was to reconnoitre the line of the Mincio. This was only precautionary, it is true, but it was not a factor that encouraged detrainment too far to the east.

Shortly after my own arrival, three days later, the position looked better, and General Cadorna, whom I saw at Treviso, was emphatic in his wish that we should detrain as far forward as Padua. The Rapallo Conference was sitting at this time, and it was clear that there was still some apprehension of an attack from the north, directed down one side or other of Lake Garda. This is proved by the fact that I was warned from Rapallo to be ready to march instantly to Brescia.

This apprehension was founded on the fact that Milan and Turin are not only the workshops of Italy, but that their inhabitants are excitable and not easily controlled in a crisis. The anxiety, therefore, was partly political. Tactically, it always appeared to me that an attack by the enemy on Mt. Baldo, on the eastern shore of Lake Garda, would, if successful, have turned the whole of the defences of the western side. Further, the main line of supply via Brescia and Verona would have been seriously threatened.

Such a threat then from the north could not be ignored—in spite



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of the carefully made defences which protected the southern road from Rovereto.

Some of these defences were marvellous feats of engineering, but I formed the opinion in driving up and down through Ala that in many cases guns and machine guns were sited too high up, and that in consequence the beaten zones of fire actually on the road were narrow and could be crossed by resolute troops.

The definite decision was finally made to detrain at Mantua. A glance at the map will show that there were good marching roads running either northward to Brescia or eastward to the Piave river.

The wonderful recovery of the Italian Army, the heroic action of the Italian cavalry in Friuli, and the stubborn defence of the Italian Third Army, under the Duke of Aosta, gave time for the French and British not only to complete the detrainment, but also to march the ninety miles to the Montello unmolested by the enemy.

The Montello, situated on the right bank of the Piave, at its exit from the higher mountains, was, and is, in my opinion, an ideal position for defence. The soil, besides being easy to dig, is so firm that it scarcely wants revetment. The positions for howitzers in the curious natural hollows formed by old volcanic action are numerous and secure. The observation to the front across the river is uninterrupted. There are wonderful facilities for launching a counter-stroke, in the event of a successful passage of the river by the enemy, either to the south by Spreziano, or to the north by Cornuda. These considerations enabled me to tell General Plumer, in January of 1918, that I felt a supreme conviction that, come what may, we would hold the Montello.

The work done by the small British force under General Plumer's command during the winter of 1917–1918 was extraordinary. The weather on the whole was very favourable and men could keep dry and clean, but, in spite of these favourable conditions, it was a great tribute to their energy and endurance that they not only dug two new lines on the Montello itself, but also a long sector of defence underneath the foothills of the Alps between Asolo and Bassano.

The reason for the construction of this line was that General Plumer would not accept the prevailing theory that all was lost, even if the enemy succeeded in obtaining possession of the crests overlooking the plains, including Mt. Grappa. He was indubitably right, for reconnaissance of the lower foothills proved that the descent on to the plains would be no easy business—being in full view of every man and gun. The steepness of the southern slopes had two important bearings in support of this theory. First, that the

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abrupt descent would disorganize even a well-drilled enemy ; second, that it would be impossible for any but very light artillery to support the pursuers, as the muzzles of the heavier calibres could not be sufficiently depressed.

A resolute stand, therefore, on the lower ground, held out every prospect of our being able to check an advance for some time, and any idea of a farther withdrawal to the line of the Mincio was consequently repudiated by General Plumer with great vigour.

As soon as the defensive had been thus firmly re-established, plans for an offensive began to be considered. Even the withdrawal of General Plumer back to France, with the two extra divisions which he had brought with him, did not materially affect the ardent desire of the Italian Supreme Command to take the offensive.

The three British and two French divisions were placed side by side in the mountain sector facing Asiago. Plans were discussed and preparations made. The latter included the making of a completely new mountain road, 17 kilometres long, climbing to 8000 feet. This wonderful piece of work was begun and finished by 3000 Italian workmen in nine weeks : a truly remarkable tribute to their engineering skill and energy.

There was some anxiety as to our own preparations. I had to send a telegram to the Quartermaster-General stating that my minimum requirements for the proposed offensive would be no less than 430 truck loads of shells of various kinds, exclusive of those which were already in transit.

At this time, the middle of April, 1918, the needs of France and the difficulties of the railway service were acute, but it was necessary for me to know whether or not my demands could be complied with. I stated clearly in my reports to London that I quite understood that the situation in France might not allow of shells, or of trains to carry them, but that, if this were the case, I should have to inform the Comando Supremo and the 6th Italian Army, to which we were attached, that I could not possibly reach the objective assigned to me. I considered that it was important not to disappoint General Diaz, but that to undertake the attack without adequate artillery support would be sheer folly.

It was also necessary to keep a good reserve of ammunition in the plains in case of emergency, for it must always be remembered that the fringe of mountain land held by the Italians, French and British between Asiago and the steep descents was very narrow, and that any successful attack by the enemy would mean the abandonment of all our mountain stores.

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By the 24th of April it became clear that our proposed offensive would have to be postponed. Our troops had been leaving Italy for France in a steady flow for more than a month, a fact which was probably as well known to the enemy as to ourselves.

It appeared to me, however, that the Austrians would not be credited by the German High Command with the ability even of "containing" the troops opposed to them, and that, in consequence, they would be given one of two orders :—

Either (1) to attack and so to prevent more troops from being sent to France ; or (2) to send some of their own divisions to France.

If it was found that the Austrians were sending strong reinforcements to France, General Diaz made up his mind to attack. If, on the other hand, the Austrians attacked elsewhere than on the Asiago plateau, General Diaz intended to launch an offensive against Asiago and Mt. Erio as a counter-offensive.

After discussion, the latter plan was modified, for it was pertinently asked, what was the good of our being on Mt. Erio, that is, north of the Asiago plateau, if the Austrians were west of the Piave and in possession of Treviso ?

Intelligence to the effect that an attack by the Austrians, but without the assistance of German divisions, was in course of preparation was received about this time, and during the first fortnight in June the day and the hour of this attack became known to the Higher Command. General Diaz argued with some force that, while his own forces were being weakened daily by the withdrawal of divisions—English, French and Italian—to the French front, the Austrians were at their strongest numerically and, so far as was known, had not yet sent any help to their allies. It was decided, therefore, to await the attack ; and the result fully justified this decision, for the attack was completely defeated in the mountain sector, and, after heavy and severe fighting, on the Piave sector as well.

It was this heavy fighting with its tale of casualties which really influenced the decision of the Italians to postpone their offensive until the autumn.

There were some points of tactical interest in this battle. The enemy attacked selected points only, each point being attacked on a two-company front with supports in great depth. He chose his ground well—this was, of course, easy enough in the broken country of the Asiago plateau—and consequently he did not suffer much from our S.O.S. barrage and the brunt of his attack had to be met by the infantry.

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Owing to the situation in France, the conserving of man-power was all important. Before the Austrian offensive we had formed reserve companies from cooks, servants, grooms, signallers, etc. We had also taken the precaution of keeping as many men as possible out of the front lines in order to avoid the bombardment. In places this latter policy was overdone, and the temporary success of the enemy in getting through the wire on the British left was due to this cause. On the other hand, the strength of the reinforcements in immediate support made it possible for us to launch a vigorous counterstroke at dawn on the 16th of June, and to restore the whole line to its former position.

As regards our artillery, one of the features of this battle was the prompt action taken by batteries upon their own initiative, when all communication with observation posts and headquarters had been severed. It was borne out that heavy and field artillery must have observation posts in trees or anywhere else, within megaphone distance of the batteries.

Our aeroplanes brought down eight hostile machines without loss to themselves by 5.30 a.m., and then when the mist came on went off in a body to the Piave and dropped three tons of bombs on the enemy's bridges and troops. Low clouds and mists in mountainous country are even more of a handicap to airmen than they are in countries like France and Belgium, as it is impossible for aeroplanes to get underneath them, owing to the height of the hills. In this particular battle it may be stated that from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. the mist was as thick as a London fog.

In what follows I speak entirely for myself. I blame nobody, I simply record my own opinion as a soldier.

The day after the repulse of the Austrians in the Asiago sector, the information which was sent to me by my divisional commanders, and the reports which were received from all our observation posts, pointed to a state of collapse in the enemy's ranks. I authorised General Babington, therefore, commanding the 23rd Division, to carry out a raid on a large scale. The result of this successful daylight raid was the capture of 1000 prisoners, 6 field guns and a large quantity of machine guns and material, whilst our casualties were practically nil.

This convinced me that, if the original attack could be carried out quickly, our success was assured.

His Excellency General Diaz always gave me the opportunity of seeing him personally on every occasion, and I frankly put my views before him, even taking him a telegram which I had proposed to send

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to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He counselled patience, telling me that sufficient reserves were not at the moment available in the Italian Army, owing to the necessity for reinforcing those divisions, which had fought so hard to defeat the Austrians on the Piave. I confess that I was greatly disappointed at this decision, for I felt—and I believe that every British soldier in Italy felt—that this was a wonderful opportunity, possibly a fleeting one, for carrying out a vigorous and resolute attack against a temporarily demoralized enemy.

During those subsequent months of July, August and September —months of marvel on the Western front in France—it was hard indeed to be compelled to inactivity.

I am convinced that a bold stroke launched early in July would have given us a victory not less complete than that gained in October.

The actual plan of the final battle was finely conceived. The tactical objections to attacks delivered either in an easterly or in a northerly direction were considerable. In the first case there would be a perpetual menace to the left rear of the attacking force, and the difficulties of transport across the rivers, if the bridges were destroyed, might be almost insuperable.

A glance at the old map of Italy will also show that the farther an Italian Army were to penetrate in an easterly direction into Austria, the more the whole of the long leg of Italy would be exposed, because its safety depended absolutely upon the defence of the mountain fringe against a hostile counterstroke. In addition to this, if such a counterstroke were to be successful, the whole of the communications of the Italian Army advancing victoriously eastward would be severed. It should also be remembered that although the lines of communication towards the east over the Piave and the Tagliamento were supplied with good road and railway bridges, these were perpetually menaced from the air, and that, in case of any serious breach, the supply of the advancing Italians would become exceedingly precarious.

The objections to an attack in a northerly direction over summits of 9000 feet so late in the season as the end of October were even more obvious. It was always possible that the autumn snowfall might begin early, while the physical difficulties confined the sector of attack absolutely to the Asiago plateau and the mountains which divide that plateau from the Val Sugane. In no other portion of the whole northern front between the Adige and Switzerland was it possible even in summer to deliver an attack in strength.

The blow, therefore, at Vittorio Veneto, exactly bisecting the

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two lines of difficulty, and striking at the dividing line between the two main Austrian Armies, separating the one from the other and both from their bases, was a conception based on sound strategic lines, and one fully deserving more study and a higher mead of praise than it has so far received.

The plans for secreting the movement of British troops from the mountain sector to the river were elaborate. One division was left in the mountains in order that no change of uniform could be discovered by the enemy. The infantry of the two divisions was moved by train and the artillery by road at night. Reconnaissances by British officers were made in Italian uniform and all our troops in forward lines on the river bank were similarly disguised. No British gun fired a round until the attack was launched, registration being dispensed with, and trust placed in the accuracy of the work of the Field Survey companies. This trust was fully justified.

I do not propose here to relate the incidents of the battle, but, when once the passage of the Piave had been successfully accomplished, the enemy's resistance grew weaker with each step of the advance and demoralization set in with great rapidity. It is true that the Italians had to fight with extraordinary persistence in Mt. Grappa and their final victory there was one of their most heroic achievements, especially when it is remembered that their attacks began before any attempt was made to cross the river. Their duty, therefore, of attracting the enemy's main forces to Mt. Grappa and away from the threatened point, was accomplished with a devotion worthy of a great place in their military history.

The news from France was hardly likely to be encouraging to the Austrians during August, September and October, and this may account in part for the rapid collapse of the defence, but I repeat my conviction that, from the moment of the failure of its offensive in June, the Austrian Army lost cohesion. There were still a few good Hungarian divisions—I may mention in particular the Edelweiss Division, the spirit and moral of whose troops remained unimpaired up to the very last—but a few plums do not make a pudding, and I believe that the pudding could have been cut into slices three months earlier than was actually the case.

As regards the future, it would not be becoming to discuss the questions which are to-day agitating all Italians and which have aroused tremendous passions ever since their great victory. I only wish to present a personal view of the present military situation on the broadest lines.

Italy has deservedly secured the watershed of the Alps as her



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national frontier. This simply means that, instead of an ever-present threat of a descent by an enemy into the plains of Lombardy and Venezia (for few people realize how thin was the fringe of mountainous ground, how completely overlooked and commanded from the higher Alps to the north), Italy can hold the only possible doors of entry with a very few divisions.

This advantage would seem to make it possible for the Italian Government to release a large number of men from military service, to lessen the grip of conscription, and to show the way to a firmer establishment of Italian industries. Is it then entirely wise to sacrifice these advantages for the sake of the acquisition and retention of new territories on the far side of the Adriatic? For, if such territories are to be held at all, they must be held in strength.

Let us suppose that there were British colonies in Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Havre. For how long should we be sure of holding these places, even with a strong navy behind us in the Channel, if the French were bitterly hostile? Is not the Adriatic problem somewhat similar? and does it not require the gravest consideration before the substance of the great victory which Italy has won is sacrificed or jeopardized for the shadow of acquisition on the Dalmatian coast?

These questions are for the Italians to decide, but those of us who love Italy, who have had close intercourse with her people and breathed her mountain air, long to see her great and prosperous.

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# THE STAFF

In writing about the "Staff" it is essential first of all to be quite certain of the sense in which the word is employed, so loosely are we accustomed to use it. It is used here in its strictly legitimate sense, to describe the whole of that body of officers who were qualified for service on the Staff under the normal competitive system of peace time, or who worked their way up during the war to important positions on the Staff proper as defined by the *Staff Manual*. It does *not* include the Personal Staff, or the many specialists and other extra-regimentally employed officers who were given a staff grading during the war, and many of whom were allowed to assume staff titles and wear staff distinctions.

The correct term, of course, is "The General Staff" or, better still, "The Imperial General Staff." But we are debarred from the use of these titles by the arbitrary distinction which they imply between "General Staff" "Adjutant-General's Staff" and "Quartermaster-General's Staff"—an unfortunate distinction peculiar to our organization which will be discussed later on in this article—for the present it will be better to adhere to the plain unadorned title of "The Staff," using it to include all those earnest soldiers on whose shoulders, by virtue of their training and experience, fell the burden of preparation for the great war which is now over, and of the direction and administration of the British Armies at home and abroad during its course.

It is safe to say that no part of our military effort in the war is less understood and less appreciated, outside the ranks of the Regular Army and of the small number of intelligent outsiders who were drawn into the inner working of the military machine, than the work of the Staff; it was to be expected that this would be so. The statement that the British, although the most martial, are at the same time the least military of nations, is as true now as when it was written nearly a hundred years ago. The abhorrence of anything savouring of militarism in time of peace, with the possibilities for the misuse of armed power which that unfortunate word suggests, and with the curtailment of personal liberty which it implies is deeply rooted in the national mind. This attitude, as we



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have seen, does not prevent the nation from turning out in its full ill-organized strength, and with all its resources, once its interests or honour are touched and it is genuinely roused; nor does it react on the superb fighting qualities of the individual once he finds himself committed to war. It does militate, however, against any real understanding of the skilled direction which the successful creation and employment of large armies demand. In time of peace the training and work of the Staff is carried out, if not exactly in the dark, anyhow unobtrusively and almost apologetically, as if it were an essential condition that the less public susceptibilities are offended by the bloody-minded activities of the soldier, the better —and to such an extent was this so before 1914 that our enemies were almost as completely in the dark as to the quality and capacity of our staff work as was our own dear "man in the street." Also it is a curious fact that, even during the war, when the skilled work of our professional Staff in the field earned and succeeded in keeping the admiration and respect both of our allies and of our enemies, it was never appreciated by the mass of our own people. Now that the war is over, the regular soldier is tucked away again into his ancient obscurity and left to work out his problems and his own salvation as best he can until the next crisis drags him out into the light; even his advice as to the military policy of the Empire, backed by his professional experience in the greatest war there has ever been, is either not sought, or, if sought and given, is seldom taken.

This state of affairs was only to be expected, and the regular soldier is too much accustomed to it to allow himself to be unduly depressed. At the same time, it is a little disappointing that the experience obtained during the war should have had so little effect upon public opinion. The Staff would do its work more easily and with more fruitful results if it could count upon the intelligent sympathy and help of the government and of the public, instead of having to reckon, as often as not, on the prejudices of both as an inevitable obstacle to be reckoned with and overcome in the working out of almost any problem with which it is confronted. And besides, this attitude means that when war comes again the Staff will have to step on to the stage as an unknown public quantity, will have to earn anew the confidence of the nation as represented by the citizen forces enrolled for war, and must expect to see its plans endangered by the ignorant and nervous hostility of a public and press who never think of war until it is actually at their door, and who have no conception of the knowledge and training required to fit an officer for a share in the direction and execution of the operations of modern war. The

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earnest soldier need cherish no false hopes of an improved atmosphere for his work; he is back where he was before 1914, so far as the forgetful public is concerned; while the politician, who is as suspicious of proved efficiency in any form as he is incapable of understanding single-minded service for the State, will watch him with an even more jealous eye than of old.

Be this as it may, the lack of any general appreciation of the work of the Staff in the war is a remarkable fact. It is hardly to be wondered at, perhaps, that the performances of a small body of regular soldiers, trained to self-effacement, should be overlooked in the flood of service and sacrifice of an unmilitary Empire suddenly plunged into war. The imagination of the people was gripped from the start, and is gripped still, by the picture of the millions of peaceful citizens who gave themselves up to the horrors of the trenches at the call of duty; and so crowded is the emotion of this picture that there is little room in it for the professional soldier, who, if he appears in it at all, is given a place in the background whence he ominously presides over the holocaust. This arrangement of ideas is quite natural in an uninformed public mind strained by emotion and anxiety; and perhaps it is equally natural that politicians and the press, who batten on emotion, should exploit the picture for their own ends.

But it is curious that a nation which prides itself on its hard head for business should be content to accept so remarkable an achievement as the enrolment, training, equipment, movement, administration and employment of millions of men all over the world without inquiring how these things were done. These things do not run themselves, nor are they done by amateurs; there must be some brain behind it all, organizing, controlling, adjusting and coaxing.

The British public, as we know, takes its ideas chiefly from what it reads; which is tantamount to saying that the bulk of it gets its views from the newspapers and from books written in a popular form. Neither of these sources of information is likely to be very instructive as regards the professional conduct of the war. The censorship made any expert comment impossible during the actual period of the war, even if there had been any non-combatant correspondents available with the trained knowledge to make it. And though many war correspondents are now beginning to turn their experiences into money by writing books, their writings do not appeal very convincingly to the thinking public. To the journalist it is an axiom that the amateur is always better than the professional in war as in everything else, because he is himself necessarily an amateur as are most of the people whose fancy he hopes to

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tickle; and the intelligent citizen is more likely to be irritated than impressed by the opinions of a man who hangs about the outskirts of a universal battle in order to make capital out of the sufferings and sacrifice of those who work and fight. Whatever may be the case in other games, there is no doubt that a European war is one of which the looker-on sees extraordinarily little. While that other most common writer of popular war books, the demobilized temporary soldier, is far too much engrossed with the terrible and glorious experiences of himself and his friends to bother about the creators and drivers of the vast war organism into which he found himself absorbed, or the compilers of the wonderful little manuals on which he was trained. It is only from the modest, carefully edited dispatches of the Commanders-in-Chief, or from the rare and equally modest little books written by highly-trained soldiers (like those by Sir Frederick Maurice), that glimpses can be obtained of the work of the Higher Command; and neither of these descend to the level of popular literature.

However, let us put the question of public recognition on one side, and get back to the work of the Staff, which is what really matters.

To appreciate the work of the Staff in the war, it is necessary to glance back at its origin and growth before 1914. As a modern institution it was barely ten years old when the war broke out! Its conception began after the South African War, with Lord Esher's Committee, which reported that the absence of a trained General Staff "gravely prejudiced the conduct of operations in South Africa." The report implied no reflection upon the Staff as it existed at that time, but pointed out that no general principles or settled doctrines for the conduct of a war, even on the scale of the South African campaign, were available; that there were not enough trained staff officers to fill a quarter of the posts which had to be filled; that commanders had not been trained to use their Staffs to the best advantage, nor had the Staffs ever worked together before the opening of active operations, or even been trained to work on the same lines.

This was due, in the opinion of the Committee, to the defects of our system, or rather to the absence of system; in short, we were behind the times and our military organization was not in keeping with the requirements of modern war, even of a leisurely, isolated, half-guerilla war like that in South Africa. The Committee, therefore, recommended, amongst other reforms, the immediate formation of a General Staff, and also laid down some general principles on which they thought that the regulations for the General Staff

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should be framed; and they urged the need of haste. As a result, the War Office was completely reorganized, and the Army Council was formed with a Chief of the General Staff as first military member.

From this time onwards the General Staff began to develop, but so slowly that the majority of soldiers complained that they could detect no difference in the organization of the Staff except the introduction of a few high-sounding titles. As a matter of fact, circumstances were not in favour of rapid growth; the Army Council themselves had to settle down to their work, and the old premises of the War Office in Pall Mall were anything but conducive to co-operation or to a free exchange of views—it is sufficiently surprising that any one could have any views at all in such an atmosphere.

In November, 1905—a year and a half after the publication of the Esher Report—Mr. Arnold-Foster, who was then Secretary of State for War, addressed a minute to the Chief of the General Staff defining broadly the lines on which the formation of the General Staff should proceed. He said that the General Staff should not form a separate corps; he outlined the rules which should govern the appointment of officers to the General Staff, and the rewards which they should receive for good work done; he laid great stress on the necessity for the Chief of the General Staff having absolute control over all officers of the General Staff, and on the probability of its ultimately becoming necessary to extend the tenure of office of the Chief of the General Staff to an indefinite term of years in order to secure continuity of policy; and he urged the necessity of broadening the functions of the General Staff beyond the rather narrow limits originally assigned to it.

The next development came some two years later and took the form of the expansion of the General Staff into the Imperial General Staff. This step originated with the Imperial Conference which met in London early in 1907. The Conference resolved that there was need for a General Staff drawn from the forces of the Empire as a whole; defined broadly the duties of such a Staff, and decided that the Chief of the General Staff should be asked to submit proposals to give effect to the resolution. The Chief of the General Staff at that time was Sir William Nicholson, and the proposals which he submitted in his memorandum of the 7th of December, 1908, form the basis on which our present Imperial General Staff has been built up.

This memorandum, which is now of historic interest, is worthy of the closest examination. It was based on the general policy

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enunciated by Lord Haldane before the Imperial Conference in 1907, namely: the assumption of the maintenance of our supremacy at sea; the adoption by the Empire of a broad plan of military organization designed to take fully into account all local conditions and difficulties; and the suggested organization of the armed forces of the Empire into two parts, of which one should be available for the general service of the Empire as a whole, and the other restricted to local defence.

The memorandum then went on to state that the real problem was how best to guide military opinion in the right direction, and stated that this could only be done by an Imperial General Staff.

This subject was dealt with under four headings: (1) the general principles of Imperial Defence, and the relation of the parts to the whole; (2) the organization required for an Imperial General Staff; (3) the best means of selecting and training staff officers; and (4) the means at the time available for the formation of such a Staff, and how soon they could be utilized.

As regards the first heading, all we need now note is the contention laid down in the memorandum that, if the military forces drawn from the various parts of the Empire were to be able to combine usefully, they must be organized on the same lines, inspired by the same doctrine and accustomed to a uniform system of command and staff duties. This could only be realized if all the parts were organized by one brain, that is, by the collective brain of the General Staff. As regards the organization required, the memorandum stated that the duties of the General Staff were, shortly, the collection of intelligence, the preparation of armed forces and their successful conduct in war. For these purposes it was contended that the Staff must consist of a central guiding body, with closely affiliated branches for the study of local needs and for the application to them of the principles formulated by the central body. The head of the central body must be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London; but the guidance given by him must not be allowed to interfere with the complete control of a local Chief of the Staff by his own Government. Thus, so far as the self-governing Dominions were concerned, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff could only give advice, not orders. Great emphasis was laid on the importance of close and frequent personal communication between the central body and the branches in order to check the growth of divergent opinion which would be fatal to combination; and the exchange of personnel between the central body and the branches was recommended. Sir William Nicholson gave it as his view that in a great

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war the staff officers of the local forces should eventually be drawn from the local section of the Imperial General Staff, and those of the supreme commander from the central body, and he added that the officers so employed must command the confidence of military opinion. He maintained that this could only be secured if the officers in question possessed a thorough practical acquaintance with the military and political conditions of the Empire as a whole.

As regards the selection and training of officers, the memorandum stated that a common standard of military knowledge and uniformity of doctrine could only be secured by passing officers through a Staff College, that is, either through Camberley or Quetta, or through such other Staff Colleges as might be founded on the Camberley model. The ideal to be aimed at was that local forces should eventually become self-supporting both as regards the supply of staff officers for their local sections and also as regards the provision of a proportion of officers for the central section.

As to the means for providing General Staff officers for the Empire, the memorandum stated that in the United Kingdom and India there were at the time of writing plenty of experienced officers to draw from and ample means of training them (a rather optimistic statement), but that in the Dominions, except in Canada, there existed no machinery for training officers at all, let alone for any higher training. It was urged that the only way to get over this difficulty was for the Dominions to borrow officers from Home and India, and to take immediate steps to prepare selected officers of their own for training at one of the Staff Colleges. Sir William Nicholson realized that the inauguration of the Imperial General Staff must be undertaken without delay; the Dominions at the time when he wrote were contemplating the complete reorganization of their forces, so that the formation of suitable and efficient local sections was a matter of great urgency if uniformity of principles of organization and training were to be adopted.

Finally, the memorandum, after again emphasising the necessity for an identical system of organization throughout the Empire and for uniformity in the practice of staff duties and training, concluded with the following words :—

"The value of continuity in our methods of action is thus of prime importance, and though the personnel of the General Staff may change from year to year, the spirit in which it is conceived, and which animates all its members, must always remain the same, namely, loyalty to the Empire and to each other at all times and in all places."

And so it has.

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Such, very briefly, is the history of the birth and childhood of the Imperial General Staff, a child still absurdly young in years, but very old in experience. Fortunately, it was born just in time, and it is lucky that in the old Regular Army it had a very sturdy and very exacting parent.

Fortunate, also, was the fact that during the critical period of its growth there were such heads of the Camberley Staff College as Lord Rawlinson, Sir Henry Wilson and Sir William Robertson. It was the doctrine developed and nurtured at the Staff College between 1904 and 1914 which inspired and sustained the Staff throughout the supreme test; and, although the colouring of this doctrine varied with the character of each successive commandant it varied not at all in principle, but was always positive, fearless and unselfish.

The Staff developed rapidly on the lines laid down for it in Sir William Nicholson's memorandum, and by about 1912 it had established itself firmly on a really Imperial basis. The whole Staff developed simultaneously, although the development of its administrative branches suffered, even as the lines of development of the section known as the General Staff were narrowed, by the artificial barrier set up between them.

In looking back at the experiences of the war, the fact that stands out above all others is the soundness of our training before the war. To any one who recalls the limited opportunities for actual practice and practical training which existed before 1914, it comes almost as a revelation to note the smoothness of the effort by which the Staff passed from the theoretical exercises of peace time to the actual problems of a great war. It must be remembered that before the summer of 1909, when the first division at Aldershot was mobilized as an experiment, no one had ever seen a modern British division at war strength, far less handled one—and no one ever saw one again until the war came. Yet from that brief and single experiment data were produced and experience gained which formed the basis for the study of the movement and handling of large formations, and which have stood the test of war.

It was inevitable that a certain sense of unreality should have hung like a mist over all the staff training before the war. What after all was our higher training, but a paper training—a fabric of theory laboriously built up by the imagination of our teachers on a foundation of slender experience and much study? It is almost impossible for an outsider to realize the sense of relief and confidence which our staff officers experienced when they found that their

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theories and deductions were sound, that real armies and corps and divisions answered to their handling even as the paper ones had done, and that, in short, the British Staff knew its job. It was this initial sense of confidence in their teachers, in themselves, and in each other which upheld the officers of the British Staff through tasks of a magnitude and complexity undreamt of in their pre-war philosophy, and which enabled them to pass on in perfect faith their doctrines to others. Moreover, it was due to the fact that their imagination had been forced by the conditions of their training and by the kaleidoscopic variety of the Imperial problems which they had had to study, that they were able not only to tackle, and even to anticipate, each new development as it arose, but also to adopt and to improve the ideas of allies and enemies alike to an extent which surprised the inventors themselves.

Of course, the Staff made mistakes, both of direction and of management. But, when all is said and done, it kept its grip of the situation from start to finish and it kept its grip on the Army. Of the Army no regular soldier can write without danger of becoming sentimental; through fair weather and foul, in good times and bad (and the times were mostly bad), the men played up to their leaders; they were asked to do heroic things, without its being possible to tell them why, and they did them; their leave was stopped, their brief rest periods were cancelled, their officers and non-commissioned officers were killed or changed, yet they fought on under conditions often too terrible to be described. They were wounded and sent out again, while other people in plain clothes stayed at home; and, perhaps, most trying of all, officers and men were transferred suddenly to strange units without knowing anything of the recurring crises in the man-power situation which made reshuffling so often unavoidable; but they "carried on" all the same. Never was the work of a Staff made easier by the patience and courage and endurance of the troops than was the work of the British Staff during this war; and never, in justice be it said, did a Staff more devotedly serve its troops.

Any mistakes of direction must be left to be dealt with by the historian. The evidence to be weighed is so voluminous, and the factors which entered into every big military decision of the war so numerous and conflicting as to make criticism by an ordinary individual too dangerous, though many have already been rash enough to embark upon it.

It is, however, one of the objects of this paper to suggest some directions in which the Staff showed a weakness in the management of its

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own affairs. The first and perhaps the greatest mistake was the weakening of the central body at the beginning of the war. As soon as the schemes worked out in peace time for mobilization—the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force, the application of the "War Book," the Press and Cable Censorship, the arrest of known agents of the enemy, and so on—had been launched, every trained staff officer who could manage it went out to the war himself. Far too many were allowed to go. This mistake had two results which materially prejudiced the conduct of the war. First, the Staff at the War Office to which the whole Empire looked at that critical time for skilled direction was dangerously weakened not only by the sudden withdrawal of most of its best officers, but also by being filled up with others of inferior quality brought in from the by-ways and hedges to fill their place. Secondly, many of the highly-trained officers thus released, together with others who happened to be doing a tour of duty with their regiments, became casualties in the first few weeks and were lost for ever. It is easy to recall the names of many brilliant officers who, if they had only been held back, would have been worth their weight in gold in the days that were to come. This rush of staff officers to the front may have shown a proper spirit, but it was contrary to common sense, and it militated against the first principle of keeping strong the central directing body. The anxiety of staff officers for executive commands had to be severely held in check as the war progressed and our forces grew, for then the problem of finding commanders and Staffs for new formations became more and more difficult. It is a fact apparently little known outside the Staff itself that a great proportion of the regular officers appointed to the Staff were kept there against their will or anyhow against their inclination. But they had to be retained on the Staff because there were not, and never were, enough trained officers to go round. It is the natural ambition of every soldier who knows his work to command men in the field, and this desire was very strong among staff officers who had spent many strenuous years in learning their work, and who knew that they had learned it. In an ordinary war they would naturally have been given executive commands in their turn. In this war, however, it was impossible. Commanders can be born (though a born commander needs an exceptionally strong Staff), while there are no born staff officers; moreover, war produces efficient commanders much more quickly than it produces efficient staff officers.

It is possible for a comparatively amateur commander to carry things through by force of character and by natural gifts; but the responsible staff officer, be he never so gifted, must be laboriously

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trained as well. The trained staff officer generally made a first-rate commander in the field when he got the chance; but he did not often get it. This state of affairs did actually react to some extent on the efficiency of the Staff. Not only did the staff officer miss the experience of command, but he became liable to despise his own work, and himself for having to do it. In a Regular Army this would not have mattered so much; there the staff officer has his recognized place, and his value, or rather the value of his work, is known. But the citizen soldier, the whole of whose partially trained faculties are needed to compete with his immediate surroundings, is inclined to look on every one echelonned in his rear as more or less of a non-combatant according to the distance of the various head-quarters behind the line. However unjust and short-sighted this view might be, it was one which was bound to have its effect.

As the war went on, the question of supply and demand of officers for the Staff became more and more difficult. As the demand increased with the growth of the Army, the standard was forced down; and as the standard was forced down, the tighter became the hold which the Higher Command had to keep on the lower formations. It is interesting to trace this development, as it was one of the principal factors in the tendency towards greater centralization and specialization which was so marked a feature of the later stages of the war. When commanders and staff officers have all been carefully trained in the same school, the Higher Command can afford to give a much freer hand to the formations under it, because it knows how those below will interpret the orders received from above, and can calculate consequently with more or less certainty the action which these orders will produce. But as the standard of training of the lower Staffs deteriorates, however gifted the individuals composing them may be, the uncertainty of their action grows, and consequently the orders and instructions issued from above become more numerous and more detailed. At the same time, it becomes necessary to provide Staffs with various specialists and technical advisers in ever-increasing numbers. It is a vicious circle; as the numbers go up, the standard goes down, and, as the standard goes down, the numbers go up.

As soon as the supply of trained officers begins to give out (as it soon must in an Army like ours where the peace establishments bear but small relation to war requirements) individuals begin to find themselves in positions which they have not been trained to fill; they clamour for more help, and they have to have it; with the result

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that units are robbed of their best officers and the balance of the whole machine is upset.

The only remedy for this state of things is to train a far greater number of our regular and territorial officers in peace time as potential staff officers. It was a defect of our military system before 1914 that we did not do this—a mistake both from the point of view of expansion in war, and also from that of giving all officers a clearer understanding of the work which is done by the Staff. A series of short courses at a War College would give a reserve of at least partially trained staff officers, and would also help in the selection of candidates for the more advanced training at the Staff College.

It is only by mutual understanding between the Staff and the rest of the Army that confidence and true co-operation can be assured, and that the Staff can win and keep the prestige which it must enjoy if the organism controlled by it is to develop its full power. It is absurd to suggest that the policy of the Staff is to keep itself apart; also it is contrary to the terms of its original charter. It must always be a proselytising body seeking recruits from every branch of the Service; it must also be a missionary body, spreading its doctrines wherever it goes. There is no mystery about staff work, and the more the rest of the Army understands its aims and methods, the easier it becomes for the Staff. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of the many staff courses and higher schools of instruction which flourished throughout the war, and it is to be hoped that some such institution as the short war course suggested above will be established on a permanent basis.

As things are, although all staff officers have first been regimental officers, and have graduated in regimental work, few regimental officers have been on the Staff or had any opportunity of learning staff work. On the fulfilment of this latter want the efficiency of the Army of the future, both regular and territorial, very largely depends.

But though the Staff is but a part of the Army, it has an entity of its own, and it must be very sure of its discipline, of its allegiance, and of its functions. The first two are very easy to define—much easier to define than to act up to. Discipline can be summed up in three words—"Playing the Game"—which is the foundation of all discipline as we understand it in the British Army. The staff officer's allegiance is to the principles which he has been taught, to the troops, and to the superiors under whom he is responsible, that is, both to his commander and to the chief of the particular branch of the Staff on which he happens to be serving. The best

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test of the soundness of any Staff is the extent to which these three allegiances are synonymous or, at least, reconcilable. There is no need to tell any soldier that loyalty must override the convictions of the individual; but some clashing of allegiances must come to every staff officer at times in the course of his work, and the more original and strong-minded he is, the more often it comes. But if the Staff has been trained on broad and human lines, if its brain has been developed as a collective brain, if obstinacy is not confused with strength, and, above all, if the system of promotion to the higher appointments is sound and clean, the Army and the Staff will only emerge the stronger from these occasional searchings of heart.

It requires little imagination to see how great must be the influence of the Staff College teaching, not only on the Staff itself, but on the whole Army, of which the Staff is at the same time the product and the leaven. The Staff College performs continuously the functions of a great clearing house; there flow into it from the Army all over the Empire ideas, experiences and data which, after being studied, sorted and developed under the eye of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself, go out to the Army again in the form of doctrine. This doctrine is clear or confused, courageous or flabby, positive or negative, according to the character of those who are in charge of the machine at the time of its passage.

As to the functions of the Staff, they are too well known to require summarising here, even if there were space to do it. But to any one of an inquiring turn of mind, the duty-charts of the branches of the Staff at G.H.Q. in France during the war will be found an interesting supplement to the *Staff Manual* and *Field Service Regulations, Part* II.

There is no doubt that the Staff during the war allowed its prestige to be weakened by neglecting to limit its membership to those who were employed on genuine staff work. The inclusion of specialists and technical advisers is a case in point. In the complex organism of a national army there is unlimited scope for every kind of expert that the nation can produce. The Staff, however, is not the place for these experts. It is a primary duty of the Staff to ensure that all the resources at its disposal are used to the best advantage, and to see that no service or arm is starved or neglected for the inflation of another; further, it is its duty to allot and to distribute the available men and material so that the maximum of power is derived from each man and thing, and to see that the power when obtained is correctly applied.

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The judgment of the specialist is inevitably biassed by concentration of vision upon his own particular subject. He must, therefore, be the servant of the Staff, not a staff officer. It is for the Staff, seeing things in their proper perspective, to allot to the specialist his task, his limits, and the resources on which he is at liberty to draw; otherwise there is a loss of balance, and the Staff loses its grip.

A far greater error than its absorption of experts was the weakness displayed by the Staff in allowing its titles to be borne and its distinctions to be worn by a number of camouflaged dilettants from influential circles at home who felt bound to coquette with the war for appearance sake, but who shirked the honest service for which the absence of any previous military experience alone fitted them.

In the opinion of many thoughtful soldiers another weakness of the Staff, as tested by the war, lay, and still lies, in its division into distinct branches, each controlling its own appointments, and in the consequent lack of fluidity and of interchange between the different branches of the Staff and between the Staff and Command. The division of the Staff itself into three separate branches—General Staff, Adjutant-General's Staff and Quartermaster-General's Staff, or, if it is preferred so to state it, into the two main branches of General Staff and Administrative Staff—seems to these critics to be fundamentally unsound. It is, as a matter of fact, a purely artificial division. The term General Staff, which in all other armies covers the whole of the Staff proper, has been adopted in our Army to cover only a part of the Staff. Our so-called General Staff has thereby acquired a certain glamour at the expense of the rest of the Staff, whose work, though less in the limelight, is equally essential, equally exacting, and is true staff work. This division is accentuated by our plan of delegating to the senior General Staff officer of a formation, as such, the responsibility for the co-ordination of the staff work as a whole. The consequence is that the Staff has definitely established itself in two divisions on either side of an artificial barrier; the General Staff on the sunny side, because of the advantages which the glamour of its more attractive work, and the co-ordinating powers of its chiefs, give it; and the Administrative Staff on the other side in self-defence. This division is liable to lead to invidious distinctions and to duplication of work. It has certainly resulted in officers who have clung to the General Staff side arriving at the highest positions on the Staff and obtaining command in the field without any practical administrative experience, whilst officers whose lot has fallen on the Administrative side have reached responsible positions in their own

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branches without any experience of what is called General Staff work. This is not good either for the Army or for the Staff.

Would it not be better that this artificial barrier should be broken down, and that there should be established one single Imperial General Staff, the appointments to which, within which, and from which to command, would be filled from one list controlled by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff?

There is no doubt that the present system encourages specialization by staff officers, and this should not be allowed, for although undoubtedly each officer's individual ability will find its more useful expression in that class of work for which he has a natural bent, no officer should be permitted to climb to the highest positions up the narrow ladder of specialization. The only way to the highest positions in command or on the Staff must be by the path of all-round efficiency; Directorates and Departments are the proper places for specialists, not the Staff.

If this principle of a single Staff is to be carried to its logical conclusion, it must lead to the appointment of a Chief of the Staff in every formation. It is a recognized necessity that the work of every Staff must be co-ordinated by some individual, and this individual cannot, in practice, be the Commander. There must be some one in the position to hold staff conferences and to convey decisions as to policy. Under our present system the Commander is supposed to delegate these powers of co-ordination to his chief General Staff officer, that is, to the senior staff officer responsible for Operations. If the commander does really delegate this power in unmistakable terms, he appoints thereby his own chief of the Staff, and the difficulty to some extent is met. But he does not always do so; and it seems preferable in any case that this round-about procedure should be given up, and the appointment of chief staff officer be made by higher authority.

Such an appointment does not necessarily involve any alteration in the present division of the work of the Staff into three main branches—Operations, Adjutant-General's work and Quarter-master-General's work. The chief of the Staff could still be the head of the Operations branch—indeed, he should be, as Operations govern everything else in war; while the other branches would continue to carry on their work as at present under the officers of the Imperial General Staff appointed under the chief staff officer as heads of those branches. There would be no more question than there is now of the chief of the Staff hampering himself with detail, or accepting responsibilities which he ought not to carry. His work



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of co-ordination should, indeed, be made much easier by the fact that the whole Staff would really belong to one family, and that his own position would be more assured; the petty jealousies and friction between branches would disappear.

This question of a single Staff is one on which every staff officer of experience will have formed his own opinion. There is much involved in it.

However, whatever faults the Staff may have had, no one can deny that it has proved itself a most virile product of a wonderfully virile old Regular Army. In spite of the lavish expenditure of professional personnel in the early days of the war, the powerful leaven of the old Army did its work without a break, so that the millions of the new Armies became replicas of itself, of the same pattern, of the same spirit, and even of the same quaint tricks of speech. The Staff never swerved from its principles, working, nursing and teaching; though its business grew in volume and complexity to an extent unimagined before the war. Despite the parrot-cry so often raised in the press and parliament for "business" men and "business" methods, the Army and the Staff generally proved in the end that they knew their own business best; it was shown once again that commercial methods are not always the best business methods in war, and that the easy morality of competitive commerce is sometimes not quite strict enough for the service of the State.

It is to the credit of those responsible for the British Army in peace time that they fashioned it so true to the national type that it was able to expand in war to such vast dimensions. There was only growth, not change. Military administration has always been held by the British public to be typical of "red tape" methods; but this war has shown the War Office and the Admiralty, so far as the soldiers and sailors in those offices are concerned, to be far the most human of our government departments. The Army and the Navy are the most human institutions we possess; in them the thread of personal contact and sympathy runs right through from the highest to the lowest; they have been built up by taking the raw iron of the national character and tempering it into steel, and this could only be done by those who were careful and sympathetic students of their fellow men. We have seen what a strain an Army can stand which is commanded and staffed by officers who are human beings as well as soldiers; and we have seen a great Army break which was controlled by men who in perfecting themselves to be soldiers had forgotten how to be human. Let us be careful to stick to our traditional methods, and to ensure that no officer, however great his ability,

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finds a place on the British Staff who lacks the essential qualities of sympathy and breadth of view.

Finally, there is the question whether staff work has become more difficult as to the result of the war. There is every reason to hope that, for us, it has become easier. It is true that it is now infinitely more comprehensive and complicated than it was of old. But we are no longer groping in the dark. The Staff has found itself. Not only has it now concrete experience of its own of every conceivable kind on which to base its work, but it has learned to trust its own instincts and deductions. It has stored up enough examples of the typical behaviour of enemies, of allies, of neutrals, of its own government and of the British public to last it for many years to come. And its personnel and potential personnel has been tested and proved under the most pitiless conditions. As has already been stated, there is little hope of a more sympathetic general atmosphere for its studies; but the professional atmosphere has been cleared out of all recognition. Let us take advantage of it against the time when we shall be wanted again.

There is a third atmosphere in which some of the most important work of the Staff is done, and to which the war has added a new independent element. This may be called the inter-professional atmosphere, and in it all the combined naval, military and air force problems have to be worked out. It was a murky atmosphere before the war, and up to the present time there are few signs of it clearing. The question of the creation of some sort of machinery for the co-ordination of all kinds of defence problems has indeed been raised in parliament, and will doubtless be raised again by the few genuine military members who understand its vital importance.

It is a question rather beyond the scope of this rambling article, and we will not discuss it; but we may at least register a devout hope that some good may come of it.

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# THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

By Lieut.-Colonel the Honble. Sidney Peel, D.S.O., M.P.

Any one who has commanded a unit in the field knows that it is during the period immediately following a spell of active work that some of his most worrying anxieties occur. To refit, to make good losses, to reorganize, to secure the lessons of experience, and to resist the insidious slackening of moral which follows any great output of energy, all these are tasks which demand great qualities in a commander, qualities not less essential to material success than the more obvious ones which shine upon the battlefield itself. The whole British Army is now passing through this difficult period, but, while the problems are great in the case of the Regular Army, which is the nucleus of our whole system, they are infinitely greater in the case of the Territorial Force, which does not possess the solid framework and the long traditions of the Regular Army, and whose composition and scope is even more affected by political conditions, both at home and abroad. The Regular Army is still a profession, and offers many attractions to the adventurous, if only because it has to play the part of policeman in many parts of the world. The territorial soldier must snatch his training out of his leisure hours; and though it is true that what is a monotonous repetition to the regular, is a pleasant novelty to him, he must be well equipped with patriotic zeal and sense of duty, if he is to persevere, and make his soldiering a reality and not a sham. It is impossible for those who worked hard in building up the Territorial Force during the years before the war not to feel some satisfaction in the thought that the military and civil authorities in their combined wisdom have had to fall back on the territorials once more. It is true that the principal reason given is that territorials are cheap soldiers, but as even a very cheap soldier is very dear, if he is a bad soldier, the Territorial Force can be content to think that facts have vindicated their existence.

The new war establishment of the Force is to be approximately 13,100 officers and 368,000 other ranks. The peace establishment will include all the officers and about 60 per cent. of the other ranks, *i.e.* 220,500 men. It will have a permanent staff of about 612 officers



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and 2425 other ranks. Of this peace establishment of 233,000, about 120,000 are to be infantry, 4000 cavalry, 44,000 artillery, 15,000 engineers, 8600 signal service, besides the usual auxiliary services.

The conditions of service are very much the same as in the Force before the war. The territorial soldier is for home defence, and cannot be sent out of the country without a special Act of Parliament in a national emergency, nor can he be called out for quelling civil disturbances.

Although up to the present time recruiting for the Territorial Force has not been good, there can be little doubt that the required numbers will be reached in time. There are several reasons for the present slackness. The whole country has had a good dose of soldiering and military discipline, but the present reaction will pass off. Many men are suffering from a species of war-exhaustion, which amounts to a disease, but they will recover and take up their duty again. It is useless to try and force matters, but there is no need for discouragement. Some of the discharged soldier societies, from motives not very easy to understand, except on the same theory of war-disease, are doing their best to prevent recruiting. The League of Nations idea has been quite wrongly used as an argument against any form of military service. As for the younger men, who were not old enough to serve in the war, they are hanging back partly from a lack of example from their elders, and partly, it is said, from the growth of many athletic clubs, which take up a great deal of time and leisure. But in their case, too, it will not be permanently out of fashion to fit themselves for military service, should the necessities of the case demand it.

Let us assume, then, first of all, that, for a long time to come, however peaceable the world may become, it will still be agreed to be a measure of prudence to maintain an army for home defence, and secondly, that this army is to be recruited on a voluntary principle on the lines now laid down. What are to be the relations of this Territorial Army to the Regular Army, and what part is it to play, should a similar necessity to that of 1914 unfortunately arise?

It is, of course, quite inevitable that there should be difficulties caused by the existence side by side of a professional and a non-professional army. There is no reason why these difficulties should not be overcome with good will and consideration on both sides, but they have not always been overcome in the past, and it is as well to call attention to them.

The regular soldier must naturally feel some contempt for the professional attainments of those who have only been practising in

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their spare time what he has been doing for a lifetime. If he had not some such feeling, he could not have much respect for his own profession, or much faith in the training he has received. Nor is he wrong in placing a high estimate on the methods of the Regular Army. But he is making a mistake if he goes on to argue that that training and those methods are the only ones which can produce good soldiers, or, at any rate, soldiers who are of good value on the battlefield. It is indeed a wonderful training, and has produced wonderful results. The material it has had to work on has by no means been the best the country had to give, whether in physique or brains, but no one with the slightest knowledge or experience can withhold the most ungrudging admiration for their achievements. The maxim, deeply fixed in the breast of every regular soldier, that a regular soldier can do anything, may not always be borne out by experience, though far oftener than might have been expected, but it has carried him successfully through a great many difficult situations, both in war and peace. It is not at all unnatural, though it is a pity, that he is often unable to distinguish between this maxim and a second one, which has no logical connection with it, namely, that a non-regular soldier can do nothing.

This attitude of mind, often unknown to, or unformulated by, its possessor, sometimes produces very laughable results. At a divisional conference of commanding officers in France, summoned to discuss the selection and training of officers with a view to commanding battalions, the only territorial officer present, seized with the untimely impulse to be funny which such conferences engender, remarked that there could not be any such officers in his regiment, as they were all territorials. No jest ever fell flatter, for no one in the room regarded the statement as other than a perfectly natural statement of fact. The unfortunate officer had to wallow in explanations that he had meant it for a joke, even a very obvious joke, and even then failed to do more than convince most people present that no one but a territorial would be so silly as to try and make a joke at a divisional conference, especially a joke which was not at all funny.

But the results are not always laughable. If this attitude of mind prevails in high places, it can do a great deal to discourage the auxiliary forces. At the beginning of the war, Lord Kitchener was supposed to hold the view that the Territorial Force was, and could be, of no use, except for guarding railway bridges, culverts, and so on. Whatever view he did hold, there is no doubt that recruiting for the territorial divisions was held up during the first weeks of the war in order to help the new Armies. There may have been good

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reason for this, but it looked as though the authorities supposed that the new Armies would be of more service than the older and better trained divisions, for no other reason than that they were labelled regular. If any such theory existed, facts proved too strong for it. Before the end of 1914, several territorial units were in the fighting-line, and the first half of 1915 saw many complete divisions on active service in the field, before any of the new Armies were ready. It is not too much to say that these divisions played a most important part in filling the gap between the exhaustion of the old Army and the coming of the new. It may well be that if the existing territorial machinery had been used for the foundation of the new Armies, those Armies might have been ready much sooner than they were. Without discussing such possibilities, it is certain that many keen soldiers, who had devoted their spare time to learning all that was possible about the elements of the art of war, were given no encouragement, and even felt, rightly or wrongly, that they were marked out to be deprived of the opportunity of showing their capacity, simply because they had not the regular label.

If we are going to rely on volunteer auxiliary forces, they must not be told by any military authorities whatsoever that they are, and can be, of no military value. Even if it were true, it should not be said or implied. But it is not true, and no sensible and experienced soldier believes it. The fact is that fighting power, which after all is the essence of a soldier, is not at all an uncommon characteristic in the ordinary man. Soldiering in its elementary stages is not a very recondite or difficult profession. A stout heart and a little common-sense will make a man a fairly competent leader in war, up to the command of a battalion, and with luck, up to the command of a brigade. In several branches there is a good deal to learn, but it is not necessary to have much brains to acquire all the needful knowledge. If this is true of the leaders, it is still more true of the rank and file. Given discipline, a point to which we shall return in a moment, no great amount of training is necessary for the ordinary soldier to make him able to perform his usual tasks. Even in the teaching part of the military profession, and that is a very large part, given certain qualities of sympathy and imagination, which are not peculiar to any class of men, a very moderate amount of study will make a man a sufficiently competent instructor in the lower ranks.

But while a great many ordinary men may be successful in the elementary parts of soldiering, it is a very different story when you come to the higher commands and staff work. Certainly there are few professions in the world in which real competence is so difficult

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to attain. To be a really great commander is to be a very great man indeed. The highest problems of strategy seem only to be capable of solution by genius, and genius which has been forged and tempered in the schools of study and experience. The decisions which a statesman has to take are not different in kind and responsibility from those which confront a commander-in-chief. But the statesman has often to wait for years to see the consequences of his action, or he may never see them. The general is aware that the event will judge him, perhaps in a few hours, certainly within a short period, and that probably in a dramatic form, which no one can misunderstand or dispute. He has need for great moral qualities as well as intellectual, and he must also have a very strong physique. How many men who have been excellent regimental officers make very indifferent generals: the reason is simply that the training and experience of regimental life are very little help towards the necessities of higher command.

The out-and-out regular may very likely reply to all this, that, so far as theory and knowledge go, it may be true that the soldier amateur may reach some success, but that, when it comes to judging the fighting qualities of troops, the state of their discipline, and their discipline alone, is what counts; that it is impossible for the territorials to attain, in the time at their disposal, anything like the state of discipline of regular troops, and that therefore they are useless, until they can be given time to acquire it. The point of discipline is probably the root core of all the objections to the Territorial Force. No one can question the extreme importance of discipline; it is, of course, the absolute life-blood of an army, but for all that, the argument rests upon a fundamental misapprehension that there is only one way of attaining the necessary discipline, namely, that practised by the Regular Army, the method of constant repetition, and rigid enforcement of penalties for broken rules.

It is not less fallacious than the old argument about saluting, which ran somewhat as follows: the best fighting battalions are those which salute best. Look at such and such. Therefore good saluting battalions are good fighting battalions. Therefore good saluting makes good fighters. Therefore, if you teach your men to salute well, you have taught them what is really necessary to make good soldiers. The argument sounds absurd laid down in black and white, for a battalion that could average 12–15 aimed shots a minute, as a really good shooting battalion ought to do, would knock out the best saluters in the world, if they did not understand the use of the rifle. But it was not too absurd to be implied in the terms of a great

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many General Orders during the war, terms which are somewhat exasperating to any but the most unintelligent of soldiers. The country as a whole is suffering from the reaction against discipline enforced in this blind way in the minds of many returned soldiers. They have so often been made to obey an order simply because it is an order, that they have become sick and tired of obeying any orders at all, and hence comes much so-called Bolshevism in certain groups of discharged soldiers.

At any rate, it is no use trying to inculcate discipline in the territorial soldier by such means. Unless you begin by stating the reasons and the necessity for discipline, and persuade all ranks to practise it for their own sakes, you will either have no Territorial Force at all, or else one that is scarcely worth having. Once you have put your discipline on a sound voluntary basis, you can get astonishing results out of troops in a very short time. There is no reason why a commander should not insist on the most absolute and immediate obedience to orders, if that obedience is based on reason and a good cause. But if the attempt is made to force unexplained and unreasoning discipline on intelligent troops, good material will be spoiled, and the attempt will absolutely defeat itself. Most men submit very easily to discipline, if it is put to them in the right way. Perhaps a much greater difficulty is to avoid carrying discipline into the regions of opinion. It is so much simpler, and it saves so much trouble, to believe what you are told by a superior officer without examination, than to think for yourself, that the distinction between doing what you are told, and thinking what you are told, is apt to be forgotten. Once that distinction is lost, all personal initiative is very apt to be lost, and troops which are first class when well commanded, will pass to the condition of a mob, if the commander is removed. The commander of any territorial unit should endeavour to impress upon his officers and men that, whilst every order from a superior must be obeyed instantly and without question, and with complete loyalty, this complete obedience is not to extend to their thinking and critical powers. This is all the more necessary because war is far from being an exact science, and less in war than in any other sphere does history repeat itself, at least with such a precise picture as to be of any help to an officer who is trying to cope with the details of a particular situation. The most necessary thing in most situations is a rapid application of common-sense, and discipline must not be carried so far as to dull the thinking powers of the individual.

The conditions of campaigning often produce conditions in

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which individual leaders and individual men are forced to use their own initiative or perish. This is a discovery which sometimes leads to results very damaging to discipline, if that discipline is based on unthinking repetition instead of a reasoned habit. It is a common remark that war is destructive of discipline, and many a sergeant-major has regretfully sighed for a return to really proper manœuvres, and a life in which it was really possible to turn out good soldiers. Military authorities must beware of the danger of trying to apply the system of their beloved long-service to the quickly learning but intermittent civilian soldier.

On the other hand, the civilian soldier must be careful not to underrate the value of the peace training of the professional soldier. There is a great deal besides tactical and strategical knowledge and skill in the actual use of weapons, whether those weapons be horse, sword, rifle, bayonet, machine gun or artillery, which goes to the building up of an efficient army. Any territorial, or indeed any newly-raised, regiment or battalion, which has lived alongside some good regular regiments, remembers with gratitude the thousand and one points of interior economy, and many other details, on which it has received instruction, by example and precept, of the greatest possible use in making the wheels go round. There is still, and always will be, the greatest difference between the professional and the amateur in such matters. The subject of transport alone is quite sufficient illustration of the point. The man who has practised for years the comparatively simple task of handling bodies of men acquires a facility and an automatic habit which leaves his mind free to deal with all the other difficulties that arise. In the Territorial Force of the immediate future there will be numbers of men with much experience of war, and they will be tempted to think that they know all there is to be known about soldiering and the training required. They must remember that it is one thing to have the experience, and quite another to be able to digest it properly, and apply the resulting conclusions skilfully and fruitfully in training.

It is to be presumed that the training manuals of the different branches of the service are being, or will be, largely rewritten or revised in accordance with the experience gained in the war. It is essential that every territorial officer should be well acquainted with all the textbooks of his branch. There is no reason why he should not be thoroughly posted in all the theory, and, of course, the further he goes in the study of the profession of arms beyond the dry bones contained in the official books, the more efficient he will be. But that is not the whole story for the civilian army. The regular soldier

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has the whole of the military year in which to lay out his programme of instruction. The territorial can only count on a limited number of days in which to practise the execution of the theory. He has to pick and choose among the essentials. Take the cavalryman for example. Equitation, drill, mounted and dismounted, the use of the rifle, of the sword or lance, care of the horse, patrolling, information, the mounted combat, attack and defence on foot, all these do not comprise the whole of what the efficient cavalry soldier should know. It is clear that no single unit can be thoroughly grounded in all these things in the time allotted for training during the year. In times past it was left very much to the option and judgment of the individual commander as to what subjects of training he would lay particular stress on. When a new general or inspecting officer was appointed, the first duty of his commanding officers was to discover his particular ideas, or possibly his particular fads. Sometimes it was a particular kind of drill, or shooting, or map-reading, or shoeing, or march-discipline, or buttons. It was often very difficult for the regimental officer to detect any settled line of policy in the orders he received over a term of years. Perhaps the difficulty of securing any general agreement was too great to permit of any official programme for short-time training to be drawn up. But it would be very helpful if such official programmes could be issued, or at least some kind of treatise giving alternative programmes. It would be a mistake to aim at too great uniformity. Too rigid a scheme would not suit the elastic conditions of the voluntary system. It is absolutely necessary to allow a great deal of initiative to individual commanders, who know best how to develop the peculiar and varying qualities of their men. Even in the same battalion, one company may be composed of quick-witted townsmen, another of countrymen, and each may demand quite different treatment to obtain the best results. But it should be possible for experts on training, and, after the last six years, we must surely have many such, to draw up some general rules, or at least to issue some instructions to guide those officers who are taking up territorial commands. For this is not purely a military question. Many officers think, and probably rightly, that sheer barrack-square drill and steady hammering in of the elements, is the best possible foundation. But with all troops, and especially with volunteers, who can always leave if they like, you must always be on your guard against boredom. The story of the Guards' battalion that came shattered out of a successful action, picked up a draft of recruits, and did an hour's steady drill without further delay, is a very fine and touching one. But it would not do for the commander of a territorial

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regiment to apply the lesson indiscriminately in all times and in all places. If he did, and saved himself all the trouble of thinking and invention by doing nothing but steady drill, he would find his battalion melting away training by training, and the stream of recruits would dry up. A certain amount of drudgery is a necessity in every profession, and a certain amount of steady drill is an unavoidable foundation But you must mix your powder with jam. Even drill can be made amusing now and then. Theoretically you ought not to practise any field work with troops till they are thoroughly well drilled. If, however, you apply that theory too rigidly, you will make a dull thing of soldiering, and that will be fatal to the keenness and *esprit de corps* of both officers and men.

In these days with the general rise in the standard of living, and the spread of education, the regular private soldier is a very different man from what he was. But it must not be forgotten that the territorial soldier is still very different from him in many ways. As a rule, he is not a man who would think of adopting the career of a soldier as a profession. He is generally the flower of the county, older and more developed in character and training. He enlists for reasons of a different kind to the desire to make a livelihood. He is, as often as not, a man who with training will make a good officer. It is absolutely necessary to keep his interest alive, and to make him grasp the possibilities of the higher parts of soldiering.

There is a further consideration which goes to the heart of the whole difference which there must be in the training of the regular and of the auxiliary soldier. The Regular Army ought to be always ready for action ; at least, its training is directed to the end of being able to produce an efficient striking force at any moment. The Territorial Force is not calculated for this purpose. Its object in training is to produce such a condition that a very short intensive training will be required to turn out a fighting force of fair quality, perhaps of very good quality. Take, for example, a battalion of infantry, not much practised in combined exercises, but well taught as individuals, good shots, and with some training in the use of the bayonet, keen, and with a strong *esprit de corps*. It would not take much more than a fortnight, hardly as long as would be required to make men fresh from a sedentary life fit for long marching, to make such a battalion into a most valuable addition to any brigade in the world. Organized bodies of men who can shoot with fair accuracy and rapidity are already a formidable addition to the defence ; if they can march as well as shoot, they have passed the purely defensive attitude, and can attack. And even if they cannot march, in these days of

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mechanical transport they may still be capable of causing a very disagreeable surprise to the enemy in a very unexpected direction.

It naturally takes a shorter time to reach a fairly useful pitch of training for infantry than for the other branches of the service. But infantry is the major part and the backbone of the Territorial Army as well as of any other. What is true of the infantry is also true with qualifications in the case of the cavalry, gunners, engineers and the technical services which go to make up an army. In some branches indeed, as, for instance, signalling and communication, with or without wire, there is no reason why the territorial units, considering the material on which they have to draw, should not be well equipped with skill and knowledge, both in theory and practice, equal to, or surpassing, any regular units. The opinion may be hazarded that it takes longer to train a really efficient cavalry soldier than any other kind, owing to the great variety of things that he ought to know, and the comparatively short amount of time in the day in which he has to learn them. The question of having territorial cavalry is, however, of comparatively little importance. This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the future of cavalry, but under the present scheme the territorial cavalry will not be at all numerous, rightly, in the writer's opinion, for it is difficult to imagine conditions, under which large bodies of cavalry would be useful or possible, compatible with those under which the Territorial Force would be likely to be employed in the early part of any war. The artillery is a much more important consideration, and will naturally form a much larger proportion of all arms than before. There would be a greater difference between the civilian and the regular gunner at the outbreak of war than between the regular and civilian infantryman. But in essence it is the same point. The object of a gunner is to shoot with his rifled barrel at the right time and in the right place, just as it is of the infantryman. If he can shoot, and there is no reason why the territorial gunner should not be taught to shoot with his weapon as well as the rifleman with his, he has gone a long way to be a good and useful soldier, and he will not need a very long period of intensive training to take his place in the field.

On the whole, it seems fair to conclude that the Territorial Force will be able to furnish the arms and legs of an army in a reasonably serviceable condition. The supply of the head and brains is a more difficult and very important question. How are the higher commands and the staff posts to be recruited and maintained? As we never know when the Territorial Force might be called up for active service, all this organization must be ready beforehand. The staff

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work of an army ought to be good from the very beginning. It is then that most of the difficulties occur. It is of extreme importance that, however rudimentary the main bulk of an army may be, its staff work should be in working order from the start. Staff work is a totally different business to ordinary leadership. Technical knowledge and prolonged study is required. No blowing of hunting horns or kicking of footballs, however valuable and necessary these accomplishments may be in their proper place, will be of any assistance in drawing up the orders for an attack or the march of columns, or in arranging for the proper supply of all the articles necessary for the daily routine of a division. A gallant officer might toot till he was black in the face, but all his efforts would fail to do anything to solve the confusion produced by a couple of brigades trying to billet themselves in an area only large enough to hold one, on a dark and rainy night. Clear and precise orders, so necessary for the conduct of all military operations, are not the result of inspiration, but of much detailed and careful forethought. Midnight oil and the wet towel should be the symbols of the staff officer. In other words, the professional is required. That is not to say that there are not numbers of territorial officers who would make good staff officers. But in peace time they have not the time to give to it. At the present moment there is no doubt a certain number of officers who have the leisure and the experience required to make them capable brigade or divisional commanders. But they have been trained professionally in the five years' school of war. The further we get from the war period, the fewer such officers will be available, and after a few years we shall have to rely entirely on the Regular Army to supply all the staff personnel.

It is not necessary in peace time that the staff of the Territorial Force should be fully manned. That would be wasteful and impossible, for many capable officers would be kept without sufficient occupation to keep them in good working order. Not more than skeleton staffs need actually be kept in existence. But all the plans for mobilization and equipment should be carefully worked out for each unit to the last detail. The Regular Army should possess such a supply of properly trained staff officers, that it would be able on the outbreak of war to send immediately enough to man the staffs of the Territorial Force without inconvenience to itself. If the commanders of brigades and divisions are well acquainted with the units of their command at the outbreak of war, it will not take the machine very long to fall into smooth working order.

For the efficiency of the staffs it will be necessary to rely entirely

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on the General Staff training which they receive in the course of their profession in the Regular Army. It will practically never be possible to have any army manœuvres in which territorial corps or divisions can take part as a whole. The conditions of service, and the state of their training, quite apart from questions of economy, will not permit of it. All that can properly be expected is that the different parts of the staff machine should be good material in themselves, and handy to put quickly together.

It is not really possible to arrive at any clear idea of what the organization of the Territorial Force should be, unless we first form a conception of what its functions and duties would be in time of war. The old idea was that the Territorial Force should be used solely for the defence of these islands within our own territorial limits: in fact that its function was to deal with a raiding enemy who had managed to evade the vigilance of the Fleet and effect a landing on our shores. This notion was never a very sound one, and the experience of the late war may be taken to have finally exploded it. It is now recognized that the proper place on which to defend our shores is not within them, but outside. The development of submarines and other defensive appliances makes it more than ever difficult for an enemy to effect a landing in sufficient force to be effective, and it is hardly conceivable that any amount of land forces would be able to render any effective service against attacks from the air. We must, therefore, conclude that the duty of the territorials will be to take their place alongside the Regular Army in whatever field of operations it may be. In the early stages they might conceivably be used as they were in 1914 to relieve our regular garrisons in the Mediterranean or India. But their main duty will undoubtedly be to supplement the Regular Army in the field, and it is highly probable that, in the event of any unfortunate international conflagration, such as alone would demand a great output of military force by this country, that field would be Flanders or the adjacent countries, as it was in the late war, in the Napoleonic wars, in those of Louis XIV., and those of the sixteenth century, to go no further back in history. But wherever the line of defence may be, and we may feel certain that it will be a line of defence and not of offence, there will be no occasion for the employment of the Territorial Force as a separate army. It will be employed by units, not greater than divisions, alongside the Regular Army, just as it was in the late war. Another course is possible, namely, that it should be used to supply drafts like the Special Reserve. Any such plan, at least in the early stages of a war, is greatly to be deprecated. It throws away the priceless asset of

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regimental sentiment, tradition and *esprit de corps*. Even at the beginning of the war in 1914, when many territorial regiments had no long and glorious history behind them to stimulate and encourage them, as was the case with regular regiments, the attachment of officers and men to their own unit was very strong indeed. Pride in their district and in their county took the place of long traditions. This feeling sometimes went very far indeed. In yeomanry regiments, for instance, no end of trouble was caused by the fact of the war establishment being a three squadron establishment, and the peace one a four squadron. The men of the squadron which had to be broken up and distributed among the other three, resented the change most bitterly, and sometimes kept their feelings of loyalty and affection for their old squadron right to the end of the war. From a military point of view, this sentiment is of the greatest possible value, and should be used to the fullest extent. Now that many territorial regiments and divisions have a long and illustrious record behind them, to enforce and increase the strong ties of local feelings, it would be more than ever wasteful to ignore regimental sentiment and send men to other formations, where they would feel homesick and resentful, and lose a great deal of their military value at a most critical period. Regimental pride and *esprit de corps* have been so long part of the recognized foundations of the British Army, that it may be thought unnecessary to insist upon this point. It is all the same very liable to be forgotten by those who sit in the centre of things at Whitehall or elsewhere. They have larger issues to deal with, and cannot be bothered with those tiresome local feelings. Such minute classifications introduce great complications when you are dealing with large bodies of men : to them any officer is an officer, and a man a man, the same as any other. The most convenient plan is to use men indifferently. If you are to take into account local feelings and individual peculiarities, organization will be a sort of jig-saw puzzle instead of a straightforward matter of parcelling out material, like the supply of bricks for a building, all of one pattern. There is, of course, great truth in this, in the later stages of a war, when you are dealing with millions of men ; but it is not necessary in the beginning. Military efficiency is made up of a thousand details, and the private feelings of the soldier is one of the most important.

Since, therefore, the Territorial Force will only be used to supply units up to divisions to the Regular Army, there can be no need for any elaborate or expensive staffs on the peace establishment. Most of what would be called the " Q " side of administration has been

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performed in the past by the county associations. Some of them, of course, are not so efficient as others, but on the whole, the work has been very fairly, and certainly very cheaply, done. In any case, it is a good thing that the local county authorities should have their interest in this very constitutional force kept alive, and that they should apply their energies to keeping up its recruiting. Their administration, however, should not extend, with the exception possibly of recruiting duties, a day beyond the outbreak of war. Some really terrible results were produced in 1914, as soon as recruiting for the Territorial Force was reopened, by the competition of the different county authorities in endeavouring to obtain clothing and all kinds of equipment for their men. It may be hoped that, if ever we have such an emergency in the future, arrangements will be made by which the War Office will be in a position to take over the whole work of supply and equipment. There was special confusion where, as not infrequently happens, more than one county association was responsible for the same regiment, and a great deal of time and trouble was wasted in adjusting these local differences. All this could be avoided by the coming into being of a central administration without delay.

It is remarkable that this step, the sense of which seems so extremely obvious, was not taken until many months after the outbreak of war. It is difficult to think of any other explanation, except that the military authorities did not really regard the territorial troops as a serious addition to the forces of the Crown. But even if they were not, they still had to wear the same kind of khaki cloth, and needed the same kind of leather, etc., as the men of the new Armies, and it was obviously wasteful, when all were buying with the same object, not to concentrate the buying in one hand, and to distribute the supplies thus acquired, according to the needs of different units.

This is only one of the arguments which lead to the conclusion that, when once war has broken out, no distinctions ought to be maintained between one kind of soldier and another. There used to be, and possibly still is, a different set of establishments for territorial and regular units. Such complications are quite unnecessary from any point of view. There are other distinctions of the same sort which ought certainly to be abolished. The status of officers is a matter of more delicacy.

Before the war the King's Regulations laid it down that a territorial officer ranked as junior to all the regular officers of his rank, no matter what his seniority might be. This regulation was of no importance in peace time. The occasions on which it came into



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active being were few and not of long duration. In many cases where it was applied, the result no doubt amounted to a recognition of professional merit as against pure seniority. The vast majority of territorial officers had no feelings on the subject, and no grievance. They were not out for the assertion of their position as against the regular officer. Probably few officers of either branch were aware of the existence of the rule. It made very little difference to the regular officer, whether for a few days in the year at some manœuvres he was, or was not, regarded as senior to this or that territorial. It is not the habit of most Englishmen to attach importance to a regulation of little practical value, whatever the principle involved. But in reality it was a half-hearted and illogical compromise. It could only be based on the assumption that a territorial officer was an officer of such inferior merit to his regular brother, that the ordinary Army rule of seniority had to be superseded. But it did not carry this assumption to its logical conclusion, namely, that a territorial officer ought not to have any seniority at all compared to any regular officer. Why should a regular captain of ten or twelve years' service be reckoned junior to a recently promoted territorial major of six or seven years' service? The unfairness of this becomes even more apparent, if the difference between the amount of soldiering in the regular and territorial year is taken into account. But, on the other hand, many territorial officers are old regular soldiers, and many others, though not regulars, had some war service to their credit. It was hard to say that they had forfeited all claim to professional merit because they had become territorials. Even if this difficulty was put on one side, to push the argument to its logical conclusion, and to insist on the absolute value of the regular and territorial labels, was to knock down the label theory in another place. A major is a major, and a captain a captain. It is easy to grasp the answer to the question, When is a soldier not a soldier? When he is a territorial, is a reply simple enough to be understood and digested by the meanest intelligence. But if that involves you in the further proposition that sometimes a major, though he is called one, is dressed like one and generally looks like one, is not really a major, you get into a whirl of thought which is quite intolerable. There must have been great searchings of heart among the military authorities who had to frame the regulation, and they may be congratulated on having arrived at a very reasonable compromise for the period before the war.

But, as a matter of fact, their ingenuity was not only illogical, it was also misplaced. In peace time, it is merely a matter of ceremonial

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precedence, or of precedence of command at manœuvres or a field-day. The ceremonial precedence is a matter of no importance to anybody. In the field at manœuvres no possible harm can be done by allowing a less trained territorial to take up any command over the head of a regular. If he is fit to do so, well and good. If he is not, the fact will be soon apparent, and may as well be made clear. In any case, the territorial will learn far more by being allowed to make mistakes, than by carrying out the correct orders of a qualified superior. There is no more royal road to the acquisition of true knowledge. But the strongest argument against maintaining such a regulation in peace time is that experience shows that it will not work in war.

It may seem hard on the regular officer who has given his life to his profession that, at the very moment when his chance has come, and when the crisis for which he has been working up has arrived, he should be superseded by some amateur, who has devoted nearly the whole of his energies and education to brewing or banking or any other profession. But in war all minor considerations vanish. All must be treated alike. A captain, who is fit to be a captain at all, must be governed by the same rules as all other captains, whether those rules are based on seniority or upon something else. It would be ridiculous that a subaltern, with a year's hard fighting behind him, should be reckoned inferior to a callow youth freshly joined, simply because one was labelled a territorial and the other a regular. There is no magic in a label. In the late war, it was a long time before this fact was publicly recognized in orders. There ought to be no reason for such orders to be issued, for the point ought to be perfectly clear from the beginning.

There is no sound reason why it should be regarded as a grievance by the regular soldier. If his previous training has really been a good one, and he has taken advantage of it, he need not fear that his chances of distinction will be snatched from him by some undeserving amateur. There will probably be all too many opportunities for him to prove his metal. And, after all, a great war is a national emergency, and not a heaven-sent opportunity for regular soldiers to gain credit and promotion. The professional soldier may well be content with the opportunities afforded by minor wars and punitive expeditions. In a great war where all must join in defence of their country and share alike the chances of the battlefield, there must be only one object, and all minor and personal considerations must be put on one side. The rule of seniority, wherever applied, may cause difficulties: and these can only be solved by

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mutual good sense on the part of all concerned. If a brigadier becomes a casualty, in the absence of any orders from above, the senior colonel takes command. He may be far from a suitable commander, but it is difficult to imagine any other workable rule. The only remedy is to communicate as quickly as possible with a higher authority, and " carry on " in the meantime. During the war, a zealous brigadier, confronted by a situation of which the feature was only one territorial colonel in his brigade, and he the senior according to the date of promotion, tried to solve it by informing the territorial that, if he (the brigadier) became a casualty, he would leave directions that the seniority rule was to be put on one side. It was hardly the way to instil confidence into his subordinate, nor was it in other ways a solution of the difficulty. The colonel pointed out that he had no ambition to command the brigade, should a more suitable candidate be available, but that, if he conceived it to be his duty in accordance with regulations to take command, he should certainly not hesitate to do so, whatever might be the wishes of a defunct brigadier.

It may be maintained with some show of plausibility that seniority is the only possible rule for promotion in the Regular Army, even in war, where some certainty can be felt that all officers will be trained up to a fair degree of competency. In the Territorial Force there is a great deal to be said for a similar rule in peace, provided that certain not very elaborate tests are passed as a qualification. It saves a great many heart-burnings, and saves a great many complications to a commanding officer who has a difficulty in keeping his regiment together. Nor are the penalties that follow on an unfortunate promotion very immediate or severe. But in war the territorial officer ought to be prepared to accept with equanimity a much greater degree of alteration in the order of the regimental list. The stakes at issue are too great to allow much consideration to anything but fitness. Merit, perhaps tempered by seniority, not seniority tempered a very little by merit, should be the rule. Pure seniority so often depends on quite accidental circumstances, and often corresponds very little even to the actual amount of service of the respective officers. The opposite view was clearly expressed in an order understood to have emanated from a very high quarter in France. " It has been observed," it ran, " that officers commanding yeomanry regiments have lately been recommending officers for promotion on the ground (*a*) that they are more fit, or (*b*) that they have greater experience of war," and it continued with the admirable and lucid brevity of a properly drawn up order : " This practice

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must cease." It is true of course that any promotion by merit can easily degenerate into promotion by favouritism, but in war this is not very likely to happen, when regimental commanders are keenly anxious to make their commands as efficient as possible, and where they always have to justify their recommendations to more than one superior officer, equally anxious for the interests of their command. The matter is the subject of practice rather than of regulation, but at least it should be clearly understood by all ranks that seniority gives no more right to promotion in the lower ranks than it does in the higher.

There remains a very important point, which ought to be clearly thought out, in view of our late experience, and that is, what part would be played by the Territorial Force in case a great expansion of our land forces was again required. The question must obviously be answered differently, according as the policy of the country remains on a voluntary basis of military service, or changes over to compulsory service immediately on the outbreak of war. If compulsory service becomes the rule, there is nothing to be said from the territorial point of view; the whole Army will be one, and its expansion and recruitment will be conducted on uniform lines. Even if the voluntary system were continued, it would still be very questionable whether any kind of competitive recruiting should be allowed. But it is hardly thinkable that the nation should ever try the experiment again of trying to get through a fight for its existence without compulsory service.

At present the only arrangement for expansion proposed is the formation of a Territorial Reserve, from which, as well as from fresh recruiting, the 40 per cent. extra of war establishment should be filled up. The plan followed at the beginning of the war was not very satisfactory. The Territorial Force at that time was not subject to service overseas, in any circumstances whatsoever, and consequently units, before they were ready to go abroad, had to be purged, not only of the unfit, but also of the unwilling. These formed the nucleus of the second line regiments or battalions. The better the officers of a regiment, the fewer there naturally were available for the second line, and keen officers had the mortification of seeing others promoted over their heads, who were either freshly joined, or had refused to volunteer for service abroad. For some time the second line battalions endeavoured to carry out the incompatible objects of being a separate unit and also a feeder to the first line. Eventually the third line was evolved to be a sort of depot to both the others. By the time this system had developed into working order, there had

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long ceased to be any difference except in name, between the Territorial Force, the new Armies and the old Army. But in the early stages it was a system of expansion that put a premium on plausible shirking, and led to many good men being retained at home, against their will and much longer than was needful. It would clearly be much easier to expand a battalion to a brigade by drafting new men and officers into the original battalion, till each company became itself a battalion, than by keeping the original battalion intact and raising three entirely new battalions. If the Territorial Force is ever called upon to expand in time of national crisis, it is to be hoped that some such method will be adopted, along with the creation of a suitable training depot.

All proposals for the expansion of the Territorial Force are really wrapped up in the idea that, on mobilization, all serving forces come under the same administration and under one label. There must also be established schools for training staff officers of all kinds. There must be no closing of the Staff College on the outbreak of war. Many civilian soldiers are especially well qualified by their ordinary avocation for work on the administrative staff. Quite a short training in technical points will make them quite first-rate for such duties. If they have the advantage of being labelled the same as the rest of the Army, they may have a fairer chance of being employed, where their talents would be of the most use.

Before the war, the territorial had few friends in high places. Some disliked him for being what he was, a volunteer, some for not being what he was not, a conscript. But he lasted out, and he need not fear comparison with any one for his record in the war. He has proved his vitality, and, if he be handled sympathetically, or even with bare justice, by the military authorities, he will continue to furnish, with the least expenditure possible, a very useful force in case of emergency and an instrument capable of very great expansion.

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# THE EVOLUTION OF A REVOLT

By T. E. Lawrence (late Lieut.-Colonel General Staff, E.E.F.)

The Arab Revolt began in June, 1916, with an Arab offensive, a surprise attack by the half-armed and inexperienced tribesmen upon the Turkish garrisons in Medina and about Mecca. They had no success, and after a few days' effort they withdrew out of range of the fort artillery, and began a blockade. This method forced the early surrender of Mecca, whose road communications were too long and rough to be held by the Turks. Medina, however, was linked by railway to the Turkish main Army in Syria, and, thanks to their superior numbers and equipment, the Turks were able in a week's fighting to restore the line and reinforce the temporarily-besieged garrison there. The Arab forces which had attacked it fell back gradually as the Turks became more offensive, and at last moved fifty miles south-west into the hills, and there took up a position across the main road to Mecca.

At this point the campaign stood still for many weeks, while both sides breathed, and the Turks prepared to take the initiative, by sending an expeditionary force to Mecca, to crush the revolt where it had started. They moved an army corps to Medina by rail, and strengthened it beyond establishment with guns, cars, aeroplanes, machine guns, and quantities of horse, mule and camel transport. Then they began to advance down the main western road from Medina to Mecca. The total distance was about two hundred and fifty miles. The first fifty miles were easy : then came a belt of hills twenty miles wide, in which were Feisal's tribesmen standing on the defensive : after the hills was a level stretch, for seventy miles along the coastal plain to Rabegh, rather more than half-way. Rabegh is a little port on the Red Sea, with good anchorage for ships. In it was Sherif Ali, Feisal's eldest brother, with more tribal forces, and the beginnings of an Arab Regular Army, recruited from officers and men of Arab blood, who had served in the Turkish Army, and were now willing to fight against their old masters for their national freedom.



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Our military advisers had told us that Rabegh was the key of Mecca, since no hostile force could pass along the main road without occupying it and watering at its wells under the palm trees. Its defence was therefore of the main importance. The Navy could co-operate effectively from the harbour, and the circle of the palm-groves must be laid out as an entrenched position, and held by regular troops. They thought that Beduin tribesmen would never be of any value in a fixed position, and that therefore an Arab regular force must be formed and trained as soon as possible to undertake this duty. If the Turks advanced before the new force was ready, the British would have to lend a brigade, of British or Allied troops, to save the Sherif in his extremity, by maintaining this stop-block.

A personal reconnaissance of the Arab positions, here and in the hills where Feisal was, caused me to modify the views of the experts slightly. Feisal had some thousands of men, all armed with rifles, rather casual, distrustful fellows, but very active and cheerful. They were posted in hills and defiles of such natural strength that it seemed to me very improbable that the Turks could force them, just by their superior numbers : for in some ways it is easier to defend a range of hills against nine or ten thousand men than against nine or ten. Accordingly, I reported that the tribesmen (if strengthened by light machine guns, and regular officers as advisers) should be able to hold up the Turks indefinitely, while the Arab regular force was being created. As was almost inevitable in view of the general course of military thinking since Napoleon, we all looked only to the regulars to win the war. We were obsessed by the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy's army, his centre of power, and destroy it in battle. Irregulars would not attack positions and so they seemed to us incapable of forcing a decision.

While we were training the regulars (of course not sending officers or light machine guns to Feisal in the hills meanwhile), the Turks suddenly put my appreciation to the test by beginning their advance on Mecca. They broke through my " impregnable " hills in twenty-four hours, and came forward from them towards Rabegh slowly. So they proved to us the second theorem of irregular war—namely, that irregular troops are as unable to defend a point or line as they are to attack it.

This lesson was received by us quite without gratitude, for the Turkish success put us in a critical position. The Rabegh force was not capable of repelling the attack of a single battalion, much less of a corps. It was nearly impossible to send down British troops from Egypt at the moment : nor do I think that a single British brigade

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would have been capable of holding all the Rabegh position: nor was the Rabegh position indispensable to the Turks: nor would a single Arab have remained with the Sherif if he introduced British troops into the Hejaz.

In the emergency it occurred to me that perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had been the threat of attack by them upon the Turkish northern flank which had made the enemy hesitate for so long. The actual Turkish flank ran from their front line to Medina, a distance of some fifty miles: but, if we moved towards the Hejaz railway behind Medina, we might stretch our threat (and, accordingly, their flank) as far, potentially, as Damascus, eight hundred miles away to the north. Such a move would force the Turks to the defensive, and we might regain the initiative. Anyhow, it seemed our only chance, and so, in January, 1917, we took all Feisal's tribesmen, turned our backs on Mecca, Rabegh and the Turks, and marched away north two hundred miles to Wejh, thanks to the help of the British Red Sea Fleet, which fed and watered us along the coast, and gave us gun-power and a landing party at our objective.

This eccentric movement acted like a charm. Clausewitz had said that rearguards modulate the enemy's action like a pendulum, not by what they do, but by their mere existence. We did nothing concrete, but our march recalled the Turks (who were almost into Rabegh) all the way back to Medina, and there they halved their force. One half took up the entrenched position about the city, which they held until after the Armistice. The other half was distributed along the railway to defend it against our threat. For the rest of the war the Turks stood on the defensive against us, and we won advantage over advantage till, when peace came, we had taken thirty-five thousand prisoners, killed and wounded and worn out about as many, and occupied a hundred thousand square miles of the enemy's territory, at little loss to ourselves.

However, we were not then aware that Wejh was our turning point. We thought we had come to it to cut the railway, and I was at once sent up country to do this, as a means to take Medina, the Turkish headquarters and main garrison. On the way up I fell ill, and spent ten days on my back in a tent, without anything to do except to think about war and analyse our hitherto empirical practice for its real import.

I was unfortunately as much in charge of the campaign as I pleased, and had had no training in command to fit me for such a work. In military theory I was tolerably read, for curiosity in

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Oxford years before had taken me past Napoleon to Clausewitz and his school, to Caemmerer and Moltke, Goltz and the recent Frenchmen. These had seemed very partial books, and after a look at Jomini and Willisen I had found broader principles in the eighteenth century, in Saxe, Guibert and their followers. However, Clausewitz was intellectually so much the master of them all that unwillingly I had come to believe in him. Tactically the only campaigns I had studied step by step were the ancient affairs of Hannibal and Belisarius, Mohammed and the Crusades! My interests were only in pure theory and I looked everywhere for the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war, about which I thought a little for some years. Now I was compelled suddenly to action, to find an immediate equation between my book-reading and our present movements.

However, the books gave me the aim in war quite pat, "the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy" by "the one process battle." Victory could only be purchased by blood. This was a hard saying for us, as the Arabs had no organized forces, and so a Turkish Foch would have no aim: and the Arabs would not endure casualties, so that an Arab Clausewitz could not buy his victory. These wise men must be talking metaphors, for we were indubitably winning our war . . . and as I thought about it, it dawned on me that we had won the Hejaz war. We were in occupation of 99 per cent. of the Hejaz. The Turks were welcome to the other fraction till peace or doomsday showed them the futility of clinging to our window pane. This part of the war was over, so why bother about Medina? It was no base for us, like Rabegh, no threat to the Turks, like Wejh: just a blind alley for both. The Turks sat in it on the defensive, immobile, eating for food the transport animals which were to have moved them to Mecca, but for which there was no pasture in their now restricted lines. They were harmless sitting there; if we took them prisoner, they would cost us food and guards in Egypt: if we drove them out northward into Syria, they would join the main Army blocking us in Sinai. On all counts they were best where they were, and they valued Medina and wanted to keep it. Let them!

This seemed unlike the ritual of war of which Foch had been priest, and so I began to hope that there was a difference of kind between us and him. He called his modern war "absolute." In it two nations professing incompatible philosophies set out to try them in the light of force. A struggle of two immaterial principles could only end when the supporters of one had no more means of resistance. An opinion can be argued with: a conviction is best shot. The

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logical end of a war of creeds is the final destruction of one, and Salammbo the classical textbook-instance. These were the lines of the struggle between France and Germany, but not, I thought, between Germany and England, for all efforts to make our men hate the enemy just made them hate war, and later on by the Armistice we made the Great War fall short of the Foch ideal. To me it seemed only a variety of war: and I could then see other sorts, as Clausewitz had numbered them, personal wars for dynastic reasons, expulsive wars for party reasons, commercial wars for trading reasons.

Then I thought of the Arab aim, and saw that it was geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia. In the doing of it we might kill Turks: we disliked them very much. Yet "killing Turks" would never be an excuse or aim. If they would go quietly, our war would end. If not, we would try to drive them out: in the last resort we would be compelled to the desperate course of blood, on the maxim of "murder" war, but as cheaply as possible for ourselves, since the Arabs were fighting for freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive.

My own personal duty was command, and I began to unravel command and analyse it, both from the point of view of strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard which sees everything by the standard of the whole, and from the point of view called tactics, the means towards the strategic end, the steps of its staircase. In each I found the same elements, one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological. The first seemed a pure science, subject to the laws of mathematics, without humanity. It dealt with known invariables, fixed conditions, space and time, inorganic things like hills and climates and railways, with mankind in type-masses too great for individual variety, with all artificial aids, and the extensions given our faculties by mechanical invention. It was essentially formulable.

In the Arab case the algebraic factor would take first account of the area we wished to conquer, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles . . . perhaps a hundred and forty thousand . . . and how would the Turks defend all that . . . no doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we were an army attacking with banners displayed . . . but suppose we were an influence (as we might be), an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind, and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so perhaps we offered nothing material to the killing. It seemed a

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regular soldier might be helpless without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his rifle at.

Then I estimated how many posts they would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of these hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish Army inside and out, and allowing for its recent extension of faculty by guns and aeroplanes and armoured trains, still it seemed it would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. The Turks would need six hundred thousand men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had one hundred thousand men available. It seemed the assets in this part of command were ours, and climate, railways, deserts, technical weapons could also be attached to our interests, if we realized our raw materials and were apt with them. The Turk was stupid and would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare. Analogy is fudge, anyhow, and to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.

So much for the mathematical element, which I annoyed the others by calling hecastics. The second factor was biological, the breaking-point, life and death, or better, wear and tear. Bionomics seemed a good name for it. The war-philosophers had properly made it an art, and had elevated one item in it, " effusion of blood," to the height of a principle. It became humanity in battle, an art touching every side of our corporal being, and very warm. There was a line of variability (man) running through all its estimates. Its components were sensitive and illogical, and generals guarded themselves by the device of a reserve, the significant medium of their art. Goltz had said that when you know the enemy's strength, and he is fully deployed, then you know enough to dispense with a reserve. But this is never. There is always the possibility of accident, of some flaw in materials, present in the general's mind : and the reserve is unconsciously held to meet it. There is a " felt " element in troops, not expressible in figures, guessed at by the equivalent of δόξα in Plato, and the greatest commander is he whose intuitions most nearly happen. Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books : but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensued by instinct, sharpened by thought practising the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.

Yet to limit the art to humanity seemed to me an undue narrowing down. It must apply to materials as much as to organisms. In the

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Turkish Army materials were scarce and precious, men more plentiful than equipment. Consequently our cue should be to destroy not the Army but the materials. The death of a Turkish bridge or rail, machine or gun, or high explosive was more profitable to us than the death of a Turk. The Arab Army just now was equally chary of men and materials: of men because they being irregulars were not units, but individuals, and an individual casualty is like a pebble dropped in water: each may make only a brief hole, but rings of sorrow widen out from them. We could not afford casualties. Materials were easier to deal with and put straight. It was our obvious duty to make ourselves superior in some one branch, gun-cotton or machine guns, or whatever could be made most decisive. Foch had laid down the maxim, applying it to men, of being superior at the critical point and moment of attack. We might apply it to materials, and be superior in equipment in one dominant moment or respect.

For both men and things we might try to give Foch's doctrine a negative twisted side, for cheapness' sake, and be weaker than the enemy everywhere except in one point or matter. Most wars are wars of contact, both forces striving to keep in touch to avoid tactical surprise. Our war should be a war of detachment: we were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till the moment of attack. This attack need be only nominal, directed not against his men, but against his materials: so it should not seek for his main strength or his weaknesses, but for his most accessible material. In railway cutting this would be usually an empty stretch of rail. That was a tactical success. We might turn the average into a rule (not a law—war is antinomian, said Colin), and at length we developed an unconscious habit of never engaging the enemy at all. This chimed with the numerical plea of never giving the enemy's soldier a target. Many Turks on our front had no chance all the war to fire a shot at us, and correspondingly we were never on the defensive, except by rare accident. The corollary of such a rule was perfect "intelligence," so that we could plan in complete certainty. The chief agent had to be the general's head (de Feuquière said this first), and his knowledge had to be faultless, leaving no room for chance. We took more pains in this service than any other staff I saw.

The third factor in command seemed to be the psychological, that science (Xenophon called it diathetic) of which our propaganda is a stained and ignoble part. Some of it concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain end.

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Some of it deals with individuals, and then it becomes a rare art of human kindness, transcending, by purposeful emotion, the gradual logical sequence of our minds. It considers the capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation of what in them profits the intention. We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on.

It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander, and we, being amateurs in the art of command, began our war in the atmosphere of the twentieth century, and thought of our weapons without prejudice, not distinguishing one from another socially. The regular officer has the tradition of forty generations of serving soldiers behind him, and to him the old weapons are the most honoured. We had seldom to concern ourselves with what our men did, but much with what they thought, and to us the diathetic was more than half command. In Europe it was set a little aside and entrusted to men outside the General Staff. In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused. We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter.

These reasonings showed me that the idea of assaulting Medina, or even of starving it quickly into surrender was not in accord with our best strategy. We wanted the enemy to stay in Medina, and in every other harmless place, in the largest numbers. The factor of food would eventually confine him to the railways, but he was welcome to the Hejaz railway, and the Trans-Jordan railway, and the Palestine and Damascus and Aleppo railways for the duration of the war, so long as he gave us the other nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the Arab world. If he showed a disposition to evacuate too soon, as a step to concentrating in the small area which his numbers could dominate effectively, then we would have to try and restore his confidence, not harshly, but by reducing our enterprises against him. Our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort to him.

Accordingly, I put in a few damages to the line, enough to annoy

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the enemy without making him fear its final destruction, and then rode back to Wejh, to explain to my chiefs that the Arab war was geographical, and the Turkish Army for us an accident, not a target. Our aim was to seek its weakest link, and bear only on that till time made the mass of it fall. Our largest available resources were the tribesmen, men quite unused to formal warfare, whose assets were movement, endurance, individual intelligence, knowledge of the country, courage. We must impose the longest possible passive defence on the Turks (this being the most materially expensive form of war) by extending our own front to its maximum. Tactically we must develop a highly mobile, highly equipped type of army, of the smallest size, and use it successively at distributed points of the Turkish line, to make the Turks reinforce their occupying posts beyond the economic minimum of twenty men. The power of this striking force of ours would not be reckoned merely by its strength. The ratio between number and area determined the character of the war, and by having five times the mobility of the Turks we could be on terms with them with one-fifth their number.

Our success was certain, to be proved by paper and pencil as soon as the proportion of space and number had been learned. The contest was not physical, but mineral, and so battles were a mistake. All we won in a battle was the ammunition the enemy fired off. Our victory lay not in battles, but in occupying square miles of country. Napoleon had said it was rare to find generals willing to fight battles. The curse of this war was that so few could do anything else. Napoleon had spoken in angry reaction against the excessive finesse of the eighteenth century, when men almost forgot that war gave licence to murder. We had been swinging out on his dictum for a hundred years, and it was time to go back a bit again. Battles are impositions on the side which believes itself weaker, made unavoidable either by lack of land-room, or by the need to defend a material property dearer than the lives of soldiers. We had nothing material to lose, so we were to defend nothing and to shoot nothing. The precious element of our forces were the Beduin irregulars, and not the regulars whose rôle would only be to occupy places to which the irregulars had already given access. Our cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and these gave us strategical rather than tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force. The invention of bully-beef has modified land-war more profoundly than the invention of gunpowder.

My chiefs did not follow all these arguments, but gave me leave to try my hand after my own fashion. We went off first to Akaba,

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and took it easily. Then we took Tafileh and the Dead Sea: then Azrak and Deraa, and finally Damascus, all in successive stages worked out consciously on these sick-bed theories. The process was to set up ladders of tribes, giving us a safe and comfortable route from our sea-bases (Yenbo, Wejh or Akaba) to our advanced bases of operation. These were sometimes three hundred miles away, a long distance in lands without railways or roads, but made short for us by an assiduous cultivation of desert-power, control by camel parties of the desolate and unmapped wilderness which fills up all the centre of Arabia, from Mecca to Aleppo and Bagdad.

In character these operations were more like naval warfare than ordinary land operations, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence of bases and communications, their lack of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. "He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will": he who commands the desert is equally fortunate. Camel raiding-parties, as self-contained as ships, could cruise without danger along any part of the enemy's land-frontier, just out of sight of his posts along the edge of cultivation, and tap or raid into his lines where it seemed fittest or easiest or most profitable, with a sure retreat always behind them into an element which the Turks could not enter. We were fortified in our freedom of movement by an intimate knowledge of the desert-front of Syria, a country peculiarly and historically indefensible against attack from the east. I had traversed most of it on foot before the war many times, working out the movements of Saladin or Ibrahim Pasha, and, as our war-experience deepened, we became adepts at that form of geographical intuition, described by Bourcet as wedding unknown land to known in a mental map.

Our tactics were always tip and run, not pushes, but strokes. We never tried to maintain or improve an advantage, but to move off and strike again somewhere else. We used the smallest force, in the quickest time, at the farthest place. If the action had continued till the enemy had changed his dispositions to resist it, we would have been breaking the spirit of our fundamental rule of denying him targets.

The necessary speed and range were attained by the extreme frugality of the desert men, and their high efficiency when mounted on their she-riding-camels. The camel is an intricate animal, and calls for skilled labour in the handling: but she yields a remarkable return. We had no system of supply: each man was self-contained and carried on the saddle from the sea base at which the raid started,

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six weeks' food for himself. The six-weeks' ration for ordinary men was a half-bag of flour, forty-five pounds in weight. Luxurious feeders carried some rice also for variety. Each man baked for himself, kneading his own flour into unleavened cakes, and warming it in the ashes of a fire. We carried about a pint of drinking water each, since the camels required to come to water on average every three days, and there was no advantage in our being richer than our mounts. Some of us never drank between wells, but those were hardy men : most of us drank a lot at each well, and had a drink during the intermediate dry day. In the heat of summer Arabian camels will do about two hundred and fifty miles comfortably between drinks : and this represented three days' vigorous marching. The country is not so dry as it is painted, and this radius was always more than we needed. Wells are seldom more than one hundred miles apart. An easy day's march was fifty miles : an emergency march might be up to one hundred and ten miles in the day.

The six weeks' food gave us a range of over a thousand miles out and home, and that (like the pint of water) was more than ever we needed, even in so large a country as Arabia. It was possible (for me, the camel-novice in the Army, " painful " was a better word) to ride fifteen hundred miles in the month without re-victualling, and there was never a fear of starvation, for each of us was riding on two hundred pounds of potential meat, and when food lacked we would stop and eat the weakest of our camels. Exhausted camel is poor food, but cheaper killing than a fat one, and we had to remember that our future efficiency depended on the number of good camels at our disposal. They lived on grazing as we marched (we never gave them grain or fodder), and after their six weeks on the road they would be worn thin, and have to be sent to pasture for some months' rest, while we called out another tribe in replacement, or found fresh riding-beasts.

We did not hamper ourselves with led-camels. The men carried with them a hundred rounds of ammunition and a rifle, or else two men would be an " automatic " team, dividing the gun and its drums between them. They slept as they were, in their riding cloaks, and fared well enough till the winter of 1917–1918, which caught us on the five-thousand foot hills of Edom behind the Dead Sea. Then we lost many men and camels frozen to death, or trapped in the snow, which lay over all the high lands in deep drifts for weeks, while we vainly appealed to Egypt for tents and boots and blankets. In reply we were advised that Arabia was a tropical country !

The equipment of the raiding parties aimed at simplicity, with



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nevertheless a technical superiority over the Turks in the most critical department. We had great quantities of light machine guns, used not as machine guns, but as automatic rifles, snipers' tools, by men kept deliberately in ignorance of their mechanism, so that the speed of action would not be hampered by attempts at repair. If a gun jammed, the gunner had to throw it away, and go on with his rifle. We made another special feature of high explosives, and nearly every one in the revolt was qualified by rule of thumb experience in demolition work. We invented special methods of our own, for rapid work under fire, in the course of our months of practice, and before the end were dealing with any quantity of track and bridges economically and safely.

On some occasions we strengthened tribal raids by armoured cars, manned by Englishmen. Armoured cars, once they have found a possible track can keep up with a camel party. They are, however, cumbrous and shorter-ranged, because of the difficulty of carrying petrol. Therefore we seldom used them more than a hundred miles from home. On the march to Damascus, when we were nearly four hundred miles off our base, we first maintained them by a baggage train of petrol-laden camels, and afterwards by the help of the Air Force were able to give them further supplies by Handley-Page. Cars are magnificent fighting machines, and decisive whenever they can come into action on their own conditions. But though each has for main principle that of " fire in movement," yet the tactical employments of cars and camel-corps are so different that I do not recommend their being used in joint operations, except in very special circumstances. We found it demoralizing to both, to use armoured and unarmoured cavalry together.

The distribution of the raiding parties was unorthodox. It was impossible to mix or combine tribes, since they disliked or distrusted one another. Likewise we could not use the men of one tribe in the territory of another. In consequence, we aimed at the widest distribution of forces, in order to have the greatest number of raids on hand at once, and we added fluidity to their ordinary speed, by using one district on Monday, another on Tuesday, a third on Wednesday. This much reinforced their natural mobility. It gave us priceless advantages in pursuit, for the force renewed itself with fresh men in every new tribal area, and gave us always our pristine energy. Maximum disorder was in a real sense our equilibrium.

The internal economy of the raiding parties was equally curious. We aimed at maximum articulation. We were serving a common ideal, without tribal emulation, and so we could not hope for any

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*esprit de corps* to reinforce our motives. Soldiers are made a caste either by being given great pay and rewards in money, uniform, or political privileges; or, as in England, by being made outcasts, cut off from their fellows by contempt. We could not knit man to man, for our tribesmen were in arms willingly, by conviction. There have been many armies enlisted voluntarily: there have been few armies serving voluntarily under such trying conditions, for so long a war as ours. Any of the Arabs could go home whenever the conviction failed him. Our only contract was honour.

Consequently we had no discipline, in the sense in which it is restrictive, submergent of individuality, the lowest common denominator of men. In regular armies in peace it means the limit of energy attainable by everybody present: it is the hunt not of an average, but of an absolute, a 100-per-cent. standard, in which the ninety-nine stronger men are played down to the level of the worst. The aim is to render the unit a unit, and the man a type, in order that their effort shall be calculable, their collective output even in grain and in bulk. The deeper the discipline, the lower the individual efficiency, and the more sure the performance. It is a deliberate sacrifice of capacity in order to reduce the uncertain element, the bionomic factor, in enlisted humanity, and its accompaniment is *compound* or social war, that form in which the man in the fighting line has to be the product of the multiplied exertions of the long hierarchy, from workshop to supply unit, which maintains him in the field.

The Arab war was *simple* and individual. Every enrolled man served in the line of battle, and was self-contained. We had no lines of communication or labour troops. The efficiency of each man was his personal efficiency. We thought that in our condition of warfare the sum yielded by single men would be at least equal to the product of a compound system, and it was certainly easier to adjust to tribal life and manners, given elasticity and understanding on the part of the commanding officers. Fortunately for our chances nearly every young Englishman has the roots of eccentricity in him, and so we got on well enough. Of course we used very few Englishmen in the field, not more than one per thousand of the Arab troops. A larger proportion would have created friction, just because they were foreign bodies (pearls if you please) in the oyster: and those who were present controlled by influence and advice, by their superior knowledge, not by an extraneous authority.

In practice we did not employ in the firing line the greater numbers which the adoption of a "simple" system put theoretically

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at our disposal. We preferred to use them in relay: otherwise our attack would have become too extended. Each man had to have liberal work-room. In irregular war if two men are together one is being wasted. The moral strain of isolated action makes this simple form of war very exacting on the individual soldier, and demands from him special initiative, endurance and enthusiasm. Our ideal was to make action a series of single combats. Napoleon, in his pregnant valuation of the Mamelukes in terms of French soldiers, first gave me the idea: Ardant du Picq widened its application: the prejudices of historians are generally the richest part of their histories. Our value depended entirely on our quality, not on our quantity. We had to keep always cool, for the excitement of a blood-lust would impair the science of our combatants, and our victory depended on our just use of speed, concealment, accuracy of fire Irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.

The illiteracy of our forces was not harmful, since we worked intentionally in these small numbers and explained our plan verbally to every one. Their very illiteracy has trained them to a longer memory and a closer hearing of the news. Nor were our tactics too subtle, for they had to be translated into independent action through the heads of our followers, and success was impossible unless most of them used their intelligence to forward our conception against the moral and material accidents of the path. This dilution of tactical ability to the level of the lowest interpreter was regrettable, but not all loss. The only alternative would be independent enterprise, and a mediocre design, persisted in, is grander than a series of brilliant expedients and will overcome them in the end.

By careful persistence, kept strictly within our strength and following the spirit of our theories, we were able eventually to reduce the Turks to helplessness, and complete victory seemed to be almost within our sight when General Allenby by his immense stroke in Palestine threw the enemy's main forces into hopeless confusion and put an immediate end to the Turkish war. We were very happy to have done with all our pains, but sometimes since I have felt a private regret that his too-greatness deprived me of the opportunity of following to the end the dictum of Saxe that a war might be won without fighting battles. It was an irony of fate to entrust this side-show of a side-show, with its opportunity of proving or disproving the theory, to an outsider like myself, not qualified technically to make the best of it. I would have given so much to show that Saxe was the greatest master of his kind of war, but now all I can say is that we worked by his light for two years, and the

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work stood. This is a pragmatic argument that cannot be wholly derided.

Unfortunately our campaigns lacked a historian as much as an executant. Now that I try to write down what we did, and why, some of our principles look truisms (mankind would so rather believe a sophism) and some look contradictory. The fault must be either in my exposition or in my observation. Savage warfare seems never to have been thought out in English from the savage point of view, and the Arab revolt would have been a great opportunity for a thinker to test its possibilities on a grand scale. Our war was so odd and so far away that coy Authority left us to ourselves. We had no base machinery, no formal staff, no clerks, no government, no telegraphs, no public opinion, no troops of British nationality, no honour, no conventions. The experiment was a thrilling one, which took all our wits. We believed we would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines. We did not prove it, because the war stopped : but here the thesis is :—

It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it : such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfil the doctrine of acreage : too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, " the study of communication " in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not. In fifty words : Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

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# THE OBSTACLE OF THE SOMME VALLEY

By Hilaire Belloc

In the history of warfare obstacles to communication seem to fall into three categories.

There are first those which are so formidable that military commanders "take them for granted," as it were. I mean that in campaign after campaign they are ruled out as impossible for the passage of troops. Such obstacles are the great mountain ranges, wide deserts, and (more rare) great stretches of marsh land. Obstacles of this first category are either wholly impossible or to be passed only at a few special points indicated by nature and improved by man. Thus, the Pyrenees have from the beginning of history been crossed, if I am not mistaken, by six passages and six alone; the depression along the Atlantic coast and its corresponding parallel road of Roncesvalles; the narrow gate at the Mediterranean end, and the corresponding parallel passage over the Cerdagne; in the centre of the range the great main pass which the Romans used by Urdos, and the neighbouring pass of Sallient which, with the former, was used by the Mahommedans in their great invasion of the eighth century.

In the same way the Alps, though their passages are much more numerous, and though the use of these passages fluctuates somewhat more, have been crossed at only a certain number of such points which cannot be greatly changed. The great marshes of the Pripet have never admitted, I believe, of the passage of a great body of troops, nor have the Sahara and Arabian Deserts.

The second category is that of obstacles which appear upon the map as formidable, but have proved in history to be hardly obstacles at all, because certain characters not at first apparent, rendered their franchise easy. Not a few great rivers fall into this category, and especially the Rhine.

The Rhine has never seriously arrested any great military operation, although it is very long, and during nearly the whole of its course far too deep for fording. If a man were told nothing of military history in the past, and had to be guided by a map of Western



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Europe alone, he would certainly put down the Rhine as one of the most formidable strategic obstacles. History having proved that it is not so, one must look into the special modifications which produce the paradox of its easy passage, and we find it, I think, in a combination of circumstances, chief, that the Rhine, lending itself more than almost any other river to the passage of commerce, both through its direction, the fertility of much of its area, the high proportion of good wharfage along its banks, etc., has had fairly dense human settlement all the way along it within historical times: hence towns, and therefore permanent bridges, and not only permanent bridges, but the opportunity, through local labour, of rapidly throwing a temporary bridge across, as of boats—the more usual expedient—or of piles, after the fashion used by Cæsar.

Another obstacle falling into the same category, and more puzzling at the first approach, is that of the Rhone below Lyons. Here you have a very swift stream, few bridges, and a direct transverse thrown right across territory where there has been perpetual military need for passing from west to east and from east to west. Yet the Rhone has never acted as a serious obstacle in warfare.

There is a third category which has a peculiar interest. It is the category of those obstacles which are neither sufficiently formidable to be, as it were, "ruled out" of operations—and which yet turn out over and over again in practice to be more formidable than they appear.

Now this third category it is which lends so much interest to the art of war. It is an obstacle of this kind leading men on to tasks often beyond their strength and always to a considerable trial of skill, which both presents a problem of much interest to the military student and rehearses in history time and again the same rôle.

Such obstacles are like a trap: but a trap that seems never to get found out. They play a perpetually recurring trick in military history, and generals are taken in by that trick century after century.

Among these obstacles may be quoted the belt of wood which is the continuation of the Ardennes to the north, certain of the Spanish lower transverse mountain ranges, the oddly difficult country which the French call "the March," lying to the west of the Auvergne, and having for its northern capital Limoges, and for its southern, Perigueux: it appears over and over again in history from the fifth century to the Hundred Years' War as a barrier between the north and south, in spite of its apparently open character. But of all of them the one which plays the same part most regularly again and again is the valley of the Somme.

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The valley of the Somme stops invasion from the east. It threatens sudden disaster to those thrown back too rapidly upon it. It compels campaigns carried out parallel to its course to follow the most curious detours. And in nearly every case it seems to have something of the effect of surprise upon the commanders who deal with it.

Yet any one unacquainted with the ground would be puzzled to explain why the Somme valley should be thus conspicuous in affecting military history. The river is of no great length, as compared at least with the main rivers of Europe, such as the Seine or the Rhine. The actual stream is not (above its estuary), and never has been, of any great breadth. It is so shallow throughout its whole course that fords have always existed within a few miles of its mouth. It is but one, and only somewhat the largest, of five parallel streams, falling, as it does, into the Channel from the water partings west of the Oise valley. Yet none of these other streams have left their mark upon military history, but only the Somme. Further, even regarded as an obstacle, it is one that can be easily turned by the south where there is open country traversed from the earliest times by great roads. Again, the Somme does not seem to stand in the path of military operations conducted from or against the mass of French territory, or from or against either the earlier or the later French capital. It has never formed a frontier. I think I am right in saying that it has never been made the basis of a line of resistance.

Why then is it perpetually luring military effort into a sort of trap and proving itself time and again in the history of warfare upon French soil a more formidable element of complexity than the best generals had imagined ?

So far as we can judge from the very meagre accounts left us, the Somme checked the march of the few auxiliary troops marching in the break-up of the Empire, towards the centre of Gaul. It determined the campaign of Crecy and it determined the campaign of Agincourt. It canalized the Spanish action of the sixteenth century. It served for a brief space the plans of the French defence in the North fifty years ago. And in this last great struggle—though the battle on its upper reaches with which its name will always remain associated, had little or nothing to do with its character as an obstacle farther down—it played a very great rôle which might well have been decisive. For with the last German throw made in March, 1918, the plan, most certainly well conceived, was wholly based upon the effect which the Somme valley would have upon an Allied retreat, had the enemy been able to compel that retreat to extend some few miles farther than was actually the case.

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What are the geographical or political reasons underlying all this?

The geographical conditions are by far the more important. The only political condition applying to the Somme and modifying its geographical character, is the position of Paris, the political centre of France for now more than a thousand years. Paris lies sufficiently near the North Coast to make the obstacle of the Somme act as something of a covering, and this function has vaguely and imperfectly accounted for not a few movements in history, among which I have quoted the Spanish march which ended in the Battle of St. Quentin. The political position of Paris has also determined the importance of the Somme valley as a road. It is because Paris lies where it does in relation to the Straits of Dover that the old coach-road to the Straits followed the valley of the Somme as far as Abbeville, and that the modern main railway follows it farther still—as far as Noyelles at the head of the old estuary.

But the geographical conditions of the Somme valley are what really determine its character in military history. It has presented throughout recorded history, and presents to this day, an obstacle of just that sort most serious to the passage of armies: the obstacle of marsh. Not of marsh on a large scale such as would render it notorious for its difficulty, but marsh which, if I may so express myself, a man hardly discovers until he comes to it.

The whole valley floor from far above Amiens to the sea is one long narrow corridor of cultivated and utilized marsh. It is this very cultivation and use which makes the character of the line, and, if we may judge by the antiquity of human habitation along that line (where some of the earliest human remains have been found), it has always been so. In recorded times, at any rate, the cultivation and use of the Somme marshes go back to the origins of French history.

A man approaching the Somme valley from Normandy or the Beauvaisis, or from Pontieu in the north, and seeing it first from the crest of the low hills above it, would never take it for what it is. He sees good pasturage, little arable land indeed, but plenty of habitations. He does indeed remark upon his map the paucity of causeways, but he will ascribe that, unless he is acquainted with the ground, to some political reason, or perhaps to the backwardness of the district. A further examination will show him that the paucity of causeways is directly due to the nature of the ground; and the difficulty of passing the Somme line in any great force and with any rapidity, though immediately attributable to the lack of bridges and of

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transverse roads, is ultimately attributable to those topographical conditions which prevented roads from being built in the past.

The whole of the valley floor is impermeable, and the river has flanking it, upon the whole of its course from the moment when it becomes navigable by barges, a series of shallow meres carefully embanked, of water meadows regularly flooded, and of market gardens peculiar to the district, and known as *hortillonages*, the produce of which depends on this excess of moisture. There is no point in all this 120 miles (for that is about the length of the line) where a bridge can be thrown across without such an expense in foundation as made the operation difficult in the extreme before modern times. The consequence of this was an absence of transverse communication. The numerous villages which line either wall of parallel low hills north and south of the valley, lived each upon its own territory, having little communication with its opposite neighbour. There was here nothing like what you have upon the Seine where hard banks, and therefore a succession of good wharfages, mark the course of the stream. Amiens and Abbeville were the only two points where good wharfage existed, though there were short stretches of hard land at one or two other places, notably at Picquigny. Below Abbeville the estuary began and was, until within living memory, flooded everywhere at high tide.

There is, besides the paucity of transverse fixed communications in the shape of bridges, a second condition far more formidable to the passage of armies, which is that you cannot in the valley of the Somme supplement your fixed transverse communications by temporary ones. The approaches to the river render this impossible. Any army attempting to pass the line of the Somme valley, especially an army that is pressed and is in retreat, is shepherded on to the defiles of Pont-Remy, Abbeville itself, Bray, Corbie, Amiens, Picquigny—the sole main roads inherited from the past; while modern times have added such rare supplementary and narrower passages as the roads of Daours, St. Sauveur, Bourdon, etc. Between these rare opportunities of passage an army cannot rapidly improvise supplementary passages over such wide marshes.

The two great instances in English history, before the late war, where the military geography of the Somme valley played a part, were, as I have said, the campaign of Crecy and the campaign of Agincourt. In the case of both the final victory was the unexpected termination of a retreat. In the case of both that retreat was at once determined and embarrassed by the Somme valley, and it is true, paradoxically enough, that neither Crecy nor Agincourt would have

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been won, nor the great effect of either have been felt upon the history of this country, had Edward III., in the first case, or Henry V., in the second, found the Somme less difficult. In both cases it was the obstacle of the Somme which permitted the enemy's force to cut off the English retreat, and in both cases it was the success of the English Army challenging that force attempting to cut it off, which produced the victory.

Edward's campaign, less scientific than that of his great grandson, was in all its middle part a series of desperate attempts to cross the Somme valley, and of failures to make a passage. He had marched by the valley of the Seine in a great raid, at the close of which his scouts almost reached the walls of Paris. He crossed the river at Poissy and made straight across country for the Straits of Dover to return home, for he was not in force to meet the numbers which the King of France could ultimately bring against him. In his direction towards the Straits of Dover the Somme barred his way. He had believed, like so many before and after him, that the valley was passable, as might be the valley of any other river, and he found, what so many have found before and after him, the unexpected difficulties of the crossing.

He was baulked at Picquigny and at St. Remy, and so right down the river till he got below Abbeville, and was apparently cooped up in the peninsula of St. Valery, west of the estuary. Whether, had he been compelled to remain there, the large French Army crossing by Abbeville could have defeated him in the peninsula of St. Valery is doubtful, for we know how, in the event, the far better discipline, tactics *and weapons* of the more compact small force which he commanded had the better in the final struggle. But, at any rate, he and his advisers clearly thought that the position was one of grave danger, and he saved himself from it by using, on the advice of a local man, the ford of Blanchetaque, where the estuary was passable at low water. That ford is to-day a narrow lane crossing the reclaimed land of the Lower Somme. He found the farther end of the passage hastily garrisoned, and had to fight his way up to the high land. All this delay it was which permitted the French Army to catch him up just as he had got through the forest of Crecy, and which therefore produced the action. Had there been no such delay, had the Somme been easily passable, had there been many bridges between Picquigny and Abbeville, or a hard valley floor so that the Army could find its way across by temporary bridges, the small English force would have got clean away to the Straits, and Crecy would never have been fought.

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The Somme plays almost exactly the same part in the campaign of Agincourt. Henry V. was there also conducting a raid with quite a small force, less than the equivalent of what to-day we call a "division." He also was making, after the first success of his raid on Normandy, for the Straits; hurrying to get to Calais before the much larger force accumulating against him could cut him off. He also comes, marching from Eu on the Norman frontiers, upon the estuary of the Somme, he also finds the passage guarded, and he also, but in the reverse order to that taken by his great-grandfather—marching eastward, that is, up river—tries over and over again to cross, and over and over again is baulked.

The splendour of the victory at Agincourt has obscured in English history at once the anxiety of Henry at this moment, and the very fine feat of marching to which that anxiety led. He went with his few thousand men at a rate of over fifteen miles a day up the river, everywhere attempting a crossing and everywhere foiled. That course led him dangerously far into his enemy's country. He went well past Amiens, crossing the Noye at Boves, he still marched on to the upper reaches where the Somme becomes quite a small stream. He marched right across the battlefield of this last great war, cut across the great bend of Peronne, but everywhere found the marshy character of the valley floor and the consequent ease of defending a crossing too much for him. He did not get to the further bank until he was right up on the last waters of the river opposite Nesle, and there he crossed by the remains of the causeway laid down by the Romans 1500 years before. It was not a complete passage: it had to be strengthened and partly rebuilt. I know the place as it was before the war: and even here, where the valley has become so narrow, though there is good firm land upon either side, its marshy character remains an obstacle: there is nearly 400 yards of marshy ground. Over that 400 yards the modern road crosses upon an artificial causeway.

It was because Henry V.'s march had been shepherded so far into the heart of the enemy's country that his opponents took his defeat for granted and stood awaiting him a week's march to the north directly upon the road between himself and Calais. He met them in vastly superior numbers, holding the gap between the two woods that lie east and south of the village of Agincourt, and there won the victory which opened his way to the sea and so nearly founded an Anglo-French dynasty which, had it endured, would have changed all the history of our civilization.

Though the rôle is reversed in every way, yet its essentials remain

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the same upon the last occasion when the Somme again played its part in military history: I mean in the retreat that followed the successful German attack of Easter week, 1918.

Though all the gulf that separates antiquity and the Middle Ages from modern mechanical methods lay between that event and those to which I have just alluded, the same characteristics appear: the obstacle of the Somme valley, the tardy recognition of that obstacle.

I know not what number of men had appreciated, at the moment when the great offensive struck all the way down from Arras to St. Quentin, that the obstacle of the Somme was the ultimate factor in the enemy's plan. But I know that opinion in general, instructed and alert opinion throughout Europe after four years' study of the map, did not wake up to what the Somme meant in this affair until the retreat upon Amiens was already far developed.

The amazing closing of the gap by the rapid extension of the French northward and westward to their left, the equally astonishing skill of the enemy in supplying his rapid advance over such completely ravaged land, the breathless expectation of further disaster, the final containment of the peril in an arc covering Amiens—all these distracted attention from the main issue, which was plainly this: whether a continuation of the enemy's advance would compel a retirement to the very line of the Somme. Then was it suddenly apparent how that line, formidable as an obstacle for defence, was equally formidable as an obstacle against retreat. In that moment many men grasped for the first time what was meant by the nature of the valley. It would have been impossible to have completed a successful retirement beyond it at the pace demanded; and the German effort was directed to pressing this great body of men, the British Armies, into an ever-narrowing belt of which the sea and the Somme valley were the difficult exits.

As we know, the plan failed: but it only just failed. And that was the last and most critical appearance of this singular trench in the story of European battles.

There are, I suppose, many to-day who would say that the rôle of such obstacles is now over, or at any rate has been so modified by the progress of invention that they will never again play fully their old part. The power of observing from, and engaging combat in, the air and the modern facility of transport, have between them half destroyed the meaning (it may be said) of that direct broad, shallow groove which cuts so singularly across the north-east of France.

I have no competence in the matter, but, if an opinion may be

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permitted, I would express the opinion that such a judgment is wrong.

Man is a land animal, and no matter how far he extends his action beyond his natural habitat, whether by the older machines that gave him passage over the water or by the new ones that give him access to the air, his ultimate base for all he does is the land. The same reasons that made the best critics hesitate half a generation ago to admit the exaggerated claims then made for sea-power will, and with more strength, apply to the doubtful future of power in the air. That such power will profoundly modify war all are agreed. That it will eliminate the natural obstacles of ground I cannot see, for whatever fights in the air is maintained from the earth.

Nor (though this is of course mere guess-work) do I see a future in which mechanical power will eliminate natural obstacles.

Rather it would seem that the mechanical progress of our civilization has reached its term, and may in the approaching industrial quarrel rapidly decline.

I conceive, therefore, that a man reading the history of Europe some centuries hence will not discover that Easter week two years ago to have been the last occasion on which the Somme halted, threatened or baffled armies.

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# ARTILLERY DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT WAR

By Lieut.-General Sir Noel Birch, K.C.M.G., C.B., Colonel Commandant, Royal Artillery

" Four years of scientific warfare have seen a consistent and progressive development in the power and influence of artillery, both in the actual fighting battle and in all the stages which lead up to it. Despite the handicap under which we started the war, British artillery has played a large part in that development, and of late has dominated the enemy's artillery to an ever-increasing degree. The influence of this fact upon the moral both of our own and the enemy's troops could scarcely be exaggerated."—Extract from the Dispatch from the Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France, dated the 21st of December, 1918.

Volumes might be written on the subject of this article, but the time is not yet ripe. We are too near the events of the Great War to see them as our descendants will see them, without prejudice and with fuller knowledge of the facts as a whole.

I shall not refer to demands for artillery material previous to 1916, but propose to give, first, the reasons which prompted Field-Marshal Lord Haig to ask for so many guns, and some idea of the work he required them to carry out; secondly, to describe the organization and the staff machinery set up to handle the enormous mass of artillery which came into being over and above the amount allotted to divisions; and thirdly, to state briefly the innovations introduced and the scientific progress made by the British artillery during the war.

## I.

### The Necessary Artillery and its Rôle.

Guns and ammunition cannot be made in a day. Before construction can begin, jigs * and gauges have to be manufactured and machinery either made or adapted for the purpose, and this takes a

* A jig is an appliance to hold the work and guide the tool, or tools, in repetition work, so as to ensure that all parts machined on the same jig are interchangeable.



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long time. Other points concerning manufacture which are not always appreciated by the layman are that the adoption of any technical improvement, either in the construction of the gun or of the ammunition, immediately reduces total output for a considerable period, and that when a new gun or howitzer has been made, it has to go through extended firing tests, and, in most cases, travelling trials, before it is fit to take the field. The history of this war proves, as former wars have often proved, that improvised artillery material is the reverse of satisfactory.

The British Artillery owes a great deal to Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop. It was due to his foresight and initiative that the 9·2″ Mark I. Howitzer was introduced, probably the best and most reliable weapon the British put into the field, and the only modern heavy howitzer available at the outbreak of war. It was in 1908 that he first began advocating the use of the heavy howitzer in the field, and in July, 1914, the first 9·2″ Mark I. Howitzer, designed and constructed under von Donop's guidance, passed its test. This weapon gave comparatively little trouble in the shops, which cannot be said of some of its more hastily designed brothers.

In 1916 when the Field-Marshal submitted a fresh programme of construction, orders for artillery material which had been given in July, 1915, were nearly completed. As at that date the early delivery of more guns and ammunition was a matter of vital importance, in view of the fact that the British line was being lengthened and new troops were arriving in France, he selected the latest "Marks" of existing models, adopting this policy in order to facilitate construction and to ensure uniformity in design. The elimination of a variety of existing natures of guns was not therefore immediately practicable.

In submitting his programme, however, the Field-Marshal insisted that every endeavour should be made as time went on to increase the range and accuracy of our guns, and that there should be no cessation of research and no finality of design. But in 1916 quality had to give way to quantity.

The two main principles on which the construction programme was based were as follows :—

(1) Having ascertained from the best information available the number of guns per division in the German Army and the increase the enemy was aiming at, to ask for such a number as would give the British a decisive fighting superiority.

(2) Heavy guns only to be used for work that heavy howitzers could not do.

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The preference for the howitzer over the gun caused a certain amount of criticism at the time, some of it uninstructed and some hardly to be called disinterested, but the reasons for laying down the second principle were both clear and sound.

The " life " of the howitzer—that is to say the number of rounds that can be fired from it before it becomes unserviceable from wear—is far longer than that of a gun. For example :—

The 6″ Gun, Mark VII., has an average life of 1,500 rounds.
„ 6″ Howitzer, 26 cwt. „ „ „ 10,000 „
„ 9·2″ Gun, Mark X. „ „ „ 500 „
„ 9·2″ Howitzer, Mark I. „ „ „ 7,000 „

As every weapon had to go back to England to be relined and generally renovated, it is obvious that the second principle was not only sound, but necessary from a manufacturing point of view. This, however, was by no means the only reason. The howitzer is much easier to place in position in the field. Many can be sited in a comparatively limited area owing to the high line of departure of the shell, and the problem of crest clearance is rarely met with.

Howitzers have less range than guns of a similar shell power, but are more mobile, and, when fired at horizontal targets their accuracy is generally speaking greater.

The continuous artillery battle which began on the Somme and culminated as it did in the defeat of the enemy's guns (vide Field-Marshal Lord Haig's Dispatch of the 10th of April, 1919) would have been impossible if the proportion of medium and heavy howitzers to heavy guns had not been large. His demand worked out to be 70 per cent. howitzers and 30 per cent. guns, but these proportions were never quite reached, owing to the delay in the delivery of the heavy guns. This delay was no fault of the Ministry of Munitions, as gun plant had to be diverted after orders had been placed for the manufacture of anti-submarine guns for merchantmen.

There were 486 guns and howitzers in the original Expeditionary Force, 24 of which were of medium calibre, and on the day of the Armistice there were no less than 6437 guns and howitzers of all natures in France (exclusive of anti-aircraft artillery and mortars), of which 2211 were medium and heavy artillery. This number was below Lord Haig's original demand, but it must be remembered that the Ministry of Munitions was obliged to supply other theatres and other nations with artillery material ; and further, that in the last year of the war men were not available to man more guns.

The work which Lord Haig required his artillery to perform was, briefly, to destroy the enemy and to protect his own armies. Various



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kinds of fire were made use of in attempting to attain this high ideal. To dominate the enemy's artillery continuous counter-battery work was employed. The " barrage " covered our infantry in the attack. Harassing fire by day and night did much to make the enemy's roads and paths difficult to use, and often delayed and even stopped the bringing up of his rations. How science and experience helped to develop these and other methods of fire will be told later.

## II.

### Organization and Staff Machinery.

It will be plain to any student of war tactics that, other things being equal, the commander who can rapidly concentrate masses of artillery when and where he chooses has a great advantage over the adversary who is unable to do so. Napoleon taught Europe that artillery should be employed in masses in order to prepare for decisive action. The victories of Friedland, Austerlitz and Wagram can be largely ascribed to his having observed this cardinal principle, which means concentration at the right time and at the decisive point.

To make quick concentration possible artillery organization must be elastic. This primary condition can only be fulfilled if the minimum number of guns required form an integral part of the unit organization.

It will be convenient to discuss the organization of the field artillery and of the heavy artillery in France separately.

It is clear that if all the field artillery belongs organically to divisions, reinforcement cannot be effected unless all or some of the guns are taken from one division to support another : the divisional organization is then dislocated and may remain so for a considerable time. In offence or active defence the infantry of a division tires and must be relieved earlier than the artillery. Therefore, during active operations on a large scale and under conditions such as obtained in France, the guns soon become separated from the rest of the division, and to bring them together again is a tedious process. Divisional artilleries are continually on the move to rejoin their formations and, in doing so, much gun-power and tractive energy are wasted. Serious administrative troubles also arise.

Our available resources in 1916 would not admit of the creation of a considerable number of fresh artillery brigades, and it thus became necessary to reduce the divisional artillery from three brigades to two, and to form a fluid reserve by organizing independent Army Field Artillery Brigades. This introduction was a success from a tactical point of view, and, although it did not entirely do away with

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the difficulties referred to above, there was much less separation. Moreover, reinforcement was easier and more economical.

It was originally intended that these army brigades should be grouped together, either two or three brigades forming a group. It was felt that they would be better cared for if they had a colonel and staff to attend to their immediate wants, and to represent their case when work was too prolonged or too severe. Neither officers nor men could, however, be spared to form these group headquarters, so the project had to be dropped.

Generally speaking, the army brigade was nearer to the enemy than the heavy artillery brigade, and it certainly had a rougher time; otherwise, as will be shown, the army field artillery was similarly situated to the heavy artillery as regards administration.

To turn to the heavy artillery organization; the circumstances here were different. When Field-Marshal Lord Haig succeeded to the command of the Armies in France the number of heavy batteries was not great, and the few that were in the country had only recently been organized into independent groups. No heavy artillery was permanently allotted to formations.

To obtain the necessary elasticity at the commencement of Lord Haig's tenure of command, single batteries were moved from place to place; as soon as it became feasible the brigade system was reintroduced and the artillery brigade became the highest permanent group in the heavy artillery. Heavy artillery of all natures and army field artillery brigades were allotted to armies, and by them distributed to corps in accordance with the tactical requirements. The corps commander fought and administered his heavy artillery and army field artillery brigades. He was enabled to use his discretion as to the temporary attachment of any of these units to divisions as the situation demanded.

Organization in war depends on the possibilities of command and administration. These possibilities are limited by the capacity of one man's brain, the facilities for communication and the degree of movement that is going on. The more mobile the fighting, the fewer will be the units that can be controlled by one commander, and the greater will be the difficulty of communicating orders.

In large wars, unless the machinery of the staffs of the higher formations is so devised that the artillery apportioned to these formations can be conveniently absorbed and effectively directed, history teaches us that grand artillery tactics fail.

The following quotation from Lord Haig's Dispatch, dated the 21st of March, 1919, shows how this axiom was fulfilled :—

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" In order to gain the elasticity essential to the quick concentration of guns at the decisive point, to enable the best use to be made of them and to facilitate ammunition supply and fire control, Artillery Commanders acting under Army and Corps Commanders were introduced and Staffs provided for them. This enabled the large concentration of guns required for offensives to be quickly absorbed and efficiently directed."

Each corps commander was also provided with a brigadier-general and staff to command his heavy artillery. This officer was under the direct orders of the G.O.C. of the artillery of the corps. In fine, both army and corps commanders were given an instrument which they could employ as and when they liked to handle their artillery concentrations, and to be technically responsible for the efficiency of the arm.

It is an historical fact that the artillery commander always crops up in war, where artillery is, comparatively speaking, plentiful and well handled. Queen Elizabeth had her artillery commanders (these fortunate gentlemen had certain perquisites in the way of church bells after successful sieges) * ; Marlborough had his artillery train commander ; Napoleon's first command of importance was that of the whole of the Jacobinic artillery in 1783, while in the following year he was appointed " General in command of the artillery of the Army of Italy," which Masséna commanded. At Friedland, where artillery played so large a part, Senarmont commanded Napoleon's guns. Alexander Dickson was Wellington's gunner, but the part played by the artillery in the Peninsular War is singularly neglected by the historian Napier.

The poor results obtained by the artillery of both sides in the 1866 campaign may be traced to the want of efficient artillery control and direction. At the battle of Königratz, half the mass of the First Army reserve artillery did not fire a single shot.

There are, however, a few soldiers who to this day think there should be no artillery commanders in war, and some of them may have formed their opinions from the teachings of the Great German General Staff. The Germans had no permanent artillery staffs for

* Extract from an Ordinance issued by Queen Elizabeth under her Sign-Manual : " Item.—As a Town is won, whether it be by assault, per force, subtile practice, or by any other manner given up, be it Town, Castle, Pile, Church, or Bastile, or Fortress, the Chief Master of the Artillery or his Lieutenant, shall ordain that the Master-Gunners and their companies shall have the best bell within that place so won, or the church wardens shall appoint or compound with the Great Master or the Artillery and his Counsel. And that to be reported by the Provost of the Artillery, and given knowledge to the Lords and Rulers of that place so won with the Commons of the same, what that the Master of the Artillery, His Counsel, and the Master-Gunners and their Companies have determined and ordeyned, by a convenable and reasonable estimation, to see and know if the Lords and Commons will hold the ordenance and appointment made."

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higher formations up to the day of the Armistice. Why was this? It was failure to draw the correct lessons from history, and the conservatism and vanity of their General Staff, who were lovers of centralization—usually the negation of efficient organization. These gentlemen were too vain to learn lessons from their enemies even in the pitiless school of war.

It has already been stated that there was no artillery staff machinery for higher formations in the German Army in the campaign of 1866, but before the war of 1870 began the Germans appointed corps artillery commanders. The results were not satisfactory from the point of view of organization and command, although the early entry of artillery into action (Wörth) and the large concentrations of guns (St. Privat and Sedan) were successfully achieved. The system lacked elasticity. The position of the regimental colonel who became the commanding officer of the corps field artillery on mobilization left much to be desired. He commanded the corps artillery, and not the artillery of the corps. The German regulations laid down that when more than half the batteries in the corps came into action the commander of the corps artillery assumed command of the whole of the field artillery in the corps. The guiding principles of higher artillery control were neglected, especially the need of decentralization in moving warfare.

After the Franco-German War the Germans, instead of moulding their organization and artillery command so as to get the best value out of their guns, deliberately destroyed the poor machinery then in existence.

As far as our own original little Expeditionary Force was concerned, it only possessed six 60-pounder batteries, in addition to the divisional artilleries, and the question of higher artillery command did not arise.

When the artillery staff organization was set up the success of this wise measure of decentralization was made certain by the close and willing co-operation of the whole British Service.

## III.

### Scientific Progress.

It is common knowledge that, after the fighting of the autumn of 1914, the Germans were in possession of practically all the high ground on the northern part of the Allied battle front, and therefore

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of the observation. This very much increased the difficulties of the British gunner. The Flying Corps and the Survey Sections came to his help; without them he would have often shot "blind."

Before this war but little shooting practice took place at night, and the serious effect of a change in meteorological conditions on the range was not fully appreciated by the regimental officer of the Field Army. A careful study of the weather, however, enabled corrections to be made in the range. Tables were supplied to battery officers giving the necessary alterations. It may not be generally known that a gun of large calibre will sometimes vary in range by 1000 yards in twenty-four hours, owing to changes of weather.

Science was also called in to ensure the correct height of burst of the shrapnel shell. The barometer and thermometer became indispensable artillery stores. For night firing electric lights were supplied for the aiming posts to make certain of the gun being on the correct line, and electric torches were supplied for gun pits.

Accuracy of fire was still further ensured to the field artillery by the establishment of calibration sections. By firing through screens the exact initial velocity of each gun was ascertained, and compensation could be given on the sights which insured the uniform shooting of every gun in the battery.

The Survey Sections supplied the artillery with excellent maps which were compiled with care and accuracy, and mounted on specially prepared boards in order to facilitate "map shooting;" further, the Survey Sections resected all batteries' positions.

The culminating result of this scientific progress was that in the Cambrai attack of November, 1917, registration was dispensed with, and surprise, so far as artillery action was concerned, was made easy. At the battle of Amiens on the 8th of August, 1918, in which over 2000 British guns were employed, practically all of them opened destructive fire from their attack positions for the first time on the actual morning of the assault.

Though observation was carried out from the ground whenever practicable, the Air Force became to a great extent the real "eyes" of the artillery, and not merely the eyes, but also the scouts, the detectives and the tale bearers of bad shooting. By means of the aerial photograph camouflaged German batteries, new works, roads and paths were discovered, and accuracy of fire assured. It was useless for a battery commander to say that his guns were calibrated and clean and the ammunition properly cared for, when the tell-tale photograph showed a bad "pattern."

Not only was observation from the air accurate when stationary

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objects were engaged, but special progress was made in the art of engaging moving targets.

Counter-battery work, so little thought of before the war, and which, according to Ludendorff, caused the Germans much loss and great anxiety, became an exact science through the development of air photography, aerial observation, sound-ranging, flash-spotting and air-burst ranging. In every gunner office in our Armies in France sat a reconnaissance officer, whose duty it was to keep track of each German gun and to bring to notice the slightest alteration in the terrain on his immediate front, which was constantly photographed.

As to improvements in artillery design, long-range modern 6″, 8″, 9·2″ and 12″ howitzers were introduced, and also the following guns :—

6″ Mark XIX. on a field carriage, the 9·2″ Mark XIII., the 12″ and 14″ on railway mountings.

G.H.Q. wished the split trail system to be gradually adopted for all light and medium natures of artillery, but this did not materialize for several reasons, two of them being that with a high rate of ammunition expenditure (it reached over twenty-three thousand tons on one day in the war), alteration in design was not easy, and that daily throughout the war the man-power problem became more difficult.

Among other improvements and innovations were the instantaneous fuze No. 106, smoke shell, gas shell, shell with large calibre head radius (long pointed shells), stream line shells, improved incendiary shells and star shells.

## IV

### Conclusion.

There are people who think that wars are things of the past ; we all hope so. There are others who think that tanks and aeroplanes will compose the fighting forces of the future, and that any guns not used in these machines should be relegated to the museums. A design of a shellproof tank has not yet materialized, owing to the immense weight of the armour which would be required for its protection, and until this problem is solved tanks will be largely dependent on artillery protection. The analogy of a battle of tanks with a naval battle is a bad one, especially if aerial or submarine attack be left out of account. Ships have only to reckon with guns fired from other ships, unless the fighting takes place within range of

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shore guns; whereas, operating as they do on dry land, tanks must always be exposed to the fire of batteries, which are mobile and usually concealed.

Of the future no one can talk with certainty, but of recent history we know something, and it is worth noting that the officers and men of the Tank Corps were the first to admit, on the evening of the 8th of August, 1918, that it was due to the supremacy of the British artillery that their course had been an easy one that morning. Here is what the Field-Marshal says on the subject in his Dispatch, dated the 10th of April, 1919:—

"As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks we may take the action fought east of Amiens on the 8th of August, 1918, and following days. A very large number of tanks were employed in these operations, and they carried out their tasks in the most brilliant manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns for this period discloses the fact that in no action of similar dimensions had the expenditure of ammunition been so great."

And what good would the artillery have been on the 8th of August, without stout infantry to hold the ground which tanks, aeroplanes, cavalry and guns had assisted them to win?

In the autumn of 1918, when the enemy was in full retreat, large masses of artillery were still employed; on the 1st of November, 1918, the fine Canadian infantry attacked south of Valenciennes, supported by guns and howitzers to the number of one to a little over every two yards of the front of attack, a large proportion of the barrage being in enfilade. This was a higher percentage of guns to infantry than had ever been reached throughout the war.

So much for recent history; what mechanical improvements the future will bring no one can foretell, but they will probably be greater than most of us think. Those who are still interested in the artillery service will, however, be well advised to go forward with experiment and research, and to lay their plans for a quick and larger output of the latest patterns in the event of trouble. The gun-howitzer seems to be the weapon of the future; that is to say, a weapon longer than a howitzer but shorter than a gun, with some of the advantages of both. In future wars an enormous increase in the number of aeroplanes employed in bombing and shooting the troops on the ground must be anticipated. All artillery weapons, or nearly all, should be able, therefore, to put up an air barrage, and construction must allow for a very high-angle of elevation. All such weapons also must be capable of quick and wide traverse in order that aeroplanes and tanks can be early engaged. Here the split trail comes in.

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A tank travelling at the rate of twenty miles an hour should not be a difficult target for the gunner, if he is supplied with an up-to-date weapon.

Space forbids me to mention the many other directions in which improvements can be sought.

Work and foresight will, however, be of no avail unless the fighting men again display that indomitable courage and power of endurance without which no great war can be won. Let me take two examples from among many of what happened before a mastery over the enemy's artillery and aircraft was obtained. Here is an extract from the official report of a certain artillery brigade during a period in the line in France. Probably no other brigade had a worse period, or even as bad a one :—

"The whole area was almost continuously under shell-fire, and the enemy's artillery fired hundreds of rounds daily on the batteries, endeavouring to silence them. By night he made use of great quantities of gas-shell, using for the first time mustard gas. Although he was successful in knocking out during this period an average of three guns and one howitzer daily, and causing casualties to the number of 50 officers and 452 men, the tasks ordered were invariably carried out."

Another report on a battery reads as follows :—

"The battery was allotted the task of wire cutting from —— to ——, it had already received much attention from German heavy howitzers.

"It was estimated that 400 rounds would be required to clear the wire, and deliberate fire was commenced. After some 50 rounds had been fired a 15 cm. howitzer battery, firing in enfilade, opened a steady and very accurate fire on the position. Each time the British battery opened fire salvoes of 15 cm. commenced, and four guns out of six were put out of action and two ammunition dumps exploded. The remaining two guns continued to fire until 400 rounds were expended ; subsequent examination after the advance showed that the wire was completely cut."

Needless to say, the gallantry displayed by all ranks of the artillery did not pass unnoticed. The gunner yields to none in his admiration of the bravery of other arms, but, as this article deals with artillery, no excuse is needed for quoting the following extract from a Special Order of the Day, issued by Lord Haig on the 9th of October, 1917 :—

"In preparing the way for the infantry, supporting their advance, and covering them against counter-attacks, the skill and endurance displayed by the Royal Artillery have never been surpassed, if ever equalled, in the annals of warfare. Though the nature of their duties has allowed them no rest, they have risen superior to every trial. Without their splendid devotion to duty the great successes gained would not have been possible."

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# THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR

By Brevet-Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O. (Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry).

1. The Method of Science.—2. The Elements of War.—3. Grand Tactics.—4. The Principles of War.—5. The Conditions of War.—6. The Battle.

## 1. *The Method of Science.*

What is science? "Science is co-ordinated knowledge, facts arranged according to their values," or, to put the definition more briefly still and to quote Huxley, science is "organized common-sense," common-sense being, in the opinion of this really great scientist and philosopher, the rarest of all the senses.

How do we attain to science? By collecting facts—good, bad and indifferent, and then, by sorting these facts into categories, we build up from them theories, and, by putting these theories to universal tests, by degrees we extract laws which form our working principles, our weights and measures of war.

The value of the scientific method is lucidly set forth in the following quotation which, though written purely from a civil standpoint, is equally applicable to the military subject before us.

"Science is the investigation and study of exact knowledge, of systematic and formulated knowledge. The methods adopted by science are to obtain and record the facts in connection with any subject, to marshal and classify them in their proper relationship, and then to make a generalization which, in a brief but comprehensive formula, endeavours to account for the association between them and also the phenomena of their existence. As new facts are discovered, they can be classified in their proper relationship, and interpreted easily and quickly with great economy of thought, while the properties of new or newly discovered substances and the results of newly observed phenomena may be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by applying to them the generalization—the theories—already formulated.

"But a fact which, seemingly, does not conform to the theory,



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must be investigated further, or the theory must be altered to accommodate the new knowledge, or must be discarded altogether in favour of a better generalization. The theory is the spirit of the fact, and must be in harmony with it.

"It will be seen that science has no hard and fast line beyond which we must not trespass; the boundaries are constantly shifting with each new discovery, with more exact or more intimate investigation into phenomena, and theories are discarded unhesitatingly if the subsequent observations do not correspond with them." *

War is as much a science as any other human activity and, like all other sciences, it is built up on facts of which there are an innumerable quantity. To sort these is, therefore, our first task, and, as many facts are compound in nature, it will first of all be necessary to construct a sorting-machine which will not only split them up into their component parts, but disentangle the simple from the complex. If this can be successfully accomplished, it will then be possible for the student not only to take up a work on military history and analytically extract from it facts, and from these facts build up theories, but also, when faced by a military problem, to construct synthetically on facts an empiric plan or solution.

## 2. *The Elements of War.*

In reducing war to a science, the first fact which confronts us is: "What is war?" War is a very complicated struggle, so complex a fact that its components must be split up into simpler parts before the student can grasp its nature and answer this question. In place of it, therefore, let us substitute a far simpler question: "What is a fight?" The simplest possible type of fight is a duel between two men.

What, now, is the object of each of these men?

"To knock out the other!"

How?

"By giving blows without receiving them!"

In these few words have we completely laid bare the essential nature of the fight, in fact we have discovered the pivotal problem in the science of war—the destruction of the enemy's strength, which not only embraces his army but the whole of his nation, and which constitutes the crucial problem in the art of war: "how to kill without being killed."

This problem is fundamental, universal and eternal to war. Add

* "Scientific Management," by Henry Atkinson; "Engineering and Industrial Management," vol. ii., No. 3, p. 71.

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to it some "frills"—a few cook-houses, batmen, parsons and Thresh disinfectors, and we have a modern army; but do not let us be led astray by these ephemeral details, let us instead abide fast to the unshakeable fact—war is a matter of men, and the simplest form of war is the fight between two unarmed human beings.

We, therefore, start with man, the author of all human strife. To destroy his adversary he has got to move towards him, he has got to hit him, and he has got to prevent himself being hit, or otherwise he may fail in carrying out his object.

Let us analyse this action very carefully, for it forms the basis of much further argument.

In war the elemental material is man; he himself, even if naked and unarmed, possesses power to move, power to hit, and power to guard.

Man, however, considered *per se* is comparable to the ether, too vague an element to become tangible, but, as from the ether all other material elements originate, so from man originate the elements of war.

What are these elements? They are to be found in the duel as in the battle; they are: (i) Movement; (ii) Weapons; (iii) Protection.

For the sake of simplicity, let us add to these three elements, a fourth, man himself; then we get—man, movement, weapons and protection as the four elements of war.

The above brief analysis, it is hoped, has projected a ray of light into that dark dungeon called warfare in which soldiers great and small have, only too frequently and to the misfortune of us all, played a tactical blind-man's buff. We have discovered the elements of war, and now all that we have got to do is to analyse their properties, to discover the laws which govern them and the conditions under which they combine, separate, work and cease to act.

In the space available in this article, it is not possible to deal fully with the main properties of these elements, consequently, only sufficient detail will be included in order to enable the reader to appreciate more fully, than perhaps he otherwise would, their values:—

First, each element possesses two main spheres of action:—

| | |
|---|---|
| (i) Man .. .. .. | The moral and the physical. |
| (ii) Movement .. .. .. | The approach and the attack. |
| (iii) Weapons .. .. .. | The offensive and the defensive. |
| (iv) Protection .. .. .. | The direct and the indirect |

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Secondly, each element may be divided into two main categories :—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (i) Man | .. .. .. | Leader and led. |
| (ii) Movement | .. .. .. | Muscular and mechanical. |
| (iii) Weapons | .. .. .. | Shock and missile. |
| (iv) Protection | .. .. .. | Static and mobile. |

Thirdly, each of these categories may again be subdivided :—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| (i) Man. | Leader in thought, | *e.g.* | Divisional commander. |
| | Leader in action, | „ | Platoon leader. |
| | Led, the fighter, | „ | Rifleman. |
| | Led, the administrator, | „ | Ammunition carrier |
| (ii) Movement. | Muscular, human, | „ | Marching. |
| | Muscular, animal, | „ | Riding. |
| | Mechanical, fixed, | „ | Road vehicle. |
| | Mechanical, flexible, | „ | Cross-country tractor. |
| (iii) Weapons. | Shock, cutting, | „ | Sword. |
| | Shock, thrusting, | „ | Bayonet. |
| | Missile, short range, | „ | Bullet. |
| | Missile, long range, | „ | Shell. |
| (iv) Protection. | Static, earth, | „ | Trench. |
| | Static, weapons, | „ | Covering fire. |
| | Mobile, armour, | „ | Helmet. |
| | Mobile, formations, | „ | Extensions. |

The above table is purposely very incomplete, in order to keep it simple, the categories being only divided into pairs. It is, however, complete enough to show how in war, as in every other science, the complex is evolved out of the simple. How complex it may become can, at once, be realized by the military student when it is pointed out that each of the above sixteen subdivisions could be extended into a row of books. For instance, " Man as leader in thought " embraces the whole art of command ; whilst under the heading, " Flexible mechanical movement," might be discussed the whole of naval, air and tank warfare. It will, therefore, be seen, even in the few preceding pages, what a tremendously complex comglomeration of compound facts has arisen out of an extremely brief analysis of the military ether, man and the elements derived from him.

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It has already been stated that each of the elements of war has two main spheres of action wherein it operates; these, it is now proposed to explain, for much depends on their exact understanding; they, in fact, form the positive and negative poles of all military action, and the complete eight, when combined, go to build up the supreme act of war called "battle."

Taking movement first, we find that tactically there are two types: protective movements and offensive movements, the first we will denote by the term "approaches," and the second by that of "attacks." In the former the one thought of the soldier is "to prevent himself from being hit," and in the latter "to hit his enemy." The more he can hit the less will he be hit, consequently, indirectly though it may be, not only is the whole action protective in character, but it becomes more and more so as the offensive succeeds. From this it will be at once seen that any idea of thinking of the offensive and the defensive phases of a war, battle or duel, as things in themselves apart, is absurd; for these two acts form the halves of the diameter of the tactical circle, the circumference of which is the fight. They are, in fact, the positive and negative poles of the tactical magnet called battle.

If the soldier always remembers that the object of all attack movements is to develop weapon power against the enemy, and of all approach movements to prevent the enemy from developing a similar power against himself, he will at once realize that when he is not attacking—and attacking here means using weapons—he is approaching, even if he be sitting in a camp five hundred miles from the front. If he remembers this, and it is important that he should (for since the advent of the aeroplane, warfare is no longer waged in two dimensions, but in three), he will never be surprised. The true appreciation of the approach and the attack carries with it the maximum of security and offensive power which, without infringing the principles of war, can never be divorced.

Of weapons there are two main types—hitting and hurling weapons—the first will be denoted by the term "shock weapons," such as the bayonet, lance and sword, and the second by that of "missile weapons," such as the arrow, bullet, shell or gas. As the object of the battle is to destroy the enemy, which is generally accomplished by clinching with him, the infantryman's offensive weapon is the bayonet, and, so long as he carries the bayonet, this characteristic remains true, his bullet being his defensive weapon, on account of its ability to secure the advance of the bayonet. Thus we see that, whenever two weapons of unequal range of action are

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employed, the one of longer range is always the defensive weapon and the one of shorter range the offensive one, and, even if three or more weapons be used, this holds equally good for all. Thus, though field guns, when covering a rifle attack, are acting defensively to the rifles they are acting offensively to the heavier guns in rear of them, though these heavy guns simultaneously are acting defensively both to them and the rifles. It might be considered that this is a purely academic problem, it, however, is not so ; its full appreciation in fact, forms the backbone of the attack from which the whole battle organization, like ribs, radiates. From this appreciation may be deduced a tactical rule of the highest importance : " In all circumstances missile weapons must be employed to facilitate or to ward off the shock."

The soldier must not only never forget this rule, but it must so completely dominate his thoughts that its application becomes instinctive, for it forms the foundation of fire supremacy, the crucial act of the attack, the paralysing of an opponent's power to hurl so that he may be hit and for a certainty be destroyed. Every missile which can economically, that is effectively, be thrown, must be thrown. The soldier must not only think but live and act in terms of " fire supremacy," for it is his sword and his shield upon which his tactical life depends.

Protection, or the defensive, has little to do with holding positions or beating back attacks, very common conceptions of it, for it is just as much part and parcel of every forward movement as of every holding or retrograde one. It has already been pointed out how the bullet defends the bayonet and the approach the attack by lessening casualties when the soldier is advancing and not actually using his weapons in order to hit. Both these forms of protection are indirect, that is to say, they do not ward off blows, but prevent blows from being delivered, either by giving them or rendering the target difficult to hit.

Besides these indirect means of protection, which include camouflage and the use of smoke clouds, several direct means have frequently been employed ; such as armour, earthworks and fortifications. Under this heading, to-day must also be placed the anti-gas respirator. Direct protection is such as will nullify the effect of blows.

Both direct and indirect protection may again be divided, as already shown, into two categories—mobile and static protection. Thus armour, such as the helmet or small box respirator, being portable, are mobile, and so also is the tank ; and earthworks and

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fortifications, being fixed, form immobile direct protection. Again, a field battery constitutes a static means of indirect protection, because fire must be delivered when stationary, while similar fire delivered from a moving tank constitutes mobile indirect protection. Mobile protection is generally the most effective, for any change in location necessitates a change in the enemy's tactical organization, and, consequently, a loss of time for destructive effect. When, as in a tank or battleship, mobile direct and indirect protection can be combined, the highest form of security is obtained; this fact in recent years has been all but unrealized in warfare, though a study of the art of war in the middle ages will show that it formed the tactical backbone of the combat between armoured knights.

The last and first of the four elements of war is man. Here, as might well be expected, we approach the complex—the moral and physical spheres of action. Man, as civilian or soldier, is governed by his nature inherited or acquired. This nature is dependent on several factors, the most important being self-preservation upon which all true tactics are founded. Fear is the grim ruler of the battlefield, and, so we find that, the instinct of self-preservation plays a predominant part in war urging the soldier to do one of three things :—

(i) To retire off the battlefield in order to escape danger.
(ii) To remain where he is in order to avoid approaching danger.
(iii) To advance, and, by clinching with his enemy, to overcome danger.

Which course he may adopt depends upon his moral, that is to say, on his " fighting spirit," which, in its turn, depends not only upon the conditions which surround him in battle, but also upon those which have long previously surrounded him in days of peace. The two main conditions which control him morally and physically are " comfort " and " safety," which in all circumstances it is the duty of every officer to endeavour to provide for his men.

### 3. *Grand Tactics.*

Battle, we now see, is a great complex action springing from four simple elements—man, movement, weapons and protection, which, interweaving defensively, attain the end aimed at through offensive action. This weaving together of the whole is called battle organization, it has little to do with *personnel* establishments which represent the body of an army, but everything to do with brains, the brains of the commander who evolves the plan. Brains in this respect may

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be looked upon as a fifth element of war, very much as " spirit " was considered a fifth element by the mediæval alchemists, and on its grading depends the grand tactical " idea " of a battle or campaign.

Grand tactics, which, in their turn, are governed by strategy, are but another name for " battle planning." With these branches of the science of war we will now deal.

Most military terms, due to the want of scientific thought, have, throughout history and never more so than to-day, been continually and consistently misapplied, and none more so than strategy, which may be defined as " making the most of time for war," which in other words, means of opportunity.* Strategy denotes the direction of war, which hinges on communications and fighting spaces. At sea, communications are governed by coast lines and land ports. Thus all seas form water-valleys, the Dardanelles being a mere gully, while the Atlantic forms a broad plain running between two distant series of hills, Europe and Africa on the one side and North and South America on the other. If the world were all earth intersected by innumerable rivers, naval strategy would approximate closely to strategy on land, which is woven on a network of railways, roads and waterways. These form the arterial system on which the grand tactics of an army exist and upon which its movement depends. We thus find that in modern wars between immense national armies the ruling factor in all battle planning is not tactics but supply. So pronounced does this become at times that all idea of fighting has to be subordinated to sustaining, with the result that, if this condition hold good for any but a short period, static warfare becomes inevitable ; this type of war only being remobilized by an increase in communications or the amassing of supplies at the battle termini of existing ones. Any simple means which can be evolved in order to increase, what will be denoted as " road capacity," that is, either the traffic down the road or the width of the road itself, carries with it a revolution in strategy, and consequently in the planning of the battle and the organization and equipment of the troops. To battle planning we will now return.

The elements of grand tactics are in essence very simple. If an enemy is to be defeated, by what means is his defeat to be effected ? By disorganizing and demoralizing him so that from a psychological and homogeneous group, his forces revert to a heterogeneous crowd pure and simple, which state potentially exists, in spirit, amongst any body of men however well they may be trained, organized and

* The purpose of strategy is : " to bring about a tactical encounter under the most favourable circumstances possible."



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drilled. Disorganized and demoralized, that is to say, attacked in body and soul, an enemy loses his power to fight, that is, his ability to co-operate within himself.

This power of disintegrating the fighting strength of an enemy may be divided into four main grand tactical acts :—

(i) *Surprise.*—An enemy may be surprised, which implies that he is thrown off his balance. This is the best method of defeating him, for it is so economical, one man taking on to himself the strength of many. Surprise may be considered under two main headings : surprise effected by doing something that the enemy does not expect, and surprise effected by doing something that the enemy cannot counter ; the first may be denoted as moral, the second as material surprise.

(ii) *Attrition.*—An enemy may be worn down by material and moral action ; this, though the usual method of defeating him, is also, frequently, the most uneconomical method, for the process of disintegration is mutually destructive.

(iii) *Envelopment.*—An enemy may be enveloped and so placed at a severe disadvantage. Envelopment, whether accomplished by converging or overlapping, presupposes a flank, a flank which may be tactically rolled up, or, if turned, will expose, in its turn, a line of communication which runs behind it. The attack by envelopment is a very common action in war which more often than not has led to victory.

(iv) *Penetration.*—An enemy's front may be penetrated in order directly to threaten his lines of communication, or to create a flank or flanks to be enveloped. Normally, when once the hostile front is broken, the two sections are rolled up, but away from each other, or one is held while the other is rolled up—an operation which, if carried out successfully, usually leads to a total disintegration of the enemy's strength.

Outside these four main grand tactical acts of battle there is little to be learned in grand tactics.

### 4. *The Principles of War.*

Earlier in this article it was pointed out that war, being a science, was founded on facts, and that, if facts were woven together, theories evolved, and that, if theories were put to a universal test, the result was the evolution of laws.

War has its laws like all other sciences, these generally are called the principles of war. What then are these principles ? This

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question may well be asked, for, except perhaps for the word "strategy," no other word in military writings has been so thoroughly abused and slurred over.*

How are we to discover these principles of war about which so much has been written, and about which such undiluted ignorance has been displayed? The answer is a simple one, indeed so simple that it appears hitherto to have defeated detection. Read nothing about great battles or the doings of great captains, go to the National Sporting Club and look upon war in its primitive and, therefore, simple form—the bout between two men. This type of battle, so we are informed by a noted German professor, first took place on this our earth one or two hundred million years B.C. It does not much matter which, for, if it can be established that the principles which underlie the duel hold equally good for war, we cannot help agreeing that the test of their value is sufficiently universal to admit of their being regarded as laws.

What do we see at the National Sporting Club or any other boxing ring?

We see one man facing another, each is desirous of knocking out the other—here we have an *objective*. We see one man hit at the other—apparently he is attempting to obtain his objective by an *offensive*. We see the other man ward off the blow—he is *securing* himself in order, a moment after, to return the compliment. A little later, one of the two men strikes the other a quick blow with his left followed immediately by his right—he is *concentrating* all his offensive power against his antagonist. Then the other man, in place of using both his fists to strike, feints with his left and brings in a jaw blow with his right—he is *economizing his force*, and by so doing has nearly got in a knock-out blow. Then his opponent rushes him, driving him to the ropes, with a rapid side-step he escapes him—*movement* is evidently an essential to success. A moment later he is down, his antagonist has won? Not a bit of it; for up he leaps and his opponent thinking him knocked out receives a terrific "welt" in the eye—he learns that *surprise* has its value. So we look at the fight, and what do we see? We see that the best fighter combines foot-play with fist-work, his muscles are not only working together, but

* "The Field Service Regulations of the British Army," Edition 1914, used as a textbook throughout the Great War, state that: "The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse," and then do not mention them. General Altham's book entitled "The Principles of War," does not mention them. Commandant Colin, in his "Transformations of War," discusses them, but does not name them; finally, Marshal Foch, in his "Principles of War," mentions four by name, and then puts, "etc.," below the last one!

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he hits from his leg as well as from his shoulder—his whole body is *co-operating* in order to obtain the objective.

Here are our eight principles of war, in truth they are not ours, they are no man's, they are eternal, universal and fundamental. They constitute the laws of every scientifically fought boxing match and of every battle. Countless millions have partaken in great battles and small combats, yet have these principles, for the most part, remained nameless throughout history. To make them perfectly clear we will enumerate them as follows :—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st | Principle .. .. | The principle of the objective. |
| 2nd | ,, .. .. | The principle of the offensive. |
| 3rd | ,, .. .. | The principle of security. |
| 4th | ,, .. .. | The principle of concentration. |
| 5th | ,, .. .. | The principle of economy of force. |
| 6th | ,, .. .. | The principle of movement. |
| 7th | ,, .. .. | The principle of surprise. |
| 8th | ,, .. .. | The principle of co-operation. |

No one of the above eight principles is of greater value than another. No plan of action can be considered perfect unless all are in harmony, and none can be considered in harmony unless weighed against the conditions which govern their application. Seldom can a perfect plan be arrived at, because the fog of war seldom, if ever, completely rises. It is, however, an undoubted fact that the general who places his trust in the principles of war and who trusts in them, the more strongly the more the fog of war thickens almost inevitably beats the general who does not.

It is not proposed here to enter upon a detailed analysis of these principles of war, they will only be so far explained as to enable the reader to grasp the importance of their nature.

*The Principle of the Objective.*—In organized warfare the main objective is the destruction of the enemy's military strength by the harmonious employment of the remaining principles of war. Without a definite objective there can be no definite policy or plan, and without a policy or plan action cannot be co-ordinated. "There are many good generals in Europe," said Napoleon, "but they see too many things at once. I see the enemy's main force and I destroy it."

Though in war, and more and more so in modern wars, the imposition of our will upon the enemy's government is our political aim, this aim is usually only accomplished by attaining our military objective, namely, the destruction of his armed forces. This objective is strategical, so far as it embraces his entire army, and grand tactically

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it is that force of the enemy's troops or workers, the existence of which is essential to his preservation as an organized and independent state. Minor tactically it may be anything from a sap head to a fortress, from a rifleman to an army corps.

On our objective depends our direction and on our direction depends our supply. The enemy is at A, we are at B. Does the line joining these two points give us our direction? Yes and no. Yes, if the seven remaining principles are not adversely affected by our moving in this direction, and if the conditions permit us doing so. No, if otherwise. We, however, cannot discard this direction offhand, even if we find that some of the principles are difficult to apply; but what we can do is to test each possible line of advance until we arrive at the line of least resistance, bearing in mind that the principle of the objective aims at the destruction of the enemy's fighting strength.

Our plan of action should aim at the following:—

To advance against the enemy's most important force (objective), with the intention of destroying it (offensive), with the greatest weapon power (concentration), so disposed as to produce the greatest effect with the least effort (economy of force), with the least possible friction (co-operation), and the shortest possible time (movement), so that we may take him unawares (surprise), without undue risk to ourselves and at the minimum cost (security).

Such is a scientific plan of battle.

*The Principle of the Offensive.*—Will the objective which we have selected enable us to apply the principle of the offensive? If it will not, then the objective must be discarded for the offensive in war is the surest road to success. If it will, then in which direction should the offensive be made? The answer to this question depends on circumstances or conditions which should be looked upon as the correctors of all our movements.

Thus, if time be against us, time in which an enemy can mass his reserves to meet our offensive and so outwit us, the offensive becomes futile or dangerous; unless possessing more men than brains our objective is simply to kill as many of the enemy as we can, regardless of cost, which is not only a violation of the principle of economy of force, but the poorest of poor generalship. A private soldier thinks in terms of killing men, but a general should think in terms of destroying armies. "Push of pikes" is a simple game compared to defeating an army, which latter act requires an acuter intellect than that of a lusty halbardier.

Seldom will it be possible to march straight towards the enemy's

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main force and defeat it. Its whereabouts may be unknown, but even so, the ultimate objective—the destruction of it—remains constant. Consequently, though many acts may be required before the curtain of victory is finally rung down, each act must be a distinct progression towards the transformation scene of peace; if this be not the case, then an infringement of the principle of the objective will take place. This must be guarded against, for each blow must form a definite link in an offensive chain of blows, in which moves, as in chess, are seen ahead.

A general will seldom win without attacking, and he will seldom attack correctly unless he has chosen his objective with reference to the principles of war, and unless his attack is based on these principles. Imagination is a great detective, but imagination which is not based on the sound foundation of reason is at best but a capricious leader. Even genius itself, unless it be stiffened by powerful weapons, a high moral, discipline and training, can only be likened to a marksman armed with a blunderbuss—ability wasted through insufficiency of means. Conversely, an efficient army led by an antiquated soldier may be compared to a machine gun in the hands of an arbalister.

*The Principle of Security.*—The objective in battle being to destroy the enemy's fighting strength, consequently that side which can best secure itself against the blows of its antagonist will stand the best chance of winning, for by saving its men and weapons it will augment its offensive power. Security, therefore, is a shield and not a lethal weapon, and to look upon it as a weapon is to turn war upside down; consequently, the defensive is *not* the strongest form of war, but merely a prelude to the accomplishment of the true object of war—the destruction of the enemy by means of the offensive augmented by defensive measures.

As the offensive is essential to the successful attainment of the objective, it stands to reason that security without reference to the offensive is no security at all, but merely delayed suicide. Every man needlessly employed in defensive work is a weapon wielder less for offensive operations. In order to avoid an excessive use of men for purely protective duties, recourse is had to guards and outposts, the strength of which depends on the condition of time; the time it will take an enemy to cover a certain distance or the time it will take us to frustrate him doing so. Security may, therefore, be frequently considered as simply a means of gaining time at the expense of an enemy.

As danger and the fear of danger are the chief moral obstacles of

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the battlefield, it follows that the imbuing of troops with a sense of security is one of the chief duties of a commander, for, if weapons be of equal power, battles are won by a superiority of nerve rather than of numbers. This sense of security, though it may be supplemented by earth-works or mechanical means, is chiefly based on the feeling of moral ascendence due to fighting efficiency and confidence in command. Thus a man who is a skilled marksman will experience a greater security when lying in the open than an indifferent rifleman in a trench.

Given the skilled soldier, the moral ascendency resulting from his efficiency will rapidly evaporate unless it be skilfully directed and employed. We ultimately, as in all undertakings, civil or military, come back to the impulse of the moment, that is, to the brains which control it and each individual nerve which runs through the military body. To give skilled troops to an unskilled leader is tantamount to throwing snow on hot bricks. Skill in command, therefore, is the foundation of security, for a clumsy craftsman will soon take the edge off his tools.

The basis of strategical security is the soundness of the general plan of action, the infrequency of the change of objective or direction and the absence of unnecessary movement. Strategical security is also arrived at by placing an army in a good position to hit at the communications and headquarters of the enemy whilst protecting its own: by so disposing a force that it may live at ease and fight efficiently. Though movement, actual or potential, is the soul of strategy itself, the placing of forces in the area of operations, so that their very position threatens the enemy's initiative, is the spirit which should imbue all generalship, for on it rests the security and offensive power of an operation, a campaign or a war.

Grand tactical security may be defined as "the choosing of a vulnerable target or the refusal to offer one." Here the factors are mainly those of time and space. The rapid massing of weapons at the decisive point whether for attack or defence; the general organization of the battle, the penetration of a front, the envelopment of a flank, the endurance of the fight whether by retirement or pursuit, these and many other actions build up that general security which cements the units of an army into one complete whole.

Minor tactical security embraces the entire gamut of a soldier's actions, his individual moral and efficiency, the quickness and audacity of his leader, the judgment and determination of his commander and the confidence of his comrades. On the battlefield itself security will depend on seeing and not being seen, on hitting and not

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being hit, on moving and not being moved. The first embraces surprise, observation and cover from view; the second, the use of weapons, ground and armour; the third of mobility and protection. To move quickly is to reduce the chance of being hit, to suit formations to the conditions of fire and ground is simultaneously the increasing of hitting power and the reduction of the vulnerability of the target.

*The Principle of Concentration.*—Concentration, or the bringing of things or ideas to a point of union, presupposes movement; movement of ideas, especially in an army, is a far more difficult operation than the movement of men; nevertheless, unless ideas, strategical, tactical and administrative be concentrated, cohesion of effort will not result; and, in proportion as unity of action is lacking, so will an army's strength, moral and physical, be squandered in detail until a period be arrived at in which the minimum result will be obtained from the maximum effort. The central idea of an army is known as its "doctrine," which, to be sound, must be based on the principles of war, and which, to be effective, must be elastic enough to admit of a mutation in accordance with the change of circumstances. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding, this central idea or "doctrine" is nothing else than common-sense, *i.e.* action adapted to circumstances. The danger of a doctrine *per se* is that it is apt to ossify into a dogma and to be seized upon by mental emasculates who lack the virility of analytic and synthetic judgment, and who are only too grateful to rest assured that their action, however inept, finds justification in a book, which, if they think at all, is, in their opinion, written in order to exonerate them from so doing. In the past many armies have been destroyed by internal discord and some have been destroyed by the weapons of their antagonists, but the majority have perished through adhering to dogmas springing from their past successes, which is tantamount to self-destruction or suicide through inertia of mind. Mental lassitude or the abiding by the letter in place of the spirit of the law, which so frequently passes for "military ability," is the dry rot not only of armies but of kingdoms, republics and empires.

Though an army should operate according to the idea which through concentration has become part of its nature, the brain of the commander must in no way be hampered by preconceived or fixed opinions, for, whilst it is right that the soldier should consider himself invincible, it is never right that the commander should consider himself undefeatable; contempt for an enemy, however badly led, has frequently led to disaster; therefore, it is the first

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duty of the commander to concentrate on common-sense, and to maintain his doctrine in solution so that it may easily take the mould of whatever circumstances it may have to be cast in. Strategy should be based upon this doctrine of action adapted to circumstances, and, consequently, concentration in strategy may be defined as making the most of opportunity, and also forecasting and foreseeing the possibility of opportunity before it arises.

Strategical actions depending on means of movement, their concentration materially depends on communications, and from the network of lines of supply is evolved grand tactical concentration or the power of overcoming resistants or turning them to advantage.

Concentration, from the point of view of the battle itself, has for centuries been based on the maxim " of superiority of numbers at the decisive point," because numbers were the coefficient of weapons, each man normally being a one-weapon mounting. This maxim no longer holds good as a general rule, and, in its place, must be substituted " superiority of weapons, means of protection and movement," particularly the first. Men, in themselves, are an encumbrance, and the fewer men we can employ, without detracting from our weapon power, the greater will be our concentration of strength, for concentration has for its object the securing of an army from blows just as much as the giving of them. This latter reading of the principles of concentration brings us directly to our next great principle, the principle of economy of force.

*The Principle of Economy of Force.*—Economy of force may be defined as the efficient use of all means, moral and material, towards winning a war. Of all the principles of war it is the most difficult to apply because of its extremely close interdependence on the ever-changing conditions of war. To economize the moral energy of his men, a commander must not only be in spirit one of them, but must ever have his fingers on the pulse of the fighters, what they feel he must feel, and what they think he must think, but while they feel fear, experience discomfort, and think in terms of disaster, though he must understand what all these mean to the men themselves, he must in no way be obsessed by them. To him economy of force first means planning a battle which his men *can* fight, and secondly, adjusting this plan according to the psychological changes which the enemy's resistance is producing on their endurance without foregoing his objective. This does not only entail his possessing judgment, but foresight and imagination ; his plan must never crystallize, for the energy of the firing-line is always fluid. He must realize that a fog, a shower of rain, a cold night, an unexpected resistance, may force

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him to re-adapt his plan to a change of conditions, and, in order to enable him to do so, the grand tactical economy of force rests with his reserves which form the staying power of the battle and the fuel of all tactical movement.

On the battlefield itself, to economize his own strength and to force the enemy to dissipate his by means of feints and surprisals, is the first step towards victory. Every weapon which he can compel the enemy to withdraw from the point of attack is an obstacle removed from the eventual path of progress. Every subsidiary operation should be based on the objective, and effect a concentration of weapon power on the day of decisive action. Every subsidiary operation, therefore, should add a definite value to victory, that is, the power of producing a tactical dividend. Thus, even in so small an operation as a raid executed by twenty men, the question must first of all be asked what will be the tactical dividend if we are successful, will 5 per cent. recompense us for our action or must we aim at 10 per cent.? "Is the game worth the candle?" This is the question every commander must ask himself before playing at war.

By this it does not mean that risks must never be taken; far from it, it is by taking risks which are worth taking that more often than not the greatest economies are effected and the highest interest secured. Audacity is nearly always right in war, but gambling is nearly always wrong, and the worst form of gambling in war is gambling with small stakes, for an army is eventually bled white by this process.

Economy of force is also closely related to economy of movement. Many generals have attempted to win a Marathon in sprinting time; they have thrown in all their reserves on the first day and lost their wind twelve hours after the battle has begun. Such operations as these are doomed to failure long before the first shot is ever fired.

*The Principle of Movement.*—If concentration of weapon power be compared to a projectile and economy of force to its line of fire, then movement may be looked upon as the propellant, and as a propellant is not always in a state of explosive energy, so neither is movement. Movement is the power of endowing mass with momentum, it depends, therefore, largely on security, which, when coupled with offensive power, results in liberty of action. Movement consequently may be potential as well as dynamic, and, if an army be compared to a machine the power of which is supplied by a series of accumulators, should the object of its commander be to maintain movement, he can only accomplish it by a refilling of one set of accumulators while the other is in process of being exhausted. The

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shorter the time taken to do so, the more difficult will the commander's task be; consequently one of his main duties throughout war is to increase the motive power of his troops which depends on two main factors, moral and physical endurance.

The power to move in war must first be considered as the general will to move. In battle the forward impulse comes from the leaders and the troops themselves; they are in fact self-propelling winged projectiles, and are not impelled forward by the explosive energy of command; such energy scarcely, if ever, exists, what does exist is direction to its impulse and the reinforcing, recharging of this impulse, with more power by means of reserves. These reserves not only endow the combatants with physical energy, but with a moral sense of power and security which impels them forward.

Even with an army of high moral—that is to say, an army which possesses " the will to move " towards danger, or inversely " the will to refuse to move away from danger "—it must ultimately be the physical factor, the muscular endurance of the men themselves, which will set a limit to their power of movement. This endurance is adversely or beneficently affected by all the conditions of war, but particularly by the space to be covered, the nature of the ground and climate and the resistance of the enemy. In order to increase muscular movement, by conserving it as long as possible, mechanical means of movement have for some time been employed for the strategical and administrative movements of an army, so much so, that tactical movement to-day is based on locomotives and lorries. The result of this is that while strategic mobility, namely, movement at a distance from the enemy, has enormously increased, tactical movement has decreased in an inverse proportion, until battles founded on muscular movement have become practically static engagements based on broadside fire from fixed positions. In order to overcome this difficulty, mechanical cross-country movement has been forced on armies, and, whatever may be the prejudice shown to its introduction, its complete replacement of muscular movement is as near a certainty as can be foreseen.

In the tactical organization of movement the endurance of mobility depends on the stability of the base of operations which covers its lines of supply. This base has little to do with a fixed locality, but much with the organization of the troops protecting such a locality; these must form a mobile base of operations from which other forces operate. Unless this be done, the foundations of mobility will soon be undermined and the whole edifice of battle will collapse.

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*The Principle of Surprise.*—Lack of security, or a false interpretation of the principle of security, directly leads to being surprised, that is, taken unawares. The principle of surprise, like a double-edged tool, is an exceedingly dangerous one in unskilled hands; for, being mainly controlled by psychological factors, it is not so intimately affected by the material conditions of war as are the other principles.

Surprise, in its direct sense, presupposes the unexpected which throughout history may be considered under four general headings :—

(i) Surprise effected by unexpected or superiority of movement.

(ii) Surprise effected by superiority or novelty of weapons.

(iii) Surprise effected by superiority of means of protection.

(iv) Surprise effected by superiority of tactical organization.

It takes time to gain superiority in anything, consequently we find that, although minor surprises may be gained by seizing the right opportunities, the possibility of effecting major surprises is based extensively on the forecasts and preparations which have been made during days of peace as regards the nature and requirements of the next war. The surest foundations of eventually being surprised is to suppose that the next war will be like the last one. This, in modern times, has seldom been the case as the most casual of retrospects into military history will prove; consequently, when a commander attempts to copy former battles, we find that an army is frequently surprised with its eyes open, it sees things coming, but, blinded by prejudice and shackled by tradition, it does not perceive their consequences, which are only realized when their causes have taken, or are actually taking, effect.

On the battlefield itself a general is frequently surprised by his own stupidity, his lack of being able to understand conditions or to apply to them the principles of war. His stupidity sometimes takes the acute form of completely misunderstanding the endurance of his men, not realizing what they can do, he orders them to do something which they cannot do, and the result is chaos and loss of life. Surprise among troops, as amongst individuals, is a matter of nerves. The nerves of an army, however, are to be found not only in the individual and collective temperaments of the regimental officers and men, but also in its staff organization. Its trunk nerves are its General Staff officers whose one great duty is to convey the impressions, as felt by the rank and file, to the brains of their commander. If this be not done, the best laid plan will fail and the result will be paralysis of action in the event of a surprise.

*The Principle of Co-operation.*—Co-operation is a cementing principle which holds together all the other principles. It is closely

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related to economy of force and, therefore, to concentration, but it differs from both of these principles, for while mass is the concentrated strength of the organism, and economy of force the dispersed strength which renders the former stable, co-operation may be described as the muscular tension which knits all the parts into one whole. Without co-operation an army falls to pieces. In national wars, the value of co-operation is enormously enhanced, embracing, as it does, the whole body and soul of the nation, social, political, industrial and military, in one intricate self-supporting organism. All must pull together, for such wars are the wars of entire nations, whatever may be the size of the armies which should be looked upon as their weapons, and not of fractions of nations represented by champions called armies. We find, therefore, that for us co-operation in war embraces the whole gamut of our imperial existence, which means that one master-mind should control the whole national machinery, in order to reduce the friction which its adjustment by many hands must create. Friction is the antithesis of smooth running, and smooth running is the thesis of success, consequently in war co-operation is essential. Take, for instance, the government of a nation at war; if there be friction in the government, there is friction not only throughout the nation, but throughout the army. No man can serve God and Mammon, no man can serve two or half a dozen masters, neither can two or half a dozen masters lead and direct the same man. In the field it is better to have one bad general than two good ones, for duality is the father of friction. If, in a cabinet of, let us suppose, six members, each controlling a great national department, each member strives to conduct a war according to his own particular degree of ignorance in strategy; instead of one objective there will be six objectives, and, consequently, there will be no definite objective at all; for the army and the nation are either distracted by six separate campaigns or six phases of one campaign. When such a state of affairs arises, it is time to declare a dictatorship and to hand over the national welfare to one man, for dispersion of force in war is to commit suicide while temporarily insane. There can be but one main objective, and all subsidiary ones must be reduced to their utmost limit, so as to enable the concentration of all requisite battle-power at the decisive point. One objective requires one master-mind to formulate the general plan, and not half a dozen jacks-of-all-trades to dissipate it. The master-mind must control the war, and all other minds must accept or be compelled to accept his ruling.

Tactically, co-operation is based on battle organization, weapons,

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protection and movement, skill, confidence, discipline and determination; it is moral, physical and mechanical. This means that all will work for the attainment of the objective, and not for themselves. The weeding out of fools and knaves is, therefore, the first step in this accomplishment; the second is the scrapping of peace processes and shibboleths, and the bringing of ability to the top. Senility of thought is the antithesis of co-operative action. A vintage of new ideas is always produced in war and the vats must be sufficient and the bottles strong enough to hold it; for new ideas, like new wine, go through a process of fermentation, which in an army, commanded by an obsolete general, means the improvisation of means and methods which do not harmonize with the general plan. Co-operation in its widest sense spells not only military efficiency, but also national and imperial efficiency which, centred round one line of direction, impel all the life and fighting strength of the nation towards victory; without such a pivotal line, an army flounders but does not fight.

### 5. *The Conditions of War.*

Principles by themselves are not worth the paper on which they are written, they are mere words strung together in a certain order; their value lies in their application, and this application depends on the thousand and one conditions which surround the elements of war during operations.

What are these conditions? for, without knowing them, their application is manifestly impossible. Conditions are innumerable and ever changing, but the following are some of the most important, namely, time, space, ground, weather, numbers, moral, communication, supply, armament, formation, obstacles and observation. Each of these conditions may be considered as possessing a dual nature—a power of increasing the endurance of the attacker and a power of increasing the resistance of the defender; each, therefore, may be looked upon as possessing the power of enhancing offensive and defensive action in war.

A commander has three means at his disposal in order to deal with any condition in war: (i) he may avoid it; (ii) he may break it down; (iii) he may turn it to his own advantage.

The third course, which masters the difficulty, is manifestly the best, and it is the one which even a superficial study of military history will show us was employed by the great captains of war, it was in fact the keynote of their success.

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### 6. *The Battle.*

An attempt has so far been made to make an analysis of the study of war; in the remainder of this article the process will be reversed, and from the various components, which analysis has separated, it is proposed to build up synthetically the crucial act of war—the battle.

A battle is an enormously complex action consisting of a number of simple parts. First, we must grasp the conditions, and, by so doing, ride the course. We then must take all the conditions which we know and weigh out their values in terms of assistance and resistance to ourselves. Those we do not know, but suspect, we must consider even more carefully than those we know, allowing for a considerable margin of error, and always giving the benefit of doubt to the enemy.

Having collected and codified these conditions, we must next apply to them the principles of war. We must decide upon our objective, applying the offensive to those conditions which will assist us and security to those which will not; thus shall we master conditions and harness them to our favour. We then think in terms of concentration, of economy of force, of movement and surprise, finally, we weave the whole together in co-operation.

By now our plan will have evolved almost unconsciously, and our plan is our grand tactics.

From this point we think purely in terms of fighting, the skeleton is complete, all that now remains is to clothe it with flesh and muscle—the elements of war. We think in terms of men, movement, weapons and protection. There are the categories—the commander, the leader, the fighter and the sustainer: what are they all going to do? Then human and animal endurance and communications; weapons, how shall we use them, how shall we combine them? protection, by armour, earth, fire and formation. All these give us our battle tactics. Then there is the battle itself in which the moral and physical powers of man come into play; the approach merges into the attack and the offensive and defensive powers of weapons, shielded by direct and indirect protection, carry the man forward. Such is battle and such is war—a science based on sure foundations, rooted fast in the past with its boughs and leaves moving this way and that above and around us according to the conditions of the moment, but governed by the laws of existence—action and inertia.

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# AIRCRAFT CO-OPERATION WITH INFANTRY

By Wing-Commander J. A. Chamier, C.M.G., D.S.O.

The immense strides made in aviation during the war and the steady growth and development of the Royal Air Force, led to a much closer co-operation between aircraft and the troops in the field than seemed probable or even possible in 1914. It is doubtful, however, whether even at the end of the war the average infantry soldier, whether officer or man, really understood the work of the airmen or appreciated the extent of the help which they gave to him or the difficulties against which they had to contend. In this article it is proposed, therefore, to discuss shortly the various rôles which the Royal Air Force is called upon to play in conjunction with infantry before, during and after a battle; for it is obvious that, if the co-operation between the two services is to be developed to the full, it must be based upon mutual confidence. There can be no such confidence unless the airman and the soldier recognize and understand the powers and limitations of each other's service. Knowledge is the only sure foundation for confidence, and, consequently, it should be the constant aim of each service to learn all that it can of the other's organization and methods of operation, in order that it may be able to appreciate its troubles and difficulties and to form some conception of its mind and point of view. It is only in this way that the necessary sympathy between the two services can be assured and a true comradeship maintained under the difficult conditions of war.

Unity of command in the field is one of the first military principles. Air formations or units, therefore, which are detailed to co-operate with troops are invariably placed under the strategic and tactical control of the military commander, although for purposes of administration and technical supply the Royal Air Force maintains its own control and organization. The senior Royal Air Force officer with his staff has his headquarters at General Headquarters in the Field. This officer is in administrative command of all air



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units, but he is subordinate in tactical matters to the Commander-in-Chief to whom he acts as air adviser. Certain air squadrons are attached to the Royal Air Force headquarters, the duties of which are to carry out special reconnaissances for the Higher Command and, as a rule, a reserve group or other formation is also retained there which can be used to reinforce any particular portion of the front or where occasion may require.

At each Army headquarters there is a group captain of the Royal Air Force who is the air adviser of the army commander. Under him there is a wing commander in command of certain squadrons which carry out distant reconnaissances and fighting and bombing work for the Army. Under the group commander there is also another wing commander, whose duty it is to act as special air adviser to the various army corps commanders. This officer controls the squadrons, one or more of which is allotted to work with each corps.

Normally, the subdivision of the Royal Air Force units goes no lower than this for the simple reason that a squadron is the smallest self-contained unit; but in an emergency one or more of the three flights into which a squadron is divided may be allotted for a definite operation to a particular division. It must be realized, however, that this can only be a temporary measure which cannot be made permanent without loss of efficiency.

A corps squadron has about forty officers and two hundred other ranks, and on active service has eighteen aeroplanes in commission. In peace time this number of machines is reduced to twelve from motives of economy.

It will be seen from this short summary that every large formation of troops has its allotted aircraft, working directly under the orders of the military commander. It is for him to decide the work which is to be carried out; the method of carrying it out is left to the discretion of the Air Force officer concerned.

Aircraft which are allotted to co-operate with infantry may be called upon to perform any of the following tasks * :—

* Observation of artillery fire by aircraft is beyond the scope of this article. Nor will more than a passing reference be made to airships, because, so far as can be seen at present, even if they are filled with non-inflammable gas, these vessels are likely to remain for a long time to come highly vulnerable, and are therefore unsuitable for use in European warfare. No reference will be made to the kite-balloon, not because it lacks capacity to render valuable assistance to troops, but because its future does not appear to be with the Royal Air Force. The military authorities probably wish to retain it as a means of observation, but it has no claim to the power of independent action on which is based the right of the Royal Air Force to exist as a separate service.



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(1) *Before and after the battle.*
  (*a*) Strategic reconnaissance.
  (*b*) Tactical reconnaissance.
  (*c*) Intercommunication.

(2) *During the battle.*
  (*a*) Reporting the position of our own troops ("Contact Patrol").
  (*b*) Watching the movements of the enemy ("Counter-attack Patrol").
  (*c*) Offensive action by bombing and machine-gun fire.
  (*d*) Other assistance to troops—*e.g.* providing smoke screens, supplying ammunition, maintaining communications.
  (*e*) Transporting troops.

(3) *At all times.*
  (*a*) Attacking the enemy's aircraft.

(1) *Before and after the battle.*

(*a*) Strategic or distant reconnaissances.—As before the advent of aircraft this task was mainly performed by cavalry, it is not proposed in this article to deal at any length with this part of the work of the Royal Air Force. It is sufficient to say that with an efficient air service no large concentration of the enemy should escape observation. Any unusual activity at railway junctions, the increase of traffic on railway lines, the growth of dumps, the erection of hospitals and camps—all these, even if they escape the observer's eye, are faithfully recorded by the camera, which is the inseparable companion of the strategic reconnaissance observer, and can be noted and analysed by the Intelligence branch of the General Staff. Darkness may be used to hide movements by rail and road to a certain extent, but aerial reconnaissance during the night, though handicapped, can still bring in a large amount of information. The use of magnesium parachute flares, both for visual observation and photographic purposes at night, is tending to lighten the cloak which darkness confers.

Strategic reconnaissance may be carried out by formations at moderate heights which expect to have to fight the enemy's air forces, or more often because more economically by single machines flying at such extreme heights that their interception by hostile aircraft or by gunfire from the ground is unlikely. The long-focus camera renders reconnaissance from these heights efficient.

Reconnaissances of this kind are carried out by H.Q. or by army squadrons, and the work is of a very exhausting character

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to the air *personnel* on account of the great distances which must be traversed, often unescorted, over the enemy's country.

(*b*) Tactical reconnaissance.—This form of reconnaissance more closely concerns the infantry, for it implies that the opposing forces are within striking distance of one another. The responsibility for this form of observation consequently rests with the corps squadrons which work directly with the infantry and are supplied with the type of aeroplane most suitable for the purpose. The distances to which aircraft which are employed upon this task must penetrate are not nearly so great as in strategic reconnaissance, and the work to that extent is less arduous, but the difficulties to be faced by the airmen in order to obtain information are very often greater. The leading troops on both sides in open warfare are usually scattered, and in enclosed country it is a matter of extreme difficulty for the airmen to detect them. It is almost impossible for them to do so unless they fly low, within the reach of effective rifle fire from the ground, and consequently they must run the risk of encountering a devastating burst of fire from concealed machine guns.

In open country, on the other hand, much valuable information can be obtained; but even here the task of the airmen would become considerably harder if troops were able to carry into practice the following simple rules for escaping observation :—

(i.) To keep still.

(ii.) To adopt irregular formations.

(iii.) To take advantage of the smallest accident of the ground : *e.g.* the line between ploughed and unploughed land.

(iv.) To keep in shadows (if any).

(v.) To avoid looking up.

In close country troops should always remember that their presence can only be detected from an aeroplane if they open fire. Reconnaissance by drawing fire became in fact an accepted method on the front of the Fourth Army during the German retreat in 1918. If this is realized, it is clear that outpost troops, whose primary duty is " to see without being seen," should refuse to fire unless it is obvious that their position has been discovered. On the other hand, when it is plain that concealment is no longer possible, efficiently controlled bursts of fire, especially machine-gun fire, have a very valuable effect, for it must be remembered that, although it is only when the pilot is killed or badly hurt that the aeroplane will fall immediately out of control, much damage is often done to a machine, the full effect of which is not obvious to the onlooker. During the last four months of the war the casualties in *personnel*

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and aeroplanes suffered by our corps squadrons from this form of defence were considerably greater than that from anti-aircraft fire and aerial fighting combined. A squadron with eighteen machines has had no less than six put out of action by machine-gun fire in one day, and yet it is doubtful whether the machine gunners in any single case had the satisfaction of seeing the results of their shooting. Even if hits are not obtained, the moral effect of machine-gun fire on the airman is considerable; it tends to drive him higher, and it is apt at least to disturb his concentration on his task. In the future armoured aeroplanes will doubtless be met by an increased penetration and weight of bullet, and the old war of gun versus armour will be carried on without greatly affecting the general rules of the case.

(*c*) Intercommunication.—This is a matter of vital interest to an army, and the use of aircraft to supplement other means of communication was early contemplated. In practice this method was little used during the war, since by the time that the number of aeroplanes available was sufficient to justify their use on this work operations had become stationary and an efficient telegraphic and telephonic system was in working order. The occasional transportation by air of a staff officer who was urgently required at some headquarters sums up the work done, except in the Palestine campaign, where aircraft were of considerable value as a means of keeping in touch with the co-operating Arab forces.

After 1914, on the Western front, the Allies never got into real offensive moving warfare—the great German retreat before the Armistice was carried out slowly, and so our communications kept pace with the limited rate of advance which was all that could be effected. There was only one occasion when real movement took place, and that was during the Allied retreat to Amiens in the spring of 1918. This period deserves more than a passing reference. The speed and drive of the German advance caused the greatest confusion. The Fifth Army found it difficult to keep touch with the various corps, while divisions and brigades were at times completely lost. That aircraft should have been of the greatest service on this occasion is clear; that they failed to be of much assistance was due to three causes:—

(i.) Due preparation had not been made for such an emergency.

(ii.) All available aircraft were diverted to bombing, in order to try to stem the German advance.

(iii.) Squadrons themselves were moving from day to day, and were thus not in a position to give the most efficient service.

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The great work done by the Royal Air Force in "holding the front" was fully recognized, but there were considerable grounds for the feeling which undoubtedly prevailed that the employment of *all* available machines upon this work had disastrous results. We often found ourselves in ignorance of the position of the enemy, and, worse still, more than doubtful of the situation of the headquarters of our own formations. From the experience gained during this period of the war the following plan was worked out in detail, which should be of considerable value in any form of rapidly moving warfare :—

(i.) Squadron headquarters will be situated well in rear at such a distance that movement will not be required oftener than every three days. This policy will entail a jump of about fifty miles at a time, but lesser distances are, in view of the range and speed of aircraft, waste of time and energy.

(ii.) A main report centre on a practicable landing ground will be established in the neighbourhood of corps headquarters. These headquarters, and, if possible, divisional headquarters, should be chosen with a view to possible landing grounds. To assist the staffs of the higher formations in this matter Royal Air Force officers will be temporarily attached to corps and divisional headquarters, whose duty it will be to improve liaison, to explain the difficulties of the air and to gain a comprehensive view of the points on which the military commander desires information.

(iii.) One flight of each corps squadron will remain on battle reconnaissance work, one will work for the artillery, and one flight will be diverted to "liaison" reconnaissance. Bombing and other offensive work in holding the line will be the rôle of the army squadrons.

(iv.) The main report centre will be the working headquarters of the squadron by day ; machines will return to squadron headquarters at night.

(v.) All headquarters will be provided with suitable call signs made up of strips, or the French system of ground sheets may be used. The object of such signs is to enable the air observer instantly to recognize the nature of any unit or formation thus :—

The signs

DW
DX
DY
DZ

} would indicate the Divisions of Corps "D."

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WW
WX
WY
WZ } would indicate the Brigades of Division " W." *


(vi.) At frequent intervals a liaison aeroplane will be detailed to fly over the ground and will make a prearranged signal for the strips to be put out. For this purpose, special call letters (*e.g.* DX) may be sounded on a Klaxon in order to get in touch with a lost headquarters. The locations obtained in this way could then be sent down by code wireless (see under " C.I.B." below) if so desired.

(vii.) Liaison machines will convey staff officers or orders, etc., whenever required.

A detailed system of communication arranged on these lines will ensure that the commanders of the higher formations are kept in touch with the lower formations throughout a battle, and are in a position to send their orders with speed to all subordinates and to receive reports from them.

Emphasis must once again be laid on the fact that the importance to the military command of an efficient air service is great enough to justify the greatest care being exercised in the establishment, whenever possible, of all headquarters within reach of a practicable

* The French system of ground panels has much to recommend it. It is reproduced below:—




Each sign is 3 metres over its maximum diameter, squares or bands 4 centimetres wide.

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landing ground. It is hardly too much to say that with the higher formations, at least, this should be the first consideration: the telegraph, telephone and motor car will do much to annihilate distance as an obstacle to liaison with lower formations, but nothing will make up for a lack of immediate and personal contact with the air service and its reports.

(2) *During the battle.*

(*a*) Reporting the position of our own troops (" Contact Patrol "). —This work is a very important rôle of aeroplanes when working with infantry. The conditions of a modern battle are such that often it is by aerial reconnaissance alone that early information of the progress of the infantry can be obtained. The closing of the rearward communications by barrage fire and the consequent destruction of telephones and telegraphs and impassibility of roads prevent the forward troops from speedily notifying their advance, while the confused nature of the ground and the destruction of landmarks by artillery fire generally make them uncertain as to their actual position on the map. The contact patrol system was started in 1916, and proved of such value that aircraft were especially detailed to follow and to report upon the progress of our troops in battle. It was soon found that this was not an easy task. Under reasonable conditions it was not a matter of great difficulty to follow the advance in the early stages. During the first leap forward of the attack, the heavy artillery barrage which was put down on the opposing lines kept the enemy busy and enabled the contact aeroplane to fly low and to see every movement on the ground; but, when once the barrage had passed on or ceased, the enemy's machine-gun and rifle fire made extremely low flying impossible. To add to the troubles of the airmen, the attacking troops usually " went to ground," or progressed by small local advances here and there, squeezing out pockets of the enemy, and it thus became a matter of extreme difficulty to form from the air an accurate estimate of the line held. Attempts to remedy these difficulties were many, but they gradually focussed themselves on the provision of a small flare, to be lit by the most advanced troops on receipt of a signal from the contact aeroplane. These flares were of considerable service, but it was realized that they were not a full solution of the trouble for the following reasons:—

(i.) They caused smoke and drew fire; hence the troops were shy of using them.

(ii.) They were an expendable store, and consequently difficulties of supply arose in a long battle.

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(iii) They were something extra to carry, and therefore unpopular with the already overburdened infantryman.

During 1917 no new system was evolved, and the difficulties of the air service constantly grew until they reached a climax in 1918 with the extensive employment of tanks. The use of these new and valuable weapons of war necessitated that attacks should be made in the semi-darkness, and, as if this were not a sufficient handicap to the air observer, it was speedily found that smoke screens were essential, if the anti-tank gun was to be successfully countered. The battlefield when viewed from above thus became a chaos of smoke and dust through which only occasional glimpses of movement could be obtained, and the work of the contact aeroplane proceeded somewhat in this manner: The observer selected as a base for operations a landmark well within our own lines. From this point, flying at under five hundred feet, he proceeded towards the lines, making large circles: in succession motor transport, guns on the move, horse transport, infantry in column of route, motor ambulances and infantry in artillery formations were seen, and lastly stretchers and small parties moving off the road. Actual contact was obtained, if movement was going on, by the recognition of troops, or, if the battle had died down, by drawing fire. This point established, the observer used to work up or down the front in a similar manner, the principle being to determine the front by methodically making good points from the rear until contact was obtained, thus minimising the risk of being shot down by fire from the ground. It will be realized from the above how much conditions on an active front had changed by 1918, in contrast with the sitting "up aloft" and calling for flares of 1916, and it is clearly most desirable to attempt to arrive at some method by which the observer may be assisted in his difficult task. If some form of distinguishing badge (say, a white sailor collar) could be worn on the backs of the infantry, it would be of great advantage. It is recognized, however, that unless the air could be entirely denied to hostile machines, troops would be more than reluctant to give themselves away to hostile aircraft. But it is believed that the benefits would greatly outweigh the disadvantages. It seems obvious that the correct principle should be that troops should be visible from the air, unless they take pains to conceal themselves, rather than that they should be permanently hidden until they take definite action to disclose themselves. If there is to be any real confidence in the general superiority of our Air Force, the former of these principles is clearly the better one. It is easier to teach men to conceal their

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identity on the approach of hostile aircraft than to violate their natural instinct for cover by disclosing their position on demand from their own contact machines, even if that demand be heard during the din of battle. It is possible that, if soldiers " grew up " in peace time to this identification collar, it would become a habit, and that it would not give rise in war to the objections which were raised against the use of flares.

Failing this council of perfection, it will be necessary to provide troops with some apparatus with which to disclose their position when required. The points which must be aimed at appear to be :—

(i.) The store should be non-expendable, *i.e.* it should require infrequent replacement.

(ii.) It must be light.

(iii.) It must not be bulky.

(iv.) It should be combined with some portion of the equipment and should not be an extra which could be thrown away or mislaid.

These desiderata seem best filled by a flap or false front to the gas-mask satchel. If this were made of white American cloth, stained khaki at the back, and the face sown to the lower edge of the back of the satchel and fastened at the top with buttons, its weight would be negligible and it would always be handy when wanted. On demand from the aeroplane, the leading troops would unbutton the flap and expose the white side of it, waving it to and fro to catch the observer's eye.

It is possible that discussion may lead to the evolution of something better than the suggested flap. It is essential at least that some identity signal should be standardized and issued to all ranks. Until this is done, the soldier is hardly likely to recognize that he and the aeroplane aloft are part and parcel of one team. This is the one real essential—a knowledge on the part of the soldier that the contact aeroplane is in the air for his benefit, and that it is to his interest to assist the observer to the best of his ability. We cannot have a repetition of the ignorance which was too common to the end of the war, in the last fourteen days of which advanced troops in no particularly exposed positions used to ignore the calls from aeroplanes for the disclosure of their identity.

But if the difficulties of gaining information by the observer so greatly increased, the closing stages of the war showed a welcome improvement in the methods of notifying the news gained. Up to August, 1918, reference by wireless to the position of our own troops had been forbidden in view of the danger of disclosing news to the

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enemy. Thus the line laboriously traced by the observer was not available to the commanders of the higher formations until the return of the aeroplane after a prolonged flight: worse than this, in many cases casualties occurred with the work half done, with the result that information gained up to that time was often lost. In August, 1918, however, the method of "protractor reference" was adopted. A circular protractor, with a pivoted arm scaled in millimeters, was centred on a given datum point with the zero line of the protractor at a prearranged angle with the north and south grid line on the observer's map and on the maps kept by the General Staff at corps headquarters. As soon as a point on the line was made good, it was reported by wireless to the central information station, which is referred to below, and from there sent out broadcast. All concerned could then trace the line almost simultaneously with its discovery by the observer, and every one from a corps commander to a battery commander was able to keep touch with the position of our forward troops.

(*b*) Watching the movements of the enemy ("Counter-attack Patrol").—In the early days of co-operation with infantry the contact aeroplane was able to keep a look out for counter-attacks, but, as its task grew more and more difficult, it was seen that the contact observer could not be depended upon for this work: during the course of 1917 onwards, therefore, a special machine was in the air during periods of major operations, the task of the observer in which was to detect preparations for a counter-attack. If the enemy was seen to be massing in his trenches, concentrated artillery fire was directed on to him, but, if he had moved out to the attack, artillery fire was called for on S.O.S. barrage lines. At the same time our own leading troops were warned of the impending attack by a special smoke signal.

It is difficult to estimate the measure of success attained by these patrols, but the impression is that in those early days more counter-attacks were seen than was the case in the last year of the war. There is little doubt that this was due to the increasing difficulty of the conditions, and, above all, to the employment of smoke in large quantities. If these conditions are to continue, it is doubtful whether the counter-attack aeroplane is worth keeping in the air merely for the purpose of locating *local* counter-attacks starting on the immediate battlefield, while, if conditions become easier, and smoke is no longer largely used, the contact patrol should once more be able to undertake this work. The experience gained in the last phases of the war, from August to November, 1918, suggests that the

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utility of aircraft lies less in giving warning of local counter-attacks than in notifying the direction of the main counter-stroke, or the enemy's pivot points for resistance in rear. It would be interesting to obtain the views of infantry officers on this subject—if the local counter-attack patrol can be dispensed with (other than with regard to such observation as can be carried out by the contact aeroplane), then, with the increased efficiency of the transmission of information attained by modern methods, it is thought that the extended counter-attack patrol machine should give valuable information of the enemy's movements. In short, it is proposed to change the rôle of this form of patrol from that of mere protective reconnaissance against local counter-attacks for the benefit of the front line infantry, to one of securing tactical information of value to the Higher Command in the general conduct of the battle.

(*c*) Offensive action by bombing and machine-gun fire.—During the recent war the Royal Air Force by offensive action was able to render very material assistance to the infantry. This co-operation took various forms. For a limited offensive, such, for example, as an attack on a divisional front, it was possible to co-operate by the direct bombardment of the objective from the air. For one such attack on the Somme in 1918 a programme was prepared for the arrival of one aeroplane every twenty seconds from zero until the attacking infantry attained its objectives, and there is no doubt that a constant stream of aircraft bombing and firing machine guns from low heights must have a considerable effect on the enemy's moral. In other cases, where the ground was favourable, offensive co-operation took the form of formations of scout aeroplanes flying in line at minimum heights, topping a rise like partridges, skimming a hedge and shooting up the enemy's trenches within a few seconds of their first coming into view.

The silencing of anti-tank guns with bombs and machine-gun fire was a very important task of the Royal Air Force in the last months of the war, and special squadrons were devoted to this purpose. No other arm can afford the same degree of assistance to tanks in this respect as air squadrons when properly handled. In a matter of seconds an anti-tank gun can do immense damage to the advancing tanks, and there is no time in which to direct effective artillery fire in order to put it out of action. During the last three months of the war it was claimed that numbers of batteries and individual guns were silenced from the air, and there is little doubt that tanks, if anything in the nature of the present type is retained, will in the next war require the closest co-operation from especially

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detailed and trained air units. On the other hand, aeroplanes, armed with a light gun of the pom-pom type, flying in rear of the advanced troops, may well prove to be one of the surest weapons for dealing with any hostile tanks which may have broken our line. Such matters, however, can be discussed more fully when the co-operation of tanks and aircraft is being considered, but a brief reference has been made to them here in view of the importance of the subject to the infantry.

Apart from these specialized operations, all aircraft which cross the line on duty, or are available for use, can be well employed from zero hour in bombing and shooting the enemy wherever he can be found. It is best that such action should be widely distributed, as it will then tend to increase the disorganization caused on the whole of the enemy's front by the infantry attack.

An hour or two after an attack has been launched some sort of order will begin, as a rule, to arise out of confusion; the enemy's resistance will begin to be reorganized on definite lines, and reinforcements will be pushing up along certain ascertainable routes. At this stage sporadic bombing is uneconomical, and far better value can be obtained if bombing is concentrated on the spot or spots where most damage will result to the enemy's plans. The truth of this assertion was clearly brought out on the 8th of August, 1918, when the Canadians had broken through on the Amiens front and were pushing on astride the road to Roye. An airman discovered that German machine-gun reinforcements were being rushed out in lorries from Roye to fill the gap. He did what he could to stop them (and earned a V.C. in so doing), but that was all. No system existed whereby he could call to his assistance all available machines, and, as he was himself shot down, his news was delayed for hours and was valueless by the time when it arrived. From this small incident it was at once seen that after the attack bombing must be used economically; that it must be concentrated, if the fullest value was to be obtained; and, as a corollary of this, that it was necessary to have a system of speedily communicating to the Royal Air Force any news of tactical value. As a result of this incident, the central information bureau (C.I.B.) system, which played such a large part in the ensuing operations, was organized. In brief, this system consisted of a wireless station pushed well up towards the front to receive wireless signals from aircraft in the usual manner, but equipped with a transmitting set on continuous wave for rapidly disseminating the information received. Thus information gained by contact, counter-attack or special patrol aeroplanes was instantly

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distributed to corps squadron headquarters (for the corps commander), Royal Air Force wing, and group headquarters, and to any other units equipped with receiving sets which desired to "listen in." The system had far-reaching results. In place of sporadic bombing, all aircraft which were not otherwise engaged could be employed in attacking German troops. An aeroplane which had found a magnificent target could at once call out reserve bombers and fighters standing ready to take the air to share his luck, and every bomb was dropped with a definite object on the spot where its effect would be most felt. Repeated attacks made it impossible for the enemy to withdraw guns, transport was wrecked, roads blocked, and in places retreat turned into rout. In these days of barbed wire and hidden machine guns, cavalry is often unable to fulfil its rôle of pressing a beaten force; it remains for the Royal Air Force to add a new terror to retreat.

(*d*) Other assistance to troops.—In addition to the various forms of co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the infantry, to which allusion has been made, other forms of assistance from the air were gradually developed during the war, to which a brief reference must be made. Of these communication was of primary importance.

Experiments are now proceeding with wireless telephony, and it is hoped that these will lead to good results. The intention is that corps headquarters should be served by advanced landing grounds and divisional headquarters by wireless telephony, but it is with lower formations and units that the chief difficulties arise. Various reasons preclude the use of wireless telephony by the lesser formations: among these are the necessity for secrecy, the complication of wave-lengths, and the difficulty of producing a small power unit for use by troops in direct contact with the enemy. It is comparatively easy to communicate from the air to the ground by dropping message bags: it is from the ground to the air that the problem becomes acute. It is possible that from brigade headquarters the picking up of messages by grapnel from a wire slung between two light poles may afford a solution of the problem, but this method can hardly be adopted for use by troops in the front line. The "Popham or T-panel" is at the present time the accepted form of communication for these, but it is a slow and clumsy method, and, although it was in use for many months of war, it can claim but few successes. It is difficult to suggest an alternative which would prove more successful, more especially in view of the desirability of its being of universal application and not being placed in the hands

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of specialists. Possibly horizontal semaphore signalling may prove to have the fewest disadvantages: knowledge of this system of signalling is almost universal; it is quick and easy to read; and it might be used by a man lying flat on his back and thus in a position to take considerable advantage of cover. The opinions of infantry officers on this point would be welcome.

Ammunition and food supply from aircraft, parachutes being used to break the fall, is a development of the last few months of the war, and appears to have been first used by the Germans on the Flanders front. During the hundred days' battle of 1918 it became a standard practice in the Fourth Army, and as many as a hundred boxes of ammunition, mostly packed in belts, were dropped in a single day. In some cases grateful messages were received from the infantry after the battle. One word of caution is desirable, military commanders must not look upon this method of sending forward ammunition as a main source of supply in supersession of ammunition columns. It is intended to be applicable only to isolated bodies of troops who indicate by a small ground strip that they are short of ammunition, or food, and who cannot be reached in time by ordinary methods. There is no doubt that in such cases material assistance can be rendered from the air.

The screening of commanding ground beyond the reach of guns by smoke bombs dropped from aircraft is a curious reversal of policy, but has been proved to be of definite value. During 1916 the Fourth Army Commander stated that he looked upon aerial observation as his trump card, and that he would not fight unless the conditions were suitable for such observation. The introduction of tanks and the success of the anti-tank gun led inevitably to the increasing use of smoke, heightening, as has already been pointed out, to an enormous degree the difficulties of aerial observation. It was, therefore, rather an amusing development that the Royal Air Force which complained bitterly of the use of smoke in the first instance should have been obliged before the close of the war to add to its volume! So long as advances were of a very limited depth in order not to lose the support of the heavy artillery, so long was it unnecessary for smoke screens to be provided by aircraft; but, during the last few months, when fighting became more open, it was a matter of policy to press on with a view to capturing the enemy's guns. The smoke necessary for masking commanding positions in the enemy's lines could, in these circumstances, only be provided by aircraft. In October, 1918, forty aircraft were employed on this work during the first two hours of a major attack, and smoke

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screens in a smaller way were continued for six hours. There is little doubt that, given favourable conditions, these screens were of considerable value to troops.

(*e*) Transporting troops.—The transportation of troops by air is a development of the future: its possibilities must not for that reason be entirely overlooked. Aeroplanes are now under design capable of carrying a platoon fully armed, equipped and rationed. Lighter-than-aircraft already have considerable carrying power, and airships already built could be adapted to carry two hundred fully equipped infantry a distance of a thousand miles in twenty hours, and to return from their destination without refuelling. In European wars this application of aircraft is perhaps of no great utility, but its possibilities in uncivilized warfare are obviously considerable. It is unnecessary to go into this subject in further detail for the present, but a reference to it is called for in view of the importance which it may assume.

(3) *At all times.*

(*a*) Attacking the enemy's aircraft.—A form of assistance to troops which the Royal Air Force is able to offer at all times, is in controlling the activities of the enemy's aircraft. This is essentially the duty of special squadrons, but the whole of our air *personnel* is imbued with the offensive spirit which leads it to engage hostile aircraft wherever met. It is not to be inferred from this that an infantry aeroplane will leave its proper work to chase an enemy through miles of space, but it *is* implied that no hostile aeroplane will be permitted to work within reasonable distance of British machines without being engaged. It is necessary, however, for the infantry to form some idea of the capacity and limitations of our aircraft in this form of warfare, for without this knowledge troops may infer that all is not well in the air, and that their moral may thus be adversely affected. It is impossible here to go into the whole art of aerial fighting, but a few points may be made :—

(i.) During the last war most aerial engagements were fought well over the enemy's lines at great heights and often out of sight of our own troops. Out of sight must not be allowed to be out of mind, and the presence of a hostile machine on the line and the absence of our fighters must not lead to conclusions being drawn adverse to the Royal Air Force.

(ii.) Offensive fighting is the surest form of defence in the air as on the ground. It was proved at Verdun that if the fighting air forces were given the task of defensive patrols, they invariably failed to prevent the penetration of the enemy's aircraft over the Allied

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lines. If the enemy be sought out and actively attacked in his own air, he will be less likely to penetrate into ours. To attempt to force the hand of the air commander by urging the necessity of close defence in the air is to pave the way for defeat.

(iii.) Aerial fighting is the surest counter to the enemy's aircraft, but this rule does not apply to hostile low-flying craft. If "ground-strafing" aeroplanes come and shoot up our forward troops, it is useless to call on the Royal Air Force to stop them. Aerial fighting requires space, and the true counter to low-flying aeroplanes is well directed and controlled machine-gun fire from the ground. As has been already pointed out in this article, this low flying is no joy-ride, and many an aeroplane goes away badly damaged without showing any obvious signs that it has been hit.

(iv.) Aerial supremacy in its completest form can hardly deny the air *in toto* to the enemy. No air force can be expected entirely to prevent the enemy from crossing the lines, any more than the most superior artillery in the world can, by its counter-battery work, absolutely prevent our troops from being shelled. Air superiority of its very nature is relative: it can hardly be absolute.

In conclusion, too much emphasis cannot be laid on the essential point that the infantry and the airmen together form a team which must work in the closest co-operation. Two considerations stand out above all others in which improvement can be obtained: First, that the staffs of all the higher formations should keep ever in their minds the needs of suitable landing country when selecting their headquarters; and secondly, that the troops in contact with the enemy should assist the airmen to discover their position, even if this be at the expense of disclosing similar information *in some degree* to the enemy. To the general superiority of the Royal Air Force over the enemy's aerial units must be given the trust that the degree of danger involved in so doing is not prohibitive.

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# INDIA AT THE CROSS-ROADS

In comparison with its effects in other parts of the Empire, the recent war touched India very slightly. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that between the years 1914 and 1918 the vast majority of the native community in India hardly realized that a great world struggle was raging, or that the destiny of the country depended upon its issue. India no doubt provided men and material, but the percentage of the former to the whole population was so small that only the few who were closely related to the men who were sent abroad were in any way affected. As for the material provided, it afforded an opportunity to such individuals as were in a position to supply the Government with the necessary stores to grow rich and to prosper at the expense of the community at large. Meanwhile, the remainder of the population, removed by thousands of miles from the scene of conflict, pursued the even tenor of its way, only disturbed from time to time by the usual frontier rising, by a spasmodic upheaval beyond the frontier, or by the machinations of political extremists at home.

And yet when the signing of the Armistice was announced in November, 1918, the vast majority of the native population of India was quite ready to believe that it had won the war, and to deceive itself into thinking that the terms of the Armistice extended to the frontiers of India, relieving it of all further responsibility as to preparation for war. Thus an immediate consequence of the restoration of peace was a demand for retrenchment, and the order went forth for drastic reductions in the Army. A new era had been promised, a new world was to be created, and, without stopping to think what the actual effect of the close of the struggle in the West would be, India gladly accepted these promises, and forthwith began to reduce her military forces to a size even smaller than before the war. But, as a matter of fact, the defeat of Germany merely removed the centre of danger to the British Empire from the West to the East, and it soon became evident that the safety of India was likely to be more seriously endangered than before the war. The Germans, foiled in the West, at once turned their attention to the East and by insidious



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methods set to work to discredit Great Britain, the Power which they realized had been the principal cause of their downfall. Needless to say, they adopted back-door methods and, while making full use of ignorant dupes and disgruntled professional agitators, they took good care not to betray themselves. This German propaganda was ably seconded by that of the Young Turks who, themselves despoiled of their kingdom and deprived of their power, similarly set themselves to work to avenge their defeat in fair fight by insidious methods of agitation. Accordingly, while, during the course of the war, the destinies of India were being decided on the fields of Flanders, during the period subsequent to the Armistice the country has found itself in a detached and independent position, threatened from within by revolution and from without by invasion, thrown more or less upon its own resources, and no longer able to rely upon British victories in other parts of the world to restore its equilibrium.

The events of last year proved that the aftermath of the war was more dangerous to the peace of India than the war itself. Diverse causes have been ascribed and various terms applied to denote the origin and to estimate the importance of disturbances in the Punjab in April, 1919, the severity of the censure upon those implicated varying in proportion to the distance of the critic from the scene of disturbance. The fact remains, however, that a definite attempt was made to discredit the Government of India, and to compel it by means of force to rescind a Bill which had been passed by the recognized legal machinery of the State and in the interests of the community as a whole.

This internal disturbance was followed almost immediately by the unprovoked attack by the Afghans, an attack which it has been amply demonstrated was no mere coincidence. As a result of this attack, India found herself engaged along the whole frontier from the Malakand to Mirjawa, a distance of some five hundred miles, at the worst season of the year, and at a time when her resources both in men and material were at their lowest ebb.

Although the Third Afghan War officially only lasted three months, and a pact was concluded in August, 1919, it was found necessary to undertake active operations against the Mahsuds and Wazirs during the autumn of that year, and, for all practical purposes, a state of war has existed on other portions of the frontier up to the present time owing principally to the unsteadying influence upon the frontier tribes of the anti-British propaganda provided by the Soviet Government of Russia through the medium of its agency in Kabul. Nor have the enemies of British rule both within and

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without India been idle. No opportunity has been lost to poison the minds of the people against the Central Government both in regard to the Punjab disturbances and also to the terms of peace with Turkey. The general state of restlessness, both political and industrial, which now prevails throughout the country is sufficient proof that a certain amount of success has been achieved by means of this agitation.

It is frequently stated in India, both in the Press and in conversation, that the military expenditure of the country is too large, and one constantly hears such expressions as: "the intolerable burden of military expenditure," "the unremunerative expenditure on the armed forces," "the revival of militarism" and such like phrases. In support of their arguments, the authors of such phrases as a rule draw a comparison between the expenditure on the armed forces and the total revenue of the country. They point with satisfaction to the fact that the former amounts to approximately 37 per cent. of the latter. But such comparisons bear no real relation to hard facts. In the first place, no one can deny that the incidence of taxation in India is light as compared with that of any other country holding a relative position in the world. Moreover, the size of the armed forces which any country is obliged to maintain should surely be governed by the work which such a force may be called upon to carry out, rather than by the revenue of the country; its size should be framed to guarantee its ability to carry out its tasks. For protection is a function which depends not so much upon what a country ought to afford in comparison with its wealth as upon what a country must provide in consideration of the dangers to which it is exposed.

In most civilized countries the budget is framed to meet estimated expenditure. In India, on the contrary, expenditure is regulated so as to come within the budget irrespective of whether or not such expenditure will meet the needs of the country. To this must be attributed the general inefficiency and the deplorably backward state of development in respect of the public services in India, for, although the principle of cutting one's coat according to one's cloth is sound up to a certain point, when that cloth is only sufficient to cover a single button, the wearer of the garment is apt to catch his death of cold.

In order to obtain a full appreciation of the existing situation in India, it is essential to get down to first principles and not to lose sight of the wood for the trees. The degree of protection which is necessary to ensure immunity from external attack is dependent upon factors over which as a rule the defenders have very little control.

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This is especially the case with regard to India. The mentality of her neighbours varies from month to month, and from year to year. The most that can be done in framing a defence policy, therefore, is to take the mean over a given period, to study the lessons of history and to assess the liability accordingly, while concurrently with these considerations it is not possible to ignore the dangers of internal disorder, particularly in the light of recent events.

The vast majority of people in India have no conception what the protection of the North-west Frontier involves, or of the conditions under which those who are entrusted with this task live and move and have their being. The distance to be covered is some five hundred miles of the most difficult country in the world; subject to extremes of climate; open to raids along its whole extent; extremely badly served as regards communications, particularly lateral communications; and utterly devoid of the ordinary amenities of life. Since the close of the recent war, certain new factors have arisen which have materially added to the task of the Army. These are the failure of the old militia system in consequence of which the Regular Army has now to provide garrisons for all the most advanced posts; the superior armament and training of the tribesmen which render them far more formidable opponents than formerly; and the uncertainty of the policy of the Afghans due to the new régime in Afghanistan, combined with Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic intrigue.

As an antidote to military expenditure, a return to the system of subsidies which existed before the war is often advocated as a cheaper and more effective method of dealing with the independent tribes. The history of the last twenty years hardly justifies such a contention. Has the policy of subsidies produced any definite result in respect of our dealings with the tribes? Can we claim any greater measure of control as a set-off against the expenditure of large sums of money? Has there been any marked diminution in the necessity for frontier expeditions? Is there any more certainty than formerly that these tribes will not fight against us in the event of an Afghan attack? The answers to all these questions would appear to be in the negative. The policy of subsidizing the tribes merely led to our spending money while we were at peace and gave us no guarantee against war. We paid the subsidies; we then paid the cost of a punitive expedition or blockade as a result of which we levied a fine, which we subsequently paid back to our defeated enemy in the form of an increased subsidy. It is not too much to say that the system encouraged raids and risings, for it did not take the tribesmen long to

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find out that our expeditions into their country were their principal source of revenue.

In addition to their habit of not examining too closely the results of the policy of subsidies, those who favour a reduction in military expenditure in India are apt to overlook the fact that military assistance is often required by the civil authorities. Are these eager economists prepared to dispense with such assistance in the event of internal disorders? The numerous occasions during the past year upon which soldiers have been employed to assist the police, and sometimes even in substitution for the police, in order to preserve law and order, certainly do not show any marked inclination on the part of the authorities to do without them. The industrial and commercial classes assert, and assert rightly, that as taxpayers they have a right to demand a certain degree of protection. There is no use in disguising the fact that the civil administration is often powerless to afford such protection through the medium of the police. The inevitable result is a demand for military assistance. India is a country of great distances and bad communications. Dispersion in detachments is hateful to every soldier. If, therefore, demands of this kind in various parts of the country are to be met, it is certain that additional troops will have to be maintained which will involve additional expenditure under the head "military." Some indication of the problem, as presented to the military authorities, may be gleaned from the fact that during the past year it has been necessary to provide troops for the preservation of law and order in such widely scattered places as Mallapuram, Bombay, Sholapur, Ahmadabad, Calcutta, Jamshedpur, Amritsar, Gujranwala and Vihoa.

It may be argued that, if military assistance is to be avoided, the remedy is a simple one. It is only necessary to improve the quality and to increase the quantity of the police. But this policy would add to the financial burdens of the provinces, and, as troops can be provided free of charge to the provinces, it is unlikely that their governments will display any inclination to incur the additional expense involved in improving and increasing their police forces.

Is it honest or reasonable, however, for individuals to denounce militarism, and in the same breath to demand military protection from external aggression and from internal disorder, both of which involve large military expenditure?

The criticism which is levelled at the cost entailed by the upkeep of the Army in India naturally leads to a comparison between the military expenditure incurred in that country and that incurred in other portions of the Empire. During the year 1913–1914 the

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military expenditure per head of population in the several self-governing countries of the Empire worked out, in the United Kingdom to £1 11*s.* 9*d.*; in Australia to 18*s.* 1*d.*; in New Zealand to 13*s.* 10*d.*; in Canada to 7*s.* 4*d.*; in South Africa to 4*s.* 5*d.*; and in India to 1*s.* 8*d.* During the war of 1914–18 Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland bore out of their own revenues the whole cost of the maintenance of their forces in the field, whereas the cost of all the Indian troops serving outside India was borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. The average annual military expenditure incurred by India during the period 1914 to 1918 amounted to £25½ millions per annum; while, during its closing months, the war was costing the taxpayers of the United Kingdom £8 millions a day.

Owing to the rise in pay and pensions and to the increased prices due to present economic conditions, it is calculated that the costing charges of an army in 1920 are 2¼ times that of an army of an equivalent size in 1914. If, therefore, in 1914, the military vote in India amounted to £19 millions, it would now cost £43 millions to maintain an army of the same numbers. At home it must be borne in mind that separate votes are allotted to the Army, to the Navy and to the Air Force. In India, on the other hand, all expenditure on the Navy and the Air Force is debited to the Army grant. In spite of this, however, and of the increased cost of everything, it is nevertheless a fact, that the ratio between military expenditure in India and the aggregate expenditure under all heads was the same last year as it was thirty years ago.

Throughout the whole course of the recent war the only actual naval attack on India was that carried out by the *Emden*, when she bombarded Madras. Further raids against the exposed coastal towns of India were prevented by the destruction of that vessel by H.M.A.S. *Australia*, a ship that was built, manned and maintained solely at the expense of the Australian taxpayer. This fact is not without significance at the present time, and should be remembered by the people of India when the policy of the Imperial Parliament as declared in the preamble of the Government of India Act, 1919, is designed "with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire." The most advanced of the Indian nationalist leaders are asking for the immediate grant of a full dominion status to their country, but do they accept the corollary? Are they prepared to spend upon the defence of India as much per head of her population as Canada, Australia and New

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Zealand have actually paid in time of peace? Are they prepared in time of war to follow the example of the great self-governing communities in the last war and to bear their just share of the burden, or do they wish that the greater part of that burden—as has hitherto been the case—should fall upon the taxpayers of the United Kingdom? Is the naval protection of the shores of India, for instance, to depend upon provisions made by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand?

There are, indeed, only two courses open to India; either to remain within the British Commonwealth, and to show without delay that she is prepared not merely to talk about her rights as a nation, but that she is ready to accept the full obligations of citizenship and nationhood, or boldly to face the alternative of independence. But her leaders should not imagine that the Dominions which bore their full share of the burden in the late war are prepared to admit her to full sisterhood unless and until she shows plainly by deeds, and not by mere words, that she is fully conscious of the duties that she must discharge.

To the British Commonwealth India at the present time is not a source of strength either from a military point of view, or economically, or otherwise. The Indian nationalist leaders and those who claim national responsibilities for their country must at once clear their minds of the belief that the desire to retain the connection with India is grounded on the idea that it is a great source of wealth to the Empire. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, 8 per cent. only of the total trade before the war was with India, the exports to India being but 10 per cent. of the total exports of the British Isles. Although a total exclusion, therefore, from Indian markets—which is practically an economic impossibility—would doubtless mean some loss commercially to the United Kingdom, such loss would not by any means be vital. To Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the loss of Indian trade would mean the loss of a mere nothing.

It may safely be said of the self-governing nations of the Commonwealth—the United Kingdom included—that to them India is no necessity; rather does she tend, in view of internal faction and disaffection, together with her disinclination fully to face her responsibilities, to become a positive danger to the security of the Commonwealth. Indian nationalists consequently must face the only other alternative which is possible, namely, that their country should cease to form part of the British Empire. Independence—if potentially hostile peoples would permit it—would mean for India the

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maintenance of armies fit to strike far beyond her frontiers, and a navy capable of defending her from attack by sea.

What this would cost, it is for those who would essay to lead the country in this path to conjecture; it is sufficient here to point out that before the war national defence cost the Japanese—a homogeneous people—who alone of all Eastern peoples have shown themselves equal to the task of self-government—7*s.* 5*d.* per head, or, including the population of the Japanese dependencies, 5*s.* 7*d.* This is more than four times as much per head as the people of India paid at that period in order to secure the defence by land of their northern frontiers, which in the past have been more frequently crossed by hostile hordes than have any other frontiers in history.

In 1921 there will assemble in London an Imperial Conference to decide the future constitutional relationship of the parts of the British Empire. It is not only in regard to the development of internal constitutional reforms that the people of India are at the cross-roads. It is for them to choose now, and for all time, whether they wish or do not wish to remain within the British Commonwealth, and their representatives should go to the Imperial Conference prepared to declare without equivocation the policy which they propose to adopt.

In the flush of victory India registered herself as an original member of the League of Nations, and thereby her people assumed certain definite responsibilities for the preservation of the peace of the world. By this act it may be presumed that the former law and practice whereby India was exonerated from any military liability unconnected with self-preservation has been abrogated; for the League of Nations is founded upon mutual co-operation both in offence and defence, and is not a philanthropic institution designed to help those who refuse to help themselves.

A country possessing the population and resources of India can no longer play the rôle of the indigent partner, but must be prepared to give at least as much as she expects to gain. Formerly it was reasonable to expect the British taxpayer to shoulder a large portion of the burden of military expenditure in connection with India, and he did so without a murmur. Under present conditions is it any longer reasonable to expect him to do so? The demand for self-determination and self-government carries with it certain obligations not the least of which is self-preservation, and India can no longer reckon on a blank cheque from the British taxpayer to meet liabilities which are peculiarly her own; she must in future be prepared to make full and adequate provision for her own protection. Hitherto

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the security of India has depended more on the forces of nature than on the energies of her people. The mountainous regions on the North-west Frontier and the deserts in the West have been considered to be the natural protection of the country, and, imbued with the policy of the " splendid isolation " of the past, the people have failed to recognize the true meaning of the events of the past few years.

The regeneration of Mesopotamia, the awakening of Persia, the desire for recognition by Afghanistan, is none of these events the concern of India? India as a partner in the League of Nations, cannot dissociate herself entirely from the obligations and liabilities undertaken by that fraternity. The mandate which has been assumed for Mesopotamia, the agreement concluded with Persia, have imposed fresh burdens upon the British Empire, a share of which India, as a partner, should be prepared to bear. In any case, however much she may wish to repudiate such share, the future of these countries is so inextricably bound up with Indian interests, that it is to her own advantage to assist the Empire to fulfil its liabilities rather than to persist in the old policy of splendid isolation, thereby risking the ingression of some foreign element at her very doors.

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# EDUCATION IN THE ARMY

By D. Borden-Turner (late Lieut.-Colonel, Staff Duties Directorate, War Office)

Francis Bacon in "The Advancement of Learning" considers the objection "that learning doth soften men's minds and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms." He deals with this objection at great length and with considerable ingenuity, developing the argument that "both in persons and in times there has been a meeting and concurrence in learning and in arms flourishing and excelling in the same men and the same ages."

Were one to use the same line of argument on behalf of education in the Army there is abundant material to hand. The rapidity with which the toga gave place to arms in the first months of the war was equalled only by the swiftness with which the scarred warrior resumed the toga after the Armistice. One of the most significant phenomena of the period immediately succeeding the war was the indecent haste with which doughty men of battle vied with one another to prove that the pen was mightier than the sword. Pick up any new volume of verse, and, as often as not, you will find the author's name followed by a string of letters which indicate martial rather than academic exploits. The soldiers are perhaps getting a bit of their own back on the literary gentlemen who during the war wrote such masterly expositions of strategy in the daily and weekly press.

Bacon's arguments, however, would carry very little weight to-day; they obviously appeal to an age vastly different from ours. It is curious, all the same, that the objections to learning which he combated, and in particular the one quoted above, are still urged by modern and intelligent people.

The War Office from time to time in the last two years has issued orders or instructions in regard to Army education which have been supplemented by quite admirable little homilies on the subject, advocating the cultivation of brains as well as brawn in the rank and file of the Army. It was very truly pointed out that the conception of the soldier as an inanimate cog in a vast military machine has



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never prevailed in the British Army as it did in those of certain other countries; that a man whose intelligence has been developed is easier to train as a soldier than a mere dunce; that in fact the demands which modern warfare makes upon the individual necessitate, if they do not actually presuppose, considerable mental development. Various telling arguments of this nature were advanced to meet objections which were not only anticipated, but which made themselves very plainly heard.

The ground, however, has to a very large extent been cut away beneath the feet of all cavillers by the extremely illuminating definition of education which is given in the new *Manual of Educational Training*—a little book which maintains the high standard for Army manuals set by *Field Service Regulations*.

"Education," in the words of the manual, "is the systematic endeavour of intelligent people to help others to make the most of themselves."

No objection could possibly be entertained by any one to education in this sense being carried out in the Army or elsewhere. If educational training really succeeds in organizing the thoughtful and sympathetic endeavour of those charged with the welfare (in the widest sense) of the soldier, no room will be found for criticism.

It is hardly sufficiently realized how much effort has been made in past years in this direction, not only to afford to serving soldiers opportunities for improving their education, but also of definitely fitting them for civil careers after their service.

During the war, Dr. Alexander Irvine, a distinguished scholar and writer, lectured to many thousands of the troops in France, and thrilled them with the account of his life in the Army. He entered it utterly ignorant, even of how to read and write, in order to obtain an education which he was afterwards to put to such good account.

In 1914 no less than 30,000 men in the British Army were being trained for civil life. When the war broke out an influential committee was sitting to consider the whole question of the employment of the ex-soldier. This committee had already completed a survey of the openings for such men in various branches of Government service, and was about to consider measures for the initiation of a regular system of educational training within the Army when events suspended their work.

The extraordinary conditions which prevailed towards the end of the war and after the conclusion of the Armistice afforded an opportunity for conducting an educational experiment, which for many years leaders in the Army had been most anxious to attempt,

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and for conducting it on an unprecedented scale. Not only on a large scale, but also over a very wide range, for a great measure of freedom was permitted in the methods adopted and the subjects of study were limited only by the horizon of human knowledge. There was never such an opportunity given to educationalists to put into practice, unhampered by harassing regulations, their particular theories and ideas. Men of great educational standing and experience who came in contact with the movement were particularly impressed with this feature, and also with the enormous value which such an experiment would have, not only for the future of education in the Army, but also for educational science as a whole.

It is really on the basis which was afforded by this experiment that the educational system that has now been introduced into the Regular Army has been constructed, but insistence must be laid on the fact that the foundations of the system go deep down into the history of the old Army, the great lower stones having been laid long ago by the efforts of men who were not destined to see the building of their dreams take shape in their day.

It is laid down in the manual that the first aim of educational training is to develop the faculty for training in the natural leaders of the Army. This is hardly the point to which the preceding paragraphs would appear to have been leading, nor is it the angle from which the question has been approached, but the manual is right in tackling straight away the most important question, namely, the place which the officer should take in the scheme. It is laid down very clearly that he has a vital place, not only as regards his men, but as regards himself.

It would seem sufficient to describe a leader as a man with the courage and capacity to go in front and to point out the way for those who follow. The real quality in leadership, however, is that which makes it certain that those led will follow. And in modern warfare this is all the more important because the leader is frequently not only out of sight of, but actually behind, the men he is leading. The days are gone when the officer, armed with a light cane, stood out in front of his men, closely packed under fire, and daintily flicked the dust from his gorgeous uniform with a silk handkerchief. He has now to depend for his hold over his men, not only on qualities of physical courage and of personality, but also on his ability to inspire such confidence that they will carry out his instructions when he is not with them.

To the temporary officer during the war few things gave greater delight than to listen to a brilliant exposé of a military situation

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or plans of operations from a commander with a great reputation as a leader, and nothing inspired greater confidence than a clear and forceful explanation of what each person was expected to do. Unfortunately these powers of exposition were frequently deplorably lacking in commanders of whose soldierly qualities there was no sort of question, and the effect of a halting and muddled statement of plans on the eve of operations was depressing in the extreme.

The complete officer has to combine two separate and very distinct qualities, power of command and ability to instruct, and, while the latter is quite useless without the former, it is becoming more and more apparent that the value of the former is greatly dependent on the extent to which the latter is developed.

A modern army has no place for officers who are unable to instruct their subordinates, however great may be their gallantry and attractive their personality. The power of command is not something which can be taught. Leadership is a quality usually partly inherited, partly the result of early associations and experience, occasionally like genius a quite unaccountable natural gift; it can be developed, but it must be there. The ability to instruct can, however, be taught; it is becoming more and more of an exact science. Army education sets out to provide the natural leaders of the Army with the faculty so essential to their leadership.

The efficiency of any army is really dependent upon the completeness with which each soldier has been instructed by his officers; the effectiveness of an army depends on its willingness to follow its leaders at the critical moment.

What does educational training propose to do for the officers of the British Army?

The Education Corps, in the words of the manual, is to "bear general responsibility for the provision of instruction in the principles and methods of educational training at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich." Cadets, therefore, are to have it very clearly impressed upon them that teaching is to form a definite part of their work as officers, and that instruction is an art which it is necessary to acquire. It is of the greatest importance that this subject is to be introduced into the curricula of these institutions, for, apart altogether from the value of the subject itself, it will influence profoundly the way in which the students will approach their own study. Satisfying an examiner and satisfying a pupil are vastly different things, and study with the latter object in view should have a most beneficial effect upon the work of the cadet.

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Some time after passing out of Sandhurst or Woolwich the young officer will be sent for a course at an Army School of Education. This course is designed partly to carry on the training in educational method which he has already received, and partly to give him special training for the instructional work in non-military subjects which every officer may be called upon to perform in his unit. It is probable that the courses at the Army Schools of Education will be so varied as to allow a commanding officer to choose the courses most suited to the type of instruction required in his unit and to the officers whom he proposes to send.

The Army Schools of Education were improvized during the Armistice period to provide some training rapidly to selected officers and non-commissioned officers in order to meet the enormous demand for teachers, a demand which increased as the professional teachers serving in the Army were demobilized.

This entirely novel educational experiment met with very remarkable success. The enthusiasm of a highly competent staff communicated itself to group after group of officers and non-commissioned officers who went through the courses, and the great majority of the students left with a profound belief in the possibility of education in the Army and with an entirely new orientation in regard to training in general.

If the tone and spirit in these schools in the future is anything like what it has been in the past, they will have the greatest influence on the whole of military training as well as on its purely educational side.

The full effect of this changed outlook will naturally not be seen for some years, but it must be evident that the gradual accustoming of the officer to the idea that instruction in any subject is an art, and one which it is his duty to acquire, will make for a far higher standard in the methods and consequently in the results of training.

It may, of course, be argued, and with a considerable degree of force, that such a change may have dangerous, even disastrous consequences. If so much stress is to be laid upon an officer's capacity for teaching, it is possible that the class to which the Army looks for its natural leaders may be deterred from entering the service. When power of command and personality are ranked inferior to ability to instruct, or at least are discounted if not accompanied by such ability, the Army may not make the same appeal as it used to make to the public school boy. Even if it is admitted that it is desirable that an officer should be able to teach, it may well

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be urged that the first qualification for an officer is his capacity to command and handle men. Is not anything which is at all likely to make it more difficult to obtain real leaders calculated, however valuable it may be, to detract from the real fighting efficiency of the Army? It may be true that in normal times an army does little fighting, and that the greater part of an officer's career is spent in other ways than going "over the top," but, whatever life in the Army may be in time of peace, the absolutely vital thing is that the troops should be able to fight when called upon. If the career of an officer is to be combined with that of a schoolmaster—however estimable and useful the latter profession may be—the question may well be asked whether under the new conditions we are not more likely to attract into the Army schoolmasters who aspire to be officers rather than men who are qualified by nature and upbringing to act as leaders, but who have little interest in the art of pedagogy?

This argument has considerable weight, and it would be idle to deny that such a change may lead to a diminution in the number of boys from the public schools who go to Woolwich and Sandhurst. But the Army has suffered and weathered many ruder shocks than this, and changes which were considered at the time to be subversive and ruinous have in due course proved beneficial. Moreover, on examination, the change contemplated is not one of principle, but is a logical outcome of the system inherent in our military practice and tradition. It has always been the duty of officers to instruct their men, in fact it has always been their main work. It is only moving with the times, therefore, to endeavour to ensure that this instruction should be carried out on the soundest lines with the minimum expenditure of time and energy and the maximum of efficiency. No officer should resent receiving training which will make him a more effective instructor of his men in military subjects.

Again, one of the splendid traditions of the service is the concern of the officer for the welfare of his men. This interest has covered not only the men's health and physical comfort, but also their recreations and amusements. An officer who interests himself in the games of his men, and takes part in concerts and other entertainments, is not considered to be doing anything derogatory to his position. The education of a soldier with a view to his employment in civil life is just the carrying one step further of the officer's responsibility for the soldier's welfare.

It is an admitted fact that between officers of the right type and their men there grow up quite peculiar and unique sentiments of regard and affection. It has been for many officers in the past a

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cause of real trouble to contemplate the rather hopeless future for the men of their regiments when they leave the Army.

If officers can be persuaded that the time which they will be called upon to give to the education of their men is really going to bear fruit in improving their prospects when they return to civil life, it is impossible that they should grudge the effort.

The greatest justification of educational training will be its success. If it succeeds, then those who have to carry it on will become its most ardent supporters. In that case there will be no question as to the quality of the recruits for the commissioned ranks. The young men leaving our great public schools will take their cue from their brothers and cousins in the Army, and, if the latter are content with and approve the change, the supply of leaders from the old source will not fail.

The second aim of educational training, as laid down in the manual, is to improve the soldier as a subject for military training and as a citizen of the Empire.

It is unnecessary to elaborate an argument in support of the thesis that it is easier to make a trained soldier of a man whose mind has been or is being developed, than of a dull creature quite unaccustomed to respond to any intellectual stimulus. The Army has in the past done wonders with uneducated and stupid recruits, but in fairness we must attribute the results to the dogged determination of the instructors, not to the slow-wittedness of their pupils.

There is a real question as to whether the amount of energy saved in imparting military training will equal the amount which will have to be expended in improving the mental equipment of the recruit. A piece of iron can be beaten cold into any shape if sufficient force is used, red-hot it can be forced into the form decreed with much less difficulty, but a great amount of energy must be expended in bringing it to the requisite heat. Nothing but experience will show, and that only after a certain time, whether there is any real labour saving in this modification in our training system.

It is certain, however, that the soldier, both as an individual and as a citizen of the Empire, will be all the better for his increased general knowledge. There is in fact a great opportunity open for sending men out of the Army really informed in regard to the affairs of their own country and of the Empire in general. There has never been such a demand for education by adults as there is at the present moment, a demand beyond the most hopeful expectation even of the enthusiasts. Men and women of the working class are seeking

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information on social and economic matters, on principles of government, on many questions, the solution of which affects them keenly, but on which it was thought impossible not so very long ago to awaken any intelligent interest. They are in a mood when they are ready to receive instruction from incompetent and ill-informed teachers, from social and political propagandists of every kind and description. The provision of sound teaching in the Army upon citizenship in all its aspects should result in the accession to the community year by year of numbers of men not only disciplined in body and mind, but intelligently informed as to their duties, rights, and responsibilities as citizens. This cannot fail to have a profound influence on future developments in social and industrial politics.

If, for instance, a right use is made of the opportunities for widening the outlook which are afforded by travel and residence in different parts of the Empire, this alone will make the ex-soldier's point of view incomparably broader than that of the average man. It will give to his experience as a soldier a real value when he assumes the ordinary life of the civilian.

The success, however, of Army education will be judged by the measure in which it fulfils the third aim laid down in the manual: "to enhance the prospect of remunerative employment of the soldier on his return to civil life."

Before the war some 30,000 men every year left the Army for civilian life. They were thrown on to the labour market without any consideration as to whether there was any room for them in that inhospitable arena, and with little consideration as to their ability to satisfy the demands of those who might come to bargain for labour.

To a future generation it will seem incredible that men who gave the best years of their life to the service of their country, mostly in distant, often in dangerous and disagreeable places, should have been treated in this way.

It is not possible or indeed fair to blame any one in particular, least of all the Army authorities, for this state of things. It was part and parcel of the confused and haphazard system under which we were all brought up and the affairs of the Empire were conducted.

"There again!" said Mr. Gridley, "the system! I am told, on all hands, it's the system. I mustn't look to individuals. It's the system. I mustn't go into Court, and say, 'My lord, I beg to know this from you—is this right or wrong? Have you the face to tell me I have received justice, and therefore am dismissed?' My lord knows nothing of it. He sits there, to administer the system."



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But the neglect of the State in the past to assist in any adequate way its fighting men to fit themselves for civil life had its critics, not a few of the most earnest of whom were themselves officers in the Army. Many gallant individual efforts have been made to ameliorate the system, without, unfortunately, any very considerable success, though what was done was often wonderful, considering the facilities available. As is usually the case whenever the State neglects its duty, private enterprise stepped in in the shape of the various Regimental Associations, the Soldier and Sailor's Help Society, the National Association and kindred bodies. These societies with a considerable revenue contributed by a generous public, with a large number of willing helpers and a very competent organization, and commanding a great deal of private interest and influence have been able in the past to find some sort of employment for the greater number of men discharged from the Army or transferred to the Reserve. But inevitably the positions found have for the most part been in the lower grades of the labour world, and unworthy of the calibre of men who had undergone the finest military training in the world, and garnered a rich store of experience in different parts of the Empire.

The following are some of the main difficulties with which these organizations have had to contend :—

The soldier during his service acquired few qualifications for any civil occupation, but acquired, on the contrary, habits of life and work so different to those of civilian life as to be detrimental. This point requires some elaboration, for it is of vital importance. The business of a soldier is to fight when fighting is needed, and to keep himself fit against that need. Once he is trained the business of keeping fit is a comparatively simple one. It is not a full-time job, it is not meant to be. Unless fighting actually comes about, when his work becomes the most arduous and exacting conceivable, he is not engaged upon his job, but in waiting for it. He loses all contact with the normal daily round of the civilian. Capacity for sustained and continuous work day after day is not something easily acquired. If he has acquired it before joining the Army the soldier has no difficulty in losing it. It is impossible for him on leaving the Army to adopt easily and at once the habits of work which are natural and expected in civilian employment, and it is for this reason that many ex-soldiers either leave or are dismissed their employment very shortly after obtaining it. It is probable that the reason for the unsatisfactory state of things is unrealized either by employer or employee, or longer trial would be given. It is commonly said

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by employers that ex-soldiers are lazy—they are most certainly wrong in most cases—the fact is that the ex-soldier is totally unaccustomed to the work which he is expected to do, and is not even aware himself of what is the matter with him.

In other ways, too, into which it is not necessary to go in detail, such as being accustomed to orders, supervision, etc., the ordering of his life in the Army has been so different that his adjustment to his civil surroundings is bound to be a more or less slow process. While he is in the Army a soldier is so well shielded from many of the common perplexities and anxieties of existence that he is apt to find himself bewildered and confused when faced with what to the civilian are natural and everyday experiences. The vexations and irritations of such common matters as inhabiting a house, travelling to one's work, buying the necessities of life, with which modern civilization has contrived to poison our existence, would be utterly unbearable were one not gradually inured to them. From these the soldier is free; he is housed, fed and clothed; he is conducted from one place to another, and safeguarded in every possible way. Suddenly he is flung from his sheltered existence into a world bristling with sharp edges; he is exposed to the cunning rapacity of lodging-house keepers, to the malignant abuse of tube-conductors, to the sarcastic contempt of petty tradesmen and works foremen; he finds himself a shrinking object of attack by a cold unsympathetic world; he loses his self-confidence, and is prematurely condemned as unfit by those who with a little more insight and imagination would know better.

If educational training effects a sensible amelioration of these difficulties, then the task of the bodies officially and voluntarily responsible for finding employment for ex-soldiers will be rendered correspondingly easier. Their solution, however, will not be attained by any rule-of-thumb methods. Everything will depend upon the sympathy, insight, and ingenuity of those who are concerned.

Little more can be done in this article than to indicate certain lines along which the various problems raised may find answers.

For instance, a very real aid towards meeting some of these difficulties is to be found by introducing with every form of manual training a system of cost-accounting. This has already been done in many places with considerable success. It will teach the soldier the value or lack of value of money, a thing of which he is kept in almost total ignorance during his service. He will learn to balance expenditure and income and to make a budget. There is no limit

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to the extent to which practical and theoretical teaching can be given in this direction, and its usefulness to him in his future career is incalculable.

Again, the initiation of the soldier into the mysteries of rates, taxes, insurance, and the multifarious complications with which democratic government safeguards our liberties will stand him in good stead when he is called upon to deal with all these things.

The preparation of the soldier for the normal arduous working day of the civilian is a more difficult matter. It is there that the resource of the educational staff will be most heavily taxed. Military training develops certain muscles to a high degree, because they must be kept at such a pitch of efficiency that they can stand, when it is demanded of them, long and severe strain ; but these muscles are not ordinarily those which are called into play in the normal motions of manual labour. A soldier who can do a route march of thirty miles without turning a hair will be utterly beat by half a day's work of an ordinary navvy without a quarter of his stamina and power of endurance.

Some system must be devised whereby soldiers are encouraged to develop the physical characteristics which will be essential to them afterwards. To accomplish this by compulsory labour of any kind is impossible, and, even if it were possible, it would be inadvisable, it would cause discontent and throw all educational training into abhorrence. The instructor responsible must endeavour to discover the form of manual training which will thoroughly interest the individual and encourage him in every way to persevere with it. This will require considerable patience and call for much tact and insight, but should not be so difficult as it may seem at first sight, for there is ample opportunity and plenty of time for careful study of his subject. A man who gets really keen on some form of manual training and works at it, more or less as a hobby, will, without realizing it, gradually acquire the habit of sustained labour. How much this is only a habit has been only too clearly demonstrated in the last two years by the extent to which it was lost by men who quitted industry to do their military service, and who are only now beginning to recover from the disorganization which it produced in their normal lives. Moreover, such work as this will necessarily be carried on in a different atmosphere from that of purely military training—the soldier will breathe the air of the workshop rather than that of the barracks square. When the time comes for him to plunge into civil life, it will not seem so utterly unreal and unfamiliar. He will not be bewildered at the idea of having to depend for his living upon

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his own initiative and his handling of some tool or machine. Psychologically he will have been prepared for the new conditions in which he finds himself, and the more energetically he has thrown himself into his preparation, the more he will be prepared physically as well as mentally.

Unless, however, educational training can enhance the soldier's prospects of remunerative employment it will be considered to have failed. No one can pretend that the amount of education, whether theoretical or practical, which it is possible to give to a man in the Army, can be compared to that which can be obtained in a college or a workshop. There can be no question, therefore, of making the soldier a skilled workman in any trade. Apart altogether from the degree of skill which the so-called skilled man may actually possess, there are various regulations in the industrial community which make it quite impossible for any man who has not undergone the full and recognized apprenticeship to rank himself as a skilled workman. There are, however, various kinds of employment requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labour, some of which command wages little, if at all, inferior to the wages paid to the " tradesman." It is confidently believed that if his general education is improved, the soldier will be able to obtain work of this kind, and that the prospect of being able to qualify for decent employment will encourage him to try to improve his education. The present widespread desire is not all cultural, there is behind it a growing belief that knowledge is power and, moreover, that it has a market value—a conviction that a man with a good education has the best chance of making his way in the world. One of the definite aims of educational training consequently is to imbue the soldier with the spirit of " getting on," to inspire him with ambition to rise in the scale and to have confidence in his ability to do so, even if he has to begin at the lowest rung of the ladder.

It is not at all unlikely that the problem as to the kind of manual training which he is to receive will be solved largely by the soldier himself. The very fact that he is to be given training will keep before the soldier from his days as a recruit the consideration of his future career. If he is wisely helped to make the best of himself, if he is given varied opportunities of self-help, he will strike, it may confidently be hoped, the line which appeals to him most.

Manual training, therefore, like general education, should be conducted on broad lines. Endeavour should be made to familiarize the soldier with a wide variety of tools, and it should be left to him to decide with which he will specialize. No matter what may be his lot eventually, this " handy-man " training cannot fail to be of

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use to him, for a thing once learned is never completely forgotten, and a tool the working of which has once been understood will not completely baffle the man who is unexpectedly called upon to use it.

It will be an enormous pity if any rules or regulations are made which prevent in any way the fostering and development of special aptitudes in individual soldiers that this kind of general training is bound to reveal. It is clear, for instance, that no ordinary unit will be able to give specialized instruction in more than a few subjects. It should be possible, therefore, in any case where an individual soldier shows marked ability for some particular handicraft, in which he cannot obtain skilled teaching in his own unit without undue difficulty, to transfer him to a unit where such teaching is provided. A soldier in certain circumstances has the right to ask to be transferred to another unit, and this ought to be one of the circumstances.

It is quite possible in course of time that certain units will become known as providing specially good instruction in certain subjects, and will attract recruits for that reason. In any case the recruit should always have an opportunity of stating the form of education he would prefer in the Army, and this should be definitely taken into account when his final destination is settled.

It is possible, however, to go a great deal beyond this, and in the mind of the writer the crux of the problem lies in the extent to which co-operation between the authorities responsible for educational training and those responsible for finding employment for the ex-soldier can be assured. Not only can the work of the former render the responsibility of the latter much easier to fulfil, but the effectiveness of the former will depend enormously on the assistance which the latter ought to be able to give in determining the nature of the training given, especially in the latter period of a soldier's career. Let us suppose that a certain regimental association knows that a year, two years, three years from a given time it will be required to find employment for so many men. Why should that association not approach employers in the neighbourhood and say, " In such and such time so many men will be available. Their educational qualifications at the present time are as scheduled. Can you forecast your requirements and state how you would like the men you require trained to meet your particular needs ? "

Were such a system to be worked out, the shrewd employer with foresight would be only too glad to have such a source of labour, disciplined, educated and trained in any particular way that he chose to indicate.

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It may be asked, " Where are the employers who will look a year or two ahead ? " The answer is " Everywhere ! " And there are not only employers who will look ahead, but there are also many, very many more now than in the days before the war, who will take the trouble to look ahead for the sake of the Army and the ex-service man. Convince them that the Army really means business in this matter, and they are prepared to talk business with the Army.

The adjustment of the needs of employers and the kind of training given will be a matter of the greatest difficulty, and will probably take years to work out, but to say that it is an impossible scheme is to deny the evidence given, and given quite recently, by employers of the highest standing in a wide variety of fields.

That the difficulties are many and great, it is conceded, but that they are insuperable to determined and patient effort is not to be admitted.

Although educational training is now a recognized part of every soldier's life and regimental officers are charged with responsibility for that as for other forms of training, the formation of a corps of specially trained advisers and instructors to assist commanding officers in carrying out the work efficiently was a patent necessity.

The Army Education Corps has thus been formed. It has absorbed and taken over the functions of the old Corps of Army schoolmasters. The personnel of the Corps will carry on the teaching of the children of serving soldiers, and will be generally responsible to commanding officers for the organization of educational training. They will advise, examine and assist, undertaking specific instruction only in higher and special subjects. The Corps, which is composed of officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, will be distributed to the best advantage, and, roughly speaking, one commissioned and one non-commissioned officer will be allotted for every thousand men.

Candidates for non-commissioned rank will be selected from serving soldiers who have gained a special Army certificate—the standard of which is that of a university matriculation examination—and may rise on their merits to the highest rank in the Corps, that of Lieutenant-Colonel.

Candidates for commissioned rank will be selected from warrant officers of the Corps with special qualifications, and from commissioned officers who possess an Honours Degree or who are otherwise exceptionally qualified.

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The Army Education Corps offers a career so attractive in comparison with other avenues of educational employment that entrance into it will undoubtedly be hotly contested. For the clever boy of poor parents who cannot afford to give the opportunity that a fuller education would afford, there is opened up a prospect absolutely unique. It will be surprising, therefore, if in time the Corps does not have at its command the pick of the brains of all classes of the community, and is not able to bring a wealth of intelligence and enthusiasm to the solution of the different problems which have been hinted at in previous pages.

The institution of a regular system of educational training in the British Army is not a unique or isolated experiment, it is part of a world-wide movement. In fact, it is generally recognized as a necessary measure in these times in countries where conscription is not in force. The American Army has organized a most thorough-going system of educational training. Continental armies are following suit. The following extract from a Vienna paper is of particular interest :—

" In order to obtain the best from the system of mercenary troops forced upon Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain, the Army, besides being a military instrument, is to be educated for practical life.

" Every soldier, in addition to his military training, will have the opportunity of theoretical and practical instruction, in carpentry, joinery, shoemaking, tailoring and other trades, the aim being not only to produce good soldiers, but at the same time highly qualified workmen who can supply the needs of the Army itself. Instruction will be given in farming, fruit and market-gardening, forestry, and in methods of draining and fertilising the soil. Book-keeping and commercial subjects generally will be included in the curriculum. Lectures will also be held on political economy and other topics. The soldier will thus be fully equipped for the battle of life in which he will play his part when his period of military service is over."

To what extent Great Britain has been responsible for giving the impetus to this world-wide movement it is perhaps impossible to estimate. The War Office during the last two years has received numerous inquiries from other countries about educational training and its progress has been followed with deep interest abroad.

It is quite certain that the whole movement for adult education has been immensely strengthened by the unhesitating support given to the schemes for the Army by the Imperial General Staff.

The cause of education as a whole has been greatly benefited

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in many ways, and notably by the recognition that has been given to the teaching profession. A profound and far-reaching difference has been effected in the status of a teacher by his acceptance in the Army as an officer on a par with other officers. Recognition of this kind, it is universally admitted, was long overdue : what is remarkable is that it is through the Army that it has been achieved.

And, lastly, educational training is a very definite recognition by the State of its duty to prevent unemployment, more than that, to take measures to ensure that its ex-soldiers at least shall have a chance of being employed in the most profitable way. The implication of this recognition is very great, and the success of educational training in the Army may have consequences far beyond the vision of those concerned either with the inception, or the carrying out, of a wonderful advance in our social economy.

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# THE FLANDERS BATTLE-GROUND

## IN 1702–1713 AND 1914–1918.

BY C. R. L. FLETCHER AND C. T. ATKINSON.

"THERE is one thing, and one thing only," says the late Mr. George in his excellent little book, "The Relations of Geography and History," "that *must* conform to Geography, and that is War on Land."

And that is true still, in spite of the fact that geography comes to lie every day more and more dreadfully at the mercy of man. Steam, petrol, electricity, are annihilating space and time.

> Nequicquam Deus Abscidit
> Prudens Oceano dissociabili
> Terras

was probably a commonplace before the reign of Augustus, and is certainly a commonplace now that oceans are a good deal more traversible than continents; *nequicquam* also hath the same Providence divided seas that would fain mingle, by ridiculous isthmuses, such as Suez, Corinth and Panama. The Alps are tunnelled and the old fortresses of the Lombard plain, the famous "Quadrilateral" have been "remaindered" thereby. The whole value of old town sites has been altered by long-range artillery, and aeroplanes struggle against *camouflage* and dazzle-paint to make surprise all but impossible. But even in the flattest country the shape and the nature of the soil will profoundly affect tactics. Mountains and forests will no longer be so effective a screen for operations as they were of old; but a river in rear will still be as fatal an obstacle to retreat as was the Aller at Friedland and the Elster at Leipzig.

While the one great object of war is still for a Foch, as for a Marlborough, to beat the enemy's greatest army as completely and as soon as possible, and while even the classic rules for effecting this—by taking him in flank, cutting his communications, rolling him up against some impassable barrier—are but little altered, the problem of putting these classic rules into force has been fearfully complicated



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by the very size of modern armies and by the punishing effect on the soil of the tramp of their feet, the grinding of their wheels and the penetrating power of their projectiles. Our last month's fighting on the Western front in 1918 was in the main not only a match against the god of winter, but also against the god of mud. But mud is no new deity in Flanders warfare. The exceptionally heavy rains of the late summer and the autumn of 1917, which hindered and delayed the progress of the British forces during "Third Ypres," and finally brought Plumer to a standstill in November, have their counterpart in older wars. Never did Marlborough's men toil to less purpose than in the 1707 campaign, when the rains descended and the floods rose till all movement was impossible. In August of that year Marlborough wrote that they had had so much rain that he "could scarce stir out of his quarters, the dirt being up to the horses' bellies, which is very extraordinary in this month," and, when he did get a chance of moving and chased Vendôme back from Nivelles behind the shelter of the French lines round Mons, such was the state of the roads that many of his infantry actually perished in the sloughs. It was before the days of Macadam, and in the beginning of the eighteenth century the roads of Belgium were at their best no great thing. There were no bombardments then to pound the shape of the land out of all recognition, to upset the natural drainage and to reduce the whole Ypres salient to a bottomless pit, but the luckless men who perished in the swamps which did duty for communication trenches in the winter of 1914–1915 had had their precursors in misfortune. Of all the earlier campaigns the history of which leaps to the eyes in this connection, only that of Napoleon in Poland in the winter of 1807 was held up in a similar way. But when Wellington said of his first adventure into Spain in 1809—"If I had had three times as many men as I had, I could not even have got to Talavera"—he was really referring to difficulties of a similar character, namely, the want of communications. War is largely a matter of supplies and transport, and it is useless to send to any theatre of war more men than can be usefully employed, maintained and fed in that particular area; as Sir Ian Hamilton says * of the Salonica venture, "You cannot carry out anything big via a couple of narrow cracks through a trackless labyrinth of mountains." In Flanders in the eighteenth century the problem of communications, on land and water, was certainly the key to much that happened and to much more that did not happen.

Flanders in the days of Marlborough presented to the eye a very

* *See* "Gallipoli Diary," by General Sir Ian Hamilton, vol. ii., p. 202.

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different landscape to that which it presents to-day, especially in its south-western corner; but at least the soil was the same; the absence of all natural frontier was the same, the *enchevêtrement* of races was the same, and the horrible climate and cold mists are not likely to have altered much in two centuries. If we look at a contour map of that region, we shall see that the Ardennes come to a somewhat abrupt end on the line of the Lower Meuse and the Sambre; there is but one well-defined swelling of them beyond this line, northward of the Carrefour de Bavay, the old Roman road through Hainault to Cologne, which skirts their base, turns at a slightly obtuse angle to the north-west, and runs, through Artois, directly for Cape Grisnez, always getting higher as it approaches Calais. From this curve of high ground rise all but one of the streams which reach the basin of Flanders, the Scheldt gathering to itself everything between Charleroi and Cambrai; and northward of the Scheldt, come successively the Scarpe, the Deule, the Lys and the Aa. The Yser alone has no connection with this system, but wanders like a lost child over the plain to the sea at Nieuport; but even the Yser is fed by a trickle from the isolated hill at Cassel. This, and the other solitary spurs and swellings which our men got to know so well in the late war, are mere outcrops of sandy gravel through the rich clay which has been deposited by the rivers all over the plain, while coal is very near the surface all round the northern base of the hills.

Flanders is a man-made country. The sand probably lay everywhere on the top of the clay till patient generations of Flemings dug it over and over. Perhaps it was once pine forest; there is one considerable stretch of pine wood in the north-eastern part of the country between Thourout, Bruges and Eecloo, on a perfectly sandy soil. It was certainly subject to marine inundations, such as that which, farther north, created the Zuider Zee in the thirteenth century. Dante tells us how the Flemings "between Wissant and Bruges" have to be constantly watching that enemy.* There was a bad inundation as late as 1880. That part of Flanders which the Flemings call "Noordland," due north of Cassel, is actually below the level of the highest tides, and is traversed by raised causeway-roads. Not only from outside is water to be feared, but from beneath too. There is water, water everywhere, a few feet below the surface; it oozes out and wanders about, until it is caught and tamed into "water-gands."

* Quale i Fiamminghi tra Guizzante e Bruggia
Temendo il fiotto che ver lor s' avventa,
Fanno lo schermo perche il mar si fuggia.

*Hell.* xv. 4.

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It does not take much to make a river in Flanders. Look at the amazing growth of the Lys between Aire and Armentières—and three days' rain equals one flood.

But man's patience is indomitable. Like Mr. Brindley, the Flemings have discerned that rivers chiefly exist in order to feed navigable canals for commercial purposes. M. de Vauban thought them a providential agent for making great moats round his huge earthen ramparts, revetted with brick. How easy, then, for Flanders to grow into a "Country," a separate unit in the European family! Though Lille eventually became the political capital of the early Counts, it was the foundation of Bruges, as a fortress against the Northmen in the ninth century, that began the separate history of Flanders, and in no long time Bruges, became one of the greatest exchanges in Christendom. "*Bruges, où hantoient toutes les nations des gens étrangers*," as Commines says; Frenchmen, Englishmen, Catalans, Hanseatics, Venetians. Guicciardini, a little later, speaks of Flanders as "one continuous town." Just as the development of the industries in Lancashire, and the West Riding, and in the Lowlands of Scotland, led to the magnificent farming of the North Riding and the Lothians, so the commerce of the Flemish cities compelled the fine intensive culture which was the glory of Belgium from the fifteenth to the twentieth century; and, long after the industries of Ghent and Ypres, and the commerce of Bruges and Antwerp, had been ruined, rural Flanders remained one of the gardens of the world. The discovery of coal-seams, and the teeming populace in the towns which was the result of this, has only increased the demand for every species of agricultural produce.*

And, in addition to her industrial, commercial, and agricultural fame, Flanders has been renowned as a battle-ground of Races. She would, in all probability, have earned this renown even without the grisly sacrifice which she had to make to the dynastic and matrimonial greed of her Counts, whether of French, Burgundian, Spanish or Austrian descent. Yet I am bound to say that if I had been an industrious Flemish farmer or manufacturer in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, I should have been an upholder of whatever political doctrine was most hostile to the divine right, or any other right, of kings and counts as a species. My country happened to be one in which men could kill each other without being starved.† Yes, but that was because they could subsist at my

* It was not till the middle of the nineteenth century that the Lens-Béthune coalfield began to be seriously exploited.

† *See* "History of the British Army," by the Honble. John Fortescue, vol. i. p. 354.

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expense, may Sainte Gudule confound the lot of them! Perhaps Mr. Fortescue should have said "without being so constantly starved as they must inevitably have been in any other European country except Lombardy," for the real difference between seventeenth and eighteenth century warfare and that of our own times has been well pointed out by the late Colonel Colin, both in his "Transformations de la Guerre" and his "Éducation de Napoléon." In the old days you could build any number of almost impregnable fortresses, impregnable, that is, to anything but the slow and costly methods of the siege warfare of the day. Even quite petty places might hold up a big army for weeks. Dendermonde, the Termonde of the present day, was reputed unapproachable on account of the waters which surrounded its walls. "It would take an army of ducks," Louis XIV. declared, "to take Dendermonde," but Marlborough and his men accomplished the feat, even without having to turn web-footed. Yet all these fortresses, their number being no less important than their strength, made campaigning in Flanders the slowest and most methodical of all business, for the fortresses had to be taken in order to allow of liberty of movement for men and supplies. Practically every town of importance was fortified, nearly all the permanent bridges were to be found within the walls of some "place," the roads, such as they were, ran through town after town, and their use, therefore, was denied to those who did not hold the towns. So warfare in Flanders was largely a matter of besieging fortresses, and an army which was tied down to a siege was generally quick to consume the resources of the surrounding country and had to be fed by means of convoys which brought food and forage from a distance. After all, armies must be fed before they can fight, and even in a rich country like Flanders a large army soon devoured a countryside and had to move elsewhere to get its food unless its food could be brought to it.

Convoys and forage, therefore, fill no small part of the bill in Marlborough's days. One reads constantly of "the enemy's foragers" being surprised or cut up, and of the parties which an army had to push out in all directions to collect forage and other supplies, and of quite substantial detachments, perhaps the equivalent of a couple of modern divisions, being sent out to protect the foragers. Thus in 1708, during the siege of Lille, a force under Lord Stair was pushed out as far as Dixmude to cover the getting in of corn, while thirty squadrons and ten battalions of Saxons made lines at La Bassée "to secure the country between that and Lille" to the Allies. Marlborough's men, like Wellington's men, when they crossed

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the Pyrenees a century later, paid for what they requisitioned, and it paid them to do so. There was no guerilla warfare to trouble them, either in Artois or in French Flanders. It was the rivers, however, which furnished the key to the situation, and on which attention should be fixed, for it was the fortresses on their banks which must be mastered before a river-line could be used by an invader. Armies were as dependent then on rivers as they are to-day on railways, or rather, were yesterday before the efficiency of the motor-lorry had been proved, and before the "super-tanks" of Colonel Fuller's visions and the near future eliminate, as he promises,* rivers, roads, railways and every other means of transport. Heavy traffic in those days normally went best by water, and the waterways were studded with fortresses which could not be masked, but must be taken. Hence the importance of securing the line of the Meuse in the opening campaigns of the War of the Spanish Succession, hence the difficulty of besieging Lille in 1708 with the French holding Ghent and Bruges, and controlling the chief waterways of Western Flanders. The defence of Maubeuge, in 1914, did a great service to the Allied cause because, by denying the Germans the use of the railways which ran through its perimeter, it handicapped their communications and system of supplies and prevented free use of that particular railway; and this was a bigger service even than its detention of a German Reserve Corps for over a fortnight, the Corps which arrived just in time to prevent Sir Douglas Haig's First Corps breaking through the enemy's lines on the critical day of the battle of the Aisne. But in Marlborough's wars there was not one Maubeuge to be taken, but many, and until the river-ways were clear an advance into the interior of France was out of the question. Villars has achieved fame by his stubborn resistance to Marlborough's advance in the closing campaigns of the war, but, when all due recognition has been given to him for his vigilance, his courage, his resource and for the way in which he inspired a defeated and disheartened army to renewed efforts, the main credit for checking Marlborough belongs to Vauban. The old engineer who had covered every weak point on the Netherlands frontier of France with his masterpieces did his work well. In the race between the growing war-weariness of England and the stripping bare of the French defences which was necessary in order to leave the road down the Oise to Paris open to the Allies, it was the fortresses planned by Vauban that just turned the scale. When the Tories deprived Marlborough of his command, he had within his grasp the road to

* *See* "Tanks in the Great War," by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.

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Paris, and the War of the Spanish Succession ended, so far as the British troops were concerned, close to the very quarter where the war of 1914–1918 began and ended, in the triangle between the Sambre, the Haine and the Scheldt. The camp from which the British troops withdrew in 1712 reluctantly and with downcast faces, when Ormonde bade them quit the side of their Allies, was at that Cateau-Cambresis which, as Le Cateau, their successors of 1914, were to make famous, where their successors' successors in 1918 were to deal one of the most successful of all the hammer-strokes of the four months of victory which brought the Allies back across Marlborough's battlefield of Malplaquet to Mons.

There is in the long series of campaigns which Marlborough waged against the fortress-barrier on the north-eastern frontier of France a fairly close analogy with the long warfare of the Allies between the end of 1914 and August 1918. In those campaigns Marlborough had to break down a barrier less formidable in itself than the fortified lines which in the late war faced the Allies in France from the Jura to the Channel, but fully as formidable in comparison with the means available for its reduction. The campaign of 1915–1918 was in one aspect a warfare of attrition, in another a warfare of experiment. Gradually weapons and methods were evolved by which the attack got the upper hand of the defence without neutralizing its own successes by the unforeseen consequences of those successes, such as the destruction of the ground which followed upon the terrific bombardments of the Somme and "Third Ypres," and impeded alike the movement of reinforcements, the consolidation of gains and the forwarding of supplies. In Marlborough's days there were no such improvements in material; the weapons in use remained substantially unchanged; engineers became more skilful and resourceful with practice, but the engineer's art remained where it had started. Le Quesnoy, in 1712, was as hard to reduce as Venloo or Liége, where "Salamander" Cutts did so well in 1702. Still, if Marlborough made but slow progress, if siege merely followed siege, he had a purpose in his sieges; they were with him a means to an end, the opening of a way into France. Sometimes, too, he besieged a town in the hopes that the French would venture a battle in order to save it. He was not apt to fall into the error of Louis XIV., and those of his generals to whom the capture of fortresses was an end in itself, regardless of what use might be made of the places captured. He was as free from any prepossession of this sort as he was from the idea that it was enough for an army to subsist in an enemy's country, destroying all the food

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and material which it could not consume, or that wars were to be won in this fashion without firing a shot or fighting a battle, or that the object of invading a country was to consume its resources—and incidentally to keep its defenders within their own country where they too must consume its resources. Sometimes, as Mr. Fortescue says, in the brilliant pages in which he discusses the principles of Flemish campaigns in the days before Napoleon, " the invader might keep the defender on the trot from place to place until he tempted him from sheer weariness to fight at a disadvantage." * This was how Marshal Luxembourg treated my Uncle Toby and his friends in 1693–1695 ; and this was how Marlborough showed that he did not intend to be treated, or to treat, his opponents in 1702–1711. Marlborough was in fact like Moses : he was " the only person who broke all the Commandments (relative to Flemish warfare) at once."

It looks at first sight an easier task than it really is to draw strategical comparisons between the War of the Spanish Succession and that of our own days ; for Marlborough was " the Allies " (and therefore had incessantly to make political outweigh military considerations), while Louis XIV. was, like the Kaiser, " the one." " Unity of Command " may not have been a subject of discussion in the early part of the eighteenth century, but the problem was there all the same. Marlborough and Eugène found their own solution, but the civilian Dutch Deputies who were attached to the field army provided their peculiar impediment to the success of the Allies, saved the French from defeat many a time, and were worth many squadrons and battalions to Louis. And even Eugène was not always ready to take the risks which Marlborough was prepared to run. That Marlborough was anxious after the battle of Oudenarde to march past Lille and the other French fortresses, sacrificing for the moment his communications with Holland, is well known. It was too bold a scheme for Eugène who did not see, as Marlborough saw, that a move to the coast—and the whole coast from Boulogne to Havre was practically defenceless against an attack by land—would allow a new line of communications to be opened with England. There was a boldness of conception about Marlborough's plan akin to that great turning movement of the Germans in August 1914, a movement which, after all, only just failed of success. True, the Germans have been criticized for leaving unmolested at that period those " Channel Ports " which they afterwards strove so

* *See* " History of the British Army," by the Honble. John Fortescue, vol. i., p. 357.



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strenuously to master, only to be foiled by the stubborn resistance of British, French and Belgians on the long line from La Bassée to the dunes at mouth of the Yser. Before the First Battle of the Marne, they might have had the Channel Ports for the asking, but they were out to secure final success by a crushing victory in the field and to have detached men then in order to seize the Channel Ports would have diminished their chances of success in the struggle, on which all depended, against the main field force of the Allies. German strategy may not always have been above criticism, but not upon this score.

If Marlborough had been allowed to carry out his scheme for the campaign of 1703, he would have fallen successively on Antwerp, Ostend and Nieuport, and he would have turned, at their northern corner, the first set of entrenched lines which the French had constructed right across Flanders and Brabant from the sea to the Meuse. Such lines of entrenchment were as marked a feature in the warfare of those days as the " trench-lines " became in the late war. But there was this fundamental difference. The trench lines in 1914 represented the point at which the battle of encounter had come to an end, and, although once the opposing sides had settled down to that which was later on regarded as normal trench warfare the lines were sometimes rather thinly held, their existence was really due to the fact that the theatre was too small for the armies contending in it, especially as any outflanking movement was impossible. In Marlborough's days, lines were constructed in order to facilitate the defence of long stretches of country by relatively small forces. They were prepared in advance, and in this they resembled that " Hindenburg Line " on which the Germans made their skilful retreat in the spring of 1917. Moreover, in 1914–1917 there was never any question of being able to break through these lines without hard fighting by merely deceiving the defenders and drawing them off to some distant quarter by feints and diversions. The trench line, even in " quiet " sectors, was too well-manned for that. But for Marlborough a " break through " was always possible : two of his most conspicuous successes, the forcing of Villeroi's lines near Louvain in 1705, and of Villars's famous *ne plus ultra* at Arleux in 1711, were practically bloodless ; he cut and swiftly levelled—" walked through," we might almost say—three successive sets of such entrenched lines in the course of the war. This was because it would have taken a million men to hold any set of lines long enough to defend all the threatened spots in the north-eastern defences of France, and the King of France had never a tenth part of a million men to spare.

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Marlborough never had to batter his way through the enemy's lines, and probably (for he was intensely humane and sparing of his men's lives) would have refused to do so except, as at Malplaquet, in the last extremity : he had only to make a skilful feint at one part of a set of lines in order to draw off his opponent from the point which he intended to attack, and, as every French Marshal whom he met, until he met Villars, was a baby compared to him, these feints always succeeded. Even Villars himself was unable to prevent Marlborough from deluding him into leaving unguarded the passage over his famous lines at Arleux, in the region where in the fighting of September and October 1918, London Territorials and the North Countrymen of the Eleventh Division met with prolonged and bitter resistance. It was about the Duke's last big success and the more precious because it was won over Villars, the ablest of his opponents. But it is worth noting that when Marlborough was gone, Villars played a very similar game against Eugène, and won thereby the last hand in the rubber (Denain).

It is interesting, too, to remember that, in the move to his right by which Marlborough diverted Villars's attention in August 1711 from the point to be attacked, his troops were passing over ground which was to become very familiar to the British two centuries later. Both in the march westward and on the return journey Marlborough's men crossed the southern end of the Vimy Ridge ; and traversed Gavrelle, Neuville-Saint-Vaast, and other places constantly mentioned in the *communiques* of 1917 and 1918. In 1709 again Villars took post behind a trench-line running from Hulluch on the right to Cuinchy on the left, a line which must have almost coincided with the German position after the British attack at Loos in September 1915. These lines, generally known as " the La Bassée Lines," the Allies pierced with ease at the beginning of the 1710 campaign, as the French, who were taken by surprise by Marlborough's unexpectedly early opening of operations, were only holding them weakly and could offer no effective resistance.

Between 1703, the year of his first real offensive campaign in Flanders, and 1706, the year of the battle of Ramillies, Marlborough had for the time been diverted to other quarters. In 1704 he had marched off to the Danube to save Vienna from the direst peril, knowing that his work in 1702 and 1703 had left the Dutch frontier secure, and that he need not feel nervous about his base in Holland. The battle of Blenheim completely changed the aspect of the war, it put the Allies definitely in the ascendant, and for the moment Marlborough hoped to follow Blenheim up by striking at France

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on a front where, if nature had done more to protect her than in French Flanders, art had done far less. Lord Nottingham, the High Tory leader, in one of those criticisms on the conduct of the war in which he from time to time displayed his lack of strategic knowledge and perception, denounced the war in Flanders on the ground that the Allies were merely knocking their heads against a stone wall, that nothing decisive would ever be accomplished in a theatre of war in which the Allies might fight to all eternity without result. But Marlborough's experiences in 1705 rather discounted Nottingham's criticisms. Difficulties of supply and transport in the more rugged and barren country of the Moselle valley through which he sought to turn the fortress-protected Flanders front proved almost insuperable. The " way round " bristled with difficulties, while the timidity of the Dutch, who were thrown into a panic by fears of a French counter-stroke in Flanders, was a constant source of trouble. For Marlborough as for the Allies on the Western Front in 1915 there was no way round. He had to break down the fortress barrier which the enemy had raised in his path just as they had to obtain the upper hand in the long and desperate struggle with the armies opposed to them. Progress might be slow in Flanders, as it was in 1916 on the Somme, but Marlborough knew where the decisive theatre lay, and, although he was denied the chance of putting the finishing touches to his work, the situation of the French at the moment of his dismissal affords ample justification for his persistent and determined strategy.

When, after the battle of Ramillies, Marlborough swept Northern Flanders clear of Frenchmen in a month of marvels, he was urged by the Ministry at home to advance against Dunkirk. The French King at least seems to have expected this, for old Vauban was despatched to carry out the last task of his long life, the construction of two strongly entrenched camps for the defence of Dunkirk. But Marlborough was not to be led away even by a victory such as Ramillies into attempting the impossible. He told Godolphin plainly that before Dunkirk could be taken Ostend and Nieuport must be reduced and Menin and Ypres into the bargain. Thanks to naval co-operation—on which Marlborough always set the greatest possible store—Ostend was quickly captured, and the Duke then turned into the Valley of the Lys to reduce Menin. That fortress, another Vaubannérie, put up a fine defence of over a month, after which Dendermonde had to be taken, mainly to satisfy the Dutch, for the Duke himself wanted to besiege Ypres. That design he never carried out, though in 1710 after the fall of Béthune the project

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of a stroke at the Channel Ports was again discussed, and one of the reasons for the reduction of Béthune had been that its capture would facilitate that of Aire and Saint-Venant, and so open the road to Abbeville and help to isolate Calais. Aire and Saint-Venant were captured before the end of 1710, and with the Upper Lys in Allied hands, and a gate into Artois opened by the capture of Aire, the problem before Villars was made far more difficult. When he planned his famous lines he had to be prepared for an advance by the Allies against both his flanks, for Marlborough's successes in 1710 had put the French left in peril, and the fall of Mons after the battle of Malplaquet had brought the Allies perilously near the Oise with only Landrecies and Le Quesnoy between them and that river. Cambrai and Arras were still in French hands with Bouchain and Valenciennes as well as Charleroi and Maubeuge farther to the east; but the French were back on their last line of defence, and the piercing of the lines near Arleux, followed by the capture of Bouchain, isolated Valenciennes and left them but a poor chance of a successful resistance to a renewed attack by the whole force of the Grand Alliance, directed by Marlborough and Eugène. In their hour of need, however, the Tories saved the French from the wrath to come, as effectually as the German retreat to the "Hindenburg Line" and the collapse of Russia prevented the Allies from reaping in 1917 the harvest of Verdun and the Somme. But, if Marlborough had been allowed to fight another campaign, 1712 would have seen British troops marching down the Oise past Guise and La Fère, or along the great road from Le Cateau to St. Quentin, two hundred years before the "Old Contemptibles" passed that way.

One might note several other points of comparison between the two wars, including the immense importance of Lille, the early masterpiece of Vauban, which Boufflers defended with such splendid skill and valour against Marlborough and Eugène in 1708. That with Marlborough the siege of Lille was only the second and less favoured of two alternatives is true: he had planned an enterprise which had fairly taken away the breath of his colleagues, who thought the siege of Lille quite difficult and daring enough. The capture of Lille was certainly one of the Duke's finest feats, for the besiegers were lying between two hostile French armies, athwart the northernmost of which (Vendôme's) all material for the siege had to be conveyed from Brussels. Lille had been an outwork of Flanders against France till the early years of Louix XIV., and had stood repeated sieges on behalf of its Counts, and their stupid Spanish successors. In 1792 it stood up, the bulwark of Revolutionary France, against

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the Austrians to an incessant bombardment of one hundred and fifty-four hours. Joffre was undoubtedly right to refuse to run a risk of the same kind in 1914, although its possession was of enormous value to the Germans—witness the fierce attacks so continually made by British troops in the hope of getting a foot on the Aubers ridge which guards it from the south-west.

But if there are some resemblances between Marlborough's attack upon France and the recent operations of the Germans in the same part of the world, there are other resemblances equally well marked between Marlborough's position and that of the Allies in the late war. In the first place Louis XIV., at the very outset of the war—indeed, before it actually began—had overrun the Spanish Netherlands, ousted the Dutch from the Barrier Fortresses and possessed himself of the whole country, much in the same way as in August 1914 the Germans made themselves masters of Belgium and acquired an enormous initial advantage. Things moved less rapidly in the days of the Grand Monarque than in those of Kaiser William II., and, if Louis's disregard for his treaty obligations was perhaps less damaging to him in the long run than was the Kaiser's, so the initial advantage he secured likewise profited him less, certainly it never seemed to be on the point of finishing the war at one stroke. There was no First Battle of the Marne in the War of the Spanish Succession, at least not in the Netherlands, but there is a distinct analogy between the " J'y suis, j'y reste . . . unless you can turn me out " of the Germans on the Western Front from their second failure at Ypres until the great onslaught of March 1918 and the French attitude in the Netherlands after 1701. The latter had secured a big advantage; they calculated that it would take the Allies all their time to dislodge them, and meanwhile they would finish the war elsewhere —by a blow at Vienna across the Black Forest. Marlborough's march to the Danube, that daring transfer of troops from the safely secured right to the imperilled centre of the Allied position, crowned as it was by the victory at Blenheim, saved the Alliance, although the success was never properly followed up. Once they had got the war out of their own dominions the Princes of the Empire showed a lack of zeal for the common cause, which would be amazing had it not been their normal attitude: they failed to provide their promised contingents, or to produce the supplies which they had undertaken to collect, they behaved as if the war were none of their concern and as if England and Holland ought to pay for the privilege of defending South Germany. So the burden of the war came more and more to be borne by Marlborough in the Netherlands, and there he had

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bit by bit to wrest from the French the fortresses and the control of roads and rivers which they had seized in 1701. So in the same way the Allies at the Somme, and in 1917, had to gain ground yard by yard from a well-posted enemy.

The second resemblance between Marlborough and the Allies in 1914–1918 is that he possessed as they did the great advantage of supremacy at sea. Even despite the submarine menace, the command of the sea was the sheet-anchor of the Allies, and equally it was the foundation of Marlborough's schemes. Just as the Germans only tried conclusions with the British fleet once, so the French did not attempt to repeat Malaga any more than the Germans ventured on a second Jutland. Marlborough was fully alive to the advantages of sea-power. He was constantly planning diversions against the French coast to distract and worry the enemy and to draw off troops from his main army: he owed his speedy reduction of Ostend largely to naval co-operation, and in all his schemes for advancing into France he took naval assistance largely into his calculations. The great scheme which was too bold for Eugène of masking Lille and basing himself on a Channel Port was planned on possibilities which arose out of the British control of the Channel. Marlborough fully realized the opportunities which were open to him, even if he could not persuade Eugène to see eye to eye with him in the matter. It was certainly a daring conception, but to those who put their trust in the sea there is nothing impracticable or fool-hardy about it, and, had Marlborough's colleagues only risen to the level of his readiness to depart from the approved methods of conducting war, the stroke might have ended the war in 1709. What use would there have been in all the fortresses of French Flanders and Artois had Marlborough burst through to the Channel and established a new base at the mouth of the Canche? Villars would have been obliged to draw back behind the line of the Somme; the garrisons of Lille, Mons and Tournai, even those of Arras and Cambrai, must have been reduced in order to reinforce his army in the field, or have been left immobile and unable to affect the fortunes of the campaign. It was well for the Allies in 1914–1918 that their opponents had only a "High Canal" Fleet behind them, and that their left flank rested safe and secure on the support of the White Ensign.

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# BERNHARDI ON REFORMS IN ORGANIZATION

By J. E. E.

In several German reviews of Sir Julian Corbett's Naval History of the War, Vol. I. (*e.g.* in the *Vossische Zeitung*), the British preparations for war are commended as being eminently practical. The same adjective has frequently been applied to our nation by foreigners, and we pride ourselves on being practical. For reasons which are perhaps constitutional, our common sense has not always been allowed free play in the Army ; it has often been overruled by a taste for foreign fashions in things military. Some one " discovers " that a continental army wears a spiky helmet, practises cavalry charges in three lines, ranges with time shrapnel, has reduced its engineers to the status of pioneers, has large companies of 250 men, writes orders for the movements of armies in five minutes or so by the clock, to the accompaniment of a Jazz band (to provide the disturbing element of a conflict)—and then, without much consideration of our own experience or our next needs, a great reform is introduced, embodying the foreign idea. Native suggestions for changes or progress, whether in peace or war, usually have met with little encouragement, as a perusal of the reports of the General Staff Conferences before the war or the inquiry into the origin of tanks will demonstrate.

It is pleasing, therefore, to one's national pride to find General of Cavalry von Bernhardi, in his recently published book, " On the War of the Future " (Vom Kriege der Zukunft), advocating, as the result of war experience, principles in the organization of the different arms to which we were the last to cling ; or to which we adhered, " in spite," as W. S. Gilbert might have written, " of all temptations to follow other nations " ; or which, at any rate, were discussed by us before the war.

It may be interpolated here that von Bernhardi commanded a corps, or group, throughout the Great War : on the Russian front, until 1918, when he took part in the Lys offensive and in the retirement across the Scheldt. His new book is a survey of the last war rather than a forecast of what the next will be like, with many a hint to the German public to begin preparations for future victory. His



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suggestions for the reorganization of the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers are really the only constructive ideas in it. With them it is proposed to deal.

The infantry company of 250 men, he considers, proved too large for one man to supervise in the field, and he advocates that the limit should be 150, not including train drivers. Our 125 men company of before the war was, therefore, not far from the mark. The company should have three platoons, divided into rifle and light machine-gun groups, with the necessary telephone men and runners.

Departing from the "three motive" so dear to the German organizer, he retains the four-company battalion, because the fourth company is a useful reserve in the hand of the commanding officer. He adds to these four, a telephone section, a heavy machine-gun company and a labour company. This last provides the drivers of the regimental vehicles, officers' servants, clerks and battalion employment men, who need not be "completely fit" for military service. Such a company was proposed in England shortly before the four-company battalion was introduced in 1913.*

In the regiment he goes back to the three-battalion organization—our infantry brigade of the later years of the war—with a telephone section, and a light trench mortar company,† and an "infantry battery" of six guns (four guns for other batteries) attached for tactical purposes. For this purpose mountain guns might be more suitable than 18-pounders.

Coming to artillery, von Bernhardi deplores the separation into field and foot (garrison) which the British Army was the last to carry out between 1894 and 1899; and states that it proved a mistake. A number of natures of guns which belonged to the garrison artillery have become field artillery, and are employed exactly like field artillery. In any case, officers of one branch must know just as much about field warfare as the other does.

A field artillery regiment might consist of gun and howitzer groups as our divisional artillery did before the war, plus a mixed group containing heavy field howitzers and 4-inch guns. This is an advance on the one heavy battery which British divisions alone had in 1914. Into a special category he would put only the heavier weapons, 5, 6, 8, 12, and 15-inch guns, and the 11, 12, and 16-inch howitzers. These could be organized into mixed battalions, and allotted to divisions and corps for field training. They must know

* By Lieut.-General Sir F. I. Maxse, I think.

† A light trench mortar, to accompany infantry, was proposed by Lieut.-General Sir F. W. N. McCracken in 1911.

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how to work with infantry. He does not suggest that motor or horse-traction might indicate the dividing line between artillery units. One can hardly expect the same officer to be an expert horsemaster and a skilled mechanic.

Medium and heavy trench mortar batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, and sound and flash ranging sections should apparently be manned by specialists, but officered from the general list of the field artillery.

Being a cavalryman, von Bernhardi's ideas on the organization of his own branch are the most interesting. He admits that the character of the arm has essentially changed; reconnaissance duties have almost entirely gone over to the Air Force: the cavalry will charge no more, though tanks may; in position warfare horsemen can only be employed as infantry (the British was the only army in which the cavalry had the same rifle as the infantry, and not a carbine), or as police behind the line. He foresees, however, a rôle for cavalry in rapidly following up a retiring enemy after a break-through has been made by the infantry, and in rolling up the flanks on either side of the gap. For he insists that envelopment is still the only way to decisive success: if the enemy has no flank, then a break-through will make two that can be got at. Of the value of a mounted arm in defence, as exhibited by the British cavalry divisions in front of Amiens in 1918, he makes no mention. He specifically states that he wants more than mounted infantry, the men must be able to ride anywhere and at speed.

A cavalry regiment should consist of at least 10 squadrons, exclusive of the depôt squadron, so that it can furnish a battalion of not less than 750 men to fight on foot, with, in addition, a machine-gun squadron. This seems to mean merely that he would make our brigade the unit, instead of the regiment, as the German squadron contains, or used to contain, 161 other ranks; 750 men from 1,610 seems a small proportion. As an equivalent of the infantry "labour companies," "escort squadrons" are suggested. They should be trained merely as mounted infantry, and would provide escort for the train and ammunition columns, carry out requisition of supplies, etc.

In each cavalry brigade of three regiments, there should be a horse-artillery battery, and, in addition, in each cavalry division a horse-artillery group. The division must also have for distant reconnaissance its own aeroplane squadron, a signal squadron, and a battalion of cyclists, or infantry in lorries. The practice in 1914 of making the Jäger battalions keep up on foot with the cavalry naturally retarded the advance.

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The cavalry division thus imagined would appear to be a somewhat cumbrous body; von Bernhardi practically admits that it could only live on a fertile country untouched by war, and, it might be added, well provided with water. The subject is certainly one that requires discussion.

For the engineers, at least a battalion per division is demanded, although it is insisted that all arms should do their own field engineering, including wiring. The Germans seldom had more than one field company per division, while we had first two and, by 1915, three. The increase is demanded "in order to relieve the infantry of the large amount of the engineer-technical work that it had to perform, and thus to free it for its own duties as a fighting arm." All sappers, whether of field companies, railway troops, or special branches, must be fully trained in field engineering, including road-making and simple infantry work. Mining and pontooning (but not bridging) are to be regarded as specialities.

There is hardly a point of value in von Bernhardi's suggestions which was not discussed in Great Britain before the war. Our military thought has, it would seem, been well ahead in times of peace, and there is no doubt it went rapidly in advance of the German during the war. It only remains to profit by our own national genius rather than that of foreign thinkers.

It was pointed out before the war that the whole German system, General Staff included, was built up on the experience and tradition of the British Army under Wellington, which were allowed to drop out of sight and be forgotten in England during the forty years peace: and the neglect of them had its results in the Crimea. It is to be earnestly hoped that the knowledge and experience gained in the Great War will not be lost in the same way.

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# SOME WAR RECORDS OF THE BRITISH INFANTRY

In a great modern war it is no easy matter for those in high places to know the truth as to the thousand and one small things which taken together constitute the great things. For a commander even of as relatively small a formation as a brigade or a battalion to be an eye-witness of all the doings of those under his command is almost impossible under modern conditions. Yet a really accurate account of the doings of an army can only be built up from the systematic collation of the narratives of the smaller formations A battle, however large, represents the combination of individual efforts: episodes quite trifling in themselves may make all the difference at the crucial moment. It is often possible to lay the finger on some one incident which has been the root of many things, the ramifications and developments of which can be traced all along a battle line. At Loos, Hill 70 was lost not on the hill itself, but away on the left at the Bois Hugo, and the resistance of a few hundred Germans, who held out for several hours in some trenches near Lone Tree, after the rest of the German front line had been carried, had the effect of breaking up the cohesion of the attack of the whole of our Fourth Corps. It is necessary, therefore, to go into the details even of the greatest battles with care if really satisfactory accounts are to be produced, for the success or failure of the greatest strategist in the end depends on the way in which his plans are executed.

*A Short History of the Sixth Division, August, 1914 to March, 1919.* Edited by Major-General T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd.

*The Welsh Riding Territorials in the Great War.* The Story of the 49th and 62nd Divisions and other Territorial troops from the West Riding of Yorkshire. By Laurie Magnus. Published by Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

*History of the Welsh Guards.* By C. H. Dudley Ward, D.S.O., M.C. Published by John Murray.

*The Grenadier Guards in the Great War of 1914–1918.* By Lieut.-Colonel Sir F. Ponsonby. Published by Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

*Three Years with the 9th (Scottish) Division.* By Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft. Published by John Murray.

*The Seventh Manchesters.* By Captain S. J. Wilson. With a Preface by Brigadier-General The Hon. Anthony M. Henley, and an Introduction by Lt.-Colonel Gerald B. Hurst. Published by Longmans, Green & Co.

*The Life of Lieut.-General Sir Stanley Maude.* By Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B. Published by Constable & Co.



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There have been many important contributions recently to the materials for the full story of the war, but so far these have been mainly of a personal character, emanating for the most part from distinguished, sometimes from extinguished, generals on both sides, belonging very often to the category of " apologetics," dealing as a rule with matters of strategy and not with tactical details. One turns to such sources more for what it was hoped to do than for detailed narratives of the actual attempts to carry out the plans and projects, or for the causes of success or failure. But these details are after all essential to a reasonable judgment. The standpoint of Head-Quarters is necessarily different from that of the front line trenches, and, even if the first essential is to know what those in authority were attempting in any particular operation—why, for example, it was imperative to continue the attack at Ypres in the autumn of 1917, despite increasingly unfavourable conditions of ground and weather—it is hardly less essential to get also the other point of view. Criticism of the Higher Command from the front line trenches is not always to be taken for Gospel, least of all when it emanates from quarters to which the working and the difficulties of the higher formations are a sealed book, but the fighting soldier's point of view is needed as a set-off against that of the commander.

If the narratives and apologetics of eminent commanders leave the inquirer not entirely satisfied, it may be asked what other categories of works are likely to be open to him in the near future. Of personal narratives of the type of " The Adventures of an Ensign " or Major Sandes' " In Kut and Captivity," many have already appeared, though for the moment the stream of them seems to be drying up. Many of these are valuable contributions to the available evidence, but, as materials for the historian, their limitations are often considerable. The personal equation is all-important; the scope of the author's experience is often, though not in all cases, restricted within narrow limits, they usually concentrate attention on some special aspect and deal, as a rule, with some striking and distinctive episode.

It is to another category of books, therefore, that one must turn for light on less dramatic but not unimportant aspects, a category which has been somewhat neglected in Great Britain in the past. Good regimental histories are almost as rare as regiments with histories well worth writing are numerous. Of late years there have been produced not a few regimental histories. Such books are sometimes valuable contributions to military history, but too often they are compiled from sources already available and have

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added little to knowledge, representing merely the rearrangement in relation to a new aspect of facts already familiar. But there is a great chance now for the historians of the units of the British Army to make a fresh start and to add appreciably to knowledge. It is to them that the Napiers, the Hendersons, the Omans and the Fortescues of the future will look for material for the magnum opus on this war. It is satisfactory, therefore, to see that efforts are being made to relate the story of the war from the point of view of particular units.

Histories of units of course have a somewhat specialized point of view. They are written in the first place for the members of the unit and their friends, for a circle more or less restricted, by which certain things obscure to the general reader will be taken for granted. But the value of the history of such a unit as the Sixth Division, briefly but not inadequately sketched by General Marden, is that it takes the reader to out-of-the-way places, to so-called "quiet" sectors in which essential, if unsensational, work had to be done without getting into Dispatches or attracting attention. Of the four great battles of 1917—Arras, Messines, "Third Ypres," and Cambrai—only the last saw the Sixth Division. But the bare record of what the division was doing from March to October in the Loos and Lens areas is all the more suggestive and impressive for the brevity and matter-of-fact way in which it is related. In the course of eight months the division carried out over thirty raids and made several successful minor attacks, beat off about twenty German raids, captured many prisoners, and suffered over 6000 casualties, nearly three and a half times its Cambrai losses, and yet the Commander-in-Chief's long Dispatch on the 1917 operations will be searched in vain for a mention of these valuable services, and there were other divisions in other parts of the line which were doing much the same work all through the campaign, contributing to the success of the larger operations indirectly but appreciably.

Within the last few months several histories of units have been added to the literature of the war. It is fortunate that they include representatives of many varieties of units, so that it is possible to form some conclusions as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of the division, the brigade, the regiment and the battalion as what may be called the "unit of narration."

One thing stands out clearly from a comparison of these units of narration. The division has many advantages. A division often had a local or national individuality which helped to build up what has been called "the new *esprit de division*"; it worked as a whole; it was, so to speak, the fighting unit; its part in a battle can usually

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be told with but little reference to other units, certainly with much less reference than is necessary in the case of the brigade or the battalion. These characteristics make the division a convenient and appropriate unit of narration. Naturally the inhabitants of a locality like the West Riding are anxious to know what their own men did and endured; there will be a demand in such districts for a good history of their achievements, and, as books cannot be produced without either a public ready to absorb them or something in the way of a guarantee fund, the wider appeal which the divisional history makes tells in its favour as against the brigade or battalion history. The next best unit of narration is the battalion. The amount to be told is more manageable, and, as Major Dudley Ward has shown, and Captain Wilson also to some degree, it is possible to convey even to the outsider something of the family life of the battalion, to keep pace with the changing personnel, to make individual officers and men more than mere names. On the other hand, it is clear that to write the history of a regiment is much harder than to tackle that of a division or a battalion. The regiment in the British Army does not fight as a unit, it may have any number of battalions, they may have been in many different theatres of war, or all in the same, scattered through several divisions or united in threes or fours in the same divisions as were, for example, several battalions of the Rifle Brigade, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the King's. The historian of a regiment may thus have many quite disconnected fractions of a great battle to describe when he comes to the Somme or to Arras. It is difficult for him to avoid repetition and scrappiness. It is even more difficult for him than it is for the divisional or battalion historian to strike the happy mean with regard to the amount of the general story of the war to be told. To overwhelm the history of the individual unit in an avalanche of details relating to the war as a whole is one extreme, the other is to keep so closely to the doings of the regiment that the reader loses sight, for example, of the importance of the achievement of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards in hanging on to the exposed Kruseick salient in the face of overwhelming artillery fire and repeated attacks by superior numbers, because he is not given the chance of seeing how this particular exploit fitted into the greater achievement of which it formed no mean part.

Not that Sir Frederick Ponsonby has failed in this respect. His sketch in six pages of the five weeks' fighting between La Bassée and the sea, generally comprehended under the title of "First Ypres," gives just what is wanted clearly and succinctly. His short

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account of Loos is equally clear, though it is hard to see why he does not include as part of that battle the hard fighting of the Guards' Division round the Hohenzollern Redoubt between the 3rd and 17th of October. But it must be admitted that later on he has not been wholly successful in avoiding repetition. In telling the story of Cambrai, for example, he not only gives four pages of general narrative but, before dealing in detail with the parts played by the four battalions of the Grenadiers, he inserts a " Divisional account," sixteen pages in length. The separate battalion narratives which follow involve much overlapping, and leave in consequence a rather confused impression in the reader's mind. But this is a minor blemish on a worthy memorial of the senior regiment of British infantry. The Grenadiers' record in the war was a great one: not the least impressive part of Sir Frederick Ponsonby's book is contained in the appendices, where thirty closely packed pages are occupied by the nominal roll of men who fell in the war. Two hundred and five officers and over four thousand five hundred other ranks is a proud but terrible total, more by 50 per cent. than the regimental establishment of men at the outbreak of war, whilst of the hundred officers who figured in the *Army List* of August, 1914, over forty were killed, including thirty-one of those who went overseas in August and October, 1914, with the 2nd and 1st Battalions.

The difficulties which Sir Frederick Ponsonby had to encounter have not been felt by Major Dudley Ward in his history of the youngest and smallest of the regiments of British infantry, and he has made almost as good use of his opportunities as the Welsh Guards did of theirs of making history. Raised early in 1915 the Welsh Guards received their baptism of fire at Loos before they were quite seven months old, and, when the Armistice stopped them on the outskirts of Maubeuge, they had crowded into three years of campaigning more pitched battles and heavier casualties than many regiments have experienced in a whole century of service in all parts of the globe.

The senior and the junior units of the Brigade of Guards have thus set a good example to the rest of the Brigade and to the Line in the matter of having their shares in the war adequately and promptly recorded. It is to be hoped that the precedent may be generally followed, for, quite apart from the importance of preventing so many fine stories of skill and gallantry from passing into oblivion, there are many things to be learned about the war in such records. Many lessons of technical and professional importance, especially in matters of tactics, will be lost if they are not put on permanent

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record, and it is to the regimental historians that the task should fall of recording such details, for to attempt to include them will overload hopelessly any more comprehensive history. Outstanding incidents, such as the 4th Shropshire Light Infantry's attack at the Montagne de Bligny, the 2nd Devons' devoted stand on the Aisne, both rewarded by citations in French Army Orders, the 8th West Yorkshire's brilliant assault at Bligny which led to the offer of the Croix de Guerre to the battalion, should be told at length. We shall only grasp the full extent of what our troops have done when the good example set by the Grenadiers has been well and widely imitated.

Neither Sir Frederick Ponsonby nor Major Dudley Ward is particularly interested in the study of tactics, though there is something on this point to be gleaned from both of them. Colonel Croft, however, is nothing if not a keen student of tactics. He is an infantryman and, though ready enough to acknowledge the necessity of close co-operation with other arms, the work of the infantry is the point with which he is most concerned. And that the work of the British infantry was the outstanding feature of the war will be admitted. Our infantry started as a better infantry than the German. General Callwell in his *Life of Sir Stanley Maude* quotes several passages from that general's letters and diary: "When we cross bayonets," he writes, "there is only one in it." And again: "What we have lacked in peace time . . . has been compensated for as far as possible by the splendid work of regimental officers and men . . . no reasonable amount of force brought against them will beat them." That it ended a better infantry is clear to whichever of these accounts one turns. That the standard was always maintained at the same level is not to be alleged: there were downs as well as ups. But taken as a whole, considering the drain on our man-power, the difficulties under which training was carried on at home and in the field, the losses in trained officers and non-commissioned officers, it was wonderful how well the British infantry stood the strain. Colonel Croft quotes General Foy, the French historian of the Peninsular War, as saying that the British soldier never retrogrades, but goes on adding to the good qualities of his predecessors. He himself claims that the history of this war bears out Foy's assertion.

That the infantry of the original Expeditionary Force should have acquitted itself magnificently can have surprised no one, except possibly some Germans, certainly it surprised no one who knew anything of the strenuous and devoted work of those responsible



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for the training of the British soldier in times of peace, for no one who in the years before the war saw a British battalion at company or battalion training, on manœuvres or in camp, could have compared the standards of work with those of other and more remunerative professions. But that after the officers and men who went out in August, 1914, and the scanty reserves behind them had melted away, their successors should have maintained their standards does border on the extraordinary. The records, however, of the Territorials, the Service battalions and the troops from Overseas will compare favourably with those of any infantry. To attempt to institute comparisons between the performances of our infantry at different stages of the war would be futile, because the comparison would turn so largely upon such questions as the equipment available at each period, the ammunition supply, the artillery support, the state of the various auxiliary services, the demands on the infantry for road-making and other fatigues not of a military character, the facilities for training; circumstances may make some particular failure fully as creditable to the troops engaged as some successes. But, without attempting comparisons between categories or periods, there are certain considerations which stand out fairly clearly.

Despite all the new and unprecedented factors on, above and under the earth, which this war has brought into the reckoning, despite the vastly increased importance of the work of the artilleryman and the engineer, the greater dependence of troops on the quantity and quality of munitions and equipment, the outstanding value of the human element—of the infantryman in particular—still remains the same. Indeed, there is much to be said for Colonel Croft's contention that " in the end it is the infantryman who stems the rush or captures and secures the ridge." There still remain essential things to be done which can only be done by the infantry. Writing of the third battle of Ypres, Colonel Croft says " you may have the biggest bombardo that the world has ever seen, but it won't win a yard of ground unless there is an infantryman ready to step forward at the given moment and occupy that yard of ground and hold it when won." It was the numerical insufficiency of our infantry which was the root of all our trouble in 1918. Skilfully designed " defence schemes " broke down for want of the necessary reserves. We had not enough infantry—that is the gist of the story, whether one reads it in General Marden's all too brief account of the stubborn stand of the outnumbered Sixth Division in front of Lagincourt, in Colonel Croft's tale of the splendid rear-guard fighting of his Lowlanders and of their Highland and South African comrades,

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or in Sir Frederick Ponsonby's narrative of the Thermopylae of the 4th Battalion of the Grenadier Guards at La Couronne in April, 1918. We were outnumbered again and again. It was the lost fourth battalions that made the difference when it came to " double work with a quarter fewer men to do it." The Fifth Army would never have been pushed back so far from the positions in which the German onslaught found it in the spring of 1918 had there been enough men to man those positions or any adequate reserves behind them.

But March, 1918, was not the first occasion on which we were short of infantry. It is clear that lack of numbers had much to do with our failure to push home the first day's success at Cambrai. Whether the doings of the Guards are followed in the pages of Sir Frederick Ponsonby and Major Dudley Ward, or those of the West Riding Territorials in those of Major Magnus, the same impression is left in the reader's mind. Moreover, when the shield is turned round and the story of the German defeats in the summer and autumn of 1918 is read, it is evident that the decline in numbers and in quality of his infantry played no small part in the German collapse. Good as his artillery and machine gunners remained to the end, this was not so with his infantry, which towards the end offered but little serious resistance. There was none of that vigorous and determined counter-attacking in 1918 which had made so difficult the retention of almost every yard won on the Somme in 1916. Colonel Croft speaks of the ease with which the counter-attacks of the German infantry were repulsed in the last great fight east of Ypres, and while Sir Frederick Ponsonby, in his account of the opposition encountered by the Guards in the fighting in September, October and November, 1918, has a great deal to say about the German machine gunners, he seems to imply that the main function of the German infantry was to fill the prisoners' cages.

To this picture the British infantry at the same period of the war affords a striking contrast. The phase of trench warfare had come to an end and new methods in tactics had to be evolved, or rather old methods and principles which had been somewhat overlooked during that period of stagnation were to reassert themselves. The rifle now resumed its pride of place as the chief weapon of the British soldier, the bomb was relegated to a subordinate position. Two things contributed to this change even before the Allies broke through the formidable and carefully prepared positions like the Drocourt-Queant line and the trench systems between Cambrai and St. Quentin. In 1918 there was activity on a far larger

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proportion of the front than had been the case formerly. The fighting was no longer on a comparatively narrow frontage as at Loos in 1915 and on the Somme in 1916. Thus the proportion of men per yard employed in an attack was much reduced, and this reduction was still more accentuated by the decline in the number of men available. Battalions consequently found themselves attacking on a frontage of a thousand yards, and therewith far greater opportunities were afforded for skilful leadership and the use of ground. In the massed attacks of 1916 such opportunities had often been completely lacking. In 1918 skirmishing was again possible, and this called for the same qualities which had distinguished the men of the Expeditionary Force in 1914.

A German general is reported to have complained that that Force was "an army of non-commissioned officers," that not only the leaders but the led were trained to work on their own. There can be no doubt that the initiative, endurance, and devotion to duty of the well-trained soldiers of the old Army helped notably to compensate for their numerical inferiority in the opening stages of the war. There were many occasions when the Germans succeeded by force of numbers or overwhelming weight of fire in gaining some local advantage which, if promptly pressed, might have been decisive. The German Guardsmen who reached the Nonne-Boschen Wood on the 11th of November, 1914, had little in front of them had they known how to use their chances. But it may be claimed that among the German rank and file, even among their junior officers, there was not the same readiness to improve an opportunity, the same initiative and grip which characterized our troops. In Sir Frederick Ponsonby's account of the splendid fight put up by the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards and the other battalions under Lord Cavan, who for nearly three weeks clung so tenaciously to the right of the British line in the Ypres salient, there are many instances of the way in which officers and men rose to the emergency.

But although in the ranks of the Territorial Force, of the new Armies and of the Overseas troops there were many men who were capable of becoming as good soldiers as the regulars in 1914, it is certain that the excellence of the British musketry, one of the sheet-anchors of the original Expeditionary Force, the salvation of the under-gunned and outnumbered Seventh Division, did not remain unimpaired. Colonel Croft, an enthusiast for the rifle, but an enthusiast with good reasons for his enthusiasm, is very candid upon this point. He speaks vigorously of the miserable quality of our musketry on the Somme, of Germans who were perfectly safe within

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two hundred yards of the muzzles of our rifles because our infantry had forgotten how to use its weapon. General Maude condemns emphatically the practice of demonstrations with rifle fire, teaching the infantry that their task was merely to keep the ground swept with bullets taught them to fire without aiming. If we did not actually abandon musketry in the trench warfare period, we undoubtedly diverted our energies to bombing. "The men took to it," Colonel Croft writes, "like ducks to water, for it made a comforting noise, very soothing to nerves tight stretched in battle. But it caused us to lose our birthright and our reputation as the best shooting nation in Europe." And it must be admitted that the influence of the bomb was detrimental to the efficiency of our musketry. A good shot may be born, but usually has to be made, and a high standard of musketry can only be reached by plenty of training and practice. One of the great difficulties in the training of the constant drafts needed to replenish the battalions in the trenches was that at first there were not nearly enough rifles to go round, and that ammunition for practice was the reverse of plentiful. The lack of familiarity with their weapon naturally handicapped the men, while the conditions of trench warfare allowed of relatively few opportunities for effective or controlled fire. It is hardly wonderful, therefore, that more than one German attack got home which would have speedily withered away in the "mad minutes" of the old Expeditionary Force. Nor were facilities for acquiring a mastery of the rifle easy to come by in France in 1915. It was not till the new Army divisions were pouring out to France in a steady stream that it was possible to give units more than very brief periods "out of the line": as much as a whole month for rest and training was a luxury hardly known, and it was only when such substantial periods became possible that anything like systematic and progressive training could be taken in hand. Long periods in the trenches, quite apart from the strain and the casualties, often very heavy even in sectors reputed "quiet," were detrimental to efficiency, physical condition, and training. "Constant warfare and little training = bad shooting" is Colonel Croft's formula, and his account of the methods of musketry instruction by which the Ninth Division recovered the old standard is most enlightening. Nor is the least valuable of the lessons of General Callwell's biography of Sir Stanley Maude, his account of the careful preparations for the great offensive against Kut. It was in no degree systematic training which was at the root of the great change in the fortunes of the war in Mesopotamia. The troops who took Kut in 1917 were largely the same who had failed to relieve it in 1916, but they

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were given a proper chance and had been thoroughly trained and imbued with the spirit of the offensive.

The careful and systematic courses of training which were given to our troops in France is perhaps the feature that contributed to our later successes which is likely to be overlooked. Critics who were in the habit of contrasting the " trench strengths " of divisions with the total numbers available in France may have had some justification for their opinions, but the officers and other ranks who were employed at corps army and G.H.Q. training schools ought not be included among the elements in the population of the " back " who might have been at the " front." It is evident from one and all of the volumes under consideration that the only sure road to success in any operation was to see that every one engaged in the undertaking knew what he had to do and was capable of doing it. Captain Wilson, in his description of the preparations for the attack on the Hindenburg Line, shows how even in a great general engagement the lessons of specialized training could be put in practice by individual brigades and battalions. The less thorough and systematic the training of officers and men, the more essential it was to make as thorough preparation as possible for the definite tasks to be attempted. In 1918, in the four months of victory, our infantry was a curious mixture of veterans and novices. Side by side with boys and the products of the final " combings out " there were wearers of three and four wound stripes, men with experience of fighting in many climes and theatres of war. The maintenance of a common system of training was the important factor which leavened up all our divisions to something like the same standard. There is not a division which has not some big exploit to its credit in the last four months, and it is to be hoped that each of them will put on record in adequate form its experiences and achievements in order to enable posterity to appreciate what our infantry attempted, endured and accomplished in the Great War.

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## LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

NOTE.—All books received are acknowledged in this list, and the inclusion therein does not necessarily preclude a book from further notice in the Review.

" The Great War, 1914–1918." A Brief Sketch. By C. R. L. Fletcher. Published by John Murray.

" The West Riding Territorials in the Great War." The Story of the 49th and 62nd Divisions and other Territorial Troops from the West Riding of Yorkshire.

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By Major Laurie Magnus. Published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

"The Grenadier Guards in the Great War of 1914–1918." By Lieut.-Colonel Sir F. Ponsonby. Published by Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

"The March on Paris, 1914." By General von Kluck. Published by E. Arnold.

"George, Third Earl of Cumberland (1558–1605). His Life and His Voyages." A Study from Original Documents. By Dr. G. C. Williamson. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"The Life of Lieut.-General Sir Stanley Maude." By Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B. Published by Constable & Co.

"Three Years with the 9th (Scottish) Division." By Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Croft. Published by John Murray.

"History of the Welsh Guards." By C. H. Dudley Ward, D.S.O., M.C. Published by John Murray.

"A Short History of the 6th Division, August, 1914 to March, 1919." Edited by Major-General T. O. Marden, C.B., C.M.G. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd.

"Seventh Manchesters." By S. J. Wilson. With a Preface by the Hon. Anthony M. Henley, and an Introduction by Gerald B. Hurst. Published by Longmans, Green & Co.

"Military Law Made Easy." By Lieut.-Colonel S. T. Banning. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd.

"With the M.T. in Mesopotamia." By Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Leland. Published by Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd.

"About Others and Myself." By Major-General Sir A. E. H. Anson, K.C.M.G. Published by John Murray.

"Dictionary of Explosives." By Arthur Marshall, Esq. Published by J. & A. Churchill.

"Imperial Military Geography." By Vaughan Cornish, D.Sc. Published by Sifton, Praed & Co.

"Les Silences du Colonel Bramble." By André Maurois. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"Air Sickness." By Rene Cruchet and Rene Moulinier. Published by John Bale & Danielsson, Ltd.

"A Manual of the Bengali Language." By J. D. Anderson. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"Letters of Travel." By Rudyard Kipling. Published by Macmillan & Co.

"The Day of the Crescent." By G. E. Hubbard. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"Hunting the Fox." By Lord Willoughby de Broke. Published by Constable & Co.

"Divisional and Other Signs." By V. Wheeler-Holohan. Published by John Murray.

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# NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THERE seems no limit to the books on the war that the German public will absorb. More books on military matters are being published than even before the war. In France, also, there is a steady output of war books at moderate prices of 6, 7.50, and 12 francs.

The most important books that have come to notice during the past quarter are General Lanrezac's "Le Plan de campagne Français et le Premier Mois de Guerre," and Generaloberst von Kluck's "The March on Paris." As the latter has been translated into English, it need not be noticed further here. General Lanrezac, it will be recalled, commanded the French Fifth Army, on the immediate right of the British, in August, 1914, and fought the battles of Charleroi and Guise. Not seeing eye to eye with the Generalissimo, he was then removed from his command and never employed again. His book is a clear soldierly account of the opening operations, and uncontroversial; but the General "gets a bit of his own back" by quoting verbatim remarks made by General Joffre and officers of his staff on certain occasions. For instance, at the Conference of Army Commanders held under the presidency of the Generalissimo on the 3rd of August, 1914, immediately after mobilization had been ordered. General Lanrezac states that there was at first only an exchange of *banalités*, but then General Dubail, the commander of the First Army, suggested that the VII. Corps, which was to begin the offensive in Alsace, would require heavy reinforcements, and that he was not prepared to find them. General Joffre merely said: "This plan is your plan; it is not mine." Thinking that he had not been understood, General Dubail began to explain further. General Joffre, his face beaming with his usual large smile, then repeated his answer, using exactly the same words: "This plan is your plan; it is not mine." The Conference then broke up, and General Lanrezac says he was not the only Army Commander who felt uneasy, and that one of them asked him if he thought General Joffre had an idea.

Three German books have been published which throw authoritative light on minor campaigns. These are General Liman von Sanders's "Fünf Jahre Türkei," General Lettow Vorbeck's "My



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Reminiscences of German East Africa " (translated), and " Deutsch-Sudwest im Weltkriege " by Rittmeister Hennig, who was one of the staff officers of the German commander, Oberstleutnant Franke. Liman von Sanders's book of 400 pages describes not only the Gallipoli campaign and the operations in Palestine to February, 1918, in both of which he was in chief command, but deals generally with the operations of the Turkish troops in all the Asiatic theatres. Of these he, as Chief of the German Military Mission, was kept informed by the German General Staff officers attached to every Turkish commander. The tone of the book is in every way worthy of a good soldier, who fought well with insufficient and unsatisfactory material, despite the fact also that Enver Pasha was jealous of him and hampered him at every turn. He was not even thanked for his defence of Gallipoli.

Rittmeister Hennig's story of the loss of German South-West Africa is based on war diaries and official documents, and the German operations are made very clear. But it is disfigured by personal abuse of his opponents, due to their preferring to stay in the British Empire rather than become Reichsangehörige, which may be translated for the occasion as " hangers on of the German Empire."

Besides Lettow Vorbeck's translated account of the war in German East Africa, there are large volumes by Herr Schnee, the Civil Governor ; Dr. Deppe, a medical officer ; W. Arning ; von Ruckteschell, and others who took part. So there is no lack of material from the German side.

Several French books on the Dardanelles by participants have appeared, *e.g.* " L'Expedition des Dardanelles " by Charles-Roux ; " La Campagne des Dardanelles " by Torau-Bayle ; " Les Aventures de l'Armée de l'Orient " by E. Halsey is concerned with Salonica, where the author spent two years. General Sarrail's book " Mon commandement en Orient " has just appeared, and contains a very full account of his work at Salonica, with copies of a large number of official documents.

A special literature is growing up on the subject of General Nivelle's offensive of April, 1917, and the struggle for Parliamentary control of operations. M. Painlevé, the Minister of War at that period, published his version in a magazine, *La Renaissance*, some time ago. There have been recently published Colonel Rousset's " La Bataille de l'Aisne," which defends the General, and points out particularly the gross exaggerations of the losses. M. Mermeix, who wrote " Joffre. La Première Crise du Commandement," has

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supported Col. Rousset with " Nivelle et Painlevé. La Deuxième Crise du Commandement." From the politicians' side there are " L'Offensive Française de 1917 " by M. H. Galli (the deputé) and " L'Offensive du 16 Avril " by M Pierrefeu (Editor of the Communiqué).

In " Au Bord du Gouffre," M. Victor Margueritte, joint author with his brother of " Le désastre," " Tronçons du glaive " and other novels on the war of 1870–71, makes a very violent attack on Maréchal Joffre and the French General Staff at the opening of the war. He quotes largely from the *Procés Verbaux* of the *Commission d'Enquête* on the loss of the Briey Basin, before which Maréchal Joffre was a very poor witness and appeared to know little about the directives and orders issued in his name.

In " Gallieni parle," MM. Marius-Ary and Le Blond, the late General Gallieni's secretaries when he was War Minister, record his conversations and remarks, particularly with regard to the claim made that to him, and not Joffre, is due the credit for the end of the great retreat and the orders to attack which led to the battle of the Marne. It is represented that considerable pressure had to be used to prevent General Joffre continuing to retire behind the Seine. General Percin in " Sarrail and Gallieni " follows much the same line, and in addition shows that General Sarrail refused to obey the G.Q.G. order to abandon Verdun. Thus it is argued that both on the right and left flank of the French Armies, the movements made were not only not by Joffre's directions, but in spite of them.

MM. Dutreb and de Cassagnac have just published an excellent sketch of the life of General Mangin.

An important book is General von Kuhl's " Der deutsche Generalstab." The author, before he was Chief Staff Officer to von Kluck and the Crown Prince of Bavaria, served for twenty-two years in the Great General Staff in Berlin. His work is really a defence of the General Staff. He gives at length the development of the German plans for a war against France and Russia, the General Staff appreciations of the armies and the plans of the belligerents, including Great Britain, and estimates of their forces. The British Army was not described as " contemptible," but " ebenbürtig " : equal in training to the German as far as it went. It may be noted that the General Staff expected that the B.E.F. would land at Ostende, Dunkirk, Calais ; and that it is admitted that the increase of the British forces and the participation of the Dominions, as well as the failure of India, South Africa, etc., to rebel, came as a great surprise and disappointment.

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Lieutenant-General Schwarte, assisted by many contributors of note, has edited two encyclopædic works, published by Mittler of Berlin. The first is called "Der Technik im Weltkriege," and deals with the apparatus for war prepared before and developed after 1914, both in the German Army and Navy, from hand-grenades to U Boats. It is a mine of information and statistics. The second is "Die militärischen Lehren des grossen Krieges." This contains chapters on the different arms, anti-aircraft guns, machine-guns, trench mortars, tanks, tunnelling, aviation, railways, intelligence and medical services.

General von Bernhardi, whose book on "The War of To-day" made such a stir in 1911, has now written one on "Der Krieg der Zukunft" (The War of the Future). It would more properly be called "The War of Yesterday," as it gives a survey of the strategy and tactics of the great war, with only a few lessons for the future as regards organization. Incidentally, he incites all good Germans to prepare for the next war.

Lieut.-Colonel Nicolai, the head of the German Intelligence, in a book called "Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung," has published an apologia for the failure of his department, both as regards obtaining information and preventing the enemy from getting it. His main excuses are, lack of preparation and absence of co-operation by Government departments and the public. The book also gives an account of the control of the German press and the endeavours to keep up *moral*, both in the Army and on the home front.

A good deal of the veil which hid what went on behind the scenes in Austro-Hungary has been lifted by the revelations of the Prussian plenipotentiary at the Army Headquarters of the Dual Monarchy, General-leutnant von Cramon. His book "Unser Oesterreich-hungarische Bundesgenosse" describes the strategy of the principal operations and the friction between the two Supreme Commands, and especially between von Falkenhayn and von Conrad von Hötzendorf. The death of the Kaiser Franz-Joseph is represented as a calamity to Germany only equalled by the first battle of the Marne. Von Conrad's case has been presented by the writer J. F. Novak in "Der Weg zug Katastrophe," who would have us believe that his hero was more far-seeing than any German, and that von Falkenhayn either took credit for his ideas or thwarted them.

General Martchenko, formerly Russian Military Attaché at Vienna, in "La catastrophe Austro-Hungroise" gives a very interesting account of events leading up to the war, with excellent

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sketches of the leading personalities. Herr Tchirsky, the German Ambassador, is made the principal villain of the piece, and it is stated that he prevented an understanding in July, 1914, between the Austrian Foreign Office and the Russian Ambassador.

Of general histories of the war: Oberst Immanuel, the well-known pre-war compiler, has published a convenient single volume, "Der Weltkrieg," with excellent black-and-white maps, which covers all theatres. Hermann Stegemann's more detailed history, which improves as it goes on, has reached its third volume, which takes the narrative in all theatres up to and including January, 1916. General Palat (Pierre Lehautcourt) has just published his fifth volume of his "Grande Guerre," which stops short of the battle of the Marne. This is the most authoritative, though not official, account of the French operations which has yet appeared. It is admirably written, but has very poor maps: only the hachured 1/80,000, without any troops marked on them. The ninth volume of Monsieur Hanotaux's "Histoire illustrée de la guerre" has appeared. His lack of military knowledge has been pointed out by French critics, but, as he has had access to many official documents of the General Joffre period, his book has a special value. The ninth volume only carries the campaign in the West as far as the 6th of September, 1914.

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# FROM A STUDENT'S SCRAPBOOK

## Why the German Fleet made no attempt to interfere with the transport of the B.E.F. in August, 1914

"The Supreme Command made no demands whatever on the Navy to stop or to delay the British transports. On the contrary, it seemed not to place much value on the action of the very efficient but numerically weak Expeditionary Corps. In any case, when at the beginning of the War Frigate-Captain Heydel of the Operations Section was sent by the Admiralty to inquire if the Army laid stress on the interruption of the transport of troops, the Chief of the General Staff personally replied that the Navy should not allow the operations that it would otherwise carry out to be interfered with on this account; it would even be of advantage if the Armies in the West could settle with the 160,000 English at the same time as the French and Belgians. His point of view was shared by many during the initial favourable course of the offensive in the West."—*See* The German Admiralty Staff's "Der Krieg sur See 1914–1918, Nordsee," Bd. I., p. 82.

## General Von Moltke's estimate of the duration of the War

"Sober reflection showed that there was a limit to the time that Austro-Hungary could stand alone against Russia. It was a question of an Empire of 52 million inhabitants against one of 160 millions, neglecting Serbia and Montenegro. Freiherr von Conrad had conversations on the subject with General von Moltke before the outbreak of war, to find out how he thought events would run in the war as a whole. The real decision, von Moltke was of opinion, must come in the West. At any rate, the most dangerous enemy was there. Von Conrad agreed with this. But he wanted to know one thing: when, in von Moltke's opinion, would the decision in the West take place. The Chief of the German General Staff replied, 'The 39th or 40th day of mobilization.'"—*See* K. F. Novak in "Der Weg zur Katastrophe," p. 54.

(The book has a preface by Feldmarshall von Conrad, who states that he read the MS.; it is obviously founded on material furnished by him to the author.)



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## Marshal Hindenburg's confidence in March, 1918

" On my return journey to Rumania I reported myself on the 1st of March [1918] at O.H.L. in Kreuznach. I found the Field Marshal and General Ludendorff in the most confident mood. Hindenburg volunteered the statement to me :

" ' The drama is nearing the end. The last act is about to begin.'

" That it would terminate so tragically for us not only he but our enemies had no suspicion."—*See* Lieut.-General von Morgen, Commander of the XIV. Reserve Corps, in " Meiner Truppen Heldenkämpfe," p. 136.

## General Gallieni's share in the battle of the Marne

" Leblond ! This afternoon Briand took me (General Gallieni) aside, and, after talking about various matters, began to speak about the battle of the Marne. And he said something of importance (take it down exactly).

" The Government in consequence of the statements made by General Gallieni that he could not defend Paris unless he had sufficient forces to deliver battle in front of the capital, in view of the backwardness of the preparations of the entrenched camp, insisted on General Joffre's sending troops to the Military Governor of Paris. At the same time, they insisted that General Joffre and the British should stop their movement of retreat on the Seine. General Joffre, on the 4th or 5th (?) of September, dispatched the following telegram to the President of the Council and the President of the Republic :—

" ' General Gallieni having attacked prematurely. . . .'

" Underline that, said the General.

" ' . . . the General-in-Chief has ordered the retreat to be stopped and the offensive to be taken.'

" You understand ?

" I think so, General.

" That ' prematurely ' is worth gold," said he.—*See* " Gallieni parle," by his Secretaries, MM. Marius-Ary and Leblond, p. 64.

## General Bernhardi wants another war

" In spite of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty, the U-Boat weapon must be developed as much as possible. That this can be done and the expansion of the Army carried out are proved by the years that succeeded 1806, when 200,000 men instead of the 42,000 permitted were trained under the very eyes of the French garrisons." —*See* General von Bernhardi in " Der Krieg der Zukunft," p. 174.

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## The effect on Austria of German defeats in 1918

"The turn of events in the West (the 8th August, 1918) had a crushing (lit. down crashing) effect in Austria. The belief that Germany's power could work miracles was so deeply rooted and so widely spread, that the exposure of the delusion was a thorough knock-down blow. Even the Kaiser was deeply affected. He had me summoned to an audience, and told me that the disaster on the Piave had not produced such an impression on his people as the turn of events in the West."—*See* Generalleutnant von Cramon (German Military Plenipotentiary in Austro-Hungary), in "Unser Oesterreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse," p. 174.

## The War the Kaiser intended

"What optimism prevented us from discerning the signs of the storm that was brewing, and from understanding and studying the character of the war contemplated by the Germans? Its nature was indicated by General Calderari, (Italian) Military Attaché at Berlin in 1913, in reporting the phrase used by the Emperor at a Conference held in connection with the manœuvres of that year. It was 'the next war will be a war of annihilation: ein Vernichtungskrieg.'"—*See* General Luigi Capello, in "Note di Guerra," p. xiv.

## The 4th of September, 1914, at O.H.L.

"On the 4th of September (1914) the Emperor said to me, 'To-day is the thirty-fifth day of mobilization. Rheims is occupied by our troops. The French seat of Government has been transferred to Bordeaux. Our cavalry points are thirty miles from Paris.'

"When I visited the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army on the evening of the same day, before my return home, I must admit that a heavy shadow was thrown across the glorious picture that I had formed of the victories and advance of our troops. I found Generaloberst von Moltke serious and depressed, and by no means in a happy and victorious mood. He confirmed that our advanced troops were thirty miles from Paris, 'but,' he added, 'we have scarcely a horse in the Army that can go out of a walk.' After a short pause he continued: 'We must not deceive ourselves. We have had successes, but we have not yet won a victory. Victory means annihilation of the enemy's resistance. When armies of millions contend, the victor has prisoners. Where are our prisoners? Some twenty thousand in the Lorraine battle; here another ten thousand, and perhaps there another twenty thousand. The

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relatively small number of captured guns shows me that the French have retired according to plan and in good order. The hardest task is still before us.' "—*See* Helfferich's " Weltkrieg," vol. II., pp. 17–18.

## The Kaiser and Gallipoli

" Between the two conferences in Pless (with Ludendorff) I (Liman von Sanders is writing) was commanded to an audience with H.M. the Kaiser at the New Palace in Potsdam. At this audience I did not have much chance of speaking, for H.M. the Kaiser had much to say on the Gallipoli Campaign and on the excellent bearing of the Turkish troops in Galicia. As regards Gallipoli, in any case, H.M. was not correctly informed ; he believed that the U-boats had played a very much larger part than the situation rendered possible. When after the long exposition of H.M. I mentioned their very limited success near the Peninsula and gave exact figures, the Kaiser did not seem pleased at the previous information being corrected. He ended the conversation very abruptly, although on all previous occasions he had been particularly gracious to me."—*See* Marshal Liman von Sanders, in " Fünf Jahre Türkei," pp. 191–192.

## The meaning of Somme

Somme, in the place-names Somme-Py, Somme-Tourbe, Somme-Vesle, etc., means " source " in the Champagne patois. Hurlu is the local name of Charlock ; Perth is the Celtic for a bush. —*See* General Palat, in " Les Batailles d'Artois et de Champagne, 1915," pp. 6–8.

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# APPENDIX

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## I. THE ARMY

### 1. ARMY COUNCIL

Rt. Hon. W. L. S. Churchill, M.P., *Secretary of State for War* (*President of the Army Council*).
Rt. Hon. W. R. W. Visct. Peel, G.B.E., *Under Secretary of State for War* (*Vice-President of the Army Council*).
Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ir. Rifles, *p.s.c.*, *Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*
Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master General of the Ordnance.*
Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces.*
Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *Quarter-Master General to the Forces.*
Major-General Sir C. H. Harington, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*
Rt. Hon. Sir A. Williamson, Bt., M.P., *Financial Secretary* (*Finance Member*).
Sir J. Stevenson, Bt., *Surveyor-General of Supply.*
Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.; Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B., *Secretaries and Members of Council.*

### 2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

#### *Secretary of State for War*

Rt. Hon. W. L. S. Churchill, M.P.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.* | Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. |

#### *Chief of the Imperial General Staff*

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ir. Rifles, *p.s.c.*

#### *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff*

Major-General Sir C. H. Harington, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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| *Director of Military Operations.* | Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Military Intelligence.* | Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Staff Duties.* | Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |



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## *Adjutant General to the Forces*

Lieutenant-General G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

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| *Director of Organisation.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) I. L. B. Vesey, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Mobilisation and Recruiting.* | Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Personal Services.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) Sir B. E. W. Childs, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Director-General of Graves Registration and Enquiries.* | Temp. Major-General Sir F. A. G. Ware, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director-General Army Medical Service.* | Lieutenant-General Sir T. H. J. C. Goodwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

## *Quarter-Master General to the Forces*

Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

## *Deputy Quarter-Master General*

Major-General Sir G. F. Ellison, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Movements and Quartering.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) R. S. May, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Remounts.* | Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. N. Birch, K.C.M.G., C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A. |
| *Director of Supplies and Transport.* | Major-General Sir E. E. Carter, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.* | Major-General Sir H. D. E. Parsons, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Director-General Army Veterinary Service.* | Major-General L. J. Blenkinsop, C.B., D.S.O. |

## *Master General of the Ordnance*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Commdt. R.A.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Artillery.* | Brigadier-General B. R. Kirwan, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director of Fortifications and Works.* | Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B. |

## *Under Secretary of State for War*

Rt. Hon. W. R. W. Visct. Peel, G.B.E.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director-General of Territorial and Volunteer Forces.* | Colonel (Terr. Army) (Temp. Major-Gen. in Army) A. F. G. B. Earl of Scarbrough, K.C.B., T.D., A.D.C. |
| *Director-General of Lands.* | Sir Howard Frank, K.C.B. |

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*Finance Member*

Rt. Hon. Sir A. Williamson, Bt., M.P.

*Assistant Financial Secretary*

Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B.

*Directors of Finance.* Sir W. P. Perry, K.B.E., C.B.; W. H. Fawcett, Esq., C.B.; J. B. Crosland, Esq.

*Surveyor-General of Supply*

Sir J. Stevenson, Bt.

*Secretary of the War Office*

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.

*Principal Assistant-Secretaries.* Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.; Sir W. P. Perry, K.B.E., C.B.; J. B. Crosland, Esq.

*Chaplain-General.* Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.V.O., D.D.

*Judge Advocate-General.* Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

## 3. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

### A.—Cavalry Regiments

| Regiment. | Station. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Life Guards | Hyde Park Barracks, S.W. | Lt.-Col. Hon. E. S. Wyndham, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd Life Guards | Windsor | Lt.-Col. Hon. A. F. Stanley, D.S.O. | |
| Royal Horse Guards | Regent's Park, N.W. | Lt.-Col. Lord Tweedmouth, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. H. J. Williams, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) | Palestine | Lt.-Col. G. H. A. Ing, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards | Sialkot | Lt.-Col. C. L. Rowe, D.S.O. | |
| 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. C. F. Hunter, D.S.O. | |
| 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) Dragoon Guards | Colchester | Lt.-Col. H. Combe, D.S.O. | to Palestine 1920–21 |

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## Cavalry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Station. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) | Athenry | Lt.-Col. H. Sadler. | |
| 7th (Princess Royal's) Dragoon Guards | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. B. G. Clay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st (Royal) Dragoons | Ballinasloe | Lt.-Col. H. A. Tomkinson, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd Dragoons, Royal Scots Greys | Redford Barracks, Edinburgh | Lt.-Col. W. M. Duguid-McCombie, D.S.O. | to Palestine 1920–21. |
| 3rd (King's Own) Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. W. T. Wilcox, C.M.G. | |
| 4th (Queen's Own) Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. W. Neilson, D.S.O. | |
| 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers | Risalpur | Lt.-Col. H. A. Cape, D.S.O. | |
| 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons | Rhine | Lt.-Col. B. Vincent, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | to U.K. 1920–21 |
| 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars | York | Lt.-Col. H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. G. M. Mort, D.S.O. | |
| 9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers | Castlereagh | Lt.-Col. F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal) Hussars | Ennis | Lt.-Col. A. G. Seymour, D.S.O. | |
| 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars | Egypt | Lt.-Col. R. J. P. Anderson, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 12th (Prince of Wales's Royal) Lancers | Curragh Camp | Lt.-Col. C. Fane, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 13th Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. J. J. Richardson, D.S.O. | |
| 14th (King's) Hussars | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. R. V. K. Applin, D.S.O. | to Rhine 1920–21 |
| 15th (The King's) Hussars | Dublin | Lt.-Col. F. C. Pilkington, D.S.O. | |
| 16th (The Queen's) Lancers | Egypt | Lt.-Col. C. E. St. J. Harris-St. John, D.S.O. | to Palestine 1920–21 |
| 17th (Duke of Cambridge's Own) Lancers | Buttevant | Lt.-Col. B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 18th (Queen Mary's Own) Royal Hussars | Secunderabad | Lt.-Col. E. C. Jury, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal) Hussars | Muttra | Lt.-Col. A. W. Parsons, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 20th Hussars | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. M. E. Richardson, D.S.O. | |
| 21st (Empress of India's) Lancers | Meerut | Lt.-Col. O. W. Brinton. | |

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## B.—Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery

*Allotment of Batteries to Brigades.*

| Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 37th | 23 | 12th | 45 | 31st | 67 | 20th | 89 | 16th | 111 | 24th | 133 | 20th |
| 2 | 13th | 24 | 7th | 46 | 10th | 68 | 14th | 90 | „ | 112 | „ | 134 | 32nd |
| 3 | 37th | 25 | 35th | 47 | 30th | 69 | 6th | 91 | „ | 113 | 25th | 135 | „ |
| 4 | 1st | 26 | 17th | 48 | 36th | 70 | 34th | 92 | 17th | 114 | „ | 136 | 1st |
| 5 | 37th | 27 | 32nd | 49 | 12th | 71 | 36th | 93 | 18th | 115 | „ | 137 | 8th |
| 6 | 12th | 28 | 9th | 50 | 34th | 72 | 7th | 94 | „ | 116 | 26th | 138 | „ |
| 7 | 4th | 29 | 31st | 51 | 10th | 73 | 5th | 95 | „ | 117 | „ | 139 | „ |
| 8 | 13th | 30 | 10th | 52 | 15th | 74 | 6th | 96 | 19th | 118 | „ | 140 | 16th |
| 9 | 30th | 31 | 35th | 53 | 2nd | 75 | 3rd | 97 | „ | 119 | 27th | 141 | 26th |
| 10 | 17th | 32 | 33rd | 54 | 10th | 76 | 9th | 98 | 1st | 120 | „ | 142 | 36th |
| 11 | 1st | 33 | „ | 55 | 33rd | 77 | 6th | 99 | 20th | 121 | „ | 143 | 15th |
| 12 | 35th | 34 | 7th | 56 | 34th | 78 | 11th | 100 | 23rd | 122 | 28th | 144 | „ |
| 13 | 17th | 35 | 22nd | 57 | 37th | 79 | 6th | 101 | 21st | 123 | „ | 145 | 20th |
| 14 | 4th | 36 | 33rd | 58 | 35th | 80 | 15th | 102 | „ | 124 | „ | 146 | 1st |
| 15 | 36th | 37 | 27th | 59 | 18th | 81 | 5th | 103 | „ | 125 | 29th | 147 | 3rd |
| 16 | 30th | 38 | 14th | 60 | 3rd | 82 | 8th | 104 | 22nd | 126 | „ | 148 | 21st |
| 17 | „ | 39 | 19th | 61 | 14th | 83 | 11th | 105 | „ | 127 | „ | | |
| 18 | 3rd | 40 | 25th | 62 | 3rd | 84 | „ | 106 | „ | 128 | „ | | |
| 19 | 9th | 41 | 31st | 63 | 5th | 85 | „ | 107 | 23rd | 129 | 31st | | |
| 20 | „ | 42 | 2nd | 64 | „ | 86 | 32nd | 108 | „ | 130 | 12th | | |
| 21 | 2nd | 43 | 24th | 65 | 28th | 87 | 2nd | 109 | „ | 131 | 19th | | |
| 22 | 34th | 44 | 13th | 66 | 4th | 88 | 14th | 110 | 24th | 132 | 13th | | |

### Stations of Units.

*Royal Horse Artillery.*

| Brig. | Battery. | — | Brig. | Battery. | — |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | H.-Q. Egypt | 3 | D | Lucknow |
| | A | Mesopotamia | (*con.*) | J | Secunderabad |
| | B | Egypt | | F | Ambala |
| | M | Egypt | 4 | | H.-Q. Newbridge |
| 2 | | H.-Q. Risalpur | | | |
| | K | Risalpur | | N | S. John's Wood |
| | C | Meerut | | I, L | Newbridge |
| | H | Sialkot | 5 | E, G, O | Aldershot |
| 3 | | H.-Q. Lucknow | | | |

*Royal Field Artillery.*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | H.-Q. 11, 146 (H) | Kilkenny | 3 | 18, 62, 75, 147 (H) | Rhine |
| | 98 | Waterford | 4 | 7, 14, 66 | Shorncliffe |
| | 136 | Fethard | | 4 (H) | |
| 2 | 21, 42, 53, 87 (H) | Fermoy | 5 | 63, 64, 73, 81 (H) | Bordon |

The following moves will take place during trooping season, 1920-21 :—

M Battery from Egypt to Palestine.

F „ „ Ambala to Mesopotamia.

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*Royal Field Artillery—continued*

| Brig. | Battery. | — | Brig. | Battery. | — |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 69, 74, 77 | Ewshott | 23 | H.-Q. 107, | Winchester |
| | 79 (H) | | | 108, 100 (H) | |
| 7 | 24, 34, 72, | Bulford | | 109 | Porton |
| | 60 (H) | | 24 | H.-Q. 110, | Jubbulpore |
| 8 | 137, 138, | Deepcut | | 111, 43 (H) | |
| | 139, 8 (H) | | | 112 | Kamptee |
| 9 | 19, 20, 28, | Deepcut | 25 | H.-Q. 40 | Fyzabad |
| | 76 (H) | | | 113 | Lucknow |
| 10 | 46, 51, 54, | Black Sea | | 115 | Bareilly |
| | 30 (H) | | | 114 (H) | Allalhabad |
| 11 | 83, 84, 85. | Palestine | 26 | H.-Q. 116 | Jhansi |
| | 78 (H) | | | 141 (H) | |
| 12 | 6, 23, 49, | Edinburgh | | 117 | Cawnpore |
| | 130 (H) | | | 118 | Nasirabad |
| 13 | 2, 8, 44, | Mesopotamia | 27 | H.-Q. 119, | Nowshera |
| | 132 (H) | | | 120, 37 (H) | |
| 14 | H.-Q. 38, | Colchester | | 121 | Peshawar |
| | 61 (H) | | 28 | 122, 123, | Black Sea |
| | 68, 88 | Ipswich | | 124, 65 (H) | |
| 15 | 52, 80, 143, | Larkhill | 29 | H.-Q. 135, | Rawalpindi |
| | 144 (H) | | | 126, 128 (H) | |
| 16 | 89 90, 91, | Palestine | | 127 | Darsamand |
| | 140 (H) | | 30 | 9, 16, 17, | Kildare |
| 17 | H.-Q. 92, | Mhow | | 47 (H) | Newbridge |
| | 10 (H) | | 31 | H.-Q. 41, | Cahir |
| | 13, 26 | Neemuch | | 45, 129 (H) | |
| 18 | H.-Q. 59, | Kirkee | | 29 | Clonmel |
| | 93, 95 (H) | | 32 | H.-Q. 134, | Hyderabad, Sind |
| | 94 | Belgaum | | 86 H) | |
| 19 | 39, 96, 97, | Mesopotamia | | 27 | Chamam |
| | 131 (H) | | | 135 | Karachi |
| 20 | H.-X. 67, | Bangalore | 33 | 32, 33, 36, | Dundalk |
| | 145 (H) | | | 55 (H) | Dublin |
| | 99, 133 | Secunderabad | 34 | 22, 50, 70 | Brighton |
| 21 | H.-Q. 101, | Meerut | | 56 (H) | |
| | 148 (H) | | 35 | 12, 25, 58, | Bulford |
| | 102 | Ambala | | 30 (H) | |
| | 103 | Agra | 36 | H.-Q. 71, | Newbridge |
| 22 | H.-Q. 104 | Lahore | | 142 (H) | |
| | 35 (H) | | | 15, 48 | Kildare |
| | 105 | Jullundur | 37 | 1, 3, 5, | Aldershot |
| | 106 | Ferozepore | | 57 (H) | |

Following moves of Brigades will take place during trooping season, 1920–1921 :—

23rd Brigade from U.K. to India.
17th „ „ India to Mesopotamia.
13th „ „ from Mesopotamia to Palestine.
11th „ „ from Palestine to U.K.

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## C.—Royal Garrison Artillery (Mobile Armament)

*British Mountain Artillery.*

| British Mountain Artillery Brigade. | British Mountain Batteries. | — |
|---|---|---|
| I. | 1, 2, 3, 4 .. .. .. | Bulford |
| II. | 17, 5, 7, 9 .. .. .. | Shoreham |
| Unbrigaded Batteries— | 6 .. .. .. .. | Waziristan |
| | 8 .. .. .. .. | Peshawar |
| | 10 (late 26th Batt. R.G.A.) .. | India |
| | 11 (late 31st Batt. R.G.A.) .. | Quetta |
| | 12 (late 35th Batt. R.G.A.) .. | Rawalpindi |
| | 13 .. .. .. .. | Mesopotamia |
| | 14 .. .. .. .. | Mesopotamia |
| | 15 .. .. .. .. | Palestine |
| | 16 .. .. .. .. | Not yet formed |

*Royal Garrison Artillery Brigades.*

| Brig. | Batteries. | — | Brig. | Batteries. | — |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | H.-Q. 1 | Egypt | 6 | H.-Q. 22 (H), | |
| | 2 (H) | Malta | | 21 (H) | Roorkee |
| | 3 (H), 4 (H) | Gibraltar | | 24 | Nowgong |
| 2 | H.-Q. | Nowgong | | 23 (H) | Peshawar |
| | 5 | Mesopotamia | 7 | 15, 26 (H), | |
| | 6 (H) | Rawalpindi | | 27 (H),28 (H) | Moore Park |
| | 7 (H) | Delhi | | | |
| | 8 (H) | Agra | 8 | H.-Q. 30 (H), | |
| 3 | H.-Q. 10 (H), | | | 31 (H),32 (H) | Exeter |
| | 11 (H) | Multan | | 29 | Rhine |
| | 9 | Nowgong | 9 | 33, 34 (H), | |
| | 12 (H) | Ferozepore | | 35 (H),36 (H) | Bordon |
| 4 | 13, 14 (H), | | | | |
| | 15 (H), 16(H) | Shoeburyness | 10 | H.-Q. 37 | |
| 5 | 17, 18 (H) | | | 38 (H) | Larkhill |
| | 19(H), 20 (H) | Tallaght | | 39 (H),40 (H) | Lavington |

## D.—Royal Engineers

### Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham
1st Reserve Bn., Chatham
2nd Reserve Bn., Chattenden
No. 1 Group Depot Cos., Chatham
No. 2 Group Depot Cos., Chatham
Reserve Mounted Depot, Aldershot
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot
4th Field Troop, Egypt
2nd Co. (Field), Egypt
3rd Co. (Fortesss), Doyer
4th Co. (Fortress), Portsmouth
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot
6th Co. (Fortress), Weymouth
7th Co. (Field), Rhine
8th Co. (Railway), France
9th Co. (Field), Colchester
10th Co. (Railway) France
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot
12th Co. (Field), Limerick
14th Co. (Survey), Edinburgh
15th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
16th Co. (Fortress), North Shields
17th Co. (Field), Curragh
18th Co. (Fortress), Falmouth
19th Co. (Survey), Southampton
20th Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
21st Co. (Fortress), Harwich
22nd Co. (Fortress), Isle of Wight
23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot
24th Co. (Fortress), Malta
25th Co. (Fortress), Malta
26th Co. (Field), Black Sea
27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
28th Co. (Fortress), Malta
29th Co. (Army Troops), Black Sea
30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
32nd Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
33rd Co. (Fortress), Cork
34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey

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ions of the Head Quarters of Units—*continued.*

35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke
36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone
38th Co. (Field), Moore Park, Kilworth
39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness
40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong
41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore
42nd Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius
44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica
45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
49th Co. (Fortress), North Queensferry
54th Co. (Field), Black Sea
55th Co. (Field), Black Sea
56th Co. (Field), Bulford
57th Co. (Field), Bulford
59th Co. (Field), Curragh
613th Co. (Fortress), Belfast
1st Pontoon Park, Chatham
2nd Pontoon Park, Aldershot
Experimental Bridging Co., Christchurch
R.E. Experimental Station, Porton

## E.—Infantry Regiments

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Coldstream Guards | Warley | Lt.-Col. W. H. V. Darell, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Chelsea | Lt.-Col. C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 3rd ditto | Wimbledon | Lt.-Col. C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Grenadier Guards | Tower of London | Lt.-Col. B. N. Sergison Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Wimbledon | Lt.-Col. Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Wimbledon | Lt.-Col. Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Irish Guards | Chelsea | Lt.-Col. Hon. T. E. Vesey. | |
| 1st Scots Guards | Windsor | Lt.-Col. R. S. Tempest, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Windsor | Lt.-Col. B. H. S. Romilly, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Welsh Guards | Wellington Barracks | Lt.-Col. Hon. A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders | Poona | Lt.-Col. H. H. G. Hyslop, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G. | |
| 1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment | Belfast | Lt.-Col. E. I. de S. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Secunderabad | Lt.-Col. G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Berkshire Regiment | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. A. Mudge, C.M.G. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. Hon. R. H. Collins, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Border Regiment | Karachi | Lt.-Col. H. Nelson, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Claremorris | Lt.-Col. G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Cameron Highlanders | Rawalpindi | Lt.-Col. N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Queenstown | Lt.-Col. G. C. M. Sorel-Cameron | |
| 1st Cheshire Regiment | Rathdrum | Lt.-Col. B. H. Chetwynd-Staplyton, *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. A. Crookenden, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Connaught Rangers | Jallundur | Lt.-Col. H. R. G. Deacon, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dover | Lt.-Col. H. F. N. Jourdain, C.M.G. | |
| 1st Cornwall's Light Infantry, Duke of | Finner | Lt.-Col. T. H. F. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Calcutta | Lt.-Col. R. M. Wetherell, C.M.G. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 1st Devonshire Regiment | Waterford | Lt.-Col. E. D. Young, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Quetta | Lt.-Col. J. P. Law, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Dorsetshire Regt. | Londonderry | | |
| 2nd ditto | Bangalore | Lt.-Col. F. W. Radcliffe, C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Dublin Fusiliers | Bordon | Lt.-Col. C. N. Perreau, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. C. Bonham Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Durham Light Infantry | Rhine | Lt.-Col. H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. E. Du. P. H. Moore | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Essex Regiment | Kinsale | Lt.-Col. F. W. Moffit, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. A. P. Churchill | |
| 1st Gloucestershire Regiment | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. F. C. Nisbet, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Ahmednagar | Lt.-Col. R. P. Jordan, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Gordon Highldrs. | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. C. J. Simpson | |
| 2nd ditto | Maryhill | Lt.-Col. P. W. Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Hampshire Regiment | Gosport | Lt.-Col. A. E. Andrews, O.B.E. | to Black Sea 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Cork | Lt.-Col. C. N. French, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Highland Light Infantry | Egypt | Lt.-Col. R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | to U.K. 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Edinburgh | Lt.-Col. J. C. Grahame, D.S.O. | to Egypt 1920–21 |
| 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal | Sialkot | Lt.-Col. J. N. Crawford, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Portland | Lt.-Col. G. C. Grazebrook, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Irish Fusiliers, Royal | North Persia | Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920 21 |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd Irish Fusiliers Royal | Dover | Lt.-Col. H. L. Knight, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Irish Regiment Royal | Plebiscite Area | Lt.-Col. A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Chakrata | Lt.-Col. G. A. Elliot, M.C. | |
| 1st Irish Rifles, Royal | Parkhurst, Isle of Wight | Lt.-Col. H. R. Charley, C.B.E. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. A. D. N. Merriman, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Kent Regiment, East | Fermoy | Lt.-Col. R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Multan | Lt.-Col. W. H. Trevor, D.S.O. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 1st Kent Regiment, West | Agra | Lt.-Col. R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. C. E. Kitson, D.S.O. | |
| 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. R. G. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Portsmouth | Lt.-Col. H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Mhow | Lt.-Col. B. J. Majendie, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | | Lt.-Col. G. A. P. Rennie, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Lancashire Fusiliers | Quetta, Dublin | Lt.-Col. C. de Putron | |
| 2nd ditto | Lahore | Lt.-Col. C. J. Griffin, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, East | Blackdown | Lt.-Col. J. E. Green, D.S.O. | to N. China 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Tralee | Lt.-Col. W. H. Traill, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, Loyal North | Malta | Lt.-Col. F. W. Woodward, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. T. Mc G. Bridges. | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, South | Dublin | Lt.-Col. D'O. B. Dawson. | |
| 2nd ditto | Pembroke Dock | Lt.-Col. H. C. Herbert, O.B.E. | to Palestine 1920–21 |
| 1st Lancaster Regiment, Royal | Dublin | Lt.-Col. H. R. Headlam, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Maymyo | Lt.-Col. O. C. Borritt, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C. | |
| 1st Leicestershire Regiment | Athlone | Lt.-Col. E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Delhi | Lt.-Col. B. C. Dent, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Leinster Regiment | Wellington | Lt.-Col. E. T. Humphreys, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Colchester | Lt.-Col. J. D. Mather. | |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Lincolnshire Regiment | Tipperary | Lt.-Col. R. H. G. Wilson | |
| 2nd ditto | Poona | Lt.-Col. C. Toogood, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Liverpool Regiment | Cork | Lt.-Col. L. M. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Khartoum | Lt.-Col. F. Hyslop. | |
| 1st Manchester Regiment | Ballincolig | Lt.-Col. E. Vaughan, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. B. A. Wright, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Middlesex Regiment | Gravesend | Lt.-Col. J. H. Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. H. N. Blakeney, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. G. A. Bridgman | |
| 4th ditto | Gibraltar | Lt.-Col. O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Munster Fusiliers | Plymouth | Lt.-Col. J. A. F. Cuffe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. H. S. Jervis, M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Norfolk Regiment | Belfast | Lt.-Col. F. C. Lodge, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. W. F. L. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Northamptonshire Regiment | Templemore | Lt.-Col. H. R. H. Drew, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rawalpindi | Lt.-Col. L. G. W. Dobbin, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Northumberland Fusiliers | Bordon | Lt.-Col. C. Yatman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. E. M. Moulton Barrett, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment | Blackdown | Lt.-Col. J. C. Harding-Newman, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. R. J. F. Taylor, C.B.E. | |
| 1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry | Limerick | Lt.-Col. F. H. Stapleton, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Lichfield | Lt.-Col. E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Rifle Brigade | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. A. T. Paley, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Belfast | Lt.-Col. W. E. Davis, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | to India 1920–21 |
| 3rd ditto | Portsmouth | Lt.-Col. J. Harrington, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | Quetta | Lt.-Col. W. W. Seymour, *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Royal Fusiliers | Cork | Lt.-Col. W. F. Sweney, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Umballa | Lt.-Col. M. P. Hancock, D.S.O. | to Aden 1920–21 |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Royal Fusiliers | Plebiscite Area | Lt.-Col. E. B. North, C.M.G, D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. H. A. Walker, C.M.G.,D.S.O.,*p.s.c.* | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Royal Highlanders | Ranikhet | Lt.-Col. J. G. H. Hamilton, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Scots, Royal | Rangoon | Lt.-Col. G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Cork | Lt.-Col. H. B. Dyson, D.S.O., O.B.E. | |
| 1st Scots Fusiliers, Royal | Bordon | Lt.-Col. F. E. Buchanan. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. R. K. Walsh, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Scottish Borderers, King's Own | Bombay | Lt.-Col. A. J. Welsh. | |
| 2nd ditto | Devonport | | |
| 1st Scottish Rifles | Curragh | Lt.-Col. J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rawalpindi | Lt.-Col. R. Oakley, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Seaforth Highlanders | Fort George | Lt.-Col. N. A. Thomson, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Meerut | Lt.-Col. L. Holland, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Shropshire Light Infantry | Aden | Lt.-Col. H. M. Smith, D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Curragh | Lt.-Col. J. Meynell, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Somerset Light Infantry | Holywood, Belfast | | |
| 2nd ditto | Palestine | Lt.-Col. W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Staffordshire Regiment, North | Curragh | Lt.-Col. T. A. Andrus. | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. E. V. Fox. | |
| 1st Staffordshire Regiment, South | Singapore | Lt.-Col. L. B. Boyd-Moss,C.M.G.,D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Cork | Lt.-Col.A.H.C.James, D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 1st Suffolk Regiment | Jubbulpore | Lt.-Col. A. F. Stewart, C.M.G., O.B.E. | |
| 2nd ditto | Colchester | Lt.-Col. A. S. Peebles, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Surrey Regiment, East | Sheffield | Lt.-Col. C. C. G. Ashton, O.B.E. | to Palestine 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. R. H. Baldwin, D.S.O. | to U.K. 1920–21 |
| 1st Surrey Regiment, Royal West | Belfast | Lt.-Col. H. C. Whinfield. | |
| 2nd ditto | Bareilly | Lt.-Col. L. M. Crofts, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Sussex Regiment, Royal | Rhine | Lt.-Col. J. B. Wroughton, C.B., C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Jamaica | Lt.-Col. A. E. Glasgow, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Wales Borderers, South | Dublin | Lt.-Col. A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Jhansi | Lt.-Col. C. W. Pearless, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Warwickshire Regiment, Royal | Chatham | Lt.-Col. H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Nowshera | Lt.-Col. D. A. L. Day. | |
| 1st Welch Fusiliers, Royal | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. J. B. Cockburn, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Limerick | Lt.-Col. C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Welch Regiment | Ferozepore | Lt.-Col. B. E. Crocker, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. H. J. B. Span, D.S.O. | |
| 1st West Riding Regiment | Palestine | Lt.-Col. R. K. Healing. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. R. N. Bray, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Wiltshire Regiment | Dublin | Lt.-Col. R. D. F. Oldman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Hongkong | Lt.-Col. J. R. Wyndham. | |
| 1st Worcestershire Regiment | Nasirabad | Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. H. A. Carr, D.S.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Chabattia | Lt.-Col. G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C. | |
| 4th ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. M. R. Walsh, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st York & Lancaster Regiment | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. M. F. Holford, O.B.E., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. G. E. Bayley, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Yorkshire Light Infantry | Quetta | Lt.-Col. H. E. Trevor, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Plymouth | Lt.-Col. J. B. G. Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment | Palestine | Lt.-Col. C. V. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Tipperary | Lt.-Col. G. B. de M. Maris, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment, East | Mullingar | Lt.-Col. T. A. Headlam. | |
| 2nd ditto | Peshawar | Lt.-Col. D. Mathers, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.C.M. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment, West | York | Lt.-Col. G. D. Price, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Peshawar | Lt.-Col. T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O. | |

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## 4. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME

### A.—Aldershot Command

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | General Lord H. S. Rawlinson, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General S. E. Holland, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *1st Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *1st Division.* | Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, K.C.B., *p.s.c. q.s.* |
| *1st Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General R. O. H. Livesay, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *2nd Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General H. C. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 1st Division.* | Brigadier-General E. W. Alexander, V.C., C.B., C.M.G. |
| *2nd Division.* | Major-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *5th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. S. Clive, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *6th Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 2nd Division.* | Brigadier-Gen. H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G. |

### B.—Eastern Command

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | General Lord H. S. Horne, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt., R.A., A.D.C. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General C. W. Gwynn, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Sir A. F. Sillem, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*, *q.s.* |
| *4th Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General N. W. Haig, C.B.,C.M.G. |
| *4th Division.* | Major-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *11th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General J. Campbell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *12th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General A. H. Marindin, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 4th Division.* | Brigadier-General S. F. Metcalfe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *54th (East Anglian) Division.* | Major-General Sir S. W. Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Essex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. C. Da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. J. M'Neill, D.S.O. |
| *East Midland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel T. W. Visct. Hampden, C.B., C.M.G. |

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EASTERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *C.R.A. 54th Division.* | Colonel W. P. Monkhouse, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O. |
| *44th (Home Counties) Division.* | Major-General Sir J. R. Longley, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Surrey Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. H. Mangles, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Kent Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Middlesex and Sussex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. J. Ross, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 44th Division.* | Colonel Sir H. B. White-Thompson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

C.—IRISH COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Forces in Ireland.* | General Rt. Hon. Sir C. F. N. Macready, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *3rd Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. A. Weir, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *5th Division.* | Major-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B. |
| *13th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General T. S. Lambert, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *14th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General P. C. B. Skinner, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *15th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 5th Division.* | Brigadier-General R. A. C. Wellesley, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *6th Division.* | Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *16th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General C. H. T. Lucas, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *17th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *18th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 6th Division.* | Brigadier-General H. E. Willis, C.B., C.M.G. |

D.—LONDON DISTRICT

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.* | |
| *Colonel in charge of Administration.* | Colonel H. C. Sutton, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *2nd Guards Brigade.* | Brigadier-General J. McSteele, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

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LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *4th Guards Brigade.* | |
| *56th (The London) Division.* | Major-General Sir C. E. Pereira, K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *1st London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. S. de E. Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *2nd London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. Maxwell, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D. |
| *3rd London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. L. G. Anley, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 56th (The London) Division.* | Colonel J. Tyler, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *47th (The London) Division.* | Major-General Sir N. M. Smith, V.C., K.C.B. |
| *4th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel F. G. Lewis, C.B., C.M.G., T.D. |
| *5th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. B. Hubback, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *6th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. T. Buckley, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *C.R.A. 47th (The London) Division.* | Colonel H. E. T. Kelly, C.B., C.M.G. |

E.—NORTHERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir F. I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. |
| *General Staff Officer 1st Grade.* | Brevet-Colonel R. W. Hare, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General i/c Administration.* | Brigadier-General H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *10th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. W. J. Dugan, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Yorkshire and Notts Mounted Brigade.* | Brevet-Colonel L. W. de V. Sadleir Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Midland Mounted Brigade.* | Colonel D. A. Legard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *50th (Northumbrian Division).* | Major-General Sir P. S. Wilkinson, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Durham Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. R. Cumming, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Northumberland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. P. A. Riddell, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *York and Durham Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. G. Price, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.* | Colonel W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *49th (West Riding) Division.* | Major-General H. R. Davies, C.B. |
| *1st West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. L. Mackenzie, C.I.E., D.S.O. |
| *2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Sir G. A. Armytage, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *3rd West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. M. Withycombe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |

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NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *C.R.A. 49th West (Riding) Division.* | Colonel E. N. Whitley, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *46th (North Midland) Division.* | Major-General Sir A. R. Hoskins, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Lincolnshire and Leicestershire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. Gordon, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Staffordshire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel V. W. de Falbe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *The Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby) Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel G. D. Godman, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. |
| *C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.* | Colonel Sir S. H. Child, Bt., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. |

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *General Staff Officer 1st Grade.* | Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. St. John, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General in charge of Administration.* | Brigadier-General J. A. Strick. |
| *51st (Highland) Division.* | Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Argyll and Sutherland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Sir W. M. Thomson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C. |
| *Cameron and Seaforth Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. W. Sandilands, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Black Watch and Gordon Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel G. S. G. Crauford, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C. |
| *C.R.A. 51st (Highland) Division.* | Colonel H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *52nd (Lowland Division).* | Major-General Sir P. R. Robertson, K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *South Scottish Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. W. H. Pollard, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Royal Scots Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel I. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Scottish Rifles and Highland Light Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. M. Findlay, D.S.O., T.D. |
| *C.R.A. 52nd (Lowland) Division.* | Colonel G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O. |

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General H. H. S. Knox, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Hon. Sir A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |



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SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *2nd Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *3rd Division.* | Major-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *7th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. V. Hordern, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *8th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *9th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *C.R.A. 3rd Division.* | Brigadier-General L. C. F. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *48th (South Midland) Division.* | Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Warwickshire Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *Gloucestershire and Worcs. Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *South Midland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. J. F. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.* | Colonel A. T. Anderson, C.M.G. |
| *43rd (Wessex) Division.* | Major-General Sir C. P. A. Hull, K.C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *Devon and Cornwall Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Hon. L. J. P. Butler, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *South Wessex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. G. Braithwaite, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Hampshire Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel L. F. Philips, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. (Wessex) Division.* | Colonel G. H. W. Nicholson, C.M.G. |

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.* | Brevet-Colonel R. J.F. Hayter., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General i/c Administration.* | Brigadier-General Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *53rd (Welch) Division.* | Major-General C. J. Deverell, C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *North Wales Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Welch Border Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *South Wales Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel O. de L. Williams, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 53rd (Welch) Division.* | Colonel A. D. Kirby, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *55th (West Lancashire) Division.* | Major-General Sir R. W. R. Barnes, K.C.B., D.S.O. |
| *North Lancashire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. G. Parker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Liverpool Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. R Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

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WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *South Lancashire and Cheshire Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 55th (West Lancashire) Division.* | Brevet-Colonel C. E. G. G. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *42nd (East Lancashire) Division.* | Major-General T. H. Shoubridge, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Manchester Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel H. C. Darlington, C.M.G., T.D. |
| *East Lancashire and Border Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. F. Clemson, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Lancashire Fusiliers Bgde.* | Colonel M. L. Hornby, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 42nd (East Lancashire) Division.* | Colonel W. B. R. Sandys, C.B., C.M.G. |

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Guernsey and Alderney District.* | Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B. |
| *Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.* | |
| *Jersey District.* | Major-General Sir A. Wilson, K.C.B. |
| *Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.* | |

## 5. RECENT ARMY ORDERS AND ARMY COUNCIL INSTRUCTIONS

### Army Orders

WAR OFFICE, *2nd July*, 1920.

**ROYAL WARRANT** A.O. 875. 1920.

**Corps of Signals**

GEORGE R.I.

20 Engineers 5469 WHEREAS WE deem it expedient to authorise the formation of a Corps to be entitled "Corps of Signals";

OUR WILL AND PLEASURE IS that the Corps of Signals shall be deemed to be a Corps for the purpose of the Army Act, and that the words "Corps of Signals" shall be inserted in Our Warrant of 7th July, 1916,* defining the expression "Corps."

OUR FURTHER WILL AND PLEASURE IS that the rates of pay for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Corps of Signals shall be as provided in the Schedule attached to this Our Warrant.

Given at Our Court at St. James's, this 28th day of June, 1920, in the 11th year of Our Reign.

By His Majesty's Command,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

* Army Order 250 of 1916.

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A.O. 275. 1920 *continued.*

## SCHEDULE.

### OFFICERS.

1. The rates of pay shall be those provided in Table I of Army Order 324 of 1919.

2. In addition, signal pay shall be issuable at the rates and under the conditions shown below.

3. Rates—

| | Per day. |
|---|---|
| Colonel, employed on technical duties .. (This does not include any appointment the sole function of which is the administration of personnel.) | 8*s.* |
| Lieutenant-colonel .. .. .. .. | 7*s.* |
| Major .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5*s.* |
| Captain .. .. .. .. .. | 3*s.* |
| Lieutenant .. .. .. .. .. | 2*s.* |
| 2nd lieutenant .. .. .. .. | 2*s.* |

4. Officers appointed, seconded, or attached for duty to the Corps of Signals after the date of this Warrant, to be eligible for signal pay must, except as laid down in paragraphs 5 and 6 below, have qualified in the examination for Associate Member of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, and signal pay will be issuable on the production of a certificate from that Institution that the officer has qualified in their examination or holds qualifications that the Institution accept as exempting from the examination.

5. Officers who prior to their appointment, seconding, or attachment for duty to the Corps of Signals have qualified and drawn engineer pay or corps pay, under the conditions of Army Order 324 of 1919, in their own arms of the service will be eligible for signal pay without any further qualification.

6. (*a*) Engineer pay at the rates provided in Table V of Army Order 324 of 1919 will be issuable to officers who were seconded or attached for duty to the Signal Service on 13th September, 1919, and who had up to that date drawn the old rates of engineer pay. Such officers, on being posted to the Corps of Signals, will be eligible to draw signal pay in the place of engineer pay without any further qualification.

(*b*) Officers who, having returned to their regiments prior to 13th September, 1919, after being seconded or attached for duty to the Signal Service for a period of not less than 2 years, are appointed or again seconded or attached for duty to the Corps of Signals will be eligible on joining the corps to draw signal pay without any further qualification.

7. Command pay will be admissible at the same rates and under the same conditions as apply to the Royal Engineers.

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OTHER RANKS. A.O. 275. 1920 *continued.*

8. The rates of pay of warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men will be those provided in Army Order 325 of 1919, the Corps of Signals being added to the corps therein mentioned.

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20 Engineers 5469

**Corps of Signals.**—1. With reference to Army Order 275 of 1920, the Corps of Signals will consist of such Signal units, Royal Engineers, as are now in existence, those of the additional personnel now serving with the Signal Service, Royal Engineers, who wish, and are accepted, for transfer, and such other Signal units as may hereafter be formed. A.O. 276. 1920.

2. The establishment of the corps as regards officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men will be notified in due course.

3. The officers required for duty with the corps will consist of—

(*a*) Officers on the permanent establishment.

(*b*) Officers of other arms of the Service seconded to the Corps of Signals to complete the number required additional to the permanent establishment (see *Note*).

4. Officers on the permanent establishment will mainly comprise the higher ranks and will be promoted to fill vacancies in the permanent establishment.

5. As regards 3 (*b*), officers desirous of being seconded to the Corps of Signals must normally have 3 years' commissioned service before being seconded and will, if selected, serve for a period of 4 years in the Corps of Signals. At the end of this period each officer will return to his own arm of the Service and will not normally be seconded for a second tour of duty with the Corps of Signals until after promotion to captain and/or 3 years' service with his own unit.

6. At the end of the second period of seconding to the Corps of Signals an officer may be given the choice, should a vacancy exist, of transferring permanently to that corps or returning to his own arm of the Service. Should, however, he wish to be transferred and is considered suitable, but no vacancy exist, his name will be placed on a list to be kept for this purpose, and selections may be made from this list as vacancies occur. A few officers who are desirous of being seconded to the Corps of Signals for a third tour of duty, after a further period of service with their own arm of the Service will, if selected, be permitted to do so.

A major of infantry or cavalry attached for duty to the corps shall return to his regiment 1 year before he is likely to be considered for promotion to lieutenant-colonel, in accordance with Article 58 of the Pay Warrant

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A. O. 276. 1920 *continued.*

7. Seconded officers will receive promotion in their own corps and not in the Corps of Signals.

8. Officers on the permanent establishment and seconded officers will take seniority in the corps according to their substantive rank.

9. If an officer is promoted in his own arm of the Service during a tour of duty with the Corps of Signals he will normally return to duty with his own arm, unless he is desirous of, and is selected for, transfer to the permanent establishment of the corps.

10. To complete the initial establishment of the corps, officers now serving in the Signal Service, Royal Engineers, may have the option of transferring to the Corps of Signals provided vacancies exist in the permanent establishment of the corps, and they are accepted for such transfer. Officers for whom no such vacancies exist, but who are wanted to complete the number required with the corps may continue to be seconded from their own arms of the Service provided they have not already been seconded for more than 4 years. Those who have already been seconded for 4 years may be seconded for a further period not exceeding 2 years from the date of this Order.

11. The tenure of the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Corps will be four years for the purpose of Article 307 (3) of the Pay Warrant.

12. The Council of the Institution of Electrical Engineers has agreed to conduct examinations on the theory and practice of the electrical subjects forming part of the initial course for officers held at the Signal Training Centre, and to regard officers who qualify in these examinations as having qualified in the examinations for Associate Member of the Institution and to issue certificates accordingly.

13. To provide the numbers required on the formation of the corps, those warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are now serving with the Signal Service, Royal Engineers, and wish for transfer, will be transferred from their present corps to the Corps of Signals provided vacancies exist in the permanent establishment of the corps. Warrant officers and non-commissioned officers will be transferred in their present permanent rank.

14. The ranks and appointments of the corps will be—

Warrant officer, Class I.—Serjeant-major.
Warrant officer, Class II.—Quartermaster-serjeant, company or squadron serjeant-major.
Company or squadron quartermaster-serjeant.
Serjeant.
Lance-serjeant.
Corporal.
Lance-corporal.
Signalman.

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15. The promotion of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers will be carried out by the Officer i/c Records on a roster common to the whole corps. A.O. 276. 1920 *continued.*

16. Instructions as regards the formation of a Record Office will be issued later, but until such instructions are issued, the Officer i/c Royal Engineer Records will continue to keep the records of the corps as hitherto.

17. Messrs. Sir C. R. McGrigor, Bt., & Co. will be the Army Agents for officers of the corps. The accounts of other ranks will be kept by the Regimental Paymaster, Chatham.

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*Note.*—Throughout this Army Order "attached for duty" should be substituted for "seconded" in the case of officers above the rank of captain, and those belonging to arms of the Service from which officers cannot be seconded, *e.g.*, Royal Engineers.

## Army Order

WAR OFFICE, 17*th July*, 1920.

3 Artillery 98 **Supernumerary Subalterns, Royal Artillery.**—Subaltern officers of the Royal Artillery who have reached the age of 35 years will be placed on the half-pay list, with effect from 17th October, 1920, and, subsequent to that date, such officers will be placed on the half-pay list from the date on which they attain the age of 35 years. A.O. 291. 1920.

Officers placed on the half-pay list under this Army Order will be permitted to retire on special terms, which will be announced shortly.

*By Command of the Army Council,*

H. J. CREEDY.

## Army Council Instruction. No. 451 of 1920.

WAR OFFICE, 8*th July*, 1920.

**451. Nomenclature of different natures of Artillery.**

To avoid confusion in describing the various natures of Artillery now included in the Army, the nomenclature given in the following table will be adopted in future.

This nomenclature will be used in orders, correspondence, etc., when it is necessary to indicate the armament of the unit in question,

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and does not constitute any alteration in the existing titles of units as given in the Army List and similar publications.

| Branch of Royal Artillery and Armament. | Descriptive Nomenclature. | Abbreviated Nomenclature. |
|---|---|---|
| R.H.A. Brigades and Batteries. 13-pr. Q.F. gun. | Horse Artillery .. .. .. Brigades and Batteries. | H.A. |
| R.F.A. Brigades and Batteries. 18-pr. Gun—4·5-inch How. | Field Artillery .. .. .. Brigades and Batteries. | F.A. |
| R.G.A. Brigades and Batteries. | | |
| (i) 2·75-inch Mountain gun and 3·7-inch Mountain How. | (i) Pack Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | P.A. |
| (ii) 60-pr. gun and 6-inch How. | (ii) Medium Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | M.A. |
| (iii) 6-inch gun, 8-inch How., 9·2-inch How. | (iii) Heavy Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | Hy. A. |
| (iv) Guns and Hows. on movable mountings heavier than above | (iv) Super Heavy Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | S. Hy. A. |
| (v) Fire Commands manning fixed Armament of Coast Defences. | (v) Coast Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | C.A. |
| (vi) Anti-Aircraft Artillery | (vi) Anti-Aircraft Artillery. Brigades and Batteries. | A.A. |

NOTE.—The letter (H) will be used after the number of a battery to indicate that it is a howitzer battery. 20/Artillery/4261 (A.G. 6A).

By Command of the Army Council,

H. J. CREEDY.

## II. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

### 1.—Air Council

*President of the Air Council.* The Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

*Vice-President of the Air Council.* The Rt. Hon. the Marquess of Londonderry, K.G., M.V.O., Under Secretary of State for Air.

*Members.* Air-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff; Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., Controller-General of Civil Aviation; Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., Director-General of Supply and Research. Sir James Stevenson, Bt., Additional Member; Rear-Admiral Sir C. F. Lambert, K.C.B., Additional Member; W. F. Nicholson, Esq., C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry.

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## 2.—Air Ministry

| | |
|---|---|
| *Secretary of State for Air.* | The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P. |
| *Parliamentary Private Secretary.* | Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon, M.C. |
| *Air Secretary and Private Secretary.* | Group Captain A. J. L. Scott, C.B., M.C., A.F.C. |
| *Assistant Private Secretary.* | Flight-Lieutenant G. W. Dobson, O.B.E. |
| *Under Secretary of State for Air.* | The Rt. Hon. the Marquess of Londonderry, K.G., M.V.O. |
| *Private Secretaries.* | Hon. O. E. Vesey, C.B.E.; P. J. Oldfield, Esq. |
| *Secretary of the Air Ministry.* | W. F. Nicholson, Esq., C.B. |
| *Assistant Secretaries of the Air Ministry.* | H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., D.S.O. (lent temporarily to Department of Civil Aviation). |
| *Finance Department :—* | |
| *Assistant Financial Secretary.* | W. A. Bland, Esq., C.B. |
| *Director of Finance for Personnel.* | J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E. |
| *Director of Finance for Material.* | B. E. Holloway, Esq. |
| *Director of Contracts.* | J. M. Spaight, Esq., O.B.E. |
| *Directorate of Lands (Joint Service for War Office, Ministry of Munitions, and Air Ministry) :—* | |
| *Director-General of Lands.* | Sir H. Frank, Bt., K.C.B. |
| *Controller of Lands.* | E. H. Coles, Esq. (Dep. Dir.-Gen.). |
| *Chief Valuer and Compensation Officer.* | Colonel H. F. Cobb, O.B.E. |
| *Department of the Chief of the Air Staff :—* | |
| *Chief of the Air Staff.* | Air Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Private Secretary.* | Captain T. B. Marson, M.B.E. |
| *Director of Operations and Intelligence.* | Air Commodore J. M. Steel, C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Director of Training and Organisation.* | Air Commodore P. W. Game, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Director of Personnel.* | Rear-Admiral Sir C. F. Lambert, K.C.B. |
| *Director of Equipment.* | Air Commodore C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Director of Medical Services.* | Group Captain (acting Air Commodore) M. H. G. Fell, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director of Works and Buildings.* | Major-General Sir Andrew M. Stuart, K.C.M.G., C.B. |

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## Air Ministry—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Department of the Director General of Supply and Research :—* | |
| *Director-General of Supply and Research.* | Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Secretary.* | Mr. L. G. S. Reynolds, O.B.E. |
| *Director of Research.* | Air Commodore H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Design).* | Wing-Commodore E. F. Briggs, D.S.O., O.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Armament).* | Wing-Commodore J. L. Forbes, O.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Instruments).* | Wing-Commodore A. D. Warrington Morris, C.M.G., O.B.E. |
| *Superintendent of Airship Design and Construction.* | Mr. C. F. Campbell, R.C.N.C., O.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Lighter than Air Craft).* | Wing-Commodore T. R. Cave Brown Cave, C.B.E. |
| *Director of Aircraft Supplies.* | Mr. R. P. Wilson, C.B.E., M.Inst.C.E., M.I.E.E. |
| *Director of Aeronautical Inspection.* | Brigadier-General R. K. Bagnall-Wild, C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Department of the Controller General of Civil Aviation :—* | |
| *Controller-General.* | Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, C.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Private Secretary.* | Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Waterhouse, C.M.G. |
| *Controller of Information.* | Major-General E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Controller of Communications.* | Group-Captain L. F. Blandy, D.S.O. |
| *Controller of Aerodromes and Licensing.* | J. A. Webster, Esq., D.S.O. (acting). |
| *Director of Meteorological Office.* | Sir Napier Shaw, LL.D., Sc.D., F.R.S. |

## 3.—Air Commands

### A.—UNITED KINGDOM

#### (a) Inland Area

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units comprising the Coastal Area, Cranwell, and Halton Camp Command.

*Headquarters :* Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgenarch, Uxbridge.
*Telephone No. :* Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Air Vice-Marshal* .. .. | Sir John Maitland Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G. C.V.O., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding. |
| *Group Captain* .. .. | Philip L. W. Herbert, C.M.G., C.B E., Chief Staff Officer. |

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**Inland Area**—*continued*

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 1 Group* .. .. | Kenley. |
| No. 24 Squadron .. .. .. | „ |
| „ 39 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| „ 25 „ .. .. .. | Hawkinge. |
| „ 1 Stores Depot .. .. .. | Kidbrooke. |
| „ 3 „ „ .. .. .. | Milton. |
| „ 4 „ „ .. .. .. | Ruislip. |
| „ 6 „ „ .. .. .. | Ascot. |
| "Q" „ „ .. .. .. | Feltham. |
| Medical Stores Depot .. .. .. | Kidbrooke. |
| Armament and Gunnery School .. | Eastchurch. |
| Central Pay Office .. .. .. | Woking. |
| General Services Pay Officer .. | Trafalgar House, W.C. |
| *Headquarters, No. 3 Group* .. .. | Spittlegate. |
| No. 207 Squadron .. .. .. | Bircham Newton. |
| „ 2 Flying Training School .. | Duxford. |
| „ 3 „ „ „ .. | Digby. |
| „ 5 „ „ „ .. | Shotwick. |
| „ 6 „ „ „ .. | Spittlegate. |
| Aeroplane Experimental Establishment | Martlesham Heath. |
| M.T. Repair Depot .. .. .. | Shrewsbury. |
| *Headquarters, No. 7 Group* .. .. | Andover. |
| No. 4 Squadron .. .. .. | Farnborough. |
| School of Army Co-operation .. | Stonehenge and Worthy Down. |
| Air Pilotage School .. .. .. | Andover. |
| Central Flying School .. .. .. | Upavon. |
| No. 1 Flying Training School .. | Netheravon. |
| School of Photography .. .. | South Farnborough. |
| Experimental Section, R.A.E. .. | „ „ |
| Electrical and Wireless School .. | Flower Down. |
| School of Balloon Training .. .. | Larkhill. |
| Record Office .. .. .. .. | Blandford. |
| *Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—* | |
| R.A.F. Depot .. .. .. .. | Uxbridge. |
| Central Band, R.A.F. .. .. .. | „ |
| Record Office Detachment .. .. | „ |
| Discharge Centre .. .. .. | „ |
| School of Physical Training and Drill | „ |
| Air Ministry, M.T. Section .. .. | War Office Garage, Ebury Bridge Road. |
| No. 2 (Northern) Aircraft Repair Depot | Coal Aston. |
| Inland Area Medical Headquarters .. | Uxbridge. |
| Central R.A.F. Hospital .. .. | Finchley. |
| Medical Officers' School of Instruction | Hampstead. |
| Officers Invaliding Board .. .. | Uxbridge. |
| Research Laboratory .. .. .. | Holly Hill, N.W |
| Candidates Medical Board .. .. | Hampstead. |
| Barrack Store .. .. .. .. | Gosport. |

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### (b) Coastal Area

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Warsash, Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, Killingholme, North Queensferry, Donibristle, Leuchars, Smoogroo, Houton Bay, Felixstowe. Also all Air-craft Carriers and Units afloat in Fighting Ships and all Airship Stations.

*Headquarters :* 33–34 Tavistock Place, W.C. 1.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgenarch, Westcent, London.
*Telephone No. :* Museum 7840.

*Air Vice-Marshal.* Arthur V. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

*Group Captain.* Charles R. Samson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 10 Group* .. .. | Lee-on-Solent. |
| No. 210 Squadron .. .. .. | Gosport. |
| ,, 238 ,, .. .. .. | Cattewater. |
| School of Naval Co-operation and Aerial Navigation .. .. .. | Calshot and Lee-on-Solent. |
| *Headquarters, No. 29 (Fleet) Group* .. | North Queensferry. |
| R.A.F. Base .. .. .. .. | Leuchars. |
| (*a*) No. 203 Squadron .. .. | ,, |
| (*b*) ,, 205 ,, .. .. .. | ,, |
| Coastal Area Aircraft Depot .. .. | Donibristle. |
| *Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.* | |
| R.A.F. Airship Base .. .. .. | Howden. |
| Marine and Armament Experimental Establishment .. .. .. | Isle of Grain. |
| No. 230 Squadron .. .. .. | Felixstowe. |
| Inspector of Recruiting R.A.F. .. | Henrietta Street, W.C. |

### (c) No. 11 (Irish) Wing

This Command comprises all units in Ireland. For operations these units are controlled by the General Officer Commanding, Irish Command.

*Headquarters :* Baldonnell, Clondalkin, Co. Dublin.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgroup, Dublin.
*Telephone No.:* Clondalkin 22.

*Group Captain.* Ian Bonham Carter, O.B.E., Officer Commanding.

*Wing Commander.* George I. Carmichael, D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| No. 100 Squadron .. .. .. | Baldonnel. |
| ,, 2 ,, .. .. .. | Fermoy and Oranmore. |
| Special Flight .. .. .. .. | Castlebar. |
| Irish Stores Centre. .. .. .. | Baldonnel. |

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### (d) Royal Air Force Headquarters, Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Headquarters, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and Cranwell Station.

*Headquarters :* Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.
*Telegraphic Address :* Aircoll, Sleaford.
*Telephone No. :* Sleaford 64/5/6/7.

*Air Commodore.* Charles A. H. Longcroft, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.
*Wing-Commodore.* Arthur L. Godman, C.M.G., D.S.O., Assistant Commandant.

Units as follows :—

(*a*) R.A.F. Cadet College .. .. Cranwell.
(*b*) No. 2 School of Technical Training (Boys) .. .. .. .. ,,

### (e) Royal Air Force Headquarters, Halton

Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Headquarters, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and Halton Station.

*Headquarters :* Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.
*Telegraphic Address :* Hedcuaros, Halton.
*Telephone No. :* Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.

*Air Commodore.* Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.
*Group Captain.* Amyas E. Borton, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

(*a*) No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) .. .. .. .. Halton.
(*b*) School of Parachute Training .. ,,

## B.—OVERSEAS

### (a) Middle East Area

*Headquarters :* Cairo.

*Air Vice-Marshal.* Sir William G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.
*Group Captain.* Bertie C. G. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

This Command comprises Units grouped as follows :—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Headquarters, Egyptian Group* | .. .. | Almaza, Cairo. |
| No. 70 Squadron | .. .. | Heliopolis. |
| ,, 47 ,, | .. .. | Helwan and Sollum. |
| ,, 56 ,, | .. .. | Aboukir and Beni Suef. |
| ,, 16 Training Depot Station | .. | Heliopolis. |
| Egypt Stores Depot | .. .. | Alexandria. |
| ,, Engine Repair Depot | .. .. | Abbassia. |
| ,, Aircraft Depot | .. .. | Aboukir. |

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**Middle East Area**—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters Palestine Group* .. .. | Ismailia. |
| No. 14 Squadron .. .. .. | Ramleh. |
| „ 208 „ .. .. .. | Ismailia. |
| „ 216 „ .. .. .. | Abu Sueir. |
| *Headquarters, "Q" Force* .. .. | Constantinople. |
| No. 55 Squadron .. .. .. | „ |
| "Q" Force Aircraft Park .. .. | „ |
| *Headquarters, Mesopotamian Wing* .. | Baghdad. |
| No. 6 Squadron .. .. .. | „ Bushire, and Ana. |
| „ 30 „ .. .. .. | „ Mosul, and Kasoin. |
| „ 84 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| Aircraft Park .. .. .. .. | „ |
| Central Air Communication Section .. | Shaibah. |
| *Survey Parties :—* | |
| Headquarters No. 1 African Survey Party | Kartoum. |
| „ „ 2 „ „ „ | Nairobi. |
| „ „ 3 „ „ „ | Pretoria. |
| *South Russia :* | |
| Training Mission, R.A.F. .. .. | Crimea. |

**(b) R.A.F. India**

*Headquarters :* Newlands, Simla.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Air Commodore.* | Tom I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air Officer Commanding. |
| *Wing-Commander.* | Reginald P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer. |

This Command comprises all R.A.F. Units in India grouped as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing* .. | Peshawar. |
| No. 5 Squadron .. .. .. | Quetta. |
| „ 20 „ .. .. .. | Bannu. |
| „ 27 „ .. .. .. | Risalpur. |
| „ 60 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| *Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing* .. | Ambala. |
| No. 28 Squadron .. .. .. | Ambala. |
| „ 31 „ .. .. .. | Mhow. |

The following Units are administered direct by Headquarters, R.A.F., India :—

| | |
|---|---|
| R.A.F. School .. .. .. .. | Bangalore. |
| (*a*) No. 1 Squadron .. .. .. | „ |
| (*b*) „ 3 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| Aircraft Depot .. .. .. .. | Lahore. |
| „ Factory .. .. .. | „ |

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**(c) Mediterranean Group**

*Headquarters :* Malta.

This Command comprises all units in the Mediterranean Sea Area co-operating with the Navy.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Group Captain.* | Eugene L. Gerrard, C.M.G., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding. |
| *Squadron Leader.* | Harry F. A. Gordon, O.B.E., Chief Staff Officer. |

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| No. 202 Squadron .. .. .. | Alexandria. |
| „ 267 „ .. .. .. | Malta. |
| Disposal Depot .. .. .. | „ |

*Aircraft Carriers :—*
*H.M.S. Pegasus.*
„ *Ark Royal.*

**(d) R.A.F. with the Army of the Rhine**

| | |
|---|---|
| No. 12 Squadron .. .. .. | Heumar. |
| Store and Repair Unit .. .. | Eil. |

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## 4.—Orders issued by the Royal Air Force

The following orders promulgated by command of the Air Council are published for general information of the Service.

AIR MINISTRY WEEKLY ORDERS.

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**694.—Promotion of Army Officers seconded to the Royal Air Force**

1. The Army Council have now decided that substantive promotion to the rank of lieutenant or captain of Army officers serving with the Royal Air Force will be carried out on the recommendation of the officer commanding the unit in which an officer is actually serving.

2. Only recommendations from senior officers holding commissions in His Majesty's forces and commanding military formations will be accepted.

3. Promotions to the rank of major will in addition be referred to the corps or officer commanding the regiment to which an officer belongs.

(*W.O.* 206/20 *cancelled.*)

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**715.—Sporting Rights at R.A.F. Stations**

1. The question of sporting rights at R.A.F. stations has been under consideration and it has been decided that where these rights exist over any land or water hired or occupied for air force purposes, the following conditions shall govern the exercise of such rights.

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2. The exercise of all rights of sporting over air force properties is subject in the first instance to approval by the Air Ministry, and written application through the proper channels should be made for sanction, before any such rights are exercised by air force personnel.

3. Preference will be given as a general rule to the officer commanding the unit occupying the property, but applications received from civilians will be considered, having due regard to the air force requirements at individual stations.

4. The rent for the sporting rights will be charged from season to season, this rent being assessed on the value in the market, having due regard to the air force requirements in each case. Where permission has been given by the Air Ministry to the officer commanding the unit at the station, he will be held primarily responsible for the payment of any charge in this respect and for the proper exercise of the privilege granted and indemnify the Air Ministry against any claims by a third party.

5. The Air Ministry reserve the right to suspend permission for any period for improper user or for the requirements of the service, nevertheless without payment of any compensation in respect of such action.

6. It must be clearly understood that the granting of any such facilities will largely depend upon the terms governing the Air Ministry occupation of the land in each case, and where facilities cannot be granted owing to terms of occupation, the officer commanding will be responsible that no infringement of the lessor's, owner's, or other rights is permitted.

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**660.—Counting of Previous Navy and Army Service for the Royal Air Force Long Service and Good Conduct Medal**

1. Airmen duly transferred from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, or Army under the Air Force (Constitution) Act, 1917, on 1st April, 1918, or at any later date, may count as qualifying service for the award of a Long Service and Good Conduct Medal in the Royal Air Force any service in the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, or Army which counts for the Navy or Army Long Service and Good Conduct Medal, under the regulations of the respective services, provided that such service has been continuous. Any such service will be subject to the conditions laid down for the Long Service and Good Conduct Medal in the King's Regulations for the Navy and Army respectively.

2.—(*a*) Airmen who, within 5 years of discharge from the Navy or Army, enlist into the Royal Air Force, and acknowledge their former service on such enlistment, will be allowed to reckon as qualifying service for the Royal Air Force Long Service and Good Conduct Medal service in either of the above branches of the forces, not exceeding 4 years, provided that such service was continuous and immediately preceded their discharge, and fulfilled the regulations governing the award of the Navy or Army Long Service and Good Conduct Medal respectively.

(*b*) Airmen discharged on medical grounds from the Navy or Army, who are allowed to enter the Royal Air Force may only be allowed to reckon their former service on the authority of the Air Council and provided that it fulfils the conditions laid down in 2 (*a*) above.

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


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
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

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THE
# ARMY QUARTERLY

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## EDITORIAL

THE *Army Quarterly* has to express its gratitude for the more than kind reception which was accorded to its first number by the Press and by correspondents. We shall do our best to merit the kind things which have been written and to give effect, where possible, to the suggestions for improvement which we have received.

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Some criticism was evoked by the article published under the title "India at the Cross Roads," though we received an almost equal amount of commendation on account of the same article. In particular, the *Times* took exception to it as a "seedling" of the Esher Report. It may, therefore, be well to say a few words about it. The article was a compilation made to express a point of view which seemed to be fairly widely held, but which had been very little ventilated in print. In view of the comment which it has drawn forth, both commendatory and condemnatory, the ventilation of this point of view seems to have been justified. It is generally agreed that a claim for national expression within the Empire must necessarily involve proportionately increased assumption of Imperial responsibilities. It is at least arguable that the only alternative is national expression without the Empire, which would involve the assumption of national responsibility unaided by any outside power and resources, and unsupported by the Imperial connection. It is at least arguable, as between these two alternatives, that mere considerations of self-preservation would weigh down the scales in favour of the former, if the choice were squarely faced. Partnership must involve duties as well as rights, risks as well as status. It would seem that thought needs to be clarified on this matter. The very fact that the article in question should have promoted some discussion has justified the setting forth of the point of view expressed



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in it, even though the matter of the article should not gain general agreement, and even though it should not express the views of any particular individual.

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It is not our intention to enter into the controversy which has arisen out of the Report of Lord Esher's Committee upon the administration and organization of the Army in India. It does seem desirable, however, to refer to certain considerations which seem to have been lost sight of in that controversy, or at least to have been obscured by it.

The Esher Report points out that it was impossible to " consider the administration of the Army in India otherwise than as part of the total armed forces of the Empire." It states that the Committee had been given " no indication of the form of organization which may be set up in future for the control of other parts of those forces, or for the whole." It proceeds to explain that the Committee has based its recommendations on " the relations of India to Great Britain and to the Empire as they stand to-day," though it has framed them in such a manner as not to " prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status." The object, therefore, has been, " taking . . . existing institutions and the present conditions in India as the basis on which to work," to lay " the foundations of a sound Imperial military system . . . consistent—

(1) " with the control by the Government of India of Indian military affairs ;

(2) " with giving to the Government of India a voice in questions of Imperial defence ; and

(3) " with allowing the Imperial General Staff through its Chief to exercise a considered influence on the military policy of the Government of India."

It is this last paragraph, apparently, which has put the Committee's fat into the Fleet Street fire. It is urged that, if the recommendations of the Committee are carried out, the Commander-in-Chief in India will become a mere mouthpiece of the General Staff in Whitehall. " We do not hesitate to say," exclaims the *Times*, " that these extraordinary proposals are in the highest degree unconstitutional. They reduce the Viceroy, who is by statute the head of the Army in India, to a nonentity. They wipe the Government of India off the slate altogether. They convert the Commander-in-Chief into a gramophone. . . . This is the negation of constitutional government, and it is entirely destructive of the fundamental

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British principle that in military matters the civil power shall be supreme."

Strong words! Strong words, indeed! But surely here is a hammer of indignant constitutionalism brandished over an egg from which is expected to hatch only a small pullet called " co-ordination."

The peccant paragraph appears, as we have said, to be that one which contains the reference to " influence on military policy." The Committee might well have selected a less ambiguous expression. But all the evidence, so it seems to us, indicates that, in the paragraph above quoted, the expression is used in its limited —though quite common—sense as meaning precisely the same kind of influence upon the military policy of the Government of India as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff exercises upon the military policy of the Imperial Government.

It is common ground that military policy is decided by the civil power. The General Staff itself does not dream of disagreeing with that " fundamental British principle." There is certainly no reason to suppose that Lord Esher's Committee held any other view. " In the Empire as it is now constituted," to quote Sir C. E. Callwell, " an Imperial General Staff can only be a consultative institution." * But it is obvious that the General Staff, if it is to be of use or to be used at all, must exercise some influence on the military policy adopted by the civil power. It is the function of the General Staff to advise the civil power on matters such as available means, military resources, potentialities, limitations, technical military matters, organization, developments, military needs and military desiderata. Consideration of the advice of the General Staff on such matters, whether it be accepted or not, whether it be politically wise to accept it or not, must necessarily " exercise influence on the military policy " adopted by any Cabinet of sane men.

This matter is admirably dealt with by Major-General Sir John Davidson in his article on the " Defence of the British Empire " elsewhere in this number. The *Times* attaches to the words " influence on military policy " a meaning which the Esher Committee never intended and probably never thought of. All decisions as to policy are the function of the Executive Government, and there is no reason to suppose that Governments will be less inclined in time of peace than they were in time of war to exercise their constitutional rights.

The point, we submit, is surely this. The Imperial military

* *See* " Experiences of a Dug-Out, 1914–1918," by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B., p. 336.

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policy is one whole. The Indian problem is one part of that whole. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is concerned with the whole. The Commander-in-Chief in India is concerned with the part. Shall any machinery, then, be set up, or the present machinery be improved, so as to reduce the chances of divergence between the part and the whole of which it is only a part? If so—and surely the possibility of improvement can hardly be doubted—is there any better alternative than the Esher proposals for setting up the required machinery or effecting the required improvement? That is all. It is a question of a closer working relationship between the military authorities in Great Britain and India in the hope of ensuring greater efficiency and a more organized system of co-operation in the defence of India as part of the Empire.

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With regard to some remarks in the editorial notes in the first number about the high hopes built upon the perfection of mechanical forces in war, a correspondent has written as follows :—

"After all a machine is no more than a labour-saving device. In domestic life it economizes housemaids, in industry it increases production, in war it gives the soldier an enlarged power of killing his man and is called a weapon. Housemaids have fought a strenuous and unavailing battle against carpet-sweepers and vacuum cleaners. The Unions for many years banned the pneumatic riveters. Less than a hundred years ago the country was wild in its protests against the introduction of railways. As to weapons, the cannon, the repeating rifle, the machine gun, have all encountered in their time a resistance none the less formidable because it was passive. Appliances, machines, apparatus, weapons advance and their usage is only a matter of degree. One fact remains, that they have to be controlled and set in motion by humans. The greater the complexity, the more powerful the labour-saving effect of the weapon, the fitter mentally, morally and physically should be the individual whose natural powers are to be multiplied. It is not profitable to labour the point that, if you are to get value from your weapons, you must consider your *personnel* in direct proportion to the result that they are capable of producing in the battle."

This is all perfectly true, including the statement that mechanical development has often encountered formidable though passive resistance. But what was said in our previous notes was by no means meant to indicate disbelief in the military value of such developments. It was only intended to express the necessity for maintaining a sense of proportion between the value of the man and the value of his weapon.

So long as armies exist and war is possible, it is vital to take every advantage of the progress of mechanical science to assist the

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soldier to kill without being killed—to have the greater chance of killing, with the lesser risk of being killed. Yet one wonders to what end it really leads, after all. Improved armour seems only to lead to improved methods of destroying armour; methods of economizing life seem only to lead to more violent methods of distributing death. With all the progress that has been made since the battle-axes of Towton, were the actions in the Great War less bloody than that bloodiest of all hand-to-hand battles? But—that appears to be a fruitless line of speculation, leading nowhere. The truth is that there is no doubt that, in the late war, the lead gained by the Entente powers in development in certain mechanical directions—such as in the conception and development of the tank—had a very considerable effect upon the result. And difficulties were certainly experienced sometimes in convincing military opinion of the value of these developments.

In spite of the aptitude shown by our officers, down to the most junior, for leadership and co-operation; in spite of their adaptibility for the handling of administrative problems, large beyond all anticipation; in spite of the proved value of their mechanical training—*e.g.* in drill—as a means of inculcating discipline; there is still no doubt that in certain directions they showed a very distinct lack of adaptability, knowledge and experience. They were admirable when grappling with new and complex problems of administration and interior economy; they were far from efficient when grappling with quite ordinary problems of managing unskilled labour, "field engineering," rough pioneering and so forth. The simplest matters of this latter kind were too often looked upon as requiring specialist *personnel* and supervision. They could get the soldier washed in bulk, get his clothing disinfected in bulk; but they could never really make the soldier dig, though his life depended on it—how few of them had really any just idea how much the soldier ought to be able to dig, or how he ought to be organized to do it. Yet casualties in war are often few or many in direct proportion to the skill or lack of it shown in directing unskilled labour and pace in extracting work. A distinguished military authority has said, indeed, that while the average officer would make a thoroughly good Club Secretary, he would starve on setting up as a supervisor of labour.

The lack of this form of handiness in our officers is largely what militates against their acceptance of progress in armament and apparatus. One reason is probably that the cadet and the young officer are not sufficiently taught to use their hands. The march of developments in weapons and appliances have made war more and

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more scientific. At present weapons are in the main mechanical, with a tendency to become more so. Yet there is little or no instruction in elementary mechanical theory and practice in the budding officer's early training. There seems to be more than a little in the suggestion that most officers are commissioned too young and insufficiently educated. The wider mind produced by some further general education, together with some definite training in the kind of handiness referred to above, would probably be found of inestimable advantage.

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The question of the great cost of the fighting services continues to occupy much attention in the Press. That economy is essential in view of the economic and financial situation of the country and of Europe is obvious. We cannot, however, enter into this argument. It is not in essence a question of military policy at all, but one of foreign and general policy with which it is not for the *Army Quarterly* to deal. Suffice it to say at present that allowance must be made at any rate for the fact that even if the Services were reduced considerably below the pre-war scale, post-war conditions, rates of pay, and so forth, would still cause them to be far more costly than they were in the good years before 1914.

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General Count Gerard Mathieu Leman, whose death took place on the 17th of October, in addition to being one of Belgium's most distinguished soldiers and patriots, was also a mathematician of European repute. He was born in 1851 and joined the Engineer Corps in 1871. After a distinguished military career, throughout which he had displayed an untiring devotion to duty and an immense capacity for hard work, he was appointed, in December, 1905, Commandant of the Military School. Here his commanding personality, great ability and professional enthusiasm left a lasting influence upon all with whom he came in contact. In January, 1914, he was given command of the 3rd Division and entrusted with the task of organizing the defences of Liège. His gallant defence of that town in the early days of the war will always rank as one of the most heroic episodes in history, while the delay which his determined resistance caused to the German advance had a far-reaching influence upon the fortunes of the war.

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The unveiling of the Cenotaph by His Majesty the King on the second anniversary of the Armistice and the burial of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey were a solemn and fitting homage to

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our heroic dead—a Triumph such as no Conqueror in history has ever received.

Only two years have passed since the Great War was brought to an end, but already there would appear to be a tendency among many of us to look upon that terrific ordeal as an episode in our history with which to-day we have almost as little personal concern as with the struggle against Napoleon. The problems of reconstruction, of social and political unrest at home and abroad, are so various and so difficult that this apparent forgetfulness of the immediate past, of the dangers, the sorrows, the glories of yesterday, is perhaps not wholly surprising. All the more desirable, therefore, is it that from time to time we should be called upon to pause for a moment, to cease from our bickerings, in order to thank God for the glorious courage and unselfish devotion to duty of the men who gave their lives for their King and Country.

If the tens of thousands who passed by the open grave of the Unknown Warrior realized at all the peculiar significance of the ceremonial in which they were taking part, it cannot fail to have inspired them with the noblest conception of patriotism—to have filled them with something of that exaltation of soul which makes men forget themselves and all that is dear to them in the pursuit of a great ideal.

> " Blow out, you bugles, over the rich Dead !
> There's none of these so lonely and poor of old,
> But, dying, has made us rarer gifts than gold.
> These laid the world away ; poured out the red
> Sweet wine of youth ; gave up the years to be
> Of work and joy, and that unhoped serene,
> That men call age ; and those who would have been,
> Their sons, they gave, their immortality."

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# THE VERSAILLES SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B.

The Versailles Supreme War Council has been the subject of much discussion both during and since the war. There are those who maintain that but for the blind and senseless opposition of certain soldiers the Council could, and would, have given us an earlier and more complete victory than that we gained. There are those who assert with equal assurance that the Council was never of any value, and was only prevented from losing the war by the institution of Marshal Foch as Generalissimo. In most of these arguments the actual development and work of the Council is either ignored or forgotten; it is assumed that after Foch took control of the Allied Armies its work was of no great importance, and that its real function, which it either failed to fulfil or was prevented from fulfilling, was the exercise of such control. This is so completely beside the truth that it is worth recording briefly the history of the origin and work of the Council during the war.

Proposals for the co-ordination of the conduct of the war by the Allied Powers were made in the early stages of the great struggle. Lord Kitchener discussed the problem both with his own colleagues of the British Government and with French Ministers early in 1915. The French Government was then in favour of the creation of a Supreme War Council, but proposed to arm that Council with executive powers over the Allied Armies and Fleets, and to this Kitchener was strongly opposed. He of all men was the least likely to favour the vesting of military command in a debating society, and so at the time no definite agreement was reached by the Allied statesmen.* Kitchener then turned to Joffre, and it was largely owing to his suggestions that the French Commander-in-Chief assembled at Chantilly, in December, 1915, a Council of the supreme military authorities of the Allies to consider and prepare the broad lines of a combined plan of campaign for the following year. As happens in war, the enemy intervened, and Falkenhayn, by attacking

* "Life of Lord Kitchener," by Sir George Arthur, vol. iii. p. 261.



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at Verdun early in 1916, gained the initiative and upset the agreed plan. This did not tend to enhance the value of the Council of generals in the eyes of the statesmen, and when the second Council was held, also under Joffre's presidency and at his headquarters and presented its plans for 1917, the statesmen treated them with scant respect. The Chantilly plan went into the wastepaper basket, Joffre was placed on the shelf and Nivelle, with an entirely new plan, reigned in his stead.

A concomitant of Nivelle's plan was the placing of the British Army under his control. The first proposal in this direction was prepared in France and presented at a conference held at Calais in February, 1917, before it had been considered by the British military authorities. This first proposal was of a very drastic nature, and not only gave the French Commander-in-Chief control of operations of war, but also of the distribution of the British troops and of all their munitions and supplies.* As the French Commander-in-Chief was responsible only to his own Government, and had no control over the supply of men and material to our Armies in France, and had no special knowledge of what interests were or were not vital to us, this proposal obviously went much too far, and it was modified in the direction of giving Nivelle general control over military operations only. Even this revised arrangement was intrinsically unsound, apart altogether from any question of General Nivelle's qualifications. From the military point of view it is bad organization to place one army under the commander-in-chief of another. In this case the French Commander-in-Chief was necessarily absorbed in the problems of his own front and in his difficulties with his own Government. He was not and could not, in the circumstances, be fully seized of the conditions of the British front, and the natural consequence was that some of his instructions to Sir Douglas Haig were not altogether suitable. Most important of all, he did not believe in the retreat of the Germans into the Hindenburg line, which began, and was in great part carried out, on the British front. He therefore did not appreciate at its full value the information received from us as to the German withdrawal, which took him by surprise. The Germans made a similar mistake, though on a much smaller scale, at the beginning of the war, when they placed von Kluck's First Army under the orders of von Buelow, the commander of the Second Army. The result was that von Buelow, not fully apprised of the situation which confronted von

* The text of the proposal is given in Col. Repington's "The First World War," vol. i. p. 465.

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Kluck at the time of the battle of Mons, issued him inappropriate orders. The right solution in both cases would have been to have appointed a commander with an adequate staff who should have been free from any special responsibility for any part of the whole, but able to control and supervise the whole from a central position, as happened when Foch assumed the supreme direction of military affairs.

The failure of Nivelle checked severely the progress of the efforts to co-ordinate the conduct of the war by the Allies. The man was lacking. Not only had Nivelle failed, but Joffre was discredited, as indeed was Foch, who had gone into semi-retirement when Joffre left Chantilly, and had only emerged in May, 1917, to become Chief of the Staff in Paris, while Pétain was untried, and there was no British General with the prestige necessary for a Generalissimo. The difficulties of the Governments were therefore great. As there was no one in whom they had complete and absolute confidence, they were loath to take any step which would weaken their control of events. Yet the need for co-ordination became daily greater. The collapse of Russia made it certain that the Allies would be thrown on the defensive in the West at least until the arrival of American troops restored the balance, and it was calculated that this could not take place before the autumn of 1918. There would therefore be a long interval when the initiative would be in the hands of the enemy, and he would have superior forces on the Western front. As each of the Commanders-in-Chief on that front would be looking naturally to the safety of his own troops and of his own lines, the need for a superior and independent authority to regulate the distribution of troops and the movement of reserves was obvious. Therefore, in the summer of 1917, a Council of the supreme military authorities of the Allies, on which Sir William Robertson was the British representative, recommended to the Governments that an organ of unity of command should be established. As this recommendation did not solve the difficulties of the Governments by finding them the right man, or alternatively by devising a system which should at one and the same time meet the military exigencies and safeguard the political control of the several Governments, nothing came of it. However, other forces were at work which did influence the statesmen. As the resources of the Allies were more and more heavily taxed by the continuance of the war and complications of all kinds multiplied, it became more and more necessary for the Allied statesmen to meet in conference. The procedure had been for the principal ministers to meet hastily,

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settle the immediate problem at issue and return at once to their respective capitals. There was in existence no inter-Allied organization to watch the horizon and foresee and prepare for such conferences, arrange for the systematic arrangement of agenda, record the discussions and conclusions reached, nor, most important of all, to see to the timely execution of these decisions. The need for some organization which would fill this gap became apparent during 1917.

This then, was the position when the shock of the Italian disaster at Caporetto fell upon the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George seized with his accustomed energy the opportunity to overcome British reluctance to the creation of a Supreme War Council, a measure which the French had long desired, and carried through a proposal of his own for the establishment of such a body at an inter-Allied Conference held at Rapallo on the Italian Riviera in November, 1917. The Council so constituted consisted of the Prime Minister and of one other Minister of Cabinet rank of each of the principal Allies. It was, therefore, a political and not a military organization, and its prime function was to secure the co-ordination of national policies. It was provided with a permanent secretariat, the organization and functions of which were to a great extent modelled on those of our War Cabinet Secretariat as devised by Sir Maurice Hankey. This secretariat had the duty of drawing up and of issuing the notices and agenda for the meetings of the Council, and of keeping records of its discussions and decisions. The military side of the Council consisted of four permanent military representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, each with a staff. The representatives attended meetings of the Council, but they were not members of the Council and had no vote. The prime function of these representatives was to co-ordinate the strategical plans of the Allies and to assure agreement between inter-Allied policy and strategy.

This organization was a great advance towards the attainment of unity of Allied effort, and, save in one important respect, was unexceptionable from the military point of view. The British Government had inserted a clause in the agreement which became the charter of the Council that the military representatives should be empowered to advise their Governments independently of their General Staffs. This struck at the root of a principle of military organization which it has always been, and for that matter still is, very difficult to get British statesmen to understand and accept. They are jealous of their undoubted right to seek whatever advice they like, and they do not appreciate that in modern war the advice

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of individual soldiers, however experienced and eminent, is rarely of much value. War in these days is such a complicated business that the only soldier who is in a position to tender authoritative advice to a Government is the responsible head of a military organization properly equipped for obtaining and sifting all the necessary information.

With us this responsible head could and can only be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, or, on matters concerning his own army, the commander-in-chief of that army. The military representative at Versailles, while admirably equipped for comparing British plans with those of our Allies and advising us to the measures required to bring them into accord, was not in a position to prepare British plans, for he was not in direct and daily touch with the Admiralty, the Foreign Office and other departments of State concerned in the conduct of the war, and could not, therefore, review the whole ground. A Government has the right to select its military advisers and to change them as often as it pleases, but it should not have the right to appoint two independent advisers, for such a proceeding can only produce divided responsibility, confusion and friction. The French Government solved the problem without difficulty by appointing General Weygand, the principal assistant of Foch, who was the Chief of the Staff, to be its military representative, but, as regards the action of the British Government, it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that its object at this time was to obtain a firmer control of the soldiers by applying the old principle of *divide et impera*, and that it was satisfied that in arranging for unity of political control it was ensuring effective unity of military command. Mr. Lloyd George made it quite clear that he was then opposed to the appointment of one soldier as the director of Allied strategy, for in envisaging the results of the Rapallo Conference he said: "I am utterly opposed to that suggestion" (the appointment of a Generalissimo of the whole of the forces of the Allies) "for reasons into which it would not be desirable to enter. It would not work. It would produce real friction, and might really produce not merely friction between the Armies, but friction between the nations and the Government." *

This was the first controversy which arose over the Versailles Council, and it quickly produced a second. The opinion was very general amongst leading soldiers, not only in Great Britain but also in France and America, that, while the institution of the Versailles

* *See* The Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. xcix. p. 896.

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Council was a step in the right direction, it had done nothing towards solving the problem of providing that effective unity of military control which was required to enable the Allies in the West to meet the great German attack, which was becoming daily more and more probable, as German reinforcements arrived in France and Belgium from the Russian front. Accordingly, a meeting of the Supreme War Council was held at Versailles from the 30th of January to the 2nd of February, 1918, to discuss this vital question. It was there decided to create a general reserve of the whole of the armies on the Western, Italian and Balkan fronts, and to delegate to an executive composed of the permanent military representatives of Great Britain, Italy and the United States of America, with General Foch for France, the power to decide upon the size, location and movements of this general reserve in consultation with the commanders-in-chief concerned. This decision was a weak and ineffective compromise due to the unwillingness of the statesmen to weaken their control over military affairs, for they were not slow to realize that a Generalissimo with supreme powers would be more difficult to influence than a Committee with very partial authority. A Committee, which almost invariably involves discussion and the adjustment of conflicting views by compromise, is in any event a very unsuitable medium for the exercise of military command, and the Executive War Board of the Supreme War Council, as the new body came to be called, was exceptionally unsuitable, for it was composed of four generals of four different countries, each responsible to his own Government, and each dependent for his information both of the enemy and of the Allied troops upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of his own country. The handling of reserves, particularly in a defensive battle, when the initiative is with the enemy, calls for immediate decision in the light of full knowledge, and such decision could not be expected from a body which would have to adjust by discussion the conflicting views of commanders-in-chief as to the strength of the enemy by which they were or might be attacked, as to the liability of their respective fronts to attack, and as to the relative importance of the interests which they guarded. While these objections apply to the Executive War Board generally, the objections to the British share in the Board were even stronger. The British Government insisted on keeping the British military representative independent of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and since by the Constitution the power to issue executive orders to British troops is vested in the Army Council the British representative was made an Army Councillor. Thus not only had

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the British Government provided itself with two independent military advisers but the British Commander-in-Chief in France was liable to receive orders from two independent authorities. Sir William Robertson informed the Government that he could not conscientiously work under such a system, and he was, therefore, removed from his position as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir Henry Wilson, who till then had been British military representative at the Supreme War Council, took his place, he being succeeded at Versailles by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

The Executive War Board had a very short existence. Owing to the facts that the British Army in France had had to extend its front in the early months of 1918, that it was very much below strength, and that the Germans were massing troops opposite to it, Sir Douglas Haig felt himself unable to comply with the requests of the Board for troops to form part of the general reserve, destined to be under the orders of the Board, and that body thereupon ceased to function, though it remained nominally in existence until it was formally dissolved at a meeting of the Supreme War Council held on the 1st and 2nd of May, 1918. Thus ended the second controversy which raged round the Supreme War Council. Neither of these controversies, as far as concerned the British soldiers involved in them, had, contrary to the general belief of the public at the time, anything to do with the principle of unity of command. They were concerned rather with the methods by which it was sought to obtain that unity, and were the result of conflicts of opinion between statesmen who were unwilling to place great powers in the hands of a general unless they were quite certain they had found the right general, and soldiers who could not agree to the organization of military command on what they knew to be unsound principles. It is very difficult to get politicians to believe in principles, of which they have no knowledge and the application of which they have not studied. They are rarely willing to admit that a good average man may work a good system successfully, but that the best of men are almost certain to fail if they are asked to work a bad system. Their mentality and training teach them to look to the individual rather than to the system, for they owe their own positions more to the personal influence which they are able to exert, mainly by speech, than to their executive powers. Therefore in war they are at a loss until some general appears who by his achievements has won for himself a position so commanding as to inspire universal confidence in the public upon whom they are dependent. These conditions, which are applicable in any country with a democratic system of

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government when at war, are intensified when an alliance is involved, and it becomes not merely a question of selecting a military adviser or a commander-in-chief for a national government or for a national army, but a military chief for allied armies.

Fortunately, in 1918 the enemy solved the difficult problem for us. The crisis produced by the great German attack in March caused, as is well known, the assembly of a special Allied Conference. That Conference, held at Doulens on the 27th of March, 1918, was not a meeting of the Supreme War Council, but was assembled hastily on the initiative of Sir Douglas Haig to devise the best means of effecting unity of command. At the Conference, after several proposals had been considered, General Foch was, again mainly on Sir Douglas Haig's initiative, charged with the task of co-ordinating the operations of the French and British Armies. Shortly afterwards he was given by the Supreme War Council the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the Forces on the Western Front." The question of command thus happily settled, the Supreme War Council was able to devote itself to its legitimate functions. These were the co-ordination of Allied policy and the utilization of the resources of the Allies for the common purpose of defeating the enemy. In fulfilling these functions it was eminently successful. Not only were the meetings of ministers conducted in a far more businesslike way than had been the case with the somewhat haphazard conferences which had preceded the institution of the Supreme War Council, but there was gradually grouped round the permanent secretariat of the Council and in touch with the military representatives, an organization which enabled the Council to survey comprehensively the whole of Allied action. A naval liaison committee was established at Versailles and constituted the necessary link between the military representative and the inter-Allied Naval Council whose headquarters were in London. That Council had been brought into existence for the co-ordination of naval plans and strategy shortly after the Rapallo Conference of November, 1917. The inter-Allied Transportation Council, which attained great importance when the depredations of the U-boats created such a shortage of shipping as to menace the food supplies of the Allies and the transport of troops and war material, was brought into touch with the military representatives and supplied them with information on the problems of transportation both by land and by sea which confronted the Allies and their enemies. The inter-Allied Technical Committee became a definite part of the Versailles

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organization and supplied advice on the development and employment of aeroplanes and tanks. Thus with the assistance of the Food Council, the Munitions Council, the Programmes Council, which dealt with the supply of raw materials other than those required for munitions of war, the Allied Governments were, during 1918, well equipped to secure united action. The Supreme War Council was, in fact, as an organization immeasurably superior to any previous attempt to ensure unity of policy, of economic control and of action amongst Allies, and some similar body will be indispensable to any alliance in a future war. The one thing it could not ensure was effective unity of executive military command, because that lies beyond the powers of any Council of Ministers of State. Much trouble and friction would have been avoided if that simple lesson of military history had been learned in time.

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# DEFENCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

By Major-General Sir J. H. Davidson, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., M.P.

"In the great frame of Kingdoms and Commonwealths it is in the power of States to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms; for, by introducing such ordinances, constitutions and customs as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these things are commonly not observed but left to take their chance."

Thus spake Bacon, "the wisest of mankind," some centuries ago; he advocates in his essay on "Empire," that things should not be allowed to take their chance.

We as a nation have persistently refused to take his advice in the question of Imperial defence. Our policy in this respect has nearly always been to wander blindly on, and, when the crisis arrives and the storm breaks, we rush to expedients, to belated and heroic measures and muddle through planless but energetic, relying on the innate vitality of our race to pull us through at unnecessary cost. We reflect then what might have been, had we been possessed of "ordinances, constitutions and customs." This methodless procedure has its negative advantages. We are not accustomed to rigid rules, we are not overcome when affairs do not follow their expected course, and we are consequently not incapable of adapting ourselves to unforeseen circumstances as they arise.

But to argue that these benefits outweigh the advantages of a sound organization for Imperial defence and combined consideration of problems of defence in their truly Imperial aspect is preposterous.

The history of the past century shows how prone we are to leave things to chance. But it is unnecessary to cast back further than the late war to understand the full absurdity of our procedure. On the outbreak of war in 1914, the Headquarters of our General Staff at the War Office was immediately scattered on the continent. Scarcely a soldier of standing and recognized ability was left behind to deal with the higher direction of the war. This was left to chance, with the result that we engaged without delay in amphibious



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operations, violating the principles of war and dissipating our available forces at a most critical period. Blame does not attach to those individuals who initiated the operations, or to the soldiers who left them in the lurch, but rather to the lack of system, and to things being left " to take their chance."

War is a hard school and experience is bitter. We learned a great deal in military affairs in three years in South Africa, with the result that a General Staff was created in the Army which could compare favourably with that of any nation. Our experience in the Great War has been more bitter ; it has extended beyond the Army to the Navy and the newly created Air Force, and—what is even of more importance—to the virile Dominions across the seas.

It had been the intention of the writer to sketch briefly the origin and development of our Army General Staff before 1914, but this was so clearly and well described in an article on the Staff published in the October issue of the *Army Quarterly* that it will suffice, for the purposes of this article, to say that the successful conduct of our military operations on land during the late war was largely due to the staff organization which was initiated by the Esher Committee in 1904, and extended to the self-governing Dominions after the Imperial Conference in 1907. It was the uniformity of staff organization and teaching which rendered possible the co-operation in war of the various forces of the Empire. We have learned a great deal since those days, and it is to be hoped that the Imperial Constitutional Conference of 1921 will formulate some " ordinances, constitutions and customs " for the co-ordination of all means of defence and remove the habit, once for all, of leaving things " to take their chance." But there are difficulties to surmount ; and these difficulties are deep-seated in the nature of our loosely-knit Imperial confederation, and in the defective form of our governmental machinery.

There is little profit to be gained in pondering too long over the history of the past or in regretting that we have not done those things which we ought to have done. Mercifully there is still health in us, and our chief concern must be the present and the future, for the world war has imposed upon the British Empire the heaviest burdens and responsibilities in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and delicacy, both internally and externally.

Internally, the financial stringency approximates to bankruptcy and industrial unrest may develop into industrial warfare. The United Kingdom, economically overpopulated, exists by means of its industries, in which both its raw materials are purchased and its

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manufactured products are sold abroad. We rely on foreign countries for the necessities of life. Our artificial prosperity rests entirely upon our power to compete in foreign markets. The tendency in the next generation will be for Nature to reassert her economic equilibrium. Great Britain will tend less and less to be the focus of power in the British Commonwealth; but what is lost in Great Britain should be more than compensated for in the growth and power of the Dominions. We shall need all our strength closely united, for there would not appear to be any diminution, but rather an accentuation, of our Imperial dangers and obligations as a result of the war.

Externally, our difficulties arising out of the war (or rather the peace) and the world unrest are immense. First and foremost comes the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by which the map of Europe has been carved up, with little attention paid to the element of practical economics. The terms of peace were necessarily the subject of controversy, readjustment, barter and haggling, based more often than not on theory without due regard to facts, on the creation or re-creation of small nations (at the expense of their neighbours), on the principles of self-determination, on corridors and treaty ports, on territories administered by the League of Nations, and on ethical experiments of every description. Instead of peace and settlement, the peoples of the world are inflamed, unsettled, disorganized, and it will be many a long day before Europe, at any rate, regains a tranquil normality. The task of making peace was hard, and perhaps no better settlement could have been effected; but do not let us delude ourselves either that Europe will cause no further serious anxiety, or that the British people can keep out of the European ring. On the contrary, the Treaty, which is our sheet-anchor, depends entirely for its execution and maintenance upon the strength of France and Great Britain, a responsibility which may well give cause for deep anxiety to the statesmen of these war-worn countries.

So far as we are concerned, our power is already dispersed, at great cost, over the face of the globe, taxed physically beyond its endurance and burdened with the most serious responsibilities. If the occasion arose, we should scarcely be in a position to do more than use moral persuasion and sea power in order to enforce the provisions of the Treaty and to support our continental friends. In the present position of Europe this is not much to gamble on.

But it is in Asia and Africa that our responsibilities affect us more closely and seriously. We have accepted a mandate over great

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tracts of territory which increase the danger points and open up unlimited liabilities. In the East we now have an almost continuous land frontier stretching from Burmah to Egypt, subject to attack from without, and to the forces of unrest and sedition, racial and religious trouble, and national and tribal turbulence from within. It has been truly said that our responsibilities extend over an almost unbroken stretch of land from Singapore to Cape Town.

In India, political experiments, agitation and labour unrest afford such cause for anxiety that, far from reducing the British garrison, it might be necessary to reinforce it heavily at short notice. We have renounced the external control of Afghanistan, and almost at the same moment have engaged ourselves in a Treaty with Persia which virtually makes us responsible for the protection of that country. The mandate which we have accepted for Mesopotamia, apart from the fact that it will necessitate the retention of a British garrison there for some years to come, involves us in the defence of Persia and entangles us at close quarters with the Turk, the unruly tribes of the North, the forces of anti-Westernism and perhaps the Bolshevik. Between Palestine and Mesopotamia our hands are fully occupied with the Arab, while the proximity of the French in Syria renders our position more difficult. Egypt is the link between East and West and must be adequately held. National feeling, the spirit of self-determination, tribal turbulence, pan-Islamism, anti-Westernism, Bolshevism and general antagonism—all these are ours to wrestle with in the future, and we cannot afford to let our prestige run down in any one quarter, since loss of prestige spreads rapidly in all directions and may prejudice our security and increase our difficulties a hundredfold.

In addition to all these burdens, we are responsible for the security of practically the whole of the Continent of Africa, the protection of the Dominions, the maintenance of refuelling stations all over the world, the freedom and safety of traffic at all times across all the seas.

It is not the intention of the writer to strike any note of pessimism or to advocate any shelving of responsibility, but to state the facts briefly without exaggeration, so that we may see our way to carry out our duties in the most efficient manner, and leave things "to take their chance" as little as possible. Nor is it his desire to advocate any form of militarism. No soldier who has had experience of war can be a militarist; he would rather go to any length to avoid war and bloodshed, and to assist in establishing stable, equitable and peaceful government. The idea that the professional soldier,

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whose business it is to conduct military operations, desires war, is as absurd as to suppose that the doctor, whose business it is to heal the sick, desires disease. It is regrettable, therefore, to find that any projects or schemes put forward by soldiers to provide security and to meet responsibilities are still regarded with suspicion in many quarters. The fault lies with those who adopt a policy frequently without regard to the consequences and without taking their experts into their confidence in a proper and adequate manner.

The grave nature of the problems which confront us warrants the closest possible attention being devoted to the matter without delay, and the establishment of an organization or the re-modelling of existing machinery, in order to cope with the task.

Before the war the Committee of Imperial Defence was the power which was responsible for the co-ordination of our defensive system. The work done by that body was admittedly valuable, but it must be equally admitted that it was inadequate for the requirements. During hostilities the War Cabinet carried out the functions of the Committee, but now on the resumption of peace we appear to have slipped back into our old disjointed, absent-minded and happy-go-lucky ways. Something must be done, and done quickly, for, as has already been explained in this article, the whole problem of Imperial defence has been rendered more complex and more urgent as a result of the war and the peace.

Never in the history of the world has there been an Empire of so great extent or so scattered over the globe as the British Empire of to-day. Linked together by wide distances of sea, land and air, the system of communication between the component parts is necessarily precarious and the periods of time required for transport are generally lengthy. The forces at our disposal for purposes of defence are, for financial and other reasons, limited to the barest necessities without any margin for safety. Increased strength can only be achieved by rapidity of movement and preparation of plans, and for this the greatest foresight and most careful study are required. The closest co-operation is essential between the Navy and the Army in almost every problem of defence which confronts us to-day ; but the complexity of these problems is greatly intensified by the introduction of the Air Force.

Apart from the great future of the Air Force, which is capable of almost unlimited development in its independent *rôle*, it must also form an essential part of the sea and land forces. Success in war is dependent on reconnaissance and fire effect, and for both these the naval and military forces must henceforth rely in great measure on

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aircraft, whose *personnel* must be trained constantly with the forces with which they will have to co-operate in war. This is a factor of great importance. It cannot be lightly brushed aside in the way in which Lord Haldane appeared to treat it in the House of Lords in a debate on Imperial defence on the 5th of May, 1920, when he stated: "I pass by the Air Force; that is a minor matter."

The closest co-operation is also required in amphibious undertakings, or, rather, in operations in which all three Services are required, for we know from experience that such undertakings should only be indulged in after the most mature consideration and after the combined plans have been carefully thought out by all the forces concerned.

The self-governing Dominions and India cannot stand aloof in matters of defence; on the contrary, with the growth of their power, they should assume their responsibilities in the Imperial Council and accept their proportionate burdens and liabilities. Their defence representatives must be consulted in all plans and projects, if co-operation and co-ordination are to be truly Imperial, and if the Empire is to be consolidated in the most effective and economic manner.

Occasional meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, informal conversations between the chiefs of the Services, spasmodic references to the Dominions and exceptional missions of a consultative and advisory nature (such as that of Lord Jellicoe to Australia and New Zealand) are totally inadequate; the problems of defence are far too serious and complex to be treated in such a superficial manner. Independent action by the numerous government departments is vicious to a degree; the War Office, Air Ministry, Admiralty, Foreign Office, India Office, Colonial Office and Treasury require the most detailed co-ordination so far as their handling of these questions is concerned. We have had some experience of the evil effects of such departmental action.

Naturally the liabilities of the Empire and the policy in relation to them are for the Government alone to consider and settle. It is in the technical means of giving effect to that policy that the co-ordinated and combined expressions of opinion by experts are required. Unfortunately the technical experts have in the past been inarticulate. They have been regarded as militarist and wasteful, and have never been provided with the organization necessary for combined thought and expression. Naval and military officers of high standing have had the reputation of being ignorant of the requirements of finance and economy. If this has been the case, then it is due to the system and not to the men, for our system of

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control of military expenditure and the compiling of estimates is most wasteful, and does not secure the best results. It is necessary that Imperial liabilities, in order that they should be fully realized in their proper perspective, should be converted into terms of men, munitions and money, by a body qualified not only to reckon the cost, but also to investigate the means.

The Government appears to be unnecessarily fearful lest its functions should be in any degree usurped, or its decisions forced, by the operations of a military clique. If such a danger really existed, it would certainly be infinitely preferable to forego any idea of reform or progress; but it can never exist, especially in a democracy such as ours. The anxiety, however, if carried too far, might well retard and defeat all efforts to improve the system. In any proposals for reform, therefore, great care must be observed to steer clear of anything which would interfere in the least degree with the authority of Parliament and the responsibilities of the Executive.

It is not possible within the scope of this article to deal fully with all the facts and arguments, to give examples where the failure due to our lack of system has led us into difficulties, or to point out the many reasons for our past mistakes. But perhaps sufficient has already been said on general lines to justify an inquiry into the desirability and means of setting up a permanent joint advisory body, comprising representatives of the three Services and the Dominions to investigate the many problems of Imperial defence in their technical aspect. Before dealing, however, with the body itself or the method of adjusting its organization to requirements and to the existing system, it is necessary first to consider in detail some of the chief criticisms which have been levelled at the principle of the idea, and to clear the air of some of the misconceptions and delusions under which certain personages in high places appear to be labouring.

In the first place, it has been asserted that if effect were given to the proposal, it would cut deeply into the organization given to the War Office by the Esher Committee in 1904. It is difficult to see how this assertion can be justified in any way, or how the proposition will interfere at all with the working of the General Staff. On the contrary, it is the natural development of the Esher Committee's recommendations and follows the normal course of evolutionary progress. At any rate such is the view of Lord Esher himself, for, in writing on the subject to the *Glasgow Herald* on the 23rd of November, 1919, he states: "I can assure you that there is no conflict between this conception and that upon which the Esher

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Committee based its policy in 1904. It is a perfectly simple evolution of a principle, then laid down, which has worked with remarkable success in the war, but in the light of that war's experience, requires to be further developed." Lord Esher even goes a step beyond this, for in the same letter he says: "It seems clearer to me than ever before, that an Imperial General Staff, if it is to be a reality, should be placed directly under an Imperial Cabinet, and divorced from the departmental control of the War Office." This latter remark, however, will require some examination presently in its relation to our system of machinery of Government.

Then again, the debate in the House of Lords on Imperial defence on the 5th of May, 1920, showed up serious misconceptions on the part of certain individuals, for, although this debate was not particularly constructive, it helped to clear the atmosphere. Lord Haldane, to whom the country owes a deep debt of gratitude for his services in the construction of the Territorial Force, referred to certain proposals put forward by members of the House of Commons, and unfortunately jumped to false conclusions as to the aim of those proposals. He addressed the House on the necessity for permitting the staffs of the three Services to grow up in their own atmospheres; and stated: "In place of staffs so growing up, it is suggested, as I understand, that the control of staff development, and the work which these staffs do, should pass to a new super body—we do not yet know how it is suggested that that body should be constituted—and that it should look after the development of the special staffs of the Services below it." Naturally, every one with any knowledge of the subject would agree with him in denouncing the fusion or amalgamation of the staffs of three Services into one joint Imperial Staff as a retrograde movement. But there was never any such proposal made in the House of Commons or outside. The respective staffs must remain separate and independent, the majority of the important work of one having no connection with or interest in the others. The proposal was confined to the establishment of a permanent joint body, whose business would be of an advisory nature, for the purpose of co-relating that portion of general staff work which is interlocked between the three Services and the Dominions.

Then again, it is constantly urged from many influential quarters that the existing Committee of Imperial Defence is in fact the body here advocated and that nothing more is required. There could be no greater fallacy. A committee, whose members are already overworked in other directions, whose sittings are spasmodic (there has been only one meeting of the C.I.D. since the Armistice), and

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whose technical advisers are only called in occasionally in a consultative capacity, can never be effective. It may perform certain work, and that work may be useful, but it is certainly not enough. It might be that the Committee should constitute the trunk upon which the advisory body could usefully be grafted, but this is a question of organization which will be discussed later on in this article.

Tedious though it may be to prolong the examination of the principle, it will be of value to make further investigation before passing on to the question of adjustment, by ascertaining the views of some of those who now hold, or have recently held, positions of responsibility appertaining to the defence of the Empire. Apart from the debate in the House of Lords, to which reference has already been made, the subject has been discussed on numerous occasions in the House of Commons in connection with estimates and interesting and instructive opinions have been expressed.

For example, the Secretary of State for War on the 15th of December, 1919, gave utterance to views which were, if not of a revolutionary, certainly of a highly advanced order. In visualizing the possibility of what might be termed a Ministry of Defence, he stated :—

"These are very revolutionary ideas, and progress towards them can only be made gradually; but progress towards them must be continued, and nothing must be done in reconstructing the Air Force which in any way conflicts with the final system to which we will certainly be drawn by logic, by economic and by war efficiency, and, in fact, by everything except existing vested interests, namely, a combined General Imperial War Staff for the three Services, actuating and operating under single control. Air power may prove itself—many people declare it has proved itself—a substitute for other more expensive forms of man power or sea power. But it is obvious that any question of such difficulty as substituting one set of developments for another, or increasing air power at the expense of existing forms of naval or military effort, for instance, can only be dealt with upon the advice and through the agency of a combined General Staff who feel impartial as to the method or instrument employed, so long as they are best and the right ones for the country to use. Therefore, I find myself in strong personal sympathy with the remarks made in regard to the creation of such a joint staff. I hope that the discussions which are now taking place between the professional heads of the three Services, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Force, may be productive of real advance in this most urgent and important matter."

And again he declared his hope that "proposals will emerge which will lead to the creation of that Joint Imperial Defence Staff, which at the present time is indispensable from every point of view."

On the other hand, General Seely, late Secretary of State for War and late Air Minister, expressed his views on the 18th of March,

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1920, thus : " While it would be foolish, as some have proposed, to have one minister to preside over the Board of Admiralty, the Air Council, and the Army Council—no member of this House would approve of that, I think—we do believe that some body, such as the Committee of Imperial Defence, with adequate powers, should be set up forthwith to see that there is no further waste of money or effort on account of lack of proper co-ordination."

On the same day the present First Lord of the Admiralty stated somewhat similar views : " We are extremely anxious also that apart from, or in addition to, the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is a body of ministers and experts, there should be a definite arrangement under which the staffs of the great fighting departments should meet regularly for consultation and to work out as far as possible a common policy." But Mr. Asquith, in the same debate, took a somewhat non-committal line. He hoped that the Committee of Imperial Defence would remain of a consultative and not assume an executive nature, that it would resume its work, that it would maintain elasticity in composition, that it would review the ever-shifting questions both of offensive and defensive policy ; and that was all. Reading between the lines of his speech, there was evident a lurking fear lest some body should be set up, or power established, which might usurp or interfere with the functions of the Government. He, however, stated that he agreed with certain of the views expressed above, " that we ought to have some machinery for closer co-operation and more continuous concentration of the staffs of the great defensive services, and that it is immediately desirable." His fear of military interference in the domain of politics was justifiable, and is certainly a point which must be carefully guarded against in any re-organization.

A consideration of the foregoing views shows that there is a wonderful and heartening unanimity in the opinions expressed, that something is required, and that some permanent joint advisory body should be set up forthwith. It is equally clear that there is a divergence of opinion in regard to the constitution of any such body, its place in the machinery of government and the limit of its functions. Nevertheless, when all these views are carefully examined and considered, they resolve themselves into one or other of the following proposals :—

1. The establishment of a Ministry of Defence.
2. The creation of special machinery in the shape of a separate Combined Imperial General Staff.
3. The development of the Committee of Imperial Defence, by grafting on to it a permanent joint advisory body.

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1. By a Ministry of Defence one naturally understands the collection of the three great spending departments—Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry—under one supervising and responsible minister. Not a complete fusion of the three staffs and administrative services, or any partial fusion of the ministries themselves. The idea of a single ministry would normally involve a Minister of Defence, with a Joint General Staff Council and three secretaries or under-secretaries for the three departments. The minister would be responsible for defining the policy and for broad questions of principle, while the secretaries would give effect to that policy and be responsible for the detailed administration of their Services. There are undoubtedly advantages in such a system, and it is no new conception seeing that such an organization exists not only in Germany, but in our own Dominions. Certainly complete co-operation and co-ordination between the three Services would be achieved by such a system. But, on the other hand, there are many and serious objections; one of the chief arguments being that such a ministry would be possessed of too great power and importance in relation to the other ministries, and that this would constitute a danger. There would not, however, be the same danger if the remaining ministries were similarly dealt with and grouped together according to cognate services and functions. For example, if at the same time with a Ministry of Defence, there were also established a Commonwealth Ministry (for the whole British Empire, including India), a Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a Ministry of Justice, etc., an organization on these lines would have the great advantage of assuring decentralization, in place of the over-centralized form of government which we have to-day, and which involves the heads of over twenty departments being directly responsible to the Prime Minister and to a Cabinet consisting of the unwieldy number of twenty members. If this idea, which was hinted at in the Machinery of Government Committee's report to the late Ministry of Reconstruction, were to be carried into effect, the Prime Minister would have to handle a cabinet of reasonable size consisting of some ten to twelve ministers only, who in their turn would deal with two or three secretaries or under-secretaries, the latter merely executing the policy formulated by the cabinet.

But even if reconstruction on these lines were decided upon, it would be a lengthy process to bring it into operation, whereas the steps necessary to co-relate the means of defence of the Empire are of such immediate importance as to brook no delay. Hence, whether the establishment of a Ministry of Defence is desirable or

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not, it is certainly undesirable to link to the solution of that problem the urgent matter with which we are now confronted, and thereby to postpone its treatment indefinitely. There are other objections to a Ministry of Defence; where military power is of predominant importance, and naval strength a relatively insignificant or minor matter, the advantages of a single ministry are great and obvious; but, where the reverse is the case, as in the British Empire, the difficulties are of a very serious nature. In any case, and if only for the reasons given above, it is considered undesirable to attempt to solve the problem by means of a Defence Ministry, and we shall have to look elsewhere for the solution.

2. The second alternative is to create new machinery in the shape of a separate Joint Imperial General Staff responsible directly to the Cabinet and to the Imperial Council. Here again there are advantages and disadvantages, but the latter are so great as to rule out the proposition altogether without further detailed consideration. If such a body were to be created, divorced from the State departments and advising the Cabinet direct, advice might be tendered which would necessitate a policy being forced on those departments over the heads of the ministers and their chiefs of staff. In practice this would be an unworkable plan, because it would lead to endless misunderstandings and friction.

3. The third alternative is to graft a permanent technical advisory body on to existing machinery, that is to say, on to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

This certainly appears to be a more promising course.

The Committee was formed many years ago, it was reconstituted in 1902 and a permanent secretariat added in 1905. Its functions are purely consultative, neither executive nor administrative, it can neither prescribe a policy nor give directions, its sole duty being to advise. It interferes with no existing authority and it possesses no fixed constitution.

Its members are selected by the Prime Minister from among his colleagues and their technical assistants, and any other persons whose advice may be sought on any particular subject. It possesses a great flexibility and is nebulous in character. Like many other bodies of such a nature, its spade work is largely performed by sub-committees, of which several are now in existence, and in this it follows the fashion of the day.

As the *Times* remarked in a recent leading article: "This Cabinet Committee is not doing, and never has done, the work assigned to it, not from lack of good will, but from lack of time."

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The fact is that those who compose it are too busily occupied elsewhere to give even a small fraction of the attention which the subject warrants. Nor are the sub-committees so constituted as to be able to deal with the problems in an adequate manner. If proof of this were needed, it is to be found in the fact that a sub-committee has now been appointed to consider the question of co-ordination of the three Services. But something greater than this is required, something which will embrace not only the three Services, but the whole Empire from the point of view of the technical requirements which are necessary for the defence of the Empire in its widest aspect.

These questions were all carefully considered by the Parliamentary Army Committee of the House of Commons, which came to the conclusion that the best and simplest method of dealing with the problem was to attach to the Committee of Imperial Defence a sub-committee which should comprise whole-time members in permanent session for the purpose of tendering expert advice.

But before proceeding to investigate in detail the proposals of the Parliamentary Committee, it is necessary to give further consideration to the matter with special reference to our relationship with the self-governing Dominions and with India.

For example, there is to be considered the status of the Dominions within the British Commonwealth, their relationship to Great Britain, the establishment of an Imperial Council or other machinery, and their acceptance of Imperial liabilities. These countries are in reality nations linked together by common bonds, whose growing strength and national feeling, coupled with their recent acquisition of military experience and sense of power, demand that they should have an effective voice in the control of Imperial affairs, not only in relation to economic and political problems, but also in matters connected with defence. They are as yet young, their economic and material, as well as their physical, development lies before them, and on them rests the future power and prosperity of the Empire, as indeed in a large measure the peace of the world. The need for consultation and discussion has been felt for many years past, and has expressed itself in conferences held in London in 1887, 1897, 1902, 1907, 1909, 1911 and during the war.

This need has become more pronounced in recent years, and the war has emphasized the desirability of calling into being a common council of a permanent nature to operate as a clearing house on Imperial matters. The form, composition and functions of such a council have been the subject of much argument, but there has been a general unanimity in regard to the principle of its establishment.

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Indeed, the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1917, whilst opposing the idea of an Imperial Parliament, lays stress on the advantages of our " autonomous nations " being in continuous consultation for concerted action, in such a manner as the several Governments may determine.

It is hoped that some definite result may be achieved in this direction from the deliberations of the Imperial Constitutional Conference which is to be held in London in 1921, and that this result will be productive of the means of co-ordination in the sphere of defence as well as in political and economic spheres. It is further to be hoped that an Imperial Council will be of a permanent nature and will consist of persons who are actually members of the Governments which they represent, co-operating with their colleagues in the Council, but responsible to their Premiers in their own countries. In this way the Council would be truly Imperial, being composed of ministers from the various Dominions. Each minister would naturally be provided with his technical experts and, in matters of defence, these persons should include deputies of the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Dominions concerned. The services of the sea, land and air are combined in a Defence Ministry in the Dominions, so that one deputy would cover problems in relation to all those Services.

A great responsibility lies on those who represent the component parts of the Empire at the forthcoming Conference. The *Observer*, in a leading article, recently summed up the situation very accurately in these words: " When the next Imperial Conference meets, it will have to face questions as delicate and difficult as ever taxed Imperial statesmanship. We are almost at the limit of silent adaptation of the Imperial structure by customary use, and by the compromises of common sense in the give and take of Imperial business." If there exists the will to co-operate, then the machinery should not be difficult to devise. Certain it is that the Mother Country is at the end of her financial tether and cannot support the heavy demands on her purse to meet Imperial obligations in full. 1921 will be the year in which we shall have the opportunity of achieving Imperial solidarity. In continuing now to explore the road to this solidarity we must assume that success will attend the efforts and proceedings of the Conference.

The problem of the self-governing Dominions is, however, easy of solution compared with the difficulties which compass our relationship with India. This country, with its three hundred million inhabitants, is entering the political cauldron from which

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it is intended eventually to emerge an autonomous Dominion. Obsolete methods and political emancipation called into being the Esher Committee recently appointed by the Secretary of State for India to inquire into the administration and organization of the Army in India. The covering letter of this Committee, dated the 3rd of November, 1919, addressed to the Secretary of State, and Part I. of the report, raise highly important and controversial matters.

A considerable body of public opinion is likely to be adverse to the recommendations for two chief reasons, first, because there is the intention to place the Army in India in regard to military policy under partial control of the War Office; and secondly, because the Committee, without any attempt at camouflage, faces the fact that the Near and Middle East is likely to remain a storm centre for some years to come. There is no doubt that the Army in India for purposes of efficiency must be brought into closer touch with the General Staff at home, also that India must be ready at short notice to have troops available for external use. For this latter purpose, it will probably be preferable to earmark and specially recruit an Indian force for expeditionary purposes, as in this country; and it is to be hoped that it would never have to be called into use.

If and when the political emancipation of India is carried into effect, presumably the Commander-in-Chief would be replaced by a Chief of the Staff, whose representative or deputy would be the military expert of the India Office, and India would follow, in principle, the procedure outlined above for the Dominions. The functions of a Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff do not in fact differ materially, neither would command forces in action and each is responsible for military efficiency. There is nothing wild or militarist about the Esher Committee's recommendations, nor is there anything in them which would tend to relax the civil control over military expenditure.

There is no object or advantage in the Governor-General in Council having two military advisers, nor in the Secretary of State being possessed of an expert who is out of touch with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. That expert should be the deputy of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and have a place in councils for the co-ordination of all technical matters connected with the defence of the Empire.

The recent leading articles in the *Times* on the subject of the Esher Committee's recommendations draw attention to the dangers involved in allowing the General Staff to define a "military policy," and express the view that "the real objects of the broad principles

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they set forth seem to be to hand over the Army in India, and consequently half India's Imperial expenditure, to War Office control." The fact of the matter is that the expression " military policy " used in the Committee's report has created misunderstanding and raised hostility to its recommendations. Military policy as used here does not imply policy in regard to initiating or undertaking military operations, but merely in regard to securing military efficiency in the means available and in the preparation and study of plans. The term is unfortunate, for in any event policy must be dictated by the Government and Imperial policy by an Imperial Council, assisted by an effective and efficient Committee of Imperial Defence. But the respective portions of the Empire can no longer work in compartments, they must co-ordinate their efforts if those efforts are to be effective and economical, and in this respect India is no exception to this rule.

As has been stated above, the Parliamentary Army Committee of the House of Commons after careful deliberation dispatched a deputation in June, 1920, to the Prime Minister and Mr. Bonar Law to bring all these matters to their notice, and to hand to them the following minute describing in broad outline certain proposals for the solution of the problem, involving the least possible dislocation of existing machinery. The proposal was admirably appreciated in a leading article in the *Times* on the 17th of June, 1920.

## EXECUTIVE OF THE ARMY COMMITTEE

### MINUTE ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The Army Committee of the House of Commons impresses upon the Prime Minister the necessity for an organization to ensure the continuous study of all our means of Defence in order to secure safety, efficiency, and economy.

2. In view of the vast responsibilities of this Empire in all quarters of the Globe, and the great changes in the means of Offence and Defence on and under the Sea, on Land and in the Air which have developed during the late war, it is of the first importance that the problems of combined Defence that have consequently arisen should be immediately and continuously studied by a competent body in close touch with the Prime Minister, so that our policy and means of Defence shall go hand in hand.

3. In order to allay the anxiety felt by the Country on this subject, the Army Committee of the House of Commons urges the Prime Minister to formulate a scheme whereby this object may be obtained without delay.

4. It is possible that the most practicable scheme under present conditions would be to create immediately a Standing Joint Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, formed of the

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First Sea Lord, the C.I.G.S., and the C.A.S., or officers appointed or deputed by them together with representatives of the Self-Governing Dominions, of India, and of other Departments concerned.

5. Whatever be the Advisory Body formed, the members of the Army Committee in the House of Commons are of opinion that it is essential :—

I. That it should meet regularly and frequently.

II. That it should have a specially selected and permanent Secretariat to assist in its work, and to record its proceedings and conclusions.

III. That the Chairman of this Sub-Committee should be a Minister not in charge of one of the Great Departments of State except on those occasions when the Prime Minister is himself present.

6. Among the duties of the Standing Joint Defence Sub-Committee of the C.I.D., should be included the following :—

To examine—

(*a*) The Imperial Organization for Defence.
(*b*) The Estimates, in draft, with a view to ensuring due economy and efficiency.
(*c*) Our Imperial responsibilities from the point of view of Defence.
(*d*) The effect of scientific progress and inventions.
(*e*) The problems of Strategy and Logistics.
(*f*) The proposals of the League of Nations.

Signed on behalf of the Army Committee,

S. SCOTT, *Chairman.*
JOHN DAVIDSON, *Vice-Chairman.*
H. H. SPENDER CLAY, *Treasurer and Secretary.*
A. HUNTER-WESTON.
G. K. COCKERILL (*Co-opted member*).
RALPH GLYN, *Secretary.*

*May 24th*, 1920.

Probably the simplest method of explaining the proposed organization is to show it in the form of a diagram (*see* next page), of which a brief study should suffice to depict the idea.

No doubt the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff should themselves be members of the permanent sub-committee, but they would usually not be able to attend, and, for this reason, they should be provided with special deputies for the purpose, for, as the *Times* says, the work of this sub-committee "will be a whole-time job." The chairman should be a minister who is not encumbered with departmental duties, since he must frequently be present to guide the sub-committee in exploring the debatable ground which lies between policy and means. It has been suggested that the ministers in charge of the three Service departments should be members, but this is neither necessary nor desirable. These ministers are members of the



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Committee of Imperial Defence and will consider the studies of the sub-committee when they are presented, but that sub-committee should preserve its technical and expert nature.

The deputies should be whole-time officers of high rank. They should carry out their work, when the sub-committee is not sitting, in the offices of their respective departments so as to be in close touch with their chiefs, from whom they will receive instructions, and be in a position to carry out their research and studies in intimate conjunction with the various branches and sections of the departments concerned, and become acquainted with the necessary facts and data.

The permanent secretariat is of importance, seeing that papers, reports and recommendations must be drawn up for submission to the Committee of Imperial Defence which will, in its turn, pass on such recommendations, as it may deem fit and desirable, to the Cabinet and Imperial Council for approval and action.

In the event of detailed information being required by the sub-committee from the Colonial Office, Foreign Office or Treasury, provision should be made for the attendance of representatives from those departments.

The duties of the sub-committee are briefly set forth in the minute addressed to the Prime Minister. They are numerous and of the first importance. The task of investigating our Imperial obligations in the light of the means available, and of drawing up recommendations in this respect with the object of securing efficiency and economy, is indeed one which is likely to absorb the full attention of this advisory body.

An attempt has been made to produce a definite solution of the problem, but it is not intended to imply by this that there is no other or better solution. Certain it is, however, that something on these lines requires to be carried into effect with the least possible delay, if we are to consolidate the British Commonwealth for future generations.

It has been pointed out earlier in this article that, in the writer's opinion, Great Britain does not stand on a sound and solid economic foundation. No country can be said to do so, whose population largely exceeds that which its land can sustain, and whose existence depends entirely on its purchase of raw materials and sale of manufactured products in foreign markets. The economic disturbance caused by the war must tend to throw such a country, artificially prosperous, back to a normal and more natural condition.

The Empire has almost entirely in the past derived its power

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from the prosperous and industrious centre, Great Britain; for the future the British Commonwealth of Nations will tend more and more to derive its power from the cohesion, co-operation, co-ordinated and concerted effort of the component parts. It is for this reason that the time is ripe to strengthen by every conceivable means the links of the Empire. We require "to introduce ordinances, constitutions and customs" so that we "may sow greatness" to our posterity and succession.

The links which normally bind the Empire together may be roughly stated in the following categories :—

1. Personal.
2. Patriotic.
3. Fiscal.
4. Defensive.

The first two of these are of a spiritual nature, the last two of a more material character. All are important and we cannot afford to neglect any opportunity of strengthening every connection, especially in these days when the line of least resistance appears to have so fatal an attraction for the politician.

The personal tie is likely to be fostered by increasing emigration from Great Britain in the near future, with the double advantage of strengthening the Dominions and reducing the population in our over-crowded homeland. But perhaps the greatest influence in personal connection is the influence of the Crown and, fortunately for us, this is particularly strong and likely to maintain its strength, as evidenced by the recent tours of the Prince of Wales.

We have had evidence on a grand scale of the power and vitality of British patriotism; but patriotism alone, unless it be established on some solid and advantageous foundation, cannot be altogether relied upon. Patriotism is the feeling of duty and affection towards the country to which one belongs, and duty is usually carried out more quickly and efficiently when stimulated by personal affection, material advantage or desire for protection.

Fiscal advantage in the sense of Imperial Protection is a subject in itself and does not concern us here, seeing that so many other problems of the highest importance are involved in this issue. Many pre-war ideas on the subject have changed, in view of the effects of the war, the trade dislocation and abnormal exchanges.

But it is the powerful link of mutual protection and the preservation of peace which requires to be strengthened by every conceivable means. Whether it be in the case of a handful of individuals or a

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collection of nations, the sense of protection has a wonderfully cohesive and binding effect. If the means of protection be inadequate, so will the cohesive power be proportionately less.

The problem of Imperial defence is not one of those troublesome questions which can be shelved until the crisis arrives. It is a constitutional matter of fundamental importance. We must no longer, in this connection, wander aimlessly on, feeling blindly for the line of least resistance. Disraeli, in a speech in the House of Commons, in January, 1846, aptly remarked: "A watcher of the atmosphere; a man who takes his observations, and when he finds the wind in a certain quarter, trims to suit it. Such a person may be a powerful minister, but he is no more a great statesman than the man who gets up behind a carriage is a great whip."

Great statesmanship and a long view are required for the future consolidation of the British Commonwealth. It is a regrettable fact, but nevertheless true, that it is almost impossible to find an opportunity in the House of Commons to debate these matters as a whole and at length; occasionally Army estimates are discussed when any matters connected with the Navy are ruled to be irrelevant and out of order, and vice versa; the problem of Mesopotamia may be debated, but one is not permitted to bring this into connection with India; the India Office vote may come before the House, but reference to the Near and Middle East is debarred. The work of Parliament is so much congested with domestic matters that affairs of Empire seldom find time for consideration and are the subject too frequently of departmental action or indefinite postponement. Some form of decentralization or devolution appears to be essential and urgent, if these affairs are to receive the attention which is due to them.

It will not be right to conclude an article on the defence of the British Empire without a reference to the League of Nations. It is too much to expect that the institution of the League will consequently involve the abolition of war. But it is not too much to hope that if the League receives a proper measure of support from all the nations concerned, it will act as a serious deterrent to war, curb the warlike ambitions of States and give breathing space for reflection and negotiation. The writer is in full agreement with the views expressed by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice in his article entitled "League of Nations and the Reduction of Armaments," which appeared in the October–November, 1920, issue of *To-day and To-morrow*, published for the League of Nations Union. The problem of establishments and armaments will doubtless be

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discussed by the League and its proceedings should be most carefully examined by an expert committee covering the whole range of Imperial defence. We shall be in a difficult position, inasmuch as we possess the most vulnerable and scattered territory and responsible task, and yet shall be expected to lead the way and to set the example both in securing peace and in reducing armaments. Whatever measures we take or advocate in this respect must be subjected to careful scrutiny by an advisory committee of experts from all parts of the British Commonwealth.

The present position is difficult and delicate, and one in which statesmanship and foresight are required. Responsibility lies with the statesmen of this generation to determine whether the Empire is to endure. Lord Beaconsfield stated in the House of Lords in April, 1878, " The Empire is no mean heritage " ; the responsibility lies with us in this critical period to see to it that " by introducing such ordinances, constitutions and customs " as may be necessary we may secure this heritage to our " posterity and succession."

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# MARSHAL FOCH

## 26TH OF MARCH TO THE 11TH OF NOVEMBER, 1918.

By COLONEL C. J. C. GRANT, D.S.O., Coldstream Guards.

"Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command."—*The Military Maxims of Napoleon.*

IT has been said in a famous passage, "Read no history, nothing but biography, for that is life without theory." If there is any truth in this assertion, a short sketch of Marshal Foch * and of the way the work was done at his headquarters in 1918 may be of some interest.

Although he was in his sixty-seventh year when he was given command of the Allied Armies, the Marshal displayed great physical strength and activity. His whole bearing was martial, and he gave the impression of being a man of relentless energy and determination.† In conversation he often employed gestures to emphasize his words; two blows in the air with his fists, followed by two kicks, used to show the fate which he reserved for his enemies. In any conversation of importance he began by saying, "De quoi s'agit-il?" and he had a way of sweeping away any difficulties metaphorically with his hands: in explaining his own views he used to say, "Ah si, Ah si," in a firm and persuasive manner, or, if he disagreed, "Ah non, Ah non," in a very decided way. He also had a way of putting both hands on the shoulders of the man with whom he was talking, especially if he were taller than himself, in a manner that was both appealing and convincing. His voice was deep and he spoke in short quick sentences, sometimes using rather colloquial language which at times made it difficult for a foreigner to understand him, but he used to add, "Vous comprenez bien?" and repeated his remarks, if he felt he had not been understood.

* Throughout this article Foch is referred to as Marshal although he was not actually given the baton until the 7th of August.

† The Marshal is a man of lower middle height, as judged by our British standard, and has a long body, a straight back and rather bowed legs. The face is remarkable with its long military moustache, high forehead and piercing eyes. The features are regular, the chin firm, the expression noble and in repose severe.



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He always thought a great deal before answering, but, when once his mind was made up, he seldom or never changed his opinion, unless a new point of view persuaded him.

His written style was his own and not always quite classic. His secretary once told the writer that the Marshal asked him to criticize a document which he had written, and, upon the latter saying timidly that some expression was not in perfect French, the Marshal replied: "Je m'en f——; je suis de l'Académie."

In his habits the Marshal was quiet and unassuming; he used to ride or walk alone, or accompanied by one officer, and he was never difficult to see or in any way unapproachable. His personal staff was small, one A.D.C., a secretary and at times a doctor. He was the model of punctuality and insisted on those of his staff who lived with him being in time for the two daily meals of luncheon and dinner. At meals the war was hardly ever discussed, or rather the military situation at the moment, for he used to talk about the earlier days of the war, and when British officers were present often used to ask questions about English life and English politics. Although the world of literature, art and politics interested him, it was impossible to live with him and hear him talk without being impressed with the single fixed idea in his mind—his confidence in his ability to beat the enemy in the field and to drive him out of France.

Marshal Foch always disliked a large staff, and was accustomed to work with a few officers who had served under his orders for some considerable time. He saw them frequently and used to go in and out of their offices quite informally, while they in their turn knew him so well that they understood at once his way of thinking and of working.

His Chief Staff Officer was General Weygand. He had been at a course for senior officers at the French Staff College, nicknamed the "Cour des elèves Maréschaux," but he was not a *p.s.c.* officer, and up to September, 1914, had never held a staff appointment. He was in command of a cavalry regiment at the beginning of the campaign, but when Marshal Foch was given command of the Ninth French Army, was sent by Marshal Joffre to be his Chief of the Staff. He is a little, active cavalryman, a consummate horseman, and a man of tireless energy. He has great military knowledge, an exact memory, and, in his work, is the most precise and business-like of human beings. During the time he was Chief of the Staff he was always at the service of the representatives of the Allied Armies attached to the Marshal's headquarters. He could always find time to see them and to hear their views and explanations. He showed

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tact, sympathy and good manners, although he was perfectly frank and open, and said precisely what he thought. He took a broad view of the situation, and was fond of saying " one must look at the whole front; it is only here that we see the situation as a whole." As a staff officer, he was, however, inclined to centralize everything in his own hands, more than is usual under our system. He was a model of loyalty to his master, and often said: " My opinion is as follows, and I have not yet discussed this with the Marshal," but he and the Marshal were always together, and their opinions seldom differed. Marshal Foch, when he was busy, used to say, " Talk to General Weygand—Weygand c'est moi—we spend all day motoring together and I hide nothing from him."

General Weygand's whole time was devoted to his duty: he never spared himself and he expected and, indeed, obtained the same high standard from his subordinates. A man of great originality of mind, with a fertile imagination and an active brain, it is impossible not to suppose that at times he may have suggested a plan of operation, but he never attributed any such thing to himself; he was as modest as his master. In private life he was a charming and agreeable companion; he was fond of outdoor life, adored horses and appreciated pictures, old furniture, etc. His one ambition, if, indeed, he had a personal ambition, was to hold a command during the war, and this, with the exception of a few weeks in 1914, was denied to him.

The Sub-Chief of the Staff was a Colonel, later Brigadier-General, Desticker. He had held an artillery command during the war and also various staff appointments. It was customary for him to remain at headquarters in the frequent absences of Marshal Foch and General Weygand. He always worked in the same room as General Weygand, next door to that of Marshal Foch. He was a recognized authority on artillery, while, from his close personal association with Marshal Foch and his Chief of the Staff, he was familiar with their ideas, so that, when necessary, he was able to give decisions in their absence. He was well-informed and his opinions were eminently sensible and clear. He had patience, good manners and consideration, and was thus able to understand the various difficulties which arose from time to time. He was easy to work with and helpful.

The remainder of the staff formed a happy family, and the officers were proud of looking upon themselves as " La famille Foch."

In French staffs, however well officers know each other, the same

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familiarity does not exist as exists among British officers and the distinctions of rank are strictly respected. In spite of this, however, the members of Marshal Foch's staff knew each other well and worked together loyally. They were capable and hard-working men wholly devoted to their master.

It was not until some months after March, 1918, that an Allied Administrative Staff was formed directly under the Marshal.

When he first received the command of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch was criticized for not having an adequate staff, and at the time it was thought that he should have at once assumed control of the arrangements for the movements of troops. There were, however, two great headquarter staffs already in being, and Marshal Foch was afraid that, if he formed an administrative staff at his headquarters, he might have confused the work in the middle of the defensive battle.*

Marshal Foch's own staff—the " famille Foch " which worked directly under his orders and invariably lived at his own headquarters —was in fact a small staff something on the lines of the staff which accompanied Sir Douglas Haig when he left his permanent headquarters in order to be nearer the front, and which was usually known as " advanced G.H.Q."

There were British, American, Belgian and Italian Missions attached to this staff, but Marshal Foch did not use the officers attached to these Missions as staff officers so far as the issue of orders was concerned. The duties of these officers were to give the Marshal exact information at any time as to the conditions of the armies they represented, to keep him in touch in every way with what went on, to act as intermediaries when required between the Marshal and their own Commanders-in-Chief, to represent, when necessary, their War Office, and generally to facilitate the daily work by every means in their power. Modern communications annihilate distance and the British Mission had, in addition to telegraph lines, telephones, motor cars and an aeroplane, a direct telephonic line to the C.I.G.S. in London.

The Marshal showed every courtesy and consideration to these Missions, received their senior officers at all times, and, as they obtained his confidence, made very considerable use of them. Their

* Later on a large administrative staff under a particularly able French staff officer, Colonel, subsequently Brigadier-General, Payot, with the title of *Direction Générale de Communications et de Ravitaillement des Armées*, was established. This was generally known as the D.G.C.R.A., and, as administrative staffs in all armies are supposed to make themselves comfortable, these letters were said by the more frivolous members of the general staff to mean " Diner gaiement et coucher royalament après."

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powers of usefulness naturally depended largely upon the support they received from the staffs of their own armies, and their position was not always an easy one. Even archangels in such a situation could not have succeeded in pleasing every one, and the charge which was sometimes made against the officers of the Missions by thoughtless people, that they failed on occasions to represent accurately the opinions of the armies from which they were sent, was a bitter one to endure.

Work at Marshal Foch's headquarters began at 8 a.m., by which hour he was always in his office, where he remained until late at night. If the pressure of work was not too great, the members of his staff used to take an hour's recreation in the course of the day, walking or riding, otherwise the officers worked all day without ceasing. There was no relaxation and the strain told upon some of them. There was no gossip and no conversation about future military events. Headquarters changed frequently, but, except for a short time at Beauvais in March and April, it was always situated in some quiet little village just off a main road.

The Marshal's room was next to General Weygand's office, where there was a large map on which the front was marked and all the dispositions of the Allies and of the Germans. There were curtains in front of this map, which could be drawn when any persons, however distinguished, who were not connected with the operations in progress visited the headquarters. Marshal Foch, who did not like to be too long alone, could often be seen standing in front of the map, smoking his British pipe to which he had taken in place of the light cigars which he smoked at one time.

As regards his orders, Marshal Foch had, to our ideas, a disconcerting way of sending them at times direct to the commander of a group of armies or even to army commanders, informing their superiors at the same time of what he had done. He often did this in order to save time, no small consideration on a front when one or other of the headquarters might be three or four hours' journey not only from his own headquarters but also the same distance from its own G.H.Q.

Every one no doubt remembers the military situation at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. It was fully realized by the Allied Governments that a serious German attack on the Western front was to be expected as soon as the weather permitted the resumption of hostilities on a large scale. The formation of an inter-Allied Reserve in the event of such an attack was under consideration, but there were difficulties when the actual distribution

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of Allied troops for this Reserve were discussed. Marshal Foch, in a recent interview with one of the correspondents of the *Matin*, published on the 8th of November, 1920, stated in the course of his remarks :

I remember a council of war which took place in London on the 14th of March, 1918. I had been appointed to command the mobile army (armée de manœuvre), which hardly existed. At this council I asked the British to help the formation of this army with their effectives. Marshal Haig declared to me in the name of the British Government, which was represented in particular by Mr. Lloyd George, that this was impossible. I wished to reply sharply. " Keep quiet," M. Clemenceau said vigorously, " I speak in the name of the French Government, and I declare that I accept Marshal Haig's reply." I said to myself, " Wait till to-morrow, I will say something," and the next day when the council was on the point of breaking up, I spoke, and this time was not interrupted. I declared that a formidable offensive was being prepared. I added, " I know what battles of allied armies mean—I have taken part in them on the Marne and in Italy. This is what the liaison should be : this is how we must understand each other : these are the precautions we must take, etc., etc. I tell you that nothing is ready to resist the offensive, and it may be a disaster." I succeeded in impressing them and a few days after, at Compiègne and at Doullens, they remembered me.

On the 21st of March the expected German attack was delivered and the British Fifth Army was driven back by the pressure of enormously superior forces. In the fighting which took place the Allied line was driven back to the neighbourhood of Montdidier and Amiens, that is to say, west of the lines of trenches held in 1915. The situation of the Allied Armies became critical, and it was evident that there was a grave danger of the separation of the French and British Armies.

In these circumstances Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed to London to ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to come to France. Lord Milner came over in place of Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Henry Wilson accompanied him. The latter went first of all to Paris, where he saw Marshal Foch late on the evening of the 25th of March. On the 26th a meeting took place at Doullens, at which Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Henry Wilson, Lord Milner, Marshal Foch, General Pétain, M. Poincaré, M. Clemenceau and M. Loucheur were present.

From a book * published in Paris by Mermeix, who was well informed, the following extracts of his account of the day are given.

M. Clemenceau has related several times to his friends the story of the historic scene at Doullens. It is one of these persons who has been

* " Fragments d'Histoire, 1914-1919. III. Le Commandement Unique Première Partie—Foch et les Armées d'Occident."

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good enough to give us this information. M. Clemenceau stated that the Conference began by examining the military situation: Sir Douglas Haig said, "The Germans are attacking Amiens from the south and from the north: to the south after the disaster of the Fifth Army I have no more troops: the duty of blocking the road on this side must fall upon our French Allies: as for us, in the northern sector, the enemy will not pass until we are dead: you can count on us: we are united in life and in death." Clemenceau continued: "I asked Pétain what he could do to guard the approaches of Amiens from the south. The General replied that he had twenty divisions available. Foch, to whom I turned, said that, with the forces of which General Pétain spoke, the battle could be won, so far as Amiens was concerned.

"After the military explanations of the Generals, Milner said to me: 'I wish to talk to you for a moment alone.' He pulled me into a corner of the mayor's office and without any preliminaries declared:

"'The British generals accept the command of General Foch.'

"'Is that a proposal of your Government?'

"'I will guarantee that the British Government will ratify what we decide. Are we agreed?'

"'We are. . . . But we must find a formula which will suit. I will go and see Foch. . . . Wait for me.'

"I called Foch. I told him the proposal, and I asked him to find the necessary formula to avoid hurting the feelings of Haig and Pétain.

"Foch after about half a minute's thought said: 'You can write this. . . .

"'By the decision of the Governments of Great Britain and of France, General Foch has been entrusted with co-ordinating on the Western front the operations of the French and British Armies, whose Commanders-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Haig and General Pétain, should give him all the information necessary for establishing such co-ordination.'

"I approved this formula. Foch scribbled it out and I went and read it to Lord Milner. He was satisfied with it, and showed it to Douglas Haig. A few minutes later he came back to me and said, 'Sir Douglas agrees.'

"In my turn, I spoke to General Pétain, to whom, I feared, the proposal would prove a disappointment. He showed no signs of this, agreed, proposing, however, that instead of the 'Front Occidental' we should put 'Front Ouest.' These two expressions meant the same thing.

"I did not think that the change would be advisable, as to introduce it into the formula, we should have had to begin the discussions again, and go into grammatical explanations.

"Every one agreed—we separated—Foch and the other generals went off in haste to their headquarters."

Marshal Foch * after receiving his new powers lost no time in taking action. Having obtained leave from Sir Douglas Haig to

* The writer is indebted to a series of articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, by M. Louis Madelin, which were published in 1919 under the title of "La Bataille de France," for much information with regard to Marshal Foch's movements at the end of March, 1918.

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visit the British Army Commanders, he went on the afternoon of the 26th to Dury, just south of Amiens, to see General Gough. He ordered him to hold on at any cost to the line La Neuville-les-Braye—Chuignolles—Rosières—Rouvroy-en-Santerre—Erches—Guerbigny, and told him that French troops were on their way to relieve his men. At Dury he also met the Chief of the Staff of the group of French Armies (the First and Third Armies) commanded by General Fayolle. He told this officer that, in order to ensure the safety of Amiens, General Fayolle's troops must hold at all costs the line then occupied by the British Fifth Army from Neuville-les-Braye to Rouvroy and Guerbigny, and must also support and relieve as soon as possible the British south of the Somme without, however, endangering the area south of Roye, which was to be defended foot by foot.

Marshal Foch then went to Paris and from there, on the 27th of March, sent a letter to General Pétain in which he explained that during his journey he had worked out the following ideas on the general situation :—

That not a yard of French soil was to be abandoned ; that the enemy must be stopped on his present line ; and that, with this object in view, a strong defensive front was to be organized rapidly with powerful mobile reserves in rear, the necessary troops being taken from the whole front. He then went on to say that until this had been done there could be no question of relieving the troops actually in the fighting line—that they must be organized so as to hold on at any cost and that General Pétain should issue an order to his men, who trusted him implicitly, explaining to them the situation and the obligations that it entailed upon them.

On the 28th of March he left Paris and went to Clermont, where he met General Humbert, the Commander of the Third French Army, and ordered him to hold at all costs the line which had been decided upon, the commander of each unit from the division to the company being responsible for carrying out his particular portion of the task. He added that there would be no reliefs until the front had been organized, a matter of several days. After an interview with General Fayolle also at Clermont, he reached Dury at midday, where he saw General Gough and then went on to Beauquesne to see General Byng, the Commander of the British Third Army.

The day following he again saw Pétain and Fayolle, M. Clemenceau, who promised to recall the staff of the French Tenth Army and some of the divisions in Italy, Pershing, who offered him the

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immediate support of his divisions, and Sir Douglas Haig at Abbeville, where it was decided to "stop the enemy from Arras to the Oise . . . to assemble behind the fighting troops reserves as soon as possible."

Meanwhile the Marshal's headquarters had been placed at Beauvais, where his tiny staff had established itself in two rooms of the Hôtel de Ville and where it remained for a few days.

On the 30th of March the Marshal issued general orders to co-ordinate the operations of the British and French Armies, in which he stated that the duty of the Allied Armies in the actual battle was above all to stop the enemy by maintaining a firm connection between the British and French Armies, in particular by holding on to and then by being able to make free use of Amiens.*

This result was to be obtained by—

1. The organization and maintenance of a defensive front on the actual positions occupied.
2. The assembly of strong mobile reserves in readiness to meet the hostile offensive or to take the offensive—north of Amiens for the British forces; north and north-west of Beauvais for the French forces. In order to form these mobile reserves, as strongly and as quickly as possible, reliefs were to be made resolutely on the parts of the fronts which were not being attacked.

On the 3rd of April he sent out further orders. In his opinion the enemy's advance had been checked from Arras to the Oise. On this front, however, the hostile offensive might be continued with ease north of the Somme, especially in the neighbourhood of Arras, on account of the railway facilities at the enemy's disposal, and less easily to the south as the railways were less numerous, in worse condition and partially within range of the Allied artillery. The Allied Armies, therefore, should expect an attack, perhaps on a large scale, north of the Somme, and a minor attack, or an attack at a later date, south of that river.

It was in the interests of the Allies to keep the enemy as far as possible from the St. Just—Amiens railway and from the railway junction at Amiens. The best means to ensure this would be for the French Armies to attack south of the Somme near Montdidier, and for the British Armies to attack astride the Somme from the Luce to the Ancre.

In this manner the two dominating ideas which had hitherto directed the operations would be preserved—*i.e.* the maintenance

* The most important road and railway centre in the north of France.

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of the connection between the French and the British Armies and the defence of Amiens—and from the shape of the front a serious check might be inflicted on the enemy. These two attacks would also be the best protection against the possible hostile attack north of the Somme.

The attack north of the Somme should be in an easterly direction, and that near Montdidier should be designed to drive the enemy on the Oise to the east and should then be pushed north in the direction of Roye. Both these attacks should be made at the same time, and both Commanders-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig and General Pétain, were asked to state when they could carry them out. The front from Albert to Arras was to be held for the moment on the defensive. At the same time Marshal Foch requested General Pétain to maintain a strong French reserve north of Beauvais, and to be ready to send this reserve to the north in the event of a very powerful German attack north of the Somme. It is interesting to see how early in this campaign the Marshal endeavoured to attack; a passive defence he did not understand or intend. He often used to say at this time, "jamais céder du terrain," "pas de relève pendant la bataille," "on fait ce que l'on peut." He was faithful to his own writings—"Si vous voulez faire *reculer* l'adversaire, battez-le; sans cela rien n'est fait et pour cela un seul moyen: la *bataille: pas de victoire sans bataille*" *—these were the dominating ideas of the whole campaign from March till November.

On the 6th of April Foch ordered a French reserve of a cavalry corps and four infantry divisions to be established west of Amiens in the area Conty—Poix and north of these places. But the great attack of Ludendorff against Amiens was dying out, and by the end of the first week in April it had failed.

Meanwhile, on the 7th, 8th and 9th of April, the Marshal met Sir Douglas Haig at various places to discuss the situation; he also saw General Maistre, who had arrived in hot haste from Italy with the staff of the Tenth French Army. His chief preoccupation at this time was the maintenance of the connection between the French left and the British right, and the arrangements necessary in the event of a heavy German attack against Arras, an attack which he thought probable in the near future.

On the evening of the 9th, however, the Germans launched a heavy attack in the valley of the Lys; and the hope that the British Fourth Army could take part in any counter-attacks on the Somme had to be abandoned. French reserves were sent

* *See* "Principes de la Guerre," Quatrième édition, 1917, p. 33.

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north, and the Marshal did everything within his power to help the British Second Army in its trial. It was during this battle, on the 14th of April, that M. Clemenceau informed him that, in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George, he had been given the title of General-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. By the 21st of April, a detachment of the French Armies under General De Mitry—five infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions—had arrived in Flanders, and the Belgian Army had taken over rather more than the front of one division. Marshal Foch, on the 19th of April, referred to the grave situation in a general order, of which the first few lines ran: "On the Franco-British front no ground can be given up, whether it is a question of blocking the road to Calais, protecting the mining areas, the railway junction of Amiens, or the Paris—Amiens line. In consequence, the defence foot by foot of the territory is to be realized. This defence must be founded upon defensive organizations, repeated again and again, and on the establishment on the spot of a numerous and powerful artillery. It must be conducted with the highest energy." And he ended his order, which elaborated all the precautions which should be taken, by stating that detailed counter-attacks must be prepared and that every detail must be made known to the troops who would have to carry them out.

On the 20th of April, Marshal Foch believed that what he called the Kemmel-Hazebrouck battle was over, but he still expected a powerful German attack at Arras and thought that Ypres was in danger; on the 25th, however, Kemmel Hill, which was at that time on a part of the front held by the D.A.N.,* was lost after heavy fighting.

It can be imagined that a complicated situation had been produced by the German attacks on the Lys. Apart from the direct threat against the Channel Ports and the exhausted state of the British Armies after the continuous fighting since the 21st of March, the road and railway communications in the North of France and in Flanders are limited: no less than three different nationalities were actively engaged—French, British and Belgian—on or near the front which had been attacked. In addition to the difficulties of co-ordinating the efforts of the troops actually engaged and of deciding such questions as the possibility of inundating part of Flanders, all of which necessitated frequent personal interviews and the issue of detailed orders, the Marshal was also engaged in the anxious task of trying to increase the number of fresh Allied

* "Détachement des Armées du Nord," commanded by General De Mitry.



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divisions in reserve. He considered that the best manner to effect this was to call upon the British Armies to send down some of the tired divisions to hold the line on a quiet part of the French front, and thus enable French divisions, which had not been actively engaged in the 1918 fighting, to be sent up as reserves behind the battle front.

A strong current of opinion in British circles was opposed to this proposal, and many persons would have preferred the British line to be shortened and the divisions thus brought into reserve kept in the British zone. Some high French authorities also favoured this plan—to put it bluntly, they were in favour of letting the British Armies stew in their own juice, and fight out their own battle—but, although there was much to be said for the maintenance of the troops of each Allied Army in their own area, Marshal Foch was very averse to this, maintaining that it was to play the enemy's game to keep tired reserves behind a battle front. In the end he got his way, and the British IX. Corps with four divisions were sent down to the Sixth French Army front north-west of Rheims, early in May, to take the place of some French divisions which were moved up in reserve behind Amiens.

The battle of the Lys gradually died away and, during the lull in the fighting, Marshal Foch studied very closely the question of the British strength, so much depleted by the serious casualties since March. It should be remembered that, after the 1917 campaign, reinforcements to replace the losses were not available, and it had been found necessary to reduce the strength of British infantry brigades from four to three battalions in the opening months of 1918. There were two schools of thought as to the means of replacing the 1918 losses—the first advocated the reduction of the number of divisions and the maintenance of a smaller number with their ranks filled up, the second urged that at all costs the number of divisions should be maintained, even with depleted ranks and with those ranks partially filled with older men. The arguments for or against either of these opinions are well known to military students, and their enumeration would take up too much space in this article; it is enough to state that Marshal Foch was an ardent advocate of the maintenance of the number of divisions and his opinion was loyally adopted.

At the end of April and beginning of May, the "great defensive battles of the Somme and the Lys" had come to a successful termination. The enemy, however, who still was estimated to have seventy-five divisions in reserve on the Western front, retained

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the initiative, and the resources of the Allies had been stretched to the utmost.

Marshal Foch, in spite of the exhaustion of the Allied Armies and their numerical inferiority, was still determined to defend by attacking, and his orders at this time contain many references to the counter-attacks he intended to carry out. On the French front he still made preparations for an attack south of the Somme with the First and Third French Armies, so as to clear the country round Montdidier and then push on with the object of improving the situation east of Amiens by cutting the enemies' communications south of the Somme. He hoped that the British Fourth Army could take part in this operation, and he also asked Sir Douglas Haig on his front to study a minor attack from Festubert—Robecq in the direction of Estaires and Merville, so as to bring the hostile communications at Estaires under artillery fire: this attack he believed would hinder, if not stop entirely, any further attack against Bailleul——Ypres. These proposed attacks were prevented by the Germans, who resumed the offensive at the end of May on another part of the front. It had indeed been the opinion of the British General Staff in France: "that before the resumption of the enemy's main offensive on the Arras—Amiens—Montdidier front the attack on our northern flank in Flanders would be followed by a similar attack on the southern flank of the Allied Armies."

It appears from Ludendorff's writings that he believed the British reserves and a great part of the French reserves had been absorbed by the fighting in Flanders, and in consequence he had planned two attacks on the southern flank. The German moral, shaken by the failure in March and April, was failing, and he did not dare remain on the defensive. The two attacks which he decided to make were—one west of the Oise in the direction of Compiégne, and the other on the front Rheims—Soissons—although he had not sufficient artillery to support both these attacks at the same time. He hoped to resume at a later date the attacks in Flanders.

The Germans on quiet parts of the front, that is, from Rheims to the Swiss frontier, were able to hold the trenches lightly and, in consequence, to withdraw a considerable number of divisions into reserve to be trained, but on the remainder of their front, the ceaseless activity of the Allied Armies, in trench raids, minor attacks, bombardments, etc., kept them in a constant state of apprehension, compelled them to hold their trenches in force and prevented their reserves from being trained.

Marshal Foch was aware of the probability of the German

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attacks being resumed in May, either on the British or on the French front, but, whether he considered that the attack on the French front was the least advantageous for the Germans and in consequence the least probable of the two, or whether he thought that, his reserves being limited, the reserves actually at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig or of General Pétain ought to be sufficient to bear the first brunt of an attack, cannot be said. In any case the Germans attacked the Sixth French Army on a thirty-five mile front north-west of Rheims with twenty-eight divisions,* and the result of their attack was that they reached the Marne.†

The second German attack, which was delivered on the 7th of June, west of the Oise failed, as the French commanders, having certain knowledge of its approach, had made every preparation to meet it and delivered a successful counter-attack in the course of the battle.

In spite of the German successes on the French front, the Marshal fully appreciated at the beginning of June the possibility of another German attack in Flanders under the command of the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, which would necessitate sending the Allied reserves to the north. On the 9th of June he wrote to General Pétain and pointed out that he had asked Sir Douglas Haig to put two divisions south of the Somme in order to protect the vital point, the junction of the French and British Armies and to enable General Pétain to assemble in security the bulk of his reserves behind the First French Army.

On the 12th of June he sent a long letter to General Diaz, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, in which he explained that the best way the Italian Armies could help the Allies in France was to attack, that the "energetic action of an army well trained and with a high moral would support powerfully the troops on the Franco-British front in the severe battle which they have carried on for more than two months."

On the 13th of June he wrote to Sir Douglas Haig and to General Pétain to the effect that the British front might be attacked and he

* The tired British divisions, which had been sent down to this part of the line, were holding part of this front. They behaved with the utmost gallantry and suffered heavy losses. A very fine tribute was paid to them by General Maistre, under whose orders they were:—"They have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves. This none of the French who witnessed it will ever forget." *See* "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," 1st edit., p. 254.

† It was this victory that led to the big salient in the German line—Rheims—Château Thierry—Soissons—the salient which subsequently brought about the enemy's undoing.

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asked that both Commanders might be ready to use their reserves wherever an attack would take place—north of the Oise, between the Oise and the Marne, or east of Rheims. On the 16th of June he wrote a long memorandum giving his ideas on the system to be adopted in the defence and on the same day, for a passive defence was far from his thoughts, he wrote to General Pétain to explain that, if Soissons could be brought under the fire of the French guns, a German offensive towards Château Thierry would be much weakened; he thought that an advance on the Dommiers Plateau would bring about this result and asked General Pétain, if he agreed, to make preparations accordingly. On the 19th of June he promised to send back to the British zone the divisions which had been fighting on the Chemin des Dames and asked Sir Douglas Haig to relieve the front of the D.A.N. and to send back the French divisions which had been fighting in Flanders. A few days later, on the 27th of June, he informed General Pétain that the time had come to study an offensive and expressed the hope that twelve American, ten French and seven or eight British divisions could be got ready for this purpose within two months. The same day he wrote again to General Diaz and gave his ideas at great length on the advisability of an Italian attack on the Asiago Plateau.

On the 1st of July * he sent out a long paper pointing out that the two most dangerous directions for the next hostile attack were against Abbeville or against Paris; that, if the Germans intended to make such an attack, it must be from Château Thierry to Lens, and that, in consequence, he wished the strongest possible reserves in each of the great armies assembled so as to be ready to support whichever army was attacked. On the 3rd of July he foresaw definitely a German attack from the Argonne to Rheims, but he had no intention of accepting this attack without counter-attacking, and so in the greatest secrecy he prepared an attack between Château Thierry and Soissons.

* At this period the strength of the belligerents in France was:—

| Allied Divisions: | Line. | Reserve. |
|---|---|---|
| French | 75 | 28 |
| British | 34 | 20 |
| Belgian | 8 | 4 |
| United States | 6 | 9 |
| Italian | 2 | |
| | 125 | 61 |
| German Divisions (estimated): | 129 | 76 |

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On the 13th of July he called upon Sir Douglas Haig to send down four divisions to be in reserve on the right of the threatened German attack, and asked him, if necessary, also to be ready to send down four more, and finally, on the 14th of July, he sent out his orders to General Pétain in which he explained his ideas on the coming battle.

He divided this battle into two parts, the defensive and the offensive. His intention in the defensive battle was to stop the enemy's advance with the divisions which were already in the line or in close reserve, with the three divisions in general reserve which were north-east of Paris and with the British divisions already mentioned.

The counter-attack was to be delivered by the Sixth and Tenth French Armies: this attack, for which General Pétain had been making arrangements, was to be made between the Marne and the Aisne. The Marshal believed this counter-attack to be the best means of defence, that it might bring to nothing the German attack east of Rheims, and thus enable all the reserves near Château Thierry to be used for the defence. He ordered the arrangements for this attack * to be prepared in every detail, so that it could be made when desired.

During the first fortnight in July the Marshal became more and more certain that the German attack would be launched against the French and not against the British front. Reference has already been made to his opinions at the beginning of the month. He had pointed out in his memorandum of the 1st of July that a hostile advance of twenty-five miles towards Abbéville would cut the line of communications with the north of France and separate the British Armies from the French—a military event of importance for the result of the war—and later on in the same memorandum he had stated that, above all, Paris—Abbéville must be protected. Without discussing any diversions which were possible, in view of the fact that the enemy's front was so organized as to permit of his attacking anywhere from Ypres to Verdun, he had arrived at the conclusion that the hostile attacks against Paris or Abbéville must be made on the front Château Thierry—Lens. But as the days passed, all the available information convinced him that the attack would be made against the French front, and it was accordingly against this attack that he made his dispositions. Among the most valuable reports which influenced this decision

* It should perhaps be added that according to the calculations made, the divisions for this counter-attack could be moved up from reserve to the point of attack in four days.

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were those of the Royal Air Force. Their long-distance reconnaissance patrols by night showed the steady and regular progress of bivouac fires which appeared stage by stage, every night farther south, on the Argonne—Rheims front, thus indicating the movement of large bodies of troops towards that area from the north. Useful information was also supplied by General Mangin, who commanded the Tenth French Army on the front between Château Thierry and Soissons; his troops carried out some small attacks to improve their positions and captured prisoners whose identifications tended to show that the bulk of the German reserves were training for a serious offensive.

On the eve of the final German offensive, therefore, the situation of the Allies was very different to that in the third week in March. Marshal Foch was ready for the enemy, ready, not only to withstand the assault, but also, in spite of the numerical inferiority of the Allies, to make a counter-attack which had been prepared in profound secrecy and under his own personal supervision.

At 8 p.m. on the 14th of July, a raid was carried out by some troops of General Gouraud's Army which held the front east of Rheims. Twenty-seven prisoners were taken and, from the information obtained from them, it became certain that the German attack was about to take place, the bombardment to begin at midnight and the infantry attack between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. This information reached General Gouraud at 10 p.m. He immediately gave orders for the counter-preparation of his artillery. At 11 p.m. the same evening, G.H.Q. telephoned to the British Mission attached to Marshal Foch to say that the attack was still expected on the British front.*

On the same day, in the morning, Marshal Foch had said that he was anxious to see Sir Douglas Haig on the 15th at Mouchy-le-Chatel, half way between Montreuil and his headquarters and three hours' journey in a motor car from each of these places. But later in the day it was thought difficult for this meeting to take place if the threatened German attack took place. At 8 a.m., however, on the 15th, General Weygand telephoned to the British Mission that the attack had taken place exactly on the expected front, that east of Rheims all had gone well, that west of Rheims the enemy had gained a little ground and that the Marshal was leaving at 9 a.m. for Mouchy.

* The writer mentions this, not by way of criticism, but to show how difficult it was for any subordinate staff, however important, to judge correctly the situation on the whole front.

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General Gouraud, east of Rheims, had withdrawn his troops from the forward system of defence before the attack began, leaving only some machine-gun detachments with orders to defend their positions as long as possible, and then to make their way back as best they could. In particular the high ground east of Rheims, known as the "Monts," from where the whole of the plain east of Rheims could be observed, had been abandoned. This stratagem proved successful, and as the German columns advanced, confident of victory, they were caught by the fire of the French artillery, which had been strongly reinforced, and swept away. West of Rheims, however, the attack made a pocket in the line south of the Marne ten miles broad and two and a half miles deep.

It is not possible in this article to go into the details of this battle, but the movements of Marshal Foch on the 15th will give some idea of his conception of his duties on that day.

Fearing nothing from the loss of the ground west of Rheims, which indeed was all to his advantage if he could make his counter-attack, he started at 9 a.m. from Bombon, near Melun, on his long motor drive to Mouchy; he arrived there a little before 12 noon, and, finding he had half an hour to spare, he went to see General Fayolle, commanding the group of French Armies which included the Tenth Army, and whose headquarters were at Noailles. On arriving there he asked how the preparations for the counter-attack were going on. He was told that, in view of the general situation and of the success of the German attack west of Rheims, General Fayolle had made arrangements to send, if required, his reserves to support the front of attack. Marshal Foch gave orders that the movements for the counter-attack were to be carried out with all possible speed and, on returning to Mouchy, sent a message to General Pétain who was at Provins that, unless a new situation arose, there could be no question of delaying, still less of stopping, the arrangements for General Mangin's attack, but that, in the event of urgent and absolute necessity, General Pétain might take from the troops allotted for the counter-attack such troops as were absolutely indispensable to him in the emergency. In such an event Pétain was to inform the Marshal at once.

The Marshal himself thought that the enemy was already beaten and his opinion was confirmed when the French counter-attack took place on the 18th, the attacking armies being the Tenth Army commanded by General Mangin, the Sixth Army commanded by General Degoutte, the Ninth Army commanded by General de Mitry, which attacked from the south of the Marne, and the Fifth

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Army commanded by General Berthelot, which attacked from the eastern face of the German salient.

The surprise of the Germans was complete. Ludendorff had estimated that his own attacks would have drawn in all the French reserves towards the Marne and Chalons. He had consequently paid little attention to some slight indications of a French attack on the Soissons—Château Thierry front, and had only left nine divisions in front of General Mangin. The fighting was heavy, and notably for the four divisions of the British XXII. Corps, two of which fought under General Mangin and two under General Berthelot.

None the less, a victory was gained which forced the enemy to retreat to the Aisne and the Vesle by the end of July, and to abandon for ever the attack in Flanders which had been intended in the event of success on the Marne and of which the possibility had been correctly foreseen by our General Headquarters. The German losses were heavy and Ludendorff was faced with the very thing he had feared so much, the defensive on a colossal scale. The immediate result of the battle, which is known to the French as the second battle of the Marne, was the capture of 30,000 prisoners, 800 guns, 6000 machine guns, in addition to shortening the Allied front by 30 miles, freeing the main line from Paris to Chalons and putting an end to any threat against Paris, apart from the fact that the initiative passed definitely to the Allies.*

On the 24th of July a meeting between Sir Douglas Haig, General Petain, General Pershing and Marshal Foch took place at the Marshal's headquarters.

It was now evident to the Marshal that again the moment had come to "take decisions, to face responsibilities, to enter upon sacrifices . . . the initiative must be secured and the offensive launched . . ." and at the meeting he read a memorandum of which the following is a summary :—

The German offensive after being brought to a standstill had been turned into a defeat, the results of which would extend beyond the actual field of battle. At the moment, although the Allies had not an actual superiority in divisions, they were at least equal to the enemy in the number of battalions and the number of combatants.

* These great results were achieved at a time when the Allies were in a marked numerical inferiority to the Germans. On the 19th of July there were one hundred and forty-four Allied divisions in the line and forty-six in reserve, whilst it was estimated that the enemy had one hundred and forty-five divisions in the line and sixty in reserve, possibly too favourable an estimate.

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For the first time they had more divisions in reserve,* and, as the Germans must relieve a number of tired divisions from the line, the Allies would soon have a superiority in fresh divisions.

All information tended to prove that the enemy had been forced to form two armies, one to hold the line and one for attack. The latter had been much shaken. The Allies were in an undoubted superiority in tanks, aeroplanes and artillery. 250,000 Americans were landing every month. The Allies knew the difficulty which the enemy found in filling up his divisions, and, in addition, they had a moral superiority due to the fact that the enemy had failed while the Allied attacks had been victorious. The moment had, therefore, come to abandon the general defensive attitude imposed up to that time by the numerical inferiority of the Allies, and to pass to the offensive.

Without seeking for a decision this offensive might produce useful results, provided that the military operations were made in such a way as to strike a series of rapid blows against the enemy—their extent being limited by the reduced numbers of the Allied Armies after four months of battle. The series of operations in view would be :

1. Operations to clear the railways necessary for the future movements of the Allied Armies.
   (*a*) To clear the Paris—Metz railway on the Marne.
   (*b*) To clear the Paris—Amiens railway.
   (*c*) To clear the Paris—Metz railway near St. Mihiel.
2. Operations with the object of driving the enemy from the mines in the north of France and from the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais.

Marshal Foch then described the proposed operations in some detail and explained that it could not be then foreseen how far they would lead the Allies, but that, if the objectives were gained before the season was too far advanced, they could anticipate an important offensive at the end of the summer or in the autumn. The enemy might be forced to shorten his front by successive retirements, and each Commander-in-Chief should, therefore, study where the enemy might retire, should watch him for any sign of such retirement and should be ready to carry out any operations necessary to prevent him from retiring at leisure.

A fortnight later the Marshal wrote a letter to General Diaz, in which he showed that the plans of the Central Empires had failed ;

* 24th of July—Allied divisions in reserve .. .. 58
German „ „ .. .. 43 (estimated).

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that the Allies must attack with redoubled energy in order to prevent the German and Austrian Higher Command from restoring the moral of their troops or from attempting another military plan; that the Allied Armies in France, though much reduced in strength by their losses, and in the case of the Americans, with an organization not yet complete, were to continue their attacks without delay; and that an Italian offensive would greatly assist the Allied cause.

Early in August the great Allied offensive which was to end with the total defeat of the Germans in a battle lasting nearly one hundred days, began with an attack delivered by the British Fourth Army and the First French Army, which had been placed by the Marshal under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig. In the first phase of these operations, known in our Despatches as the battles of Amiens, Bapaume and the Scarpe, which lasted nearly one month, the German Armies received a blow from which they failed to recover. Ludendorff has called the 8th of August "the black day" of the German Army and considers that the defection of Bulgaria and the general discouragement of Germany's allies were directly due to it. In Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches there is one eloquent passage which states that "our troops felt that at last their opportunity had come . . . and that they could now press forward resolutely to reap the reward of their patient, dauntless and successful defence in March and April." *

As attack followed attack, on successive parts of the German line, the local reserves of the Germans were hurried in despair from one part of the front to the other, and the enemy's resistance soon became weaker—in a short time Paris was safe, Amiens and the railway to the north available, the line of the Lys and Kemmel abandoned without fighting—hundreds of guns taken and thousands of prisoners captured—such were a few of the immediate results of these engagements.

Thus two of the three objectives which had been decided upon by the Marshal on the 24th of July had been obtained, while between the 15th of July and the 15th of August, 128,000 prisoners, more than 2000 guns and over 13,000 machine guns had been captured.

At the beginning of September, as this phase of the operations was drawing to a close, a senior member of Marshal Foch's staff told the writer that in his opinion the enemy was now for the first time showing definite signs of weakness. After four years the truth, which the German Higher Command had been endeavouring to conceal, was now being revealed to the troops, with the result that

* *See* "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," 1st edit., p. 264.

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their moral was visibly failing, but no one, not even the Marshal himself, had foreseen the stupendous effects which were to result from the fighting that began on the 8th of August, and the successive attacks of the British Armies had been the admiration of the Marshal's staff.

The second phase of the battle was now to begin. On the 3rd of September the Marshal issued general orders outlining the plan upon which the fighting was to be developed.

The Allied attacks from the Aisne to the Scarpe were developing successfully and driving the enemy back on the whole of this front. In order to carry forward the offensive and to increase the pressure upon the enemy, it was necessary without delay to make use of the whole forces of the Allies in converging directions and on the most favourable parts of the front.

With these objects in view, while—

(*a*) the British Armies, supported on their right by the left of the French Armies, attacked in the direction of St. Quentin—Cambrai; and

(*b*) the centre of the French Armies continued to drive the enemy back beyond the Aisne and the Aislette,

the American Armies were to carry out forthwith the following operations:—


1. The offensive already arranged in the Wœuvre as far as the line Vigneulles—Thiacourt—Règneville, which, if successful, would clear the Paris—Metz railway.
2. As strong and violent an attack as possible in the direction of Mezières, with their right protected by the Meuse and their left supported by an attack of the Fourth French Army.

These two attacks were to take place on the 10th and 25th of September.

Marshal Foch attributed particular importance to the second of these attacks—as that against the St. Mihiel salient in the Wœuvre would, in the actual state of affairs, be a limited operation which could lead nowhere and which could give no great results, while there were also signs that the Germans in the failing state of their armies meant to economize troops by evacuating the salient without fighting, in which case the American attack would be a blow in the air.

Having given his orders for the front from the Scarpe to St. Mihiel, the Marshal then turned his attention to the left of the line—to Flanders—where already there had been so much severe fighting,

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sometimes on the defensive for the protection of the Channel Ports and the left flank of the Allies, sometimes on the offensive with the hope of turning the German flank. On the 9th of September accordingly he met King Albert at La Panne. He had prepared a memorandum on the 8th of September, which was discussed at this meeting. His ideas were—by taking advantage of the exhaustion of the enemy and of the fact that the fighting in France had drawn there the bulk of the hostile forces—to defeat the Germans in Belgium and to reconquer the country north of the Lys.

He proposed to effect his purpose, first, by breaking the hostile resistance and gaining a starting point—the Clercken ridge—Houthulst Forest—the Paaschendaele ridge—the high ground at Gheluvelt and the line Zandwoorde—Comines—and then by marching as quickly as possible on Bruges. He would thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast and, by pushing forward to the Lys from Comines towards Ghent, he counted upon checking any German reinforcements which might come from the south.

He decided that this offensive, which was to be carried out by a British, French and Belgian group of Armies, under the command of the King of the Belgians, should begin between the 20th and 25th of September.

He had also on the 8th of September sent out instructions to Sir Douglas Haig, calling upon the British Armies to undertake perhaps the hardest task he had yet asked them to perform, the attack on the " principal line of resistance of the enemy," that is to say, on the famous Hindenberg line, which had already been crossed for a short time in the battle of Cambrai in 1917.

The above summaries of Marshal Foch's orders will show how he himself conceived the plans for the second phase of the operations. It is perhaps needless to say that he did not confine his activities to issuing orders : in all these cases he saw personally the principal commanders who were to be engaged and told them exactly what he hoped to do. These conferences needed a ceaseless activity on his part and involved long and tiring journeys in a motor car, though he sometimes saved time by travelling at night in his train.

The second phase of the battle began on the 12th of September with an attack on the St. Mihiel salient by the Americans, who by this time had organized their forces into two armies. The enemy had already begun to evacuate the salient and had taken away most of his guns ; for once, too, his infantry, which included two Austrian divisions, did not fight well. The attack, which was supported by some French troops, succeeded completely, and the Americans

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suffered insignificant casualties. One of the French attacking divisions which co-operated in the engagement only had about 40 casualties and took about 3000 German and Austrian prisoners.

The great defensive system of the Germans no longer proved any obstacle to the Allies, and the enemy's trenches no longer prevented surprise or the concentration of superior numbers at the decisive point.* The Marshal was proving the efficiency of his own policy as set out in his "Principes de la Guerre": First stop the enemy and then attack him, not necessarily everywhere, for in the strongest dykes there are weak places where the sea may come in and flood the land behind.

It was at about this date that the Marshal made some interesting observations with regard to the German attack which began on the 21st of March. He thought that the attack had failed from want of judgment on the part of the German G.H.Q. In March and April the attacks should have been continued against the British and French Armies at their point of junction, or, at any rate, against the British Armies. These Armies were becoming exhausted by the heavy fighting and a German success would have separated the Allies, a separation which would have been almost irreparable. If Abbeville had fallen, and this had been within the bounds of possibility, it was difficult to say what could have been done. But the German Command had made their attacks divergent and had been lured away by the successes on the Chemin des Dames and at Armentières, the success of one battle bearing no relation to the success of the other. On the other hand, he himself when he attacked had done so in convergent directions, with the results that are known.

A little later, when discussing the coming operations, he expressed great confidence in the results; he thought that it would be sufficient for one of these attacks to succeed to produce results which might be incalculable. "The battle begins on one part of the front and the enemy is compelled to send there all his available reserves—hardly has this been done when it begins again elsewhere, and then again in a third place. The situation of the enemy is

* In his introduction to "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," Marshal Foch has expressed a generous appreciation of the British share in the Allied triumph. "Never at any time in history has the British Army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive lasting 116 days, from the 18th of July to the 11th of November. The victory gained was indeed complete, thanks to the excellence of the Commanders of Armies, Corps and Divisions, thanks, above all, to the unselfishness, to the wise, loyal and energetic policy of their Commander-in-Chief, who made easy a great combination, and sanctioned a prolonged and gigantic effort." *See* "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches," 1st edition, Introduction by Marshal Foch, p. xiii.

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infernal." He explained that he himself was fighting the battle of the Marne again, but under much more favourable conditions.

His staff thought that the Americans might succeed, not much for the moment was to be expected from Champagne, in Flanders there would be little opposition, but above all it was certain the British attacks would be victorious.

On the 4th of October General Weygand thought that the critical stage of the battle had arrived and that very great results might be expected if the Allies could maintain their efforts for the next few days.

Everything showed that the enemy was in a state of great confusion and difficulty, and might be nearer the breaking point than was generally supposed, while it was certain that Marshal Foch intended to continue his efforts without relaxation as long as his resources and the weather allowed.

On the 10th of October the Marshal issued a general order in which he summed up the situation in a few words. There were three convergent attacks in progress : (1) in Belgium ; (2) Solesmes—Wassigny ; (3) Aisne—Meuse. The second attack afforded the best chance of exploitation owing to the successes of the British Armies. This offensive would be continued, therefore, towards Mons—Avesnes, as well as—

(*a*) An operation, to be carried out by the British troops in combination with the Belgian attack, in a north-east direction between the Scheldt and the Sambre, so as to clear the Lille area.

(*b*) An operation, to be carried out by the First French Army, in combination with the Aisne—Meuse offensive to outflank the line of the Serre.

On the 19th of October the Marshal issued another general order giving the line of action for the Allied Armies. The group of Armies in Flanders was to march towards Brussels ; the British First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies south of the line Pecq—Lessines—Hal, with their right on Agimont (north of Givet), were to drive the enemy into the Ardennes and at the same time to help the advance of the Armies in Flanders ; the First, Tenth, Fifth and Fourth French Armies and the First American Army were to support the British attack on the left, in the direction Capelle—Chimay—Givet, to outflank the enemy on the line Serre—Sissonne, to reach the area Mezieres—Sedan and the Upper Meuse and to turn the line of the Aisne by working on the left in the direction Chaumont—Porcien and on the right towards Buzancy—Le Chesne.

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As the battle proceeded the objectives assigned to the Allied troops were not always reached. The continuous strain told on men and horses; the difficulties of roads, railways and supply increased, and in many parts of the front the enemy fought with the energy of despair. But if one turns to the statements of the Germans themselves in October, it is clear that, as Marshal Foch thought, their situation was "infernal." It was at this time that Marshal Foch's staff considered that the enemy was on the point of a military collapse, and that this might be expected within the next few weeks.

Little more remains to be written. Up to the last days before the Armistice the Allied Armies continued to gain victories in spite of their exhaustion and their difficulties, and up to the very last the Marshal urged on his troops with all his energy and power. His last general order during the war runs as follows :—

9th of November. "The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, is giving ground on all the front. It is necessary to keep up and to quicken our action. I call upon the energy and initiative of the commanders-in-chief and of their armies to render decisive the results which have been obtained."

Had the Armistice not been signed on the 11th of November, the Marshal was ready to launch on the 13th another great attack with twenty French and six American divisions between Metz and Strasbourg—an attack which, to quote his own words, had been prepared "dans le plus grand mystère, dans le plus grand silence."

He told the writer that if this attack had taken place, the last line of the German communications would have been cut and the German Army would have suffered perhaps the greatest defeat in history, but he continued: "after all, they signed everything on the 11th of November."

The writer has endeavoured to give a slight account of Marshal Foch's activities from March to November, 1918. The space at his disposal, apart from any other reasons, has prevented him from quoting anything more than the barest outlines of the orders issued during that campaign, or from giving any idea of that "infinite capacity for taking pains" which characterized in so marked a degree the work of the Marshal and his staff.

The Marshal received his command at a moment when the battle appeared lost and assumed a responsibility which could not have been more heavy. Although it had been said of him in 1917 that he was ill and tired, he carried on that battle until the enemy lay beaten at his feet without being away one single hour from his

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work, without relaxing his energy and his activity for one single moment.

There is a homely saying, "Practise what you preach," and the military student who turns to the books of Marshal Foch *—written, it must be remembered, many years ago—will find in them his conception of the Principles of War, and cannot fail to be impressed by the consistent way in which the Marshal in 1918 acted upon the rules which he had so consistently preached.

His faith, indeed, in the correctness of the conclusions he had arrived at, enabled him, it is believed, to endure the burden of his Command.

In a passage † in one of his books it is stated, "No victory is possible unless the Commander be energetic, eager for responsibilities and bold undertakings, unless he possess and can impart to all the resolute will of seeing the thing through, unless he be capable of exerting a personal action composed of Will, Judgment and Freedom of mind."

The reader can decide for himself how far the author of this passage has attained his ideal.

* Marshal Foch was formerly a Professor at the French Ecole de Guerre, and Commandant at that institution in 1907. His books are based on the lectures he gave to the students.

† "The Principles of War," Marshal Foch, translated by Hilaire Belloc, 1918, p. 290.



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# MACHINE-GUN TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION

By Major R. M. Wright, M.C., late Guards Machine-Gun Regiment.

## I. Defence.

In any attempt to deal with the developments made in machine-gun tactics and organization during the war, many of the statements made must be matters of opinion; they cannot all be historical facts. The writer believes that the opinions expressed in this article were held by many machine-gun officers who thought the matter out, but he can only vouch for them as being his own. These opinions are based upon the experience of the machine gunners of the Guards Division, and, as far as space has allowed, have been illustrated by definite incidents. To deal fully with the subject it would be necessary to consider the experiences of other machine-gun battalions. There is no reason to suppose that their experiences were widely different or that their histories, in so far as they are honestly told and not mere eye-wash, would lead to the formation of different opinions. It must always be remembered in this connection that it is exceedingly difficult to know what happens in battle, and that it is even more difficult to give an honest and unbiassed account of it.

With each battalion of the original Expeditionary Force there was a small and highly-trained machine-gun section. The tactics practised by these machine-gun sections may be briefly summed up in the phrase, "the machine gun is a weapon of opportunity"; they were usually employed at "effective" or "close" infantry ranges. The machine-gun sections were under the direct command of battalion commanders during the opening months of the war. They acted in close co-operation with the infantry of the battalion; but close co-operation between the four machine-gun sections of a brigade was not usually possible.

As soon as the war of movement was ended and the long period of trench warfare had begun, it was seen that closer co-operation between the machine gunners of a brigade must be secured if the few guns available were to be used to the best advantage. A



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brigade machine-gun officer was appointed in each brigade for this purpose. He was not merely appointed temporarily for some particular engagement, but was to be continually responsible for the co-operation of the machine gunners on the brigade front, and to some extent for their relief. As a rule there was little relief for machine-gun sections in the spring and summer of 1915, although the number of guns with each battalion had just been increased to four. Frequently an infantry battalion would be relieved and go back to billets, whilst its machine-gun section was left behind in the trenches with another battalion of the same brigade.

The main principle adopted in placing machine guns was a simple one. It was to protect every yard of ground over which the enemy might advance by the fire of at least one machine gun directed from a flank, its own front being covered by the fire of other machine guns. In this way it was possible to arrange for a continuous belt of machine-gun fire to protect the front line, and probably a reserve line as well. There was already some idea of grouping machine guns into " strong-points " in rear—" keeps " they were usually called then. These keeps were adapted for all-round defence, but sufficient guns were never available to garrison a keep properly, with the result that usually only one machine gun was placed in each keep.

Some attempt was made to provide protection from shell-fire. It was ludicrously insufficient. In the early summer of 1915 a machine-gun officer earned high praise from his brigadier for his enterprise and initiative in constructing a mined dug-out for a machine gun, with the aid of a skilled miner or two in his section and material which was largely stolen. A regular supply of mining timber was unheard of in those days and mined dug-outs were few and far between.

Machine-gun sections were, then, often in the trenches with other battalions than their own. When the Guards Division was formed in August, 1915, the machine-gun sections in each brigade were joined together to form companies, units with their own commanders and headquarters, acting directly under the orders of their brigadiers. The change was the result of the desire to secure co-operation between the machine-gun sections of a brigade and a centralized control for them. This had, in effect, been the practice for some time past under the conditions of trench warfare and had little immediate bearing upon the tactical handling of the guns, except in so far as it made permanent a policy which might otherwise have been only temporary.

The change simplified some administrative problems, noticeably

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in supply, and created others, noticeably problems about seniority and promotion, and problems about reinforcements and the question of "attached men." The establishment authorized for a machine-gun company was so obviously inadequate that all the brigades of the Division had a certain number of men, varying in number from eight to sixteen per battalion, "attached" to their machine-gun companies. The maintenance, training and promotion of these men were a constant source of trouble to every company commander until the machine-gun battalion was formed. The only redeeming feature was that, on the whole, commanding officers and adjutants of the infantry battalions were sympathetic and generous in supplying fresh men to replace casualties, cordially assenting to the principle that only men physically and intellectually above the average should be considered worthy of becoming machine gunners. Company commanders not unnaturally were less cordial and were tempted to get rid of their worst men by sending them to be attached to the machine-gun companies.

The military arguments for forming machine-gun companies were severely logical. One important factor only was neglected, or considered of minor importance. The officers and men from whom the companies were formed were already strongly attached to their own regiments and battalions, and more or less keenly resented the change for this reason. Also, for some time to come, drafts arriving from England had the same feeling—that they were losing touch with their regiment, sometimes also losing promotion. The new organization appealed to their reason but not to their sentiment, and with the majority of regimental officers and men sentiment weighs more than reason. Nor was it merely a matter of sentiment; the gulf thus created between machine gunners and the battalions of their brigades was bound to become wider in course of time, as reinforcements arriving from England knew less and less of the personnel of the brigade to which they were posted. This tendency was accentuated later when a separate depôt for training officers and men for machine-gun companies was formed, and finally a separate regiment. As a direct consequence the officers and men of the machine-gun companies were eventually to become almost as little known among the infantry of the Division as those of the R.E. companies or artillery brigades. Mutual confidence began to dwindle, and this lack of the complete understanding and sympathy, which can only come from friendship and intimacy, had a gradual but marked effect on the relations between the machine gunners and the infantry, increasing the difficulties of securing perfect co-operation between them.

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The advocates of the modern machine-gun tactics and organization were apt to sneer at any mention of this " divorce " of infantry and machine gunners, as it was aptly termed. Living in the background, as many of them did, they were inclined to underrate the importance of what appeared to them to be merely a matter of sentiment. In practice the effect of this gradual separation was greater than they realized.

It must not be supposed, however, that the formation of machine-gun companies had any immediate effect of this nature. A strong company *esprit de corps* was soon established, and the three companies of the Division all learned to consider their own company the best unit in the Division, and any one of them better than any other machine-gun company in the British Army. The rivalry of the different sections of a company was still more marked, formed, as they were at that time and for some time to come, from different regiments, some of them even from different nationalities.

After a short period of training and an even shorter experience of offensive operations—at Loos, in September, 1915—the machine-gun companies were able to complete their organization and to improve their methods more or less at their leisure during the comparatively peaceful winter campaign of 1915–1916.

During that winter they adopted the practice of employing indirect fire as part of the ordinary routine of trench warfare. This type of fire had long been advocated by machine-gun experts, " cranks " to their enemies, " enthusiasts " to their friends. The possibility of employing indirect fire came to the front at this time for three reasons. The first was the fact that in trench warfare there was never any difficulty in securing an abundant supply of S.A.A. and spare parts. Hitherto the results gained by indirect fire had not been considered worth the expenditure of the ammunition involved. It was certainly an extravagant use of ammunition, but S.A.A. was now plentiful and comparatively cheap, so that this objection to the use of indirect fire disappeared. Secondly, the first issue of Lewis guns was made to the Division towards the end of 1915, these guns becoming available for close-range fire in the front line. Thirdly, it was beginning to be realized that, with concentrations of artillery fire becoming more and more intense, little of the front line trench would survive a serious bombardment, and that therefore a larger proportion of machine guns than hitherto must be placed in reserve positions.

This principle of " distribution in depth " was to be more and more emphasized as time went on. The infantry did not like

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the change—one of the first signs of mutual misunderstanding. On the first occasion on which a battalion of the Division went into the trenches and found there were to be no machine guns in the front line (near Neuve Chapelle in November, 1915) the commanding officer protested strongly that he could not hold his front line with his Lewis guns and rifles alone. His protest was successful, and two guns of his old machine-gun section were put into the front line after all. It was still, of course, the cardinal maxim of any " defence scheme " at this time that the front line must be held at all costs. No one had then heard of the " elastic " defence.

Some of the sections now placed in reserve positions and also many of those in the front line, were to employ " harassing fire " at night; that is, they were to fire indirect upon tracks, dumps, headquarters, anywhere in fact where the enemy might be expected to be moving above ground. There was no idea of employing this form of fire in the event of a hostile attack—that idea was to be put into practice much later. But it was argued that the enemy's ration parties and fatigue parties might be made to feel distinctly uncomfortable by occasional bursts of machine-gun fire. The Germans also were firing their machine guns all through the night at this time—much more freely than they did in the later stages of the war. No one who had to walk between North and South Tilleloy posts near Neuve Chapelle on any night of December, 1915, or January, 1916, felt disposed to argue that indirect machine-gun fire was entirely valueless. The number of casualties which the Division suffered from machine-gun fire at night was probably small, but it had undoubtedly a damaging effect on nerves and moral. Evidence was occasionally obtained from German prisoners that our indirect machine-gun fire had been annoying them, or had inflicted casualties, or even " had been absolute hell." It was always pleasant to hear this, but it is possible to put too much faith in the evidence of one or two private soldier prisoners. The general result must be regarded as probably considerable, but certainly incalculable.

One incident in this connection, which occurred nearly a year later, must be recorded anonymously. A new target had been selected for harassing fire one night, the necessary calculations were made by the officer concerned and submitted to company headquarters for verification. In the meantime, without waiting to hear if his calculations were considered correct, the officer passed on the directions and elevation to his guns, and some two thousand rounds were fired. It was eventually discovered that the compass direction

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chosen was about thirty degrees out, owing to the fact that the officer had subtracted instead of adding his " magnetic deviation." The bullets had gone into the blue, fortunately on the enemy's side of the line and it appeared that two thousand rounds of S.A.A. had been wasted. It so happened, however, that a German prisoner was taken that night, and in the course of his examination at brigade headquarters he said that some men of his company who had been at work digging a new trench had been heavily fired on by one of our machine guns during the night and had suffered casualties. The brigadier congratulated the company commander on this result of his fire; the latter saw no reason to confess in reply that the two thousand rounds which were all that he had fired that night had hit their target by good luck and bad calculations.

The moral of this unadorned tale must be pointed. Undoubtedly a large amount of harassing fire was ill-directed; not usually owing to gross errors in calculation (the tale is exceptional in that respect), but owing to the imperfections of the technical appliances available—and, later in the war, owing also to the imperfect training of the personnel. In 1916 the men could " hold " the gun well and the officers could direct them, but no proper appliances for night-firing were ever available. A suitable luminous aiming-mark, for instance, was authorized for issue for the first time just after the Armistice had been signed.

Sometimes, even, complaints would be made by our own infantry that bullets were falling short, on or behind our own front line. Frequently these complaints were groundless, due to the nervousness of men who did not like to hear the crack of machine guns behind them. Occasionally they were certainly justified, just as they sometimes were about our artillery. Practically always the error was due to defective apparatus for checking the laying of the gun rather than to the criminal carelessness of the man or officer in charge of the gun.

On one occasion when the Division was on the left of the British line—at Boesinghe, in July, 1917—with the Belgian Army to the north of them, the stormy protest of a battalion commander who complained of short shooting and the production of a damning piece of evidence in the shape of a waterproof sheet pierced by machine-gun bullets made things look black for the machine-gun officer concerned. Further investigation proved him innocent of anything worse than inspiring our Allies with too offensive a spirit. A *mitrailleur* with a Chauchard automatic rifle had watched and imitated the action of the machine gunners who were his

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neighbours. To pour out bullets in an easterly direction had appealed to him as an amusing and soldierly way of passing the night. Direction and aiming-mark, elevation and the calculation of clearance over our own front line had seemed to him too elaborate a ritual, suitable for the artillery or the deliberate British; his target should be the German Army, and ignoring all else, he had propped up his piece on the parapet and blazed away. Fortunately the waterproof sheet had been the only casualty on our side of the line, and no doubt the Germans had been as rudely disturbed by his enterprise as our own front line platoon.

Some further remarks about the accuracy of indirect fire will be made later on in this article when dealing with the introduction of "barrage" fire, but there will not be much occasion to recur to the subject of harassing fire. From the beginning of 1916 onwards it was a regular feature of normal trench warfare. The number of rounds fired by a company might be anything from a thousand rounds on a quiet night to ten or twenty thousand on the eve of a raid or an offensive. Even when ill-directed this harassing fire probably always had some moral effect upon the enemy; occasionally it was definitely known to have had some material effect.

When the Division moved into the Ypres sector in the early spring of 1916, the idea that machine guns must be protected from shell-fire at all costs became even more prominent. The principle, already mentioned, of "distribution in depth" was further emphasized, and there was usually only about one section of machine guns in the front line on a brigade front. The remainder were distributed to a depth of some two thousand yards, and in one sector machine guns were even kept in position more than two miles behind the front line. Usually also a mobile reserve of two or four machine guns was kept at company headquarters which were usually about the same distance in rear. To secure further protection from shell-fire, guns were placed in isolated positions away from the well-marked trench lines held by the infantry. Mined dug-outs were almost impossible to construct in this damp sector, but in many places concrete emplacements were built inside the ruins of farms and houses. The village of St. Jean was particularly favoured in this respect, and a large number of strong and well-sited positions were constructed inside the ruins of its houses.

These were undoubtedly the right tactics. But it may well be argued that too much importance was attached to protection and too little to the possibility of using machine guns to the best effect in the event of a hostile attack. These isolated and fortified positions, chosen

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from the machine gunner's point of view, often did not fit in well with the infantry dispositions already made. In the event of an attack by the enemy a larger number of machine guns would certainly survive the preliminary bombardment, but these would be comparatively unprotected; there was no "infantry escort" provided for isolated machine guns; they therefore could have been easily dealt with piecemeal by the enemy's infantry as it advanced. (This argument does not of course apply with so much force to the "nest" of machine guns of later years.) In any event it was no longer easy for the machine gunners and the infantry to keep in touch with each other.

Another difficulty which presented itself and was never satisfactorily solved was the action to be taken by isolated machine-gun teams in the event of a successful hostile attack penetrating our front line at night or in a mist. At best even on a clear day it was going to be difficult for them to choose the right moment to open fire when parties of our troops retiring might be intermixed with parties of the enemy advancing. At night or in a mist it would almost certainly be impossible to fire except at close ranges, and then the absence of the "infantry escort" might well have proved fatal. Great care was always taken to supply these isolated teams with stocks of bombs and Very lights, but even with these they might have been easily surprised and overpowered without being able to open fire effectively, as a direct consequence of the isolation which was to secure them immunity from the preliminary bombardment. It would appear that the comparative failure of the British machine-gun defence in March, 1918, was due to this very cause. Fortunately the dispositions made were never severely tested in this respect, for the enemy never succeeded in seriously penetrating the front line of the Division. There were rumours of impending German attacks when the Division was in the Ypres sector, but nothing ever happened other than the ordinary alarums and excursions of trench life.

The spring and summer of 1916 were mainly occupied, so far as the Division was concerned, with the training for and practice of offensive operations which reached their climax on the Somme in September. Methods of defence were not seriously reconsidered until the Division found itself condemned to spend the long winter on the Somme with all its horrible discomforts, when the sole aim of the company commander was to protect his men and guns from shell-fire and the weather. He was aided in attaining his aim by the introduction of mined dug-outs for machine guns. A large number of these were constructed, for the chalk soil was peculiarly suitable and the services of a Tunnelling Company, R.E., were

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available. The mined dug-out served its purpose in keeping the machine gunner and his gun dry and safe. Its introduction served to emphasize even more the necessity for maintaining the discipline of machine gunners at an exceptionally high level, in order that their comparatively comfortable shelters might not tempt them to relax their vigilance, and that they might be trusted in the event of an attack by the enemy to emerge from their shelter and fire their gun as soon as a target was visible. They were indeed never found wanting in this respect, but there was bound to be a strong inducement for a machine-gun team, however well disciplined, to remain in their dug-out under a heavy bombardment and to emerge, too late, to find themselves caught like rats in a trap by a party of Germans "mopping up."

The method on which machine guns were distributed was much the same as in the Ypres sector. There were still some guns in front line posts; the majority were in isolated positions in rear. But two new points are of importance.

One was a tendency for the first time to group machine guns in pairs. The chief reason for this advanced by the principal staff officer of the Division was to economize labour in making mined dug-outs. It was welcomed by the machine-gun companies because it removed some of the more immediate disadvantages of having guns in isolated positions, simplifying reliefs and the control of guns by officers and non-commissioned officers. Incidentally it was a reversion to a well-known principle of the text-books originally advocated because of the liability of the gun to stoppages. Finally, it was undoubtedly a sound principle because a subsection of two machine guns was far better able to defend itself without infantry support against an encircling movement by an advancing enemy than a single isolated gun team.

The other new point was the recognition of the possibility of using the fire of rear machine guns to defend the front line. The infantry was now holding the front line in a series of posts and not by a continuous trench line, a development which had become inevitable owing to the impossibility of draining and revetting an enormous length of trench. Forward machine guns were sited so as to be able to fire direct through the gaps between the posts and to put down "interlocking zones" of fire in front of them. Some of the rear machine-gun teams were to open indirect and overhead fire on to selected points in the enemy's lines in the event of a hostile attack. Their fire was to supplement the artillery barrage, and these lines of fire were known as their S.O.S. lines. An attempt was made to register some of their targets, but, owing to the nature of the ground

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and the difficulty of observation, it was not very successful. These lines of fire for both forward and rear machine guns were marked by aiming posts of a primitive nature, and it is doubtful if they were conducive to accurate fire. But by the time the sector had begun to assume a staff-satisfying appearance the Germans in front were found to be melting away and methods of defence again became a secondary consideration.

In the early part of 1918 the Division was in the Arras sector and the machine-gun defence tactics adopted were a logical development from the experience already gained. Machine guns were for the first time withdrawn from the front line altogether and were grouped in pairs, or sometimes in fours, in " strong points " in rear. Their emplacements were usually separated from the well-marked infantry trenches, but the disadvantages of this isolation that have been already noticed were to some extent overcome by the liberal use of the Champagne dug-out and emplacement. This type of mined dug-out—so called from the area where the French first used it, and nothing to do with a bottle—had two entrances, one opening into the main infantry trench, the other coming up above ground far enough from the trench to avoid any concentration of shell-fire aimed at the trench ; it was at this second opening that the emplacement was made and the gun mounted. More elaborate forms of the same kind of dug-out had shafts leading up to two or more emplacements. A subsection or even a section was thus enabled to live together under the direct control of an officer. There might or might not be infantry to support the machine gunners living in the same dug-out, but in any event the latter were better prepared for all-round defence than they would have been as an isolated team.

Also these positions were chosen much more carefully with reference to the infantry dispositions ; or rather for the first time the machine-gun positions were chosen first and the infantry dispositions made to suit them. It was at length recognized in practice —it had long been recognized in theory—that the machine guns were the backbone of the defence.

The chief disadvantage of the Champagne dug-out was that the entrances and exits were not as simple and convenient as they might have been but for the overpowering desire to hide them at all costs. It was awkward enough even in a leisurely tour of inspection to climb the narrow stairs and ladders that led to the small box where the gun was mounted under a screen of camouflage. Valuable time would probably have been lost in the excitement of an engagement over the business of mounting the gun. (It was not usually kept

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mounted owing to the risk of damage from stray splinters.) And it was never quite clear what would happen to a badly wounded man at the gun-position. There was not room for more than two men to serve the machine gun, and, in the event of one becoming a casualty, the man to replace him would have had serious difficulty in disposing of his body. Still there is no doubt that the Champagne emplacement together with the concrete pill-boxes which were still used where there were conveniently situated ruins of buildings in which to conceal them, as at Roeux Château, solved satisfactorily the problem of making machine-gun emplacements inconspicuous and yet safe. It should be noted in this connection that the fact that one entrance was constructed leading into a used trench got over the difficulty of concealing the tracks otherwise made by men approaching an isolated position. Positions of the old type were always given away on aeroplane photographs by these tracks.

The action to be taken by these machine-gun sections depended upon their position. The most forward sections formed a line of strong points about 500 yards behind the front line. These sections were ordered not to employ indirect fire, but to reserve all their energies and ammunition for close-range direct fire. The lines on which they were to fire in the event of a general attack were carefully laid down and marked to ensure mutual co-operation and support along the whole front. Next came a line of rear sections, which were to begin by opening overhead indirect fire on S.O.S. lines, but were to be prepared to switch at any moment to direct fire if occasion arose, and were in any event to keep a reserve of ammunition for direct fire at close range. There were two batteries, each of four guns, placed primarily for barrage fire of this nature, and arranged so as to supplement the artillery barrage. Otherwise it was always made clear that indirect fire was a subsidiary rôle, something of a luxury to be indulged in with caution, and that the main rôle of rear sections was to hold their own strong points by direct fire after points in front had given way. Behind these machine guns there were more occupied strong points in which the guns were too far back to be able to protect the front line by overhead fire.

Later in the year, when the policy of distribution in depth was carried even further, more than half the machine guns of the Division were so far back, that is over 2000 yards from our outpost line, that they would have been unable to fire indirect in the initial stages of an attack. Some suggestions were then made for giving to the machine gunners targets upon which they could employ indirect fire when it was known that the enemy had penetrated a certain distance.

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Arrangements were easily made for doing this except that no satisfactory method could be discovered by which the gun teams could be kept informed of the progress of the attack. Rocket signals were rejected as being too risky and uncertain in their meaning. In fact there remained the insoluble problem which will be mentioned in connection with the use of barrage fire in the attack. Without direct observation, which is usually physically impossible, and excellent communications, which are usually impracticable, indirect machine-gun fire cannot be used to the best effect and its use, when the position of friendly troops in front is uncertain, is out of the question.

Once again the Division was given no opportunity of testing the strength of the defences which it had constructed. It was relieved just before the German blow fell. To judge from the success with which the 4th Division which relieved it withstood the German attack on Arras, there can have been little seriously wrong with this scheme of defence, given vigilant and well-disciplined troops to carry it out. The ideal scheme of defence would be one in which the infantry dispositions were completely subordinated to the machine-gun groupings, whilst, in the machine-gun scheme itself, the use of indirect fire was subordinated to the use of direct. Machine-gun strong points form the skeleton of the defence; the infantry is the flesh and skin which clothe and conceal the skeleton.

## II. Attack.

The war had lasted a long time before any great change was made in the methods of employing machine guns in offensive operations. The formation of machine-gun companies originated in the desire to secure co-operation between the machine gunners of a brigade in the defence; its bearing upon their employment in the attack had not been considered so deeply. At any rate the possibilities and advantages of a centralized control were not so evident, and for some time the usual procedure in an attack was to put a section at the disposal of each battalion commander who could use it for supporting his attack with covering fire or for consolidation afterwards at his own discretion.

When the Guards Machine-Gun Companies were formed, they had about ten days' training as a preliminary to taking part in the battle of Loos. The Division was in reserve for this attack and it was half expected that the battle would have assumed the nature of open warfare before it took any part in the operations. With a

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view to this development training had been in accordance with the maxims of *Field Service Regulations* and the machine-gun text-books published before the war.

The actual battle in this sense, as in others, was a disappointment. To the machine-gun companies, still in their infancy, with equipment and establishment incomplete, it was a severe test, but they survived the ordeal with credit. One brigade machine-gun company was actually in action at one time as a unit, supporting the attack of its brigade on Hill 70 with direct overhead fire, using "combined sights." This would certainly have been difficult to arrange at short notice under the old system where each battalion controlled one section, but it was not in any sense a new development in tactics. This action of the machine gunners seems to have been of some assistance to the attack; at any rate, the brigadier and the commander of the leading battalion complimented them on the result, thus wisely giving the company a good opinion of itself early in its career. But, apart from this incident, there was no special feature of the fighting which calls for comment in connection with the new organization and tactics.

Subsequent training during periods of rest mainly consisted in improving the smartness and discipline of companies by close order drill, in lessons in the mechanism and stoppages of the machine gun, and in firing practice on improvized ranges; and very valuable training this was. It was not until May, 1916, when a definite offensive operation was again in prospect, the taking of the Pilkem Ridge, that the part a machine-gun company would take in the attack was seriously considered. This attack never materialized, but the lines on which the training was done are of importance as illustrating the offensive tactics of the Army at that time. Moreover, similar attacks were soon to be carried out by other divisions and later on by the Guards Division on the Somme. The operation contemplated may be styled a "set-piece" offensive, boundaries, objectives and artillery programme being clearly defined weeks beforehand. Practice grounds were prepared by the brigades which were to take part in the operation, giving an exact reproduction of the geography of the enemy's trenches. The real location of the imaginary trenches was soon public property.

The attack was to be made by the infantry in a succession of "waves," rear waves reinforcing those in front until the final objective was reached. (Mopping-up parties were a later refinement, introduced after the partial failure of the attack of the 1st of July on the Somme.) The rôle assigned to the machine gunners was

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simply to consolidate the objective when reached and to resist the inevitable counter-attack. Little was said of the possibility of their assisting the attack by covering fire. Machine-gun sections were allotted to each infantry wave; they were to advance by more or less definite routes and establish themselves at more or less definite points on the different objectives. There were no machine-gun sections actually in the leading waves, but they followed up in close support. Training on these lines was a simple form of drill, which left nothing to individual initiative. Its lessons had been well enough learned when the Division was suddenly recalled to the line to relieve the Canadians who had been heavily attacked near Hooge.

After various dates for the Pilkem attack had been fixed and cancelled, the Division went south to the Somme. There on the 15th of September this method of attack was adopted. The results of the attack made by one brigade were glorious but disastrous. A large number of the machine-gun teams got forward into the leading waves of the infantry where they were exposed and defenceless. Half the guns of the company were put out of action and all the officers became casualties. Such teams as survived with their guns got into useful positions and were able to give a good account of themselves in keeping down hostile movement and assisting the advance of the division on the right by covering fire, but the casualties suffered were out of all proportion to advantages gained or casualties inflicted. In another brigade there were fewer machine-gun teams involved in the attack, but their experience was a similar one and they achieved their results with a heavy proportion of casualties. The second attack, made by the Division on the 25th of September, taught the same lesson less cruelly, for machine-gun company commanders were allowed more discretion in getting guns forward and they did not try to take trenches before the infantry had established itself in the position.

It was made clear once and for all in these two days that, however definite the infantry plan might be, machine-gun sections could not move forward with the infantry in accordance with a fixed time-table until it was known that the enemy's infantry and machine guns had been overpowered. Their task in consolidating the ground gained could and should be definite enough, and they could often move forward into or even in front of the leading waves of infantry in order to assist a further advance with covering fire, but they could not move with the leading lines and take part in the actual assault. Therefore machine gunners must not be tied too closely to the infantry they accompany and their commander must be allowed some latitude in

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choosing time and route for his advance, in order to avoid exposing his guns either to the weight of the artillery barrage, or to direct machine-gun and rifle fire at close range.

The experiences of machine-gun companies in other divisions were similar. The casualties suffered on the Somme by machine gunners and infantry alike were equally heavy. This high rate of casualties is now seen to have been an inevitable result of the tactics adopted. But at least the infantry was essential to such success as was gained, whereas the machine gunners often did little to assist the attack. They could have been just as usefully employed if they had been kept safely in hand until they were required for consolidating the ground gained. It was clear that the problem of how to employ machine guns in a "set-piece" offensive had to be reconsidered.

The training in the autumn which followed was chiefly devoted to mobile warfare tactics; dim rumours of the possibility of a general German retreat on this front, which actually began in March, 1917, were already in the air. The main ideas in the machine-gun training were not new; they were founded on the fact that the machine gun was a weapon chiefly of value for consolidating a position which the infantry had gained, or for protecting an exposed flank, but suitable under favourable conditions for assisting the advance of the infantry by overhead fire and covering fire from a flank. A large proportion of time was given to improving the drill and discipline of all ranks and their technical knowledge of the gun. Some time was also spent on the more elaborate methods of fire control, combined sights, and so on, but no one had a profound belief in their value. It was the generally accepted view—a view which was borne out in practice—that an officer has little chance of controlling more than one machine gun in action in the open, and that the efficient officer was the officer who had an eye for ground and Germans, who set an example of coolness and gallantry to his men and trained in turn, to know their gun and do their duty.

After a winter spent in discomfort and the development of these ideas on defence, the spring of 1917 brought a long period of relief from trench warfare, a period which was valuable to the machine-gun companies in perfecting the training of new drafts, especially of "attached men," and attaining once more the high standard of efficiency and discipline which had been attained before September, 1916. The spring also brought the 4th Guards Machine-Gun Company to the Division, and the new machine-gun barrage tactics. Their arrival together was not a chance coincidence. It

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was essential to the success of the new tactics that more machine guns should be available.

The difficulty of finding a useful occupation for machine-gun companies in a " set-piece " offensive was now met by the suggestion that they could support the advance by indirect overhead fire, thereby thickening the artillery barrage and even to some extent replacing it in the later stages if the infantry succeeded in advancing so far and so fast that the troops got temporarily beyond the range of the artillery, which of necessity moved up more slowly to support them. It was stated, and proved by carefully arranged demonstrations at the Camiers Machine-Gun School, that well-directed and well-controlled machine-gun fire could be almost annihilating in its effect at ranges up to 2,500 yards, even when the fire was indirect and unobserved, provided a sufficient number of guns could be brought into action. Machine guns were therefore to be organized in batteries of four to eight guns, and the fire of these batteries was to be controlled, distributed or concentrated, in much the same way as the fire of a battery of artillery. So the new machine-gun textbooks were written and S.S. 192 became the machine gunner's bible.

This was excellent in theory, and the Canadians in their attack on Vimy Ridge in the spring of 1917 maintained that it worked well in practice. It was also successfully employed in the capture of the Messines Ridge. But there were difficulties even in theory. One was the difficulty of communications. The signalling establishment of a machine-gun company was seldom sufficient to allow for telephonic connection between forward sections and company headquarters; occasionally when company headquarters were with the brigade, one line forward might be arranged. The machine gunners, therefore, were as a rule out of touch with the immediate situation on their front and in offensive operations could only open fire according to a rigid time-table, and in defence in response to a visual S.O.S. signal. This strictly limited their sphere of usefulness.

The second difficulty was even more formidable. Even if telephonic communication to a forward observation post were arranged and maintained intact, there was still the difficulty of observing machine-gun fire. At Camiers in the sand or the sea observation was simple enough; on a dry and dusty road or on chalk it was possible and was sometimes carried out under real conditions; on the grassy fields round Arras, or in the muddy, shell-torn wastes of the Ypres Salient it was quite out of the question. One company commander successfully registered guns on a road near Ayette in the summer of 1918; the fall of the bullets on the road could be



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observed fairly easily, in the grass at the side of the road not a trace could be seen.

But without observation and registration it is almost impossible to be accurate. Wind, temperature, barometer, all have an appreciable and, under ideal conditions, calculable effect on the flight of a bullet. In practice the calculations were seldom made and only rough allowances made for these disturbing influences. A machine-gun officer was not equipped with barometer, thermometer and wind-gauge, and regular meteorological reports were not received, though in theory they were obtainable.

A brief digression must here be made to tell how a young officer in his enthusiasm for scientific machine-gunnery once brought back a wind-gauge when returning from leave. It was a beautiful little instrument, intended for measuring draughts in flues. It is doubtful whether it was large enough or could be placed sufficiently high up to measure the velocity of a real wind. Anyhow it was never put to the test. But it afforded much amusement in the officers' mess. Competitions in blowing at the thing were held and bets were freely laid on the result. The later history of this toy is not known, it is supposed to have suffered the fate of many articles of surplus kit in the hasty moves of March, 1918.

In addition to errors due to weather conditions, further possibilities of error crept in with the difficulty of locating exactly the position of the "directing" gun and laying out a line of fire by means of a compass or aiming-mark. The artillery has the same difficulties in firing indirect, but ordinarily the first sighting shot of a gun is made roughly and necessary corrections are made by simple direct observation of the result. On one notable occasion in the war the artillery fired a creeping barrage without previous registration with complete success. But then the gunners had the services of an expert Field Survey Company to assist them in laying out their initial lines of fire. The officers of machine-gun companies had neither the scientific minds nor the technical materials of a Field Survey Company.

Fortunately, absolute accuracy was not essential. The "effective beaten zone" within which 75 per cent. of the bullets fall from a machine gun firing at 2,000 yards range is an area 70 yards long and 20 feet wide, and, owing to the steepness of the trajectory at this range, the bullets have an excellent effect upon troops in shell-hole defences. Infantry officers and men who were sometimes sceptical about the value of the new tactics were apt to overlook these technical points. But even the most sceptical infantry officers have occasionally been heard to say that they were comforted during an advance by

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the sound of machine-gun bullets passing over their heads towards the enemy, and at least there was never any complaint made of short shooting. There is certainly this much to be said for these barrage tactics—that any form of covering fire is valuable. It has a moral effect upon the enemy's troops, and tends to keep their heads down, even if it does not inflict casualties. Also they cannot watch it and avoid it, as can sometimes be done by intelligent observation of an artillery barrage. The new tactics did at any rate give machine-gun companies a definite supporting rôle in an attack, when the ground was unfavourable for the use of direct covering fire. In fact, indirect covering fire is better than none.

A new organization was required to deal with the new tactics, and a Divisional Machine-Gun Officer was appointed. This of itself was scarcely sufficient, and the officer in question would be the first to admit it. For a time he doubled the parts of D.M.G.O. and O.C., 4th Company; and officially he was to be responsible for all the machine-gun barrage arrangements of the Division for the attack at Ypres which was known to be impending early in June, 1917. For the purpose of this operation, parts of the brigade companies were to be under the orders of the brigadiers. These machine guns were technically known as "forward" guns, and were to be pushed forward with the assault to consolidate the ground gained. The remainder of these companies, the whole of the 4th Company, and another machine-gun company which was placed at the disposal of the Division for the occasion, were to be "rear" guns under the orders of the D.M.G.O., and were to fire barrages to support the assault. Some of the barrage sections of the brigade companies were to come under the orders of their brigadiers again later in the day. With the billeting, relief and administration of the brigade companies the D.M.G.O. had nothing to do. Apart from this, he had the whole of the moves and work of the rear guns to control. For this purpose his staff consisted of one orderly and a batman, although he was able to get some assistance in preparing maps and orders from the clerks of the operations branch of the General Staff of the Division.

It was evident that without mutual co-operation and good will there was bound to be friction, and that misunderstandings would arise. The unfortunate brigade machine-gun company commander had to serve God and Mammon, the brigade and the D.M.G.O.; and there was grave danger of his holding to the one and despising the other. The unfortunate D.M.G.O. had a difficult team to handle. This was especially noticeable in the preliminary training and preparation, arrangements for carrying parties, ammunition dumps

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emplacements, communications and so forth. It says a great deal for the excellent spirit and good will of the machine-gun officers principally concerned, but little for the merits of the organization, that these preliminaries were successfully completed. The tasks undertaken by the different companies were settled as much by verbal mutual agreements as by direct orders from higher authorities.

This is not the place to give a detailed account of the Ypres operations of 1917. It is sufficient to say that on the 31st of July practically everything in the Division's sector of the attack went according to plan; the barrages were fired by the rear machine-gun sections without a hitch, and these sections were in a position to protect the infantry front line by an S.O.S. barrage in good time; the forward machine-gun sections advancing with the infantry did not get involved in the assault, and yet one subsection at least was well enough forward to assist the advance materially by direct fire at short range. The same may be said of a further attack delivered on the 9th of October, which was carried out on a smaller scale, but under far more difficult conditions of ground and weather. Barrage fire was employed, rear gun teams were pushed forward to defend the new line by overhead indirect fire, and on one occasion did open fire on seeing an S.O.S. signal; and forward subsections were moved forward in close enough touch with the infantry to give valuable assistance by direct covering fire. The ground gained was consolidated in depth, and the strength of our hold on it was partially tested by a German counter-attack which melted away under the fire of our machine guns and Lewis guns.

But, although delighted at the success of their plans, the machine-gun companies did not in any way flatter themselves that the general success of the Division was due to their efforts or to the new tactics. It is even arguable that the result might have been little different if not a single Vickers gun had taken part, because it is possible that the Germans were prepared to give up without much of a struggle the wilderness of shell-holes which our artillery had created. Moreover, divisions farther south which employed the same tactics were less successful. Some lessons, however, were clearly taught by these operations:—

(1) That ample time is necessary to prepare a barrage scheme, however simple.

(2) That the D.M.G.O. had not a sufficient staff to assist him, that his executive authority was far too vague and that his work

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necessitated continuous liaison with brigade staffs, if the difficulties of dual control were to be overcome.

(3) That the technical appliances for barrage fire were inadequate, that its accuracy suffered in consequence and that its results were impossible to observe and calculate.

(4) That the problem of communications had not been solved.

(5) That forward machine-gun subsections, if well-handled, could assist the advance of the infantry by direct covering fire, but that infantry officers under whose orders these subsections must necessarily come were disposed to handle the guns separately like their own Lewis guns, making the subsection officer's control of them far too difficult by splitting the subsection instead of employing the guns in pairs.

These lessons were to be rubbed in by the next two operations in which the Division took part, the attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and Bourlon Wood on the 27th of November, 1917, and the counter-attack which retook Gouzeaucourt on the 31st of November. In the attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame there were only twelve hours available in which to make all preparations for the attack, there was an inadequate system of communications, the ground was strange to the Division, and, to add to the difficulties of preparation and assembly, it began to snow during the night. The D.M.G.O. had no chance of co-ordinating the work of the machine guns taking part, and only a slender scheme of direct and indirect overhead covering fire could be arranged, which was not eventually carried out in its entirety owing to bad visibility. On the other hand, for the forward gun sections there were admirable opportunities for covering fire to assist the advance and for repelling the enemy's counter-attack, but there were not enough guns for either task. The frontage over which they had to be distributed was enormous. In particular only one gun was available for direct fire on La Folie Wood. This was just such an opportunity for employing direct covering fire as the machine gunner brought up on the old textbooks would have revelled in. The wood, which was not part of the infantry's objective, was known to be strongly held and could have been kept under direct fire the whole time, yet from it the Germans were able, almost undisturbed, to bring a devastating fire to bear upon the right flank of the attack and later to launch the counter-attack which retook the village. Machine gunners who were to have fired overhead and indirect upon this target were unable to observe the critical moment.

At Gouzeaucourt again, there was no time to employ barrage tactics, and incidentally only 1/100,000 maps were available, a fact

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which made it quite out of the question to employ any form of indirect fire. On the other hand, the skilful and enterprising action of the leading subsections which came into action in advance of the infantry showed that direct covering fire by Vickers guns could still be of the utmost value in supporting an assault.

These two operations certainly indicated that, valuable although barrage tactics might be in a set-piece offensive, in open warfare there was little to be learned that the machine gunners could not learn from the pre-war textbooks.

While the Division was spending the winter in front of Arras, there was introduced a sweeping change in organization which had long been foreshadowed. It had already been made abundantly clear that the D.M.G.O. organization was hopelessly inadequate to deal with the new methods of handling the machine guns of a division. Even in the placid existence of the Division in the Arras sector, ruffled only by the wind of the impending German attack, this organization worked none too smoothly. The D.M.G.O. was expected by the Divisional Staff to be responsible for the discipline and training of the machine-gun companies, and yet he had no executive powers over them ; he was unable to give any order to a brigade company without first obtaining the authority of the brigadier concerned. The adoption of the new machine-gun tactics and the presence of a fourth non-brigade machine-gun company both led almost inevitably to the next step, the formation of a machine-gun battalion, a separate divisional unit independent of brigade authority except in so far as sections or companies might be temporarily placed at the disposal of a brigadier for tactical purposes.

The following advantages, amongst others of minor importance, were advanced for the new organization :—

(1) The possibility of distributing tasks more evenly among the four companies. Hitherto the brigade companies had naturally had more than their fair share of the dirty work to do—and of the casualties.

(2) A more economical use of machine guns and personnel. The whole machine-gun resources of a division being in the hands of one central authority, it was possible to allocate the exact number of guns required for each task.

(3) Simplification of reliefs. These had always involved minor complications which brigade staffs had often failed to understand or neglected, and they could now be organized more easily.

(4) Better control over the training of the machine gunners of a division to ensure their efficiency and stricter discipline.

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(5) A fairer distribution of promotion and appointments among the companies. Hitherto both brigade staffs and also the D.M.G.O. had been able to express views about promotions, and this had caused friction.

(6) An improvement in the supply of machine-gun spare parts and specialities. A general improvement in supply could be expected with a battalion store and an officer quartermaster to superintend it.

(7) Economy in the use of employed men, farriers, tailors, shoemakers, etc.

All these advantages were not realized in practice, but space will not allow a more detailed examination of them. Some of the minor disadvantages, which were largely overcome in practice, may be mentioned :—

(1) The difficulty of maintaining communication with, and exercising control over, companies scattered over the whole of a divisional area.

(2) The difficulties of supply and transport under the same conditions.

(3) The dual control exercised over a company by the battalion and the brigade under whose tactical orders it might come for the time being.

In addition, there were two more serious disadvantages. The *esprit de corps* of the companies which had been carefully fostered since their formation received a rude shock. It survived the shock partially, sufficiently in fact to leave no room for the creation of a battalion *esprit de corps*. In any event there was little chance of promoting loyalty to the battalion and pride in its achievements and traditions. The battalion was not actually together for more than a month until it reached Cologne, and there was never any opportunity for competition with other machine-gun battalions. The average man scarcely knew that there were other and inferior machine-gun battalions in existence ; with him his company came first and the battalion second. The very fact that he retained this company spirit, irritating as it sometimes was to battalion headquarters, implied that his smartness and gallantry did not suffer from the absence of a soldier's feeling of pride in his regiment. And at least he was conscious of the existence of a regimental sergeant-major.

The other disadvantage was that the long connection between a brigade and its machine-gun company was finally severed. From this time forward it was only rarely that the old brigade companies could be attached to the brigade which they knew and which knew

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them. The divorce between infantry and machine gunners was complete. The decree *nisi* was made absolute. Repeated and tiresome instructions were now necessary and often insufficient to secure the liaison between machine-gun officers and infantry officers which in the early stages of the war had been as natural and inevitable as it was essential.

Though there was no time or opportunity given to build at this stage a new *esprit de corps* or new traditions to replace the old, the new formation stood with success the severe test to which it was subjected when barely a day old, the German attack on the 21st of March, 1918. There is very little that can be noted here. Inevitably in the return to mobile warfare, in the autumn of 1918, the tactical control over machine guns devolved more and more upon brigade and company commanders. At times the battalion was little more than an administrative and advisory authority in the background. But the battalion was able to handle and control the divisional machine-gun reserve, and, during any pause in the movement preparatory to a fresh advance, it was able to organize and co-ordinate the machine-gun dispositions on the whole divisional front.

Indirect fire could only be used during these pauses in the advance. At other times machine gunners had often to be placed directly under infantry battalion commanders as in the old days. One blessed phrase, invented by the theorists, the phrase, " Guns of opportunity," left a loophole by which the machine-gun officer had full scope for exercising his own initiative. The commander of these machine gunners, sometimes as many as a whole company, was left free to assist the advance as best he could, by overhead covering fire, or by pushing forward in close support, or even in advance of the infantry and employing direct fire. There were several occasions in which excellent use was made of this discretion, when it was proved that the dictum that the machine gun was a weapon of opportunity was not so far wrong after all. Under the conditions of trench warfare—whether they are to be regarded as normal or abnormal is another matter—opportunities for the use of the direct fire of machine guns were rare ; as a consequence, opportunities for the use of indirect fire were created. This led directly to the battalion organization. Under the conditions of mobile warfare, machine gunners gladly and inevitably seized their opportunities and reverted to the use of direct fire. Consequently the need for a centralized control was no longer felt. Whatever may be said of the merits of the battalion organization, it was

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introduced at an unfortunate moment. The war was just leaving the very phase in which machine-gun battalions might have shone and entering a new phase in which they were partially eclipsed. In 1917 a battalion would have had time to get together, and would have been working more frequently as a battalion than as four companies; in 1918, when movement was more rapid and the Division was operating on a wider front, the company organization would probably have worked just as easily.

It is not easy even now to see what the ideal organization should be. It seems almost inevitable that for peace-time purposes, garrison duties and so on, there should be a body of machine gunners, a section, or preferably a company, belonging to each infantry battalion and of the same regiment. Then the machine gunner's training can be brought closely into touch with that of the ordinary infantry soldier. The machine gunner, officer or private, must be trained as an infantry man first and as a machine gunner afterwards.

It is also desirable that there should be some organization available for handling large numbers of machine guns, so that opportunities for concerted action, particularly in the use of indirect and barrage fire, may not be neglected. It would appear then, that the machine gunners should be organized in small units, each recruited from and trained with its own infantry battalion; and that there should be with a brigade or a division, a staff capable of handling a large number of machine guns in much the same way as the C.R.A. handles with the aid of his staff the artillery of a division. Such a staff might easily be improvized at the outbreak of war, but it was ludicrous to expect a single officer unaided to handle the machine guns of a division, as the D.M.G.O. was supposed to do. What cannot be improvized at a moment's notice and what is essential to the training of a machine gunner, is his knowledge of, and ability to co-operate with, the infantry to which he is attached. This should be the first aim of his training in time of peace.

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# THE DIVORCE OF SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN

By Ernest Thurtle

Lemuel Gulliver, in the course of his travels, discovered a man patiently endeavouring to turn sunbeams into cucumbers. The sanguine enthusiast who sets out to persuade the readers of a Service publication that there is a comparatively simple method by which the great god War can be pulled off his throne, is doubtless engaged in an equally bizarre and hopeless task. But that is no sufficient reason why the attempt should not be made. A kindly Nature has considerately provided an illimitable store of optimism for the man with an *idée fixe*, with the result that he never regards his case as hopeless.

In the following pages, therefore, I propose to discuss briefly, from a frankly proletarian standpoint, fortified by experience as a fighting soldier, the relationship between existing military discipline and the starting and maintenance of war. Lest the charge of barren negation be brought against me I purpose submitting a proposal—revolutionary, doubtless—which I have explained more fully elsewhere, to remedy what appears to be the present unsatisfactory situation. The proposal, in a nutshell, is to subjugate Mars by the simple expedient of making his disciples free men.

I am venturing to submit these views to the *Army Quarterly* because there is, pervading the editorial of the first number of the Review, a spirit of toleration which emboldens even a dog of an infidel of an anti-militarist to believe that he may be heard in his own defence.

It will be conceded by every anti-militarist who is a realist—and none other should exist—that, given the present conventional view that armed force is the ultimate and inevitable means of settling disputes between nations, there is abundant reason for the maintenance of armies and navies, and for seeing that all the multifarious lethal weapons of warfare are kept up-to-date and efficient in every respect. Given the existing rules of the game, it is not possible to deny the soundness of the Fisher maxim that " moderation in war is



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imbecility." It follows, therefore, that those who accept the *status quo* regarding the philosophy of war are justified in seeking, by every means, to ensure the efficiency of the armed forces. Prominent among these means must be a stimulation of public interest in the training, conditions and achievements of the Services, and the fostering of a spirit of emulation and pride of efficiency in the *personnel* thereof. In such work there is undoubtedly wide scope for a periodical like the *Army Quarterly*.

There existed, in pre-war days, a semi-Pacifist section of opinion which gave support to mutually destructive policies in a manner devoid of all rational defence. It wanted the best of all worlds. It was for ever urging that Great Britain should play the part of an international policeman, now in Armenia to stop the terrible Turk from massacring Armenians, now in the Congo to prevent the Belgians from ill-treating the natives there, and now in Russia to prevent the Czar from tyrannizing over his subjects. Yet, while strenuously advocating such drastic action in these cases as might easily have involved this country in war, this section of opinion implacably opposed the expenditure of every additional penny, in the form of the Army and Navy Estimates, to equip John Bull for his *rôle* as international policeman. By no stretch of logic can such contradictory attitudes be defended. It was a flagrant example of willing the end without willing the means. The war has proved a very complete corrective to such muddled thinking, and the error is not likely to be repeated. International policing, like Empire, has to be paid for in blood and treasure, and it is a fond illusion to imagine that it can be undertaken without that price being paid.

Presumably in stating any case against war it is unnecessary to urge the great gain which would result to humanity if we could be induced to turn our swords into ploughshares. There is no real difference between militarist and anti-militarist on that point. The experience of the last few years was enough to convince the most fire-eating professional soldier that war, as practised between civilized nations these days, is a cruel and devastating calamity. From commanders-in-chief downwards military men have held and expressed this view, and, because of their first-hand experience of war's horrors and in spite of their training, it is probably true to say that military men to-day hold war in greater abhorrence than do civilians. The well-being of humanity as a whole is a much bigger thing than the glorification of any particular *métier*, and it is impossible to conceive a professional soldier who would refuse to welcome the advent of a world in which war had ceased to be a possibility, simply

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on the selfish ground that such a change would mean that, like Othello, he would find his occupation gone. The enlightened soldier does not look upon war as the leather merchant looks upon leather, and say there is nothing like it.

It is true there is a school of thought, not necessarily a military school, which speculates whether there may not be something worse than war which a nation may undergo. The value of such speculations is largely discounted by the fact that the people who indulge in them are hardly ever those who have, from personal battlefield experience, an intimate knowledge of what war means to the fighting man. The decision which any individual may make on a question of war or peace necessarily depends largely upon what that decision means to himself. This factor may be subconscious, rather than conscious, but it certainly enters into the situation. There is a yawning, unbridgeable chasm between the outlook of a statesman in Downing Street, in perfect comfort and security, nicely balancing such considerations as national honour and commercial advantage in the scales against peace, and the luckless front-line soldier cowering under the enemy's intensive barrage. To the question as to whether the war ought to be the statesman may say " Yes," but the front-line soldier will probably say " No." Reverse the position; put the whilom statesman in the front line and the whilom soldier in the Downing Street armchair, and each would probably reverse his answer; unless, indeed, the soldier's memory of his own experiences prevented him from condemning any of his fellow countrymen to experience the nightmare he knew war to be.

The statesman who elects to make war rather than compromise what he considers to be his own and the national honour does not, to say the truth, make a specially heroic choice. There is a world of difference between saying " Death rather than dishonour," and saying " *Somebody else's* death rather than dishonour "; and, in effect, the latter is what the statesmen and politicians say when they declare war.

Reflection on this point focuses attention upon the one fact above all others which is responsible for the starting and maintenance of all wars—the tragic divorce which exists between the fighting and non-fighting sections of the nation, coupled with the fact that control of the issues of war and peace invariably rests with the non-fighting sections. Hitherto war between civilized peoples has been made on this basis. Governments have been able, either by means of a voluntary standing army such as ours, largely recruited, so far as the rank and file are concerned, by sheer economic want (defined

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by Lord Roberts as " conscription of hunger "), or by the continental system of legal compulsion, to get a certain number of the able-bodied males of the nation to incur all the risks, terrors and miseries of war on behalf of the nation as a whole. The abstract right of this has never been seriously challenged. It has been accepted without question that the non-fighting section of the nation may send the men of the fighting Services to death and mutilation, without the Service men being asked so much as by your leave.

People who imagine that the recent war has left this conception unchanged are likely to suffer a rude awakening in the not distant future. It must be remembered that in the late war, as, indeed, in all wars, the vast majority of the fighting men were inevitably drawn from the working-classes. Nine million lives have not been sacrificed, twenty-four million men have not been wounded, in international strife, without causing the workers of this and other countries, yearly becoming more enlightened, furiously to think. At the moment there may not be many outward and visible signs of the ferment going on in the proletarian mind on the subject of war, but that such ferment exists nobody in touch with the masses of the people will deny. The result will sooner or later be a tremendous and, as I think, decisive challenge to the whole philosophy on which modern war is based.

There is nothing new, as a fact, in the utter dissimilarity of outlook, as regards war, between the fighting and the non-fighting sections of a nation. Such a difference necessarily existed in other wars prior to the last great struggle, but the knowledge of it was confined to a comparatively small number and never became sufficiently general to influence the national outlook. Moreover, even had such knowledge been more general, there was not, in the past, a great working-class movement capable of realizing its significance and absorbing its lesson. The late war, by reason of its magnitude, has changed all this. It has brought to millions, who have imparted their knowledge to millions more, a first-hand experience of the divorce of feeling between those who fight and those who do not. As a consequence, in all the civilized nations affected, great working-class movements, anti-militarist by principle, with internationalist ideals, are concerned to find a means of ending this divorce, confident that with its ending there will be, very largely, an end of all war.

The right to sacrifice the soldiery in war, while still nominally unlimited, has, in practice, undergone restriction within the last century. Even before the late war the power of civilized governments to

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make war on account of dynastic quarrels had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. To-day it is becoming common knowledge amongst the working classes that all other wars, howsoever they be camouflaged, are, in effect, within the Clausewitz definition of " commercial wars for trading reasons." And with the spread of this knowledge comes the hardening conviction that the shedding of the blood of the peoples for such causes must not be permitted. There is in the labour movement all over the world a strong and definite tendency to exalt the sacredness of human life, individual and collective, above material considerations and such abstractions as national honour and imperial glory.

During the war the feeling in the fighting ranks was extraordinarily strong against statesmen, politicians and civilians generally. Mr. Asquith's famous " We will not sheathe the sword, etc.," was the subject of most bitter scorn and ridicule. The basis of barrack and billet philosophy, as I met it time after time, was that the people who made wars should fight them, whether they were Kaisers or Kings, Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries, financiers or manufacturers. The private soldier had a firm conviction that he had been tricked into the horrible business of fighting battles by people who were not fighting themselves, and who never would fight. Even if these battles were a necessity, which he at times was given to doubting strongly, that necessity was none of his making. A distinguished war correspondent,* who met this feeling, has put it into the mouth of a soldier :—

" . . . What's it all about ? Oh, yes, I know the usual answers: ' In defence of Liberty.' ' To save the Empire.' But we have lost our liberty. We are slaves under shell-fire. As for the Empire, I do not give a curse for it. I am only thinking of my little home at Streatham Hill. The ' horrible Hun ' ? I've no quarrel with the poor blighters over there by Hooge. They are in the same bloody mess as we are. They hate it just as much. We are all under a spell together which some Devils have put on us."

Nobody who came into intimate contact with the fighting troops during the war will deny that their point of view was very like that described in this passage. They hated the war and were more concerned to see it end than to worry about how it ended. Generally speaking, whatever offensive spirit was shown, over and above the minimum demanded by discipline, was born of a feeling that the war could only end by the defeat of the enemy, and in a mood of fatalistic desperation the men bent themselves to the task. Held

* *See* " Realities of War," by Sir Philip Gibbs.

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together and kept at their task by the tremendous power of military law, they frequently achieved great things, but they did so, not because their inclination led them that way, but because, to desperate men, there seemed no other way out of an intolerable situation.

From the many war books published on the German side it is now very clear that a similar outlook dominated the German fighting troops. They, too, would have asked nothing better than to be allowed to go home out of it all, without troubling themselves about the nature of the peace terms. We thus have the extraordinary fact of vast armies opposing and killing each other, and keeping this up for years, when all the time the individuals composing those armies would have much preferred to quit the battlefields and return home. The will of the fighting man did not count. It had been surrendered to the military machine and, as a result, the non-fighting peoples, the statesmen, politicians, war profiteers and civilians generally were, by means of military law, imposing their will upon the troops. The fighting men willed Peace, the non-fighting men who controlled them willed War: and the will of the non-fighting men prevailed.

It would be idle to stress this acute difference of outlook between the fighter and non-fighter if war were in reality the inevitable and uncontrollable manifestation of national antagonisms that many people hold it to be. There is nothing to be gained by laying bare an injustice which mankind is incapable, owing to its own shortcomings, of redressing. But the inevitability of war is open to challenge.

It is argued that the roots of war are deep in human nature, and cannot be eradicated without fundamental change. Jealousy, avarice, suspicion, are, it is said, the qualities that breed modern wars (commercial wars for trading purposes) between nations, and until these qualities are eliminated from mankind wars must always be reckoned with. The argument does not appear to be altogether conclusive. Jealousy, avarice and suspicion do not merely exist as between one nation and another; they obtain within the nations themselves. Generally speaking, commerce is no respecter of persons or national feelings; it functions where it can and on the most favourable terms. As a consequence there is just as much jealousy and suspicion existing between two commercial rivals of the same nation as between rivals of different nations. A manufacturing firm in Liverpool, in acute competition with a rival firm in London, has just as much feeling against this firm as it has against a similar competitor situated, say, in Antwerp.

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The contention is that such a firm would feel sufficiently strongly against the competition of its foreign rival as to be prepared to work for and support war against the other country in order effectively to destroy its competitor. With a multiplication of firms and individuals similarly affected by the competition of the traders of this foreign country the necessary conditions are established antecedent to a Clausewitz commercial war for trading reasons. This is the argument of the inevitable war brought on by trade jealousy. The sum total of jealousy and hate engendered by this clash of commercial interests must, it is held, have its outcome in an appeal to the arbitrament of war. War has been defined as a duel on an extensive scale, and in the case under consideration the rival trading interests decide that such a duel must be fought. But, unlike all other duels, it is not fought out by the principals. The trading interests fight by proxy and their unfortunate proxies are the fighting men, who are not consulted before the issue is joined.

Apparently we accept this outcome as being as inevitable as the alternation of the seasons. Such a war, for such purposes, is horrible, but it is the Will of Allah. We fold our arms in resignation and the thing is upon us!

But why this appalling acquiescence? If it is true to say that war to destroy foreign commercial rivalry is justifiable, and indeed, in some cases inevitable, there would appear to be no logical reason why there should not be war within the frontiers based on much the same ground. Two rival motor manufacturing firms, for instance, both operating in this country, might mobilize what armed forces they could and seek to eliminate the other as competitor. Such a possibility is, of course, unthinkable. To permit the carrying of trade competition to the point of decision by armed force within the country would be to produce national anarchy. But it surely follows that to carry international trade competition to the point of war is, in fact, to acquiesce in international anarchy. Anarchy is anarchy, outside or inside national frontiers.

The point has already been made that commercial interests have, actually, no more feeling against foreign competition because it is foreign than they have against home competition; commerce, in fact, has an international conscience. We do not permit private interests to employ armed forces of their own, or the national armed forces, against home competition. Why, then, should we permit private interests to use the national forces against foreign competition, which is, in effect, what a war for commercial reasons means?

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Historic sanction for national anarchy may, it is true, be found in the struggles of the barons in the old days, when battles were fought between these individuals and their followers for the possession of lands and cattle. In those days, doubtless, avarice, jealousy and suspicion had a comparatively free hand within the nation itself, and the prizes went to the strongest. But, even under the shadow of the late war, may it not be confidently affirmed that modern civilization rests on something quite different from the doctrine that might is right? Physical force is not permitted, within national boundaries, to settle disputes as to possession between individuals and groups of individuals, and the working classes, on whom the burden of war inevitably falls most heavily, are pertinently asking why physical force should be employed to settle precisely similar disputes which extend beyond national boundaries. They have no ambition to be dragged by the heels by Clausewitz. They get bruised and broken far too much in the process.

The professional soldier, whose ethics are certainly not inferior to those of the politicians and commercial men, can hardly feel happy at being used in a war due to the clashing of trade interests. There is nothing of chivalry and lofty patriotism involved in a commercial war. Materialism is the basis of such a struggle and it is waged, in reality, for the benefit of a small section only of the community, whose dominant motive is that of sordid self-interest. The truth of this is not impaired by the fact that whenever the possibility of such a war arises an attempt will be made, as has happened in the past, to camouflage the issue by allegations that the national honour and the vital interests of the Empire are at stake. Plausible reasons have not been lacking to justify the war we are now waging at so much loss of blood and treasure in Mesopotamia, but discerning men know that, at bottom, the reason why such a costly military enterprise was started and is being continued, is that powerful financial interests have cast envious eyes on the oil deposits and other resources of that country. Motives of much the same kind have been operating behind the various attempts to make war, either open or by proxy, upon the present Russian Government. In France, in fact, either because the cloak of hypocrisy cannot be worn there with so much ease as here—we have a tradition behind us in this matter—or because the Government can afford to be more defiant of the wishes of the common people, there has been little attempt to disguise the fact that war on Russia was desired in the interests of the Russian bondholders.

As things are, the professional soldier has no real choice in



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selecting the causes for which he will fight. He may take up the profession of arms with the purpose of defending his home, his country and his people from foreign aggression, but in the course of his service he may find himself called upon—and, indeed, he frequently is—to risk death and mutilation for something infinitely less worthy. And, whatever his feelings, he may not refuse. Even under modern forms of democratic government the life of the soldier can be, and is, sacrificed for causes it is sheer mockery to call national. The soldier is still the hapless pawn of predatory and corrupt governments, and it is idle to deny, in the face of bitter and continuous experience to the contrary, that such governments can be enthroned in power under the most democratic constitutions that yet obtain.

Is there any possibility of redress? Military discipline, as understood to-day, demands that the soldier shall never reason why, and presumably the soldier accepts this dictum as essential to the effective performance of his function. It is highly probable that even in Great Britain, where every soldier is nominally a volunteer, military opinion would be fiercely opposed to the soldier being conceded the right to say whether or not he would fight for a particular cause. The Army, it would be urged, must fight when ordered to by the constitutional authority and must not reason why. Perhaps this is unassailable military doctrine, but the position of the soldier under it is surely not a happy one. It means his acquiescence in being used by grasping and not over-scrupulous interests which, from time to time, dominate governments. Whether such a situation is consonant with the professional soldier's comparatively high standard of honour and self-respect is not, perhaps, for a layman to say. It would appear to an outsider that sooner or later one of two things must happen: either the soldier must abate his self-respect and his high conception of the honour of his profession, and frankly recognize himself as the potential tool of selfish commercial interests, or, in the alternative, maintaining his present code, must demand the right to say when and for what cause he will fight.

Deferring, for a moment, further consideration of the possibility of any change in the status of the soldier, let us look at the problem from another angle. It is agreed that the abolition of war is a consummation devoutly to be wished by all. A further postulate, which this article has sought, briefly, to establish, is that war is very largely started and maintained by reason of the great difference of outlook between the civilian and the soldier, arising out of the utter dissimilarity of their experiences and sacrifices. Can this cause of war be eliminated by the simple expedient of levelling up possible

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sufferings and sacrifices? Is it not true to say that if it were possible to make it understood that, in any war, the non-fighting peoples would undergo approximately the same terrors, miseries and risks as the fighting men, the possibility of war between civilized peoples would diminish a hundredfold?

Fear exorcises the spirit of jingoism on the battlefield, and fear, engendered by general and persistent bombing, would no less surely destroy the chauvinism of the civilians in a city. There was method in the German madness of frightfulness. The enemy knew the civilian was the driving force behind the war. He knew that with him, much more than with the soldier, rested the power to seek peace and ensue it. If, therefore, he argued, the war could be brought home effectively to the civilian, peace would not be far off.

It is true that the German attempts to destroy the "home front" and effect peace in this way did not succeed. But the failure, I venture to submit, was due to the fact that the attacks were spasmodic, limited in extent and affected only a comparatively small proportion of the people. The story might have been very different had the air raids been of almost daily occurrence and on a vastly extended scale. To at least some comparable extent the war would then have been brought home to the civilians.

As with the stopping of a war in progress, so with the starting of a war. A decision for war, taken with the knowledge that all the nation would be involved in almost equal risks of death and mutilation, would be vastly different from that which simply decreed that a certain section of the fit males should incur all risks in the nation's behalf. The courage of politicians is not, perhaps, to be rated lower than that of soldiers, but Tadpole and Taper are human. If the 670 odd members of Parliament realized that a vote for war meant that they themselves and their families would be subject to an almost equal degree of danger, from wholesale and indiscriminate bombing, as would be experienced by the troops sent forward by their vote to meet the enemy, there is good reason to believe that they would hesitate long before casting such a vote. Equally, if the constituents of these M.P.'s were liable to run the same risks, they would hardly be likely to apply pressure in favour of war. And it is no less certain that many fire-eating editors and journalists, much given to killing international enemies with ink at no risk to themselves, would be much more subdued under the new conditions.

It is comparatively easy to make vicarious sacrifices—and such are the offerings of the non-fighter—on war's altar. Was it not said of a certain politician that he was determined to fight "to the last

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drop of somebody else's blood"? And, of course, his name was legion. The good patriots abound who are prepared to kill the nation's enemies with their mouths, but who have the most excellent reasons for not being able to adopt the more efficacious, but infinitely more risky, methods of the rifle, bomb and bayonet. In the early days of the war many were the men round about forty who stood upon recruiting platforms and urged the youth of the nation to flock to the standards, whilst bitterly lamenting the fact that age denied them the privilege of going themselves. Yet, strangely enough, when the age limit had been raised high enough to admit these oratorical heroes and they were invited to join up, not a few of them, like the young man bidden to the wedding feast, forthwith began to make excuses.

The fighting men were not without knowledge of the existence of many of these cheap and spurious patriots, whose only work was to send others to be consumed in the sacrificial fires. This knowledge bred a sense of injustice and feelings of hate. While the non-fighting civilian bound him fast to the war machine by the power of military law, the soldier was prone to ask, with much bitterness of soul: "Am I not a man and a brother?" Men returned to the line from London with a curious hatred because—

"the people there seemed so callous of their suffering, so utterly without understanding, so 'damned cheerful.' They hated the smiling women in the streets. They loathed the old man who said: 'If I had six sons I would sacrifice them all in the sacred cause.' They desired that profiteers should die by poison gas. They prayed God to get the Germans to send Zeppelins to England—to make the people understand what war meant." *

This kind of sentiment is not pretty, but it is intensely human, and it undoubtedly found lodgment in the hearts of a great number of the fighting troops.

The *cri du cœur* of the soldier was: *Make the civilian understand.* There is, indeed, much to be said for the argument that war should be extended until all civilians, as well as fighting men, were drawn into its vortex of death and destruction, but to it there is a fatal objection. It would be just in making the civilian suffer equally with the soldier. It would undoubtedly be efficacious in making the fighting and non-fighting outlook one and indivisible. But the fatal objection to such a method is that its efficacy cannot well be demonstrated without destroying civilization itself. Daily raids of hundreds of bombing aeroplanes upon great cities, pouring down a

* *See* "Realities of War," by Sir Philip Gibbs.

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hail of high explosive, poison gas and incendiary material, would bring home to the civilians of such cities some idea of the reality of war, but civilization could hardly endure such a demonstration. It must therefore be ruled out.

If it is impossible to drag the civilian into the morass of war with the soldier, can nothing be done to improve the present status of the soldier? Since it is impracticable to *compel* the civilians to suffer as the soldiers suffer and since it is the compulsory inequality of suffering which makes war possible, is not the logical alternative to say that the soldier shall not be *compelled* to suffer more than the civilian? In other words, let the soldier himself decide if and when he will fight, and take away from the civilian the power to compel him.

Obviously, if all soldiers were placed on a purely voluntary basis, so that they were volunteers even on the battlefield, there would be great gain from the point of view of abstract justice. The divorce between the fighting and non-fighting people would be annulled, since the soldiers would no longer be kept fighting against their will by the civilians. The soldier, too, would be emancipated from his present obligation, indefensible in the twentieth century, to fight for any cause which his official superiors may decree, however unworthy he may consider it, under pain of death or some less severe penalty.

But the greatest gain of all would be in the fact that such a change would reduce enormously the possibility of any war and would positively ensure that no war, even on a small scale, would be of prolonged duration. It is not possible here to elaborate the grounds for this deduction, but every great military authority concedes that modern war, in which great armies are thrown against each other, would become impossible without the penal powers of military law. By means of these powers commanders in the field are able to keep their men fighting long after the will to fight has gone.

It is, of course, a *sine quâ non* of such a revolutionary change in the discipline of armies that it should be of universal application. For one nation to adopt a policy of pure voluntarism, just though it be in the abstract, whilst its neighbours relied on rigorous coercive discipline, would be idealistic madness in this imperfect world. Any war between an army not possessing the customary disciplinary powers and another army possessing those powers, could only end in one way—in the utter defeat of the army without the penal powers. No soldier with experience in the field will question this. The explanation of it is simple. It is that war has become such a frightful,

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nerve-racking business that the best of men, animated by the highest motives, are incapable of enduring it voluntarily except for a very short time.

This is fundamental human psychology and applies to what is known as a voluntary army as well as to armies legally conscripted. It must not be forgotten that even in a voluntary army, as at present understood, the voluntarism does not operate beyond the hour of taking the oath. From that time onward the volunteer is on precisely the same footing as the conscript. The act of joining the Army in a peaceful town, fired by enthusiasm for a cause, is a vastly different thing from the act of " going over the top," in the face of a hail of shell and bullets, for that same cause. Battle conditions produce enormous re-adjustments of values. In the act of enlistment life seemed comparatively cheap and the cause greater than everything else. In the front line trench, with death and mutilation imminent, and fear gripping the heart, the outlook alters tremendously. Life, after all, is precious, and is the cause so vital ? . . . .

Granted, however, that it would be madness for any single nation, or group of nations, to adopt a military system of pure voluntarism, while others maintained existing conditions, that is not necessarily the last word. May it not be suggested, even in the *Army Quarterly*, that there is work here lying to the hand of the League of Nations ? It is part of the function of the League to build up—perhaps, indeed, only by long and painful effort—a code of international law which shall receive the sanction and obedience of the whole civilized world. If, as part of that code, it could be decreed that no law should be valid which interfered with the right of all nationals to decide, even on the battlefield, whether or not they considered a particular cause worth fighting for, this would be worth a volume of laws to promote disarmament. An international enactment of this kind would be certain to command the support of the great mass of the civilized peoples, it would constitute a great step forward in safeguarding the peace of the world and would, incidentally, be a belated act of justice to the fighting men of all nations.

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# INTELLIGENCE

FEW departments of war activity, apart from the actual fighting, aroused greater public curiosity and interest than the work of the Intelligence Service. Such interest was only natural, especially in this country, for the secrecy which was associated with the word Intelligence is generally foreign to the character of the British race. The curiosity was perhaps equally natural, for it was surprising in a country where so much general interest is taken in the public administration, and where the Press is so powerful and ubiquitous, that so little was known of the working of our Intelligence system. Since the war came to an end the public curiosity has been satisfied more or less by various revelations, of which it is sufficient to say that it is inconceivable that they have done anything but harm. A little knowledge is proverbially a dangerous thing, and sensational gossiping is undesirable in the best interests of the Service.

Apart, however, from questions of popular interest and curiosity, the growth and functions of the Intelligence Service offer a profitable field for the student of military organization and science. In its higher aspects, that of its relation to national policy and its proper place in the machinery of State, Intelligence is indeed worthy of the attention of statesmen and the higher administration. It may be of value, therefore, to make some examination of the subject, not from the point of view of offering destructive criticism of the past, though some criticism may be necessary, but for the purpose of suggesting the basis of future construction and development. If at the same time it can be shown that these suggestions may lead to greater efficiency and economy, the principal object which the writer has in view will have been attained.

Probably the most convenient method of conducting any such examination will be to deal with the subject under the following three heads: (1) the growth and gradual organization of our Intelligence system during the latter part of the last century; (2) the working of Intelligence during the war period, 1911–1918; and (3) the future organization of Intelligence.



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(1) Growth and Gradual Organization of our Intelligence System during the Latter Part of the Last Century.

As a result of the misdirected economies practised in England after the final fall of Napoleon, we entered upon the war against Russia in 1854 not only badly organized in every department, but without the semblance of an Intelligence organization: our Army landed in the Crimea without any knowledge of the topography of the country and without any maps. No Intelligence system existed and no one appears to have thought of anything of the kind, with the result that a series of soldiers' battles only served to show up the incredible decline of the staff work of the British Army.

The grave defects in our military organization, revealed by the Crimean campaign, led to the establishment in 1855 of a topographical and statistical branch at the Horse Guards, which may be regarded as the foundation of the British Intelligence Service of to-day. It was placed under the Quartermaster-General, and its duties were many and varied; it seems in fact to have acted as the general maid of all work of the staff. In the absence of any school of military thought at this period, it is not surprising to find that amongst its duties was the compilation of returns of all the articles of equipment in use by the British Army of the day, *with illustrations*, and that it also prepared the illustrations for the dress regulations!

In the Indian Mutiny, as in other minor campaigns in which the British Army took part before 1870, and indeed later, the Intelligence organization was merely local and ephemeral, adapted only to meet local conditions. However good the work done, it is in no respect worthy of serious study from an organization point of view, and it may be roughly, but not inadequately, described as a system of secret service, with local native spies and runners.

Some years later Lord Cardwell, the great organizer to whom the British Army owes an everlasting debt of gratitude, read aright one of the lessons of the Franco-German War, namely, the value of Intelligence, and proposed in 1873 to expand the old topographical and statistical section into a real Intelligence section; but some obstacle arose, and his proposal did not then come to fruition. In 1874 it appears that the withdrawal of officers from the Intelligence section made it impossible to carry on the collection of information for offensive and defensive action. In 1878, however, the section took a new lease of life; it then consisted of some twenty officers in five sub-sections and a library, under the direction of

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Sir Archibald Alison, the son of the military historian. Among the urgent needs of the period seems to have been the study of the organization, administration and equipment of the British Army. This was entrusted to the Intelligence department, which also, about this time, carried out a military reconnaissance of the British Isles from a defensive point of view, a useful and much needed piece of work. The usual misplaced economy then cut short these activities, and in 1879 the section was transferred to the Adjutant-General's department. These constant changes of the controlling head show that Intelligence was an " unwanted baby," which nobody wished to grow up ; it is not surprising to find, therefore, that the infant department did not flourish.

Things again went to sleep until the experience of the Balkan war of 1879 again aroused the people and administrators of this country to the fact that war was not a thing of the past. This campaign and the constant threats of war with Russia, which culminated in the Pendjeh incident, made Great Britain realize the Russian peril, and some attempt was made to put our military house in order. The Intelligence department, after a long period of quiescence, became, in 1888, a living organization under the able administration of Sir Henry Brackenbury. After his retirement, however, the activity of the department declined, in the peace atmosphere which enveloped Europe in the nineties, and it was not until 1897 that Intelligence was again considered of any consequence. The section was still under the Adjutant-General and was housed in Queen Anne's Gate. Partly as a result of this detachment, partly owing to the personal characteristics of its director who was much more of a Foreign Office man than a soldier, and partly as a result of the general apathy of the authorities at the War Office, the Intelligence section became less and less a recognized part of our military machinery. The natural results followed. The excellent reports on the Boer Republics, compiled by Sir John Ardagh and his staff, were sent over to the War Office from time to time, where they remained securely in their pigeon-holes. They were either not heard of again, or only produced when it was too late to make any use of them.*

Of our Intelligence system during the South African campaign there is no necessity to say much ; it consisted of the generous use

* As a specimen of the work then done may be mentioned, after this length of time without indiscretion, the feat of a young officer who worked as a navvy in the construction of the Pretoria forts, and brought out the complete plans secreted in his mule harness, not long before the declaration of the war.

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of local guides, scouts and spies, white and coloured, with a centralizing head at Headquarters in the Field.

This field Intelligence was adequate for the purpose in hand: but there were also, presumably, some agents employed in foreign ports and capitals, whose mission was to see if any arms were being shipped to the Boers. This, however, is pure conjecture, based on the case of the "Bundesrath" and on the trouble with Germany which ensued, also on the diversion from their course of some of our transports on their way out.

The South African War taught the British Government and the Army a lesson—that unpreparedness was a crime—and commissions and committees were appointed one after the other to set about repairing the errors of the past. As a result, the administration at the War Office was re-organized on a modern basis, and the work divided, on the German model, between the General Staff and the Administrative Branches. Under the new arrangement the intimate connection between information and action was at last recognized, and the Intelligence department was incorporated in 1905 with the Operations department under one Director, the Director of Operations. The staff of the Intelligence branch now set to work on the German system so far as it was known, and formed, with a very small naval Intelligence section at the Admiralty, the exact origins of which are hard to trace, and an infinitesimal Secret Intelligence Service, the whole Intelligence organization of the country.

The Germans were then the greatest military nation in Europe, and the only nation which had developed Intelligence to anything like a modern pitch. Nothing is more natural than that we should have imitated their methods. Like most would-be imitators, however, we went too far in some directions and not far enough in others; we adopted what, for want of a better term, may be called the "scissors and paste" side of their system of Intelligence and neglected the Secret Service. The one is of course complementary to the other; but we centralized information without having much that was worth having to centralize. It is therefore not to be wondered at that our *useful* information about Germany was far from complete when war broke out.

This, however, brings us to the second or war period, and the point will be further discussed there. Before entering on it, however, it is necessary to examine shortly the growth of this German system, one-half of which we were at such pains to imitate.*

* There was no system of Intelligence in France, either offensive or defensive, in 1870. In his "Études de Guerre: Tactique de Renseignements," Lewal

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The Germans have worked on the maxim of Frederick the Great, " order and method always achieve victory," and applied their usual meticulous thoroughness to the matter of Intelligence. In Frederick the Great's time and in the earlier days of Germany's rise to the rank of a first-class power, greater attention was devoted to secret service and espionage than to the elaborate documentation and classification of facts relating to possible enemies, which later served us as a model and a bogey, but even in this they only copied the French. As Lewal says, " my object is to revive the true doctrines of the French masters Desaix, Thiébault, Berthier, Bugeaud, etc., forgotten by us and applied by the Germans, but not originated by them." They copied, but improved, and did things on a bigger scale. Their preparation before embarking upon war was a copy of Napoleon's, but on a larger scale; they flooded the country which they intended to attack with whole armies of spies.

In their wars of the last century this work was largely organized and carried out by the notorious Stieber, one of the greatest organizers of espionage in history.* In 1854, twelve years before the war against Austria, he established abroad, mainly in Austria and France, a system of espionage, or secret service, for military purposes. In this Stieber's employers revealed their appreciation of the fact that Policy and Intelligence must work hand in hand, that the object of all intelligence is action. It was the sinister combination between Stieber and Bismarck which proved so disastrous first to Austria and later on to France. The cost of the Secret Service organization which the former instituted in those two countries cannot even be guessed, but Stieber's reply to a question on this subject is worth recording: " One cannot estimate in thalers the value, either of bloodshed which has been avoided, or of victories which have been

deplores the French neglect of Intelligence since the days of Napoleon. He states that in 1870 it was found necessary to " organize hurriedly in France an Intelligence service which did not exist." In spite of this fact, however, it may be mentioned that the French succeeded in having " a secret agent for nearly two months at a Prussian headquarters who reported at intervals and sent most detailed information." The only possible comment is that the German defensive measures cannot have been perfect, because Lewal is right when he remarks that " secret service must be founded during the leisures of peace . . . it is impossible to stick too closely to the rule ' prepare and practise in peace what has to be put into execution in war.' "

* His methods of work can be studied at length in Lanoir's " Espionnage Allemande en France," and in Tissot's " La Police Secréte en Prusse." He was a barrister by profession, and first came into notice during the Revolution in Prussia in 1848, when he rendered a personal service to King William IV. He became chief of the Prussian secret police in 1850. He succeeded in making this body an autonomous force outside the ranks of the ordinary police.

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gained." It is estimated that he had about 13,000 agents in France long before hostilities began, and that their number had been increased to 30,000 by the time war broke out. The German secret police, of whom Stieber was in command, actually moved, according to Lanoir, in advance of the German Army.*

As regards the German " bureau centralisateur," this, according to Bronsart von Schellendorf, was found in the Third Section of the General Staff. Its duties, he states, were :

(1) To secure information.
(2) To provide appreciations.
(3) To transmit information.
(4) To collect and distribute topographical information
(5) To prepare maps.
(6) To undertake special missions and reconnaissances

Details of the modern German Intelligence system are naturally lacking (there is no mention of it in any War Office handbook published before 1914), but it is known that it included a very complete system of espionage and of record and documentation of every conceivable item of information. It is possible, therefore, that an undue importance was given to this side of Intelligence, for the danger of losing sight of the real object of any permanent organization, the work of which is not put to immediate use, is a real one, to which further reference will be made in this article. In war it is a different matter : there is no gap between the processes of receiving information and of acting upon it.†

* In spite of Stieber's amazing system of espionage and the reconnaissance work of the German cavalry of which the German official accounts of the war are so full, the loss of contact after Reichshoffen and the complete ignorance of the German staff of the line of French retreat, the lack of information as to the movements of the Army of the Rhine, and many other instances of the same kind, argue a failure in the German system of Intelligence. This was probably due to faulty transmission and distribution of information, which modern inventions have done so much to facilitate, and not to its collection. The failure of six victorious divisions of cavalry to glean any information of MacMahon's advance from Rheims on Metz, and this news leaking out through a Paris newspaper read in London, provide evidence that reconnaissance and espionage are equally necessary in war, supplementary one to the other.

† Incidentally it may be mentioned that to those interested in fomentation by the enemy of strikes, revolutions, and other troubles in England, whether German or Bolshevik, a study of Lanoir's book, Chapters IX.–XI., may not be uninstructive. "L'Avant Guerre," by M. Leon Daudet, published in 1913, throws an interesting light on Germany's pre-war penetration of industry in France.

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## (2) The Working of Intelligence during the War Period, 1911–1918.

The war period has for definite reasons been arbitrarily fixed as extending from 1911 to 1918. It has been so fixed because in 1911 it became clear to the veriest sceptic that Germany meant mischief and to the Government of the day that Great Britain might be included in the scope of Germany's designs of world conquest. The Agadir incident put everybody on the alert: "The Day" was but postponed.

As regards France and her Intelligence system, it is not proposed to say more than that it had foreseen the danger and was organized to meet it.* As regards Germany, signs were not lacking of the revival of her old system, the building up in peace of an espionage system to be ready for war, both in France and England. The latter country was singularly unprepared to deal with such a menace and her defensive legislation was futile. It was a defence merely in name and formed no deterrent; whilst anything in the shape of an active defensive organization simply did not exist.

As regards the rest of the British Intelligence organization, it remained much as has already been described—a combined Directorate of Operations and Intelligence.

At this length of time it is not an indiscretion to reveal what subsequent events have made clear to the world at large. The Cabinet of the day, and a Liberal Cabinet at that, prepared in some measure to meet the German menace and set up in 1911 two secret organizations to work jointly under the Foreign Office, Admiralty and War Office, the one offensive to probe Germany's offensive preparations, the other defensive to grapple with German espionage in England. Though perhaps not the most courageous or far-seeing course, the method adopted was perhaps the best in that it was not provocative to Germany, or calculated to alarm the British public, while negotiations then pending might have resulted in a peaceful solution. It was courageous because of the general antipathy towards what was looked upon in those days as some sort of dirty business, especially in the advanced Liberal circles from which the Government received its principal support. Credit, however, is equally due to the expert naval and military advisers, on whose urgent solicitations the Government arrived at its decision.

* The French information service in 1914 was, however, at fault, to judge by French strategy in August and September: more probably, however, the information was correct but disregarded.

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Of the two organizations set up it is not proposed to say much here. The offensive organization was, and is, secret, and is therefore unsuited for public dissection. The defensive organization is not necessarily so secret, except in its methods. Although it was in its inception military, this is not because of its functions, which are mainly civil, but because its origin was due to military suggestion and its *personnel* were at first, at any rate, military. As regards the triple allegiance to each of the three great departments, it proved at that time no stumbling-block, but rather a source of strength, ensuring the safety of the new organizations; but it is open to question whether this threefold interest in Intelligence is not now responsible for some of the present overlap, duplication and expense.

So matters progressed from 1911, through 1912 and 1913, to the early summer of 1914.

On the outbreak of war the British Intelligence Service at the War Office consisted of five sections, as before, a mapping section and, curiously enough, a medical section. There was also a library, the whole being under a Director of Military Operations. There were employed five G.S. officers, first grade; four G.S. officers, second grade; and five G.S. officers, third grade—with a civilian librarian and a quartermaster, a few attached officers and a suitable proportion of other ranks. The secret offensive and defensive organizations were still in the embryonic stage, but had got to work. The Admiralty Intelligence was infinitesimal and was worked under a Director of the Intelligence Division, who also acted as Chief of Staff to the First Sea Lord.*

No Intelligence organization of any sort, other than these, existed, or was thought of, at that time.

The outbreak of war brought about two immediate results—the departure for France of the whole of the Intelligence staff at the War Office, except the *personnel* of the two secret organizations. This was followed by the creation of an Army for the defence of Great Britain, known as Home Forces, which immediately set up an Intelligence staff both at the Horse Guards, and also in all the Home Commands and Districts, such being the instructions laid down in War Establishments for every army in the field.

Similarly, of course, the British Expeditionary Force created an Intelligence Service. There remained, however, at the War Office, the skeleton of the old Operations Directorate, to which retired officers were appointed. This later on was to have important consequences.

* *See* " The Crisis of the Naval War," by Viscount Jellicoe, p. 8.

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The Admiralty Intelligence department expanded at a great rate to enormous proportions. The whole Empire was at war, and in every part of it an Intelligence Service was set up; every Expeditionary Force when it found its feet did the same thing. It was a long time before the retired officers who had been called to the War Office had the leisure to make any attempt at co-ordination or control. When, however, they were able to look round they, too, joined in the craze for expansion, on which the usual peace-time checks could not then naturally be imposed. Although it is fair to say that a good deal of this expansion was called for by the immense development of the war, it was in some cases simply overdone.*

It will be seen, then, that the outbreak of war led to the immediate expansion of the old Intelligence organizations and to the creation of many new ones, and that these creations and expansions tended, not to diminish, but to increase, as the war progressed. The absence of adequate pre-war preparation and of any sort of national Intelligence Service may be taken as being among the principal predisposing causes, but an equally cogent factor was the vital necessity of obtaining information in every theatre of war and in every country in which Admiralty interests especially were, or might be, involved.

It is, therefore, no reflection on the able and distinguished officers, who were responsible for the organization and the chief direction of the various Intelligence Services before and during the war, to state that these things happened; but the situation is one which should not arise again.

So far we have dealt only with the fighting Services, but it is unnecessary to emphasize even in their case the inevitable duplication of work, the unnecessary expense, the undue expansion of staffs and the minor evils which ensued on the creation of several active organizations, under able and active chiefs, all working for the same end, on almost parallel lines. The competitive element, even in a friendly spirit, has no place in Intelligence work. It may be taken as certain that every evil at the top has an exaggerated reflection in the lower grades of any Intelligence organization, and that detriment to the Service inevitably follows.

As we have seen, the mere size of the war in its normal aspects necessitated the vast and immediate increase of the Intelligence of the fighting Services, but further expansion in fresh directions was equally necessitated by its character. Thus the blockade, owing to the vital importance of neutral trade to Germany, was responsible for

* Major-General Sir Charles Callwell dealt effectively, if a little unkindly, with this question in *Blackwood's Magazine*, December, 1918.

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the creation of the War Trade Intelligence Department, whose duty was the examination of the *bona fides* of every trading transaction which might be made on Germany's behalf, as well as of the parties to the transaction. Such activities were essential to the war and this Department performed signal services, which do not appear to have received the general recognition they deserved. Normal in their nature, but abnormal in their scope and importance, were the censorship of mails, the telegraph and cable censorship, the Press Bureau, which controlled, or rather directed, our own Press; the section which examined the enemy and neutral Press and produced an exceedingly able and useful weekly review; and many other organizations unnecessary to mention at length here. It is of course impossible to overlook the Ministry of Information, but readers must be referred for details of their work to Sir Campbell Stuart's semi-official account, "The Secrets of Crewe House." The present writer has no knowledge of the subject. All were essential to the conduct of the war: their present importance lies in two things: (1) their place in any future organization, (2) the attempts which have been made to continue for some of them an unjustifiable, or a separate, and therefore competitive, existence in peace. It was, however, the study and combating of alleged enemy activities in other directions, coupled with the general appetite for free spending and loose thinking, which led to some of the worst and the least justifiable creations, under cover of the blessed word Intelligence. Few Government departments, especially the temporary ones, thought themselves complete without an Intelligence Service and some even embarked on a sort of Secret Service. The arrest of the agents of one organization by those of another department, with the satisfactory result of closing down one at least of these redundant branches, and thus saving the State a good deal of money, may be taken as symptomatic of this state of affairs. Mysterious offices cropped up everywhere, mysterious individuals with Hush! writ large all over them, jostled each other in the ante-rooms of the public offices. Some, more mysterious than the rest, appeared to secure direct access to the Cabinet and were no doubt responsible for some at least of the outrageous canards which followed each other in rapid succession during the last months of the war. All sorts of highly placed authorities from Ministers downwards, and even private individuals, with their assistance or knowledge, employed agents direct and sent them to the ends of the earth or brought them into this country on curious errands; on pure secret service work; on the quest of phantom rifles which did not exist; on the purchase of

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mythical supplies of this or that essential chemical or mineral, without which something vital to the war could not be made ; and so on. In many cases the missions were of course absolutely justifiable and the persons employed were entirely above reproach. It is, however, not unjust to say that under such a system there must be, and were, wild-cat missions on which were employed undesirables, well known as such to the proper authorities, who ought never to have been allowed to enter or to leave the country.

### (3) The Future Organization of Intelligence.

Before attempting to draw any lessons from the above, or to make any suggestions for future organization, it will perhaps be as well to clear the ground by making certain what Intelligence actually is, and what object it is intended to attain. After that, it will be easier to lay down a suitable organization, to suggest the subdivisions of the main organization into its various parts, and to arrive at the functions which may properly be allotted to those subdivisions. Simultaneously it will be possible to examine the disadvantages and dangers incidental to the Intelligence Service generally ; to consider its reorganization, the question of *personnel*, the transition from peace to war, and other questions germane to the successful performance of the work of the Service.

Intelligence is a misleading term. It may be defined as a form of national defence, which involves, primarily, the collection of all *useful* information about other countries ; and, especially, useful naval and military information, in the case of those countries with which we may ever possibly find ourselves at war. It also involves the protection of our own naval and military secrets from the agents of other countries. In both cases the work is, and must be, secret. From this it follows naturally that nearly every sort of work which involves secret duties of an offensive or defensive nature must fall to Intelligence, and this is especially the case in time of war. It is not necessary to outline such activities, they can safely be left to the imagination of the reader.

Intelligence, like war, falls naturally into two main divisions, offensive and defensive, and the activities of these two divisions lie equally naturally in two clearly defined spheres : abroad and in home territory. The two main Intelligence sections may then be named foreign and home. During the war all sorts of resounding phrases such as Special Intelligence, Security, etc., were invented by ingenious gentlemen, generally to justify a new organization, or to cover the expansion of an old one. There is no form of



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activity which they suggest, which does not fall into one or other of the above two divisions of the Intelligence organization.

Having set out the broad functions of Intelligence as a whole, and having indicated the two main subdivisions and their relative spheres of action, we may attempt to apply to them the lessons of the past. These are :—

(1) That the Services of national Policy and of Intelligence must be worked in the closest possible co-operation.

(2) That Intelligence must be centralized ; that is, that there is no room for competition within the Service itself.

(3) That Intelligence must be built up in peace, if it is to be effective in war.

(4) That the various subdivisions of Intelligence (none of which can be favoured except at the expense of the others) are interdependent and complementary. These are :—

(*a*) The collection of Intelligence.

(*b*) The recording of Intelligence.

(*c*) The transmission of Intelligence.

Two other maxims may be laid down :

(1) That the object of Intelligence is action.

(2) That the essence of Intelligence is speed combined with accuracy.

With regard to the first of these two maxims, the real object of Intelligence is easily lost sight of, as is the case in any organization, the work of which is preparatory for a contingency which may only arise after a great interval of time, or even not at all. In such circumstances the work is apt to become an academic exercise, done for the sake of doing it : whilst the test of efficiency is apt to become quantitative and not qualitative. In other words, records, from being an accessory, become the end in view ; and mass and not matter is regarded as an object of pride.

The second maxim is a consequence of the first, while the first cannot be enforced unless the second is complied with. Speed in the manipulative processes is what is meant, that is, speed in the transmission of Intelligence to the centres at which action has to be taken. This, like most other considerations applying to Intelligence, is self-evident in war and in the field ; like them, too, it is apt to be lost sight of in peace.

To turn to the question of *personnel*, the custom, at any rate in the fighting Services, has been to select officers by no particular system, except perhaps on account of their knowledge of languages. This latter qualification, though desirable, is by no means essential ; it cer-

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tainly cannot compensate for deficiencies in other qualities, which are much more important. It is unnecessary for the writer to try to define these qualities as Lewal has done so admirably. He says that they include " capacity, activity (of body and mind), both specialized and wide general knowledge, and, above all, experience (in these duties)," to which may be added " good health, patience, determination and constant application."

Our British system, however, is to transfer to other duties in the course of promotion on the staff, or of ordinary routine, officers who have shown special aptitude for these difficult and specialized duties and whose knowledge and experience of them are irreplaceable. It is only necessary to point to the Intelligence department of the War Office to-day, in which there are not many officers employed who have had any experience of Intelligence work in the war, and few even before it. Some sort of permanency in their employment is essential for officers selected for the Intelligence Service, and, if they are debarred from the ordinary rewards of the service by such permanency, other rewards, either in pay or decorations, or something else, must be made accessible to them.

If the writer has been at all successful in his intention, he has shown the necessity of a permanent organization, with a permanent staff as a nucleus, and the subdivision of that organization into two main parts or sections, foreign or offensive, and home or defensive.* He has also endeavoured to make clear that the true subdivision of the spheres of action lies in allocating to the former all countries abroad, to the latter home territory. What are to be the duties of this organization ? Logically they must include every form of Intelligence, offensive and defensive, naval, military, aerial, political, commercial and any other which may be thought of. What, however, is the case to-day ? The Admiralty has an Intelligence branch, strength immaterial, but certainly larger than it was before the war. This makes researches, from an Intelligence point of view, into a specified " subject " or " subjects," say, for argument, China, the Republic of Andorra and other matters, but only so far as they concern the Admiralty. The War Office has an Intelligence branch, strength also immaterial, but also certainly much larger than it was before the war. This makes similar researches into the same subjects, but only so far as they concern the War Office. The Board of Trade . . . read as before . . . but

* A third and complementary section, the chief functions of which are the compiling of records and their distribution will also be required. The functions of this section are set out in more detail on p. 342.

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only so far as they concern the Board of Trade. The Air Force and the Air Ministry both have Intelligence organizations. In addition, there are the two secret organizations above referred to, one offensive and one defensive, and a number of special missions and commissions in various countries abroad.

The Foreign Office in the ordinary course of its duties does a great deal of pure Intelligence work, but entirely from a Foreign Office, or political point of view. Until recently there was in the Foreign Office a Political Intelligence department for this purpose; this has been, or is being, abolished; it has, however, a definite place in any new organization.

In addition to the above, the Home Office has created an Intelligence Directorate, whose duties are sufficiently disclosed by recent debates in the House of Commons, and whose strength is immaterial. In any case it is small. Its functions are obviously defensive and are confined, therefore, to home territory.

It is difficult to discuss these matters without making disclosures which are undesirable, or without appearing to involve personal issues. It is not intended to do either: indeed, it is hoped to avoid both. Several considerations arise, however, directly from the above. Neither the Air Force, Air Ministry, Admiralty, War Office, nor the Board of Trade, departments all of which are interested in external matters, can have any pure Intelligence source outside this country (excluding their various official accredited representatives abroad, such as air attachés, naval attachés, military attachés and consuls), except such offensive Secret Service as the country may possess. On what, then, are the various Intelligence organizations in these departments engaged, which could not be better, more quickly and more cheaply, performed by a centralized Intelligence Service?

Another point is this: there is no room for two defensive Intelligence organizations in this country. It is senseless and extravagant for two organizations to be interested in one individual, one because he may be a Bolshevist, the other because he is possibly a spy. It is equally absurd that one organization should examine a movement because it may be hostile to the State—to the country as a whole—and that other organizations should examine it as it may affect the Navy, the Army, the Air Force or any other section of the community. It is more than senseless and extravagant if unnecessary staffs are maintained for the purpose. There is a third consideration, which is that if any one of these departments or organizations is conducting secret service operations independently of the official organization set up for that purpose, those operations should be suppressed.

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It is clear, then, that there should be a centralized Intelligence Department in two sections, foreign and home, under one head, in which Intelligence work shall be done for all the departments. The question arises, under which Minister or Secretary of State shall this organization be placed? From a historical point of view it is unquestionably the Foreign Office, while the argument for such an allocation is strengthened by the need for the closest association between policy and information. The department should be directly under either the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or under his Permanent Under Secretary. The argument for permanence may point to its being placed under the latter, but the closer it is to a member of the Cabinet the better. It may be argued that the head of this organization, as the channel through whom all information reaches the Cabinet, may become a dangerous political force, and that, as he controls the Intelligence Services, he may attempt to meddle in policy. The fact that he is a direct subordinate of the Foreign Minister makes this danger, on the face of it, less than it would be were the principal channel of information a member of the Army Council or of the Board of Admiralty, or even a naval or military officer of high but less exalted rank, who is not so directly subordinate. It is a danger in any case which must be faced; the only thing is to try and lessen it. Another objection which may be urged against this system is that it will lead to delay, that information will less quickly reach the departments vitally concerned. Of course only results will prove the correctness of this criticism, but in the writer's opinion the circulation of information could not fail to be quicker than under the present system. Another objection is certain to be raised, as it has been before,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| By the X Office.<br>" " Y Office.<br>" " Admiralty.<br>" " War Office.<br>" all the above. | " This information is so secret that it must be kept from " | The Y Office.<br>" X Office.<br>" War Office.<br>" Admiralty.<br>Everybody else. |

Although it is true, within limits, that a secret to be kept must be confined to the fewest possible number, the above argument is absurd. In any case it is not Intelligence officers who talk, whilst actually under the new system fewer officers and other *personnel* would see any item of information than is at present the case.

Another objection which will be (and has been) raised is: " Oh, the . . . department or staff could not think of allowing a

soldier, sailor, civilian,
police official, civilian department, etc., etc.,


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to do that sort of work for them." This is the wrong spirit and should be sternly suppressed.


Having come to the end of the rather forensic pastime of raising objections in order to show how easily they can be met, it is now possible to resume the constructive work.

The position of the new organization (1) with regard to the Cabinet, and (2) with regard to its relations with other departments, are shown graphically below. A third diagram shows graphically the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Service: and the necessary details are set out in the text following the diagrams :—


(1) *Position with regard to the Cabinet.*




(2) *Position with regard to other Departments.*




(3) *Internal organization of the Central Intelligence Service.*




* This appointment may not be necessary. It is possible, and indeed it may be preferable, for the Secretary of State to deal directly with the heads of the two sections;

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All three sections would be subdivided geographically as required. The benefits of this organization are—

(*a*) There is one Intelligence receiving station, receiving information from all sources and containing in itself a producing source, the Secret Service.

(*b*) There is only one organization dissecting, comparing, digesting and compiling information; all points of view, aerial, naval, military, political, commercial, financial, etc., being dealt with by appropriate sub-sections, and by expert officials and officers. Not only would there be greater accuracy, but greater economy. Instead of three or more handbooks on, say, the military, naval, commercial, etc., resources of the Republic of China, there would be one handbook with one general section, and three or more special sub-sections.

(*c*) Gradually a team of experts would be collected who could advise on any country from any point of view.

(*d*) The system is flexible; it can be expanded or contracted as desired in order to meet any contingency.

(*e*) The presence of representatives of each important department in each section, and, if necessary, each sub-section, ensures their particular department being supplied immediately with information which concerns it.

(*f*) The close association between the foreign and the home sections ensures the latter being supplied with the earliest information when action is required.

(*g*) The reduction of records to a minimum.

As complete records are kept in a section set up for the purpose, both the foreign and the home sections, as well as all the other Intelligence systems now in being, would only require to keep sufficient records to enable them to carry on their own work.

The present Admiralty, War Office, Air Force, Air Ministry and other Intelligence organizations could then be reduced to a minimum, a director with two or three assistants. These would perform their proper functions of preparing appreciations from a naval, air, military or other point of view; would criticize from the technical point of view the information received; would select *personnel* for attachment and training to the Central Intelligence Service; and would advise the Intelligence Chief as to special points on which information is required.

In no circumstances would they have any power of control or interference in the foreign (offensive) or home (defensive) sections.

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In case of any deficiency in the Service their remedy would be to complain through their official chiefs to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but they should be in close personal relations with the Intelligence Chief or Chiefs.

As regards the transition from peace to war, the nucleus of each organization, both offensive and defensive, for work abroad could be instantly provided from the three sections, additional *personnel* being found from selected officers who had passed through the various sections for training.

One argument only remains to be adduced for Intelligence to be placed on a footing commensurate with its importance whilst there is time, and for money to be spent in the right direction. In the early days of warfare, up to and including the Napoleonic period and even later, Intelligence was a comparatively easy matter. It was easy to build up a Secret Service quickly immediately prior to the outbreak of war and for agents themselves to circulate freely, even during hostilities. This was due to several causes, chief being the fact that wars often took place in territory neutral to both sides, that defensive Intelligence measures were primitive and ineffective, and that the size of armies in the field, relative to the native population, was inferior, or in sparsely populated areas possibly only equal. Armies moved slowly and were accompanied by every sort of civilian auxiliary, sutlers, commissaries, contractors, train and even women. Their movement was made slower by the fact that they generally lived on the country. When it came to a battle, this was between comparatively small forces in a restricted area and, so to speak, under one man's hand. Any Intelligence the commander lacked could be made up on the spot by reconnaissance, and time was often allowed in the days of short-range weapons even to alter the whole dispositions for battle in sight of the enemy. As, however, the organization of armies and communications improves, and as the size of armies and the strategic area in which they manœuvre increases, reconnaissance becomes more and more difficult, and the value of Secret Service, especially before a campaign, is enhanced. The importance of good information, and therefore of the Secret Service, is further enhanced by the possibly disastrous result of a faulty initial concentration or strategic approach, due to incorrect information. A study of the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 shows that Secret Service exercised a potent effect on the course of hostilities, even during their progress, and this was the case also in 1914–1918.

In modern war the immense size of armies, the vast theatres in

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which they manœuvre, the continuous battle front, entailing stationary as opposed to open warfare, have made reconnaissance on the old system impossible. True it has been replaced by reconnaissance from the air. This, however, has its limitations owing to its dependance on photography and to the high percentage of failure to reveal strengths, movements or dispositions of troops. In addition, the increased power of the offensive-defensive against aircraft may at any time blind one side by depriving it of this power. Secret Service, therefore, again becomes of paramount importance, which, to be effective, must be prepared long before war breaks out. This is the more the case now that the wholesale removal of the civilian population either for their safety, or under the corvée, becomes the usual practice, and especially when this is accompanied by the activities of a well-organized system of field contre-espionage, alien and passport control, and all the other defensive machinery perfected during the late war.

The cry is all for economy, and this is one of the main objects of the suggestions made in this article. Money must be saved. It is, however, difficult to estimate the amount which will actually be saved under the proposed system. Anybody who is able to get the *real* figures of the numbers of officers and officials now employed in, or attached to, the various departments for Intelligence purposes in time of peace and on the various special missions and commissions abroad, and then cares to multiply them by the numbers of thousands or hundreds of pounds paid in salaries and other expenses will get probably somewhere near 60 per cent. of the present cost of Intelligence.* Under the proposed system money would be spent, but it would be spent in the right direction in producing information, and this is the real economy. Rigid financial control throughout, and prevention of overlapping and waste would be made possible. At present such controls are not possible, owing to the prevailing dual or triple control, under which these things are everybody's or nobody's business, and whilst each department considers its own interests to be paramount. Effective checks on expenditure are also impossible so long as there are constant changes in the *personnel* of the Intelligence Service.

Efficient Intelligence is the best form of national insurance, although the premiums may come high.

* No attempt has been made to include in these calculations the cost of the Intelligence Services in Mesopotamia, Ireland, with the Army of the Black Sea, or any Naval Intelligence Services which may still be maintained outside Great Britain.

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# THE SCAPEGOAT OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE, 1914. LIEUT.-COLONEL HENTSCH, AND THE ORDER FOR THE GERMAN RETREAT

By Br.-General J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G. (retired R.E.)

According to Princess Blücher ("An English Wife in Berlin"), it was not until the 23rd of September, 1914, that it began to leak out in Germany that there had been a disaster on the Marne. All that the official bulletin of the 10th of September, 1914, had to tell about the battle had been :—

"The portions of the Army which had pursued up to and over the Marne east of Paris were attacked between Meaux and Montmirail by superior forces. They have held the enemy during two days' heavy fighting and have even made progress. As the approach of strong enemy columns was reported, the right wing was drawn back. The enemy nowhere followed. As victory-booty in these actions, fifty guns and several thousand prisoners have up to now been taken."

No further news about the Western front was given to the German public until the 13th of September: it was kept amused with "a new victory of General Hindenburg" and "successes at Lemberg." It was then told :—

"The operations in the Western theatre of war, with regard to which details cannot yet be published, have led to a new battle that stands favourably for us. The unfavourable information with regard to our Armies that the enemy is spreading by all possible means is false."

After that there was silence as to the events of the 6th to the 13th of September. Even in the long list of monographs on battles of the war that the Great General Staff has advertised, though Le Cateau is included (the monograph on it has not yet appeared), there is no mention of the Marne. An anonymous pamphlet "Die Schlachten an der Marne," issued as late as 1916, in defence of von Moltke, was at once suppressed.*

* At the time it was thought to have been written by one of his staff, but in 1920 it was announced that the author was a Herr Kircheisen.



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Gradually, however, the magnitude of the disaster became public property. Rumours were therefore set in circulation from Berlin that the reverse that had occurred had been the fault of the Saxons. Their four Army Corps served together in the Third Army under a Saxon general, von Hausen. It was said its front had been broken and he had been removed from command. This was so far the case that von Hausen was unemployed; but it was on account of severe illness. The rest of the story was not true. Far from it, a wing of the Saxon Army had assisted to drive back Foch, and otherwise it had been entirely successful though it did fight in two parts with a gap between them. The Berlin story never obtained much credence, though it is still persisted in.*

Then succeeded rumours that a Saxon General Staff officer was the guilty party; he had given a wrong order, an order to retire he had no right to give to Prussian troops, and that he had given it in the name of the Supreme Command. There had been an awful mistake, for the Germans, even the Saxons, and particularly von Kluck, were everywhere victorious. The officer had been tried by Court Martial and shot. His name was Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, head of a section of the Great General Staff in the Field.

So much for rumour. It was not until June, 1919, when the Saxon Generalmajor Baumgarten-Crusius published his book "Die Marneschlacht, 1914," "compiled from War records," in order to destroy for ever the absurd legend about the Third Army and its leader, that some of the facts began to be known. It is to the quarrel between the Saxons and the Prussians that we owe it. Since then other books on the Marne have appeared, among them those of the commanders of the German First and Second Armies, and there have been numerous magazine articles and letters on the subject of Colonel Hentsch. Finally, the result of the Court of Enquiry on him in 1917 has just been published in the *Militär Wochenblatt*, and we have practically the whole story. Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch actually did have a great say in the orders for the retreat from the Marne, and his name will doubtless be connected with the battle for all time.

At the outbreak of war, he was one of the two officers in charge of the Foreign Armies section of the German Intelligence, one half of which dealt with the French Army and those of Western States; and the other with Russia and the rest of the world. On

* *E.g.* by Generalmajor Tappen in his pamphlet *Bis zur Marneschlacht*, published this year. He was head of the Operations section of the Supreme Command in 1914, and bears some of the blame for the defeat at the Marne.

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mobilization he became head of both parts, and in this capacity accompanied Supreme Headquarters into the Field. He appears, however, to have been principally employed in liaison work in August-September, 1914, and was therefore well known to the Army Staffs.* It is certain that he took out to the First Army the Supreme Command operation orders of the 5th of September (which ordered von Kluck to face towards Paris). His arrival is mentioned by Generalmajor von Kuhl, von Kluck's Chief of the General Staff, who further accepted his covering authority for von Kluck doing something quite different to what was ordered, and pressing on southward.

"The taking of a new front towards Paris," Hentsch said, when asked, "need not be hurried, but can be carried out at complete leisure (*volle Ruhe*)."

The custom that obtained in the German Army in 1870–1 as regards the powers of General Staff liaison officers of Great Headquarters is well known †: they were not mere messengers and carriers; they were expected to explain orders, and even to give orders if necessary, in the name of the Chief of the General Staff; being supposed to be fully conversant with his wishes and intentions. There was nothing unusual, therefore, in Hentsch taking upon himself to approve von Kluck's delay in carrying out his orders. No one probably knew this better than von Kuhl, for he had served twenty-two years on the Great General Staff. Hentsch was well known to him and had served under him.

During the battle of the Marne Supreme Headquarters were back at Luxembourg, more than 150 miles from the First Army. Their only means of communication with the armies was by wireless, which worked very slowly, messages taking eight—even twelve—hours to get through, and by officers in motor cars. The great machine had been started and by the 6th of September, if not earlier, had escaped control. By the 8th von Moltke had no clear conception of what was happening in the great battle. What he did to obtain news and co-ordinate action, and what happened in consequence, can hardly be better described than in the words of the Memorandum ‡ signed by Ludendorff on the 24th of May, 1917, numbered "Chief of the Staff of the Field Army, No. 2229." This paper embodies the results of the enquiry which Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch asked for in 1914, but which was not held until Hindenburg-

* Von François, "Marneschlacht und Tannenberg," pp. 102, 108.
† *See* Rousset's "Le haut commandement Allemand en 1870–1."
‡ Given in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 18th of September, 1920.

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Ludendorff were in power. It will be given in full. Further information elucidating its plain official statement will then be given.

" Colonel Hentsch, then Lieut.-Colonel and Head of a Section on the Staff of the Chief of the Staff of the Field Army, on the 8th of September, 1914, at Great Headquarters received verbal instructions from the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army (Generaloberst von Moltke), to motor to the Fifth, Fourth, Third, Second and First Armies [a round trip of some 400 miles] and bring back a clear idea of the situation. In the case that rearward movements had already been initiated (*eingeleitet*) on the right wing, he was instructed so to direct them that the gap between the First and Second Armies would be again closed, the First Army going, if possible, in the direction of Soissons.

" Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch was therefore authorized, in the specified circumstances, to give binding instructions in the name of the Supreme Command.

" He motored on the 8th of September, 1914, to the Headquarters of the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies, and spent the night of the 8th–9th September at Second Army Headquarters. The commander of the Second Army made the decision to retire behind the Marne early on the 9th of September, independently (*selbstständig*).

" Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch agreed with this conclusion and motored on to the First Army. There, after discussion of the situation with the Chief of the Staff on the afternoon of the 9th of September, he gave the order for the retreat in the name of the Supreme Command, quoting the powers conferred on him. He was justified in this, for the case provided for in his instructions—the initiation of rearward movements—had arisen.

" Whether the decision of the Second Army Headquarters and the order of Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch to the First Army Headquarters to retreat were actually necessary from the situation must be decided by historical research in later years.

" Colonel Hentsch incurs no personal reproach that he went beyond what he was entitled to do. He acted solely in accordance with the instructions given to him by the then Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

" I request that this decision may be circulated down to divisional staffs.

" By order [signed] LUDENDORFF."

It seems strange that a comparatively junior officer should be given so fateful a task. It has been suggested that General von Stein, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was available. The device of one Lieut.-Colonel motoring behind the front of five armies to co-ordinate a retreat, if necessary, is, to say the least of it, hardly suggestive of expedition. However, it was all that the " Brain " of the German Army could evolve. General von Kuhl, writing after events,* suggests that there should have been a special

* " Der deutsche Generalstab," p. 194.

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commander for the three armies of the right wing, or that there should have been an advanced Great Headquarters nearer the armies, for the collection of reports and forwarding of orders. But no one thought of this at the time, for such an arrangement had of course not been found necessary at Staff Tours and War Games; and the German Signal Service, in any case, was far behind the British in efficiency and equipment.

It would appear obvious, from Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch being sent on his important mission on the 8th of September after his decision at First Army Headquarters on the 5th of September, that he did correctly interpret the intentions of the Supreme Command (O.H.L.) on this occasion, and still enjoyed their entire confidence.

It further appears, from the nature of von Moltke's instructions, which only contemplated a retreat, that the Chief of the General Staff considered the German Armies on the right beaten, or, at any rate, not likely to be victorious.

The situation into which the Germans had blundered on the 5th of September might well make him think. For half a century German military writers had preached envelopment, and tried to make our flesh creep with bogies of Sedan, and, after von Schlieffen's celebrated magazine article, of "Cannae." There is hardly a German book or pamphlet on war since 1911 that does not allude to Hannibal's double envelopment, to sabre-rattling accompaniment.

One cannot restrain a smile at the value of "Doctrine": for when the "Brain of the German Army" went to war—instead of manœuvres—this brain, which had so long posed as a super-brain until the world nearly believed it was, not only failed, even with the help of a stolen start, to envelope its less ready foe, but the army it controlled was enveloped—and doubly enveloped. Unfortunately, the French cavalry was too worn out by senseless *randonnées* in Belgium to be in a position to complete the Cannae, but General de Cornoulier Lucinière's provisional division of cavalry, all that Sordet's Cavalry Corps could send into action, did get in rear of the Germans, and was within an ace of capturing von Kluck, as that Commander himself relates. To complete the proof of their incapacity to handle large armies, the Germans provided a lightly held gap of thirty miles in their front to assist the enemy in breaking it. Of this General Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army and the B.E.F. took some advantage, so that that French Commander could truthfully tell his Army on the 9th of September,

"turned on both flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is retreating."

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The Germans unfortunately fell short of the complete military bankruptcy of encirclement, from the sheer fatigue of the Allies.

Is the military art a fraud? Far from it; there were good and definite reasons for the failure of the "Brain." It had been poorly nourished.

The writer, who has known the German Army fairly intimately since, as a child, he saw it in occupation of northern France in June, 1871, often advanced the opinion before the war that from the moment the Kaiser Wilhelm II. came to the throne in 1888 the Army began to go downhill, except as a parade Army. The ex-Kaiser could not tolerate a soldier of real independence of character; good men were thrust aside and passed over, and courtiers and sycophants promoted. The most notorious case is that of Lieut.-General von Kretschmar, who was uncourtierly enough to defeat him at divisional manœuvres shortly before he came to the throne; in 1889 the General was informed that he would not be promoted. There were good men in the German Army, but they were not on the Great Headquarters Staff when the war commenced. Hindenburg was unemployed and Ludendorff in a subordinate staff appointment, whilst von Prittwitz and von Waldersee were selected to defend East Prussia.*

To resume: Generalmajor Tappen, who, as already mentioned, was head of the Operations section, states that before Hentsch was dispatched—

"there was a thorough discussion of the situation [at Supreme Headquarters] at which it was emphasized that it was important to hold out (*ausharren*) and avoid any rearward movement." †

Considerable doubt has been thrown on the value of Tappen's statements by von Hausen, von Kuhl, and others in the public Press. Even he, however, does not assert that anything about holding on was included in Hentsch's instructions: he was merely to co-ordinate the movements of the armies if a retreat had been initiated.

Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch died as a Colonel in Rumania in 1916;

* GrossAdmiral von Tirpitz in his "Erinnerungen," p. 139, says, "a lack of men of strong character ruled in Berlin . . . the forceful men, who in 1866 and 1870, and even 1848, came to the top, were in our days of trial not available in the same number, or were not put in the right places."

† "Bis zur Marne," p. 24. We need not go in this paper into a criticism of the fatal mistake made by Tappen of sending two corps to Russia on the 26th of August from the striking wing, instead of from the left. This adds another item to the blunders of the "Brain."

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von Moltke is also dead ; so neither can defend himself personally. Both of them left written statements with regard to the incidents of the 8th–9th of September. When arrangements, however, were made in 1916, after von Moltke's death, to publish his apologia, they were officially stopped, and nothing more has been heard about it. Part of Hentsch's statement has been printed in the *Militär Wochenblatt*, and the published extracts of the First Army War Diary, with von Bülow's and von Kluck's statements, practically cover the important period of his mission.

What Hentsch reported of the situation in the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies, we have not yet been told in full. Tappen states that " in general," as regards the two first, he said, " the Fifth and Fourth Armies can practically stay where they are." Von Hausen, the Commander of the Third Army, in his book describes its position on the 9th of September as *hoffnungsvoll*, which is a stronger expression than our " hopeful "—

" The eastern wing of the Third Army," he says, " had successfully withstood an enemy superior in numbers, the centre and western wing had beaten the enemy (Foch) at Mailly and forced him back."

This is substantially correct.

Hentsch's report of what occurred at Second Army Headquarters is as follows :—

" I discussed the situation thoroughly with Generalfeldmarschall v. Bülow, General von Lauenstein (his Chief of Staff), and Oberstleutnant Matthes (Operations) on the evening of the 8th of September in the Château of Montmort. We weighed every possibility for avoiding a retreat ; the tone of the Army Staff was calm and confident. At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th of September, I examined the situation once again with General von Lauenstein on the basis of the reports that had come in during the night. After the First Army had withdrawn the III. and IX. Corps from the Marne to its right wing, there was no other possibility but to go back at once across the Marne."

The right flank of the German Second Army was, in fact, more than turned. Part of Franchet d'Esperey's infantry was actually behind it, not to mention Conneau's Cavalry Corps, which was on the early morning of the 9th approaching Château Thierry.

It may be recalled here that von Kluck on the 6th of September, when he took the II. and IV. Corps back to assist the IV. Reserve Corps against General Maunoury's enveloping attack, had left the III. and IX. Corps with von Bülow, covering the right flank of the Second Army. Early on the 7th, however, he had urgently recalled

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them to his own Army. Kluck's message to the Second Army asking them was significant :—

" Assistance of the III. and IX. Corps on the Ourcq is urgently required. Enemy considerably reinforced. Please start Corps in direction La Ferté Milon and Crouy."

To return to Hentsch's report ; it continues :—

" There behind the Marne, the Army could and would stop. The basic condition for this was, however, that the First Army should take over the protection of the right flank of the Second Army and prevent the British from crossing the Marne west of the Second Army."

We know that the First Army was not in a position to accomplish this, and that by the evening of the 9th the greater part of the B.E.F. was across the Marne.

Von Bülow's own account of Hentsch's visit is a little disingenuous.* He says :—

" When early on the 9th of September numerous enemy columns crossed the Marne between La Ferté Jouarre and Château Thierry, there remained no doubt that the retreat of the First Army was, for both tactical and strategical reasons, unavoidable, and that the Second Army must also go back, in order not to have its right flank completely enveloped. In agreement (*Uebereinstimmung*) with the representative of O.H.L. (Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch), I was convinced that the most important task of the Second Army was to support the First Army north of the Marne and offer it again the possibility to connect with the right wing of the Second Army in the direction of Fismes."

As no part of the B.E.F. (except the 11th Hussars) had crossed the Marne by 5.30 a.m. (British time 4.30 a.m.) on the 9th of September, when Hentsch left Second Army Headquarters, and no French troops had crossed at that hour, von Bülow had other reasons for retirement than those he gives ; and Hentsch knew them and, in these words, told the First Army :—

" The right wing of the Second Army has been driven back (*zurückgeworfen*), not drawn back."

That this was the case is fully confirmed by a statement made by the Commander of the 13th Division, VII. Corps,† which stood on the extreme right of the Second Army. After the French had attacked him all day on the 8th, they broke through his front, and his whole division went back. His own words are :—

" A weak enemy detachment ‡ succeeded in the darkness in breaking through where two companies of the 57th Infantry Regiment were

* " Mein Bericht zur Marneschlacht," p. 60.

† General v. François, pp. 104 *et seq.* The other division of the VII. Corps, the 14th, was farther down the line and not alongside the 13th.

‡ The German is " eine schwächere feindliche Abtheilung."



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interpolated between the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 158th Infantry Regiment. As the strength of the enemy could not be ascertained [he has said it was weak !], I gave the order to go back to the Montmirail—Artonges railway." *

One might quote dozens of instances where German commanders have argued that they were not driven back, because they gave an order to retire. We need not, however, quibble over the words, and Hentsch no doubt interpreted them correctly as "thrown back." A German division of 1914, and that a flank division, was hardly likely to be ordered back except for very strong reasons: the compulsion of the enemy. But the full significance of the retirement of the German 13th Division is not grasped until one looks at the 1/80,000 map, and finds that the southern half of the Montmirail—Artonges railway faces (for the Germans) west, and the northern half, where the 13th Division stood, *north-west*.

The diagram provided by von Bülow is more illuminating on the subject than his text. It shows half the French Fifth Army and the whole of the B.E.F. at 10 a.m. on the 9th as having broken through the Germans on a thirty-mile front, and in the act of turning outward to envelope his right and von Kluck's left. To show them in this position at that hour is a little premature; von Bülow had evidently taken counsel with his fears, and, as we have so often heard lately, "a general is beaten who thinks himself beaten." Ludendorff's conclusion that von Bülow made the decision to retire seems completely justified. The particular effect of such a decision by von Bülow on Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch should be considered. It was expected by the whole General Staff when von Schlieffen retired in January, 1906, that von Bülow would succeed him.

"With Generals von Bock, von Eichhorn, von Haeseler, and von der Goltz, he was reckoned among the best Corps commanders that the German Army had possessed. His intellectual gifts and capacity were generally recognized. The Kaiser and the Supreme Command had a high consideration for his judgment." †

One may well imagine that von Moltke, in sending Hentsch off, said to him, "You had better be guided by von Bülow"; for he, poor man, the humble bearer of an historic name,

"had never expected to be Chief of the General Staff, had never prepared for it," ‡

* The enemy was the 18th Infantry Regt. of the French XVIII. Corps; the place Marchais. The Germans fled leaving dead and wounded behind (J. Maze in "Les Champs de Bataille de l'Epopée. La Marne," p. 159).

† Von François, p. 102, writing of 1914.

‡ Von Stein (Deputy Chief) in his "Erlebnisse," p. 37.

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and had spent the greater part of his life first as A.D.C. to his uncle and then to the Kaiser. In any case, von Bülow's decision would weigh much with a Lieut.-Colonel of the General Staff.

It may be of interest to note here that von Bülow when commanding the III. Corps in peace time had been celebrated for "shoulder to shoulder" tactics, and his operation orders always allotted very definite boundaries even to small units. In August, 1914, he was constantly clamouring for the First and Third Armies to keep near him. He was, therefore, more likely to be disturbed by the knowledge of gaps in the line than a less precise and more up-to-date commander; and he was sixty-eight years of age.

We now come to what happened at von Kluck's headquarters when Hentsch arrived there with von Bülow's decision in his mind. One extraordinary feature of the visit is that he did not see von Kluck, but did his business with the General Staff. Von Kluck complains of this; it is certainly curious that his Chief of Staff, von Kuhl, did not inform him of the presence of the representative of O.H.L., and detain the bearer of such an important decision. The explanation seems to be that, as Hentsch took seven hours to travel between the two Army Headquarters, the Second had already sent information by wireless that it was going back, and the First Army had already decided that it must retreat before Hentsch arrived. This will be referred to again later. The entry in the First Army Operations War Diary with regard to his visit is :—

"Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch brought the following information :—The situation is not favourable. The Fifth Army is held up before Verdun; the Sixth and Seventh before Nancy—Epinal; the Second Army is simply exhausted. The retreat behind the Marne is irrevocable. The right wing of the Second Army has been driven, not drawn, back. It is, therefore, necessary for all the Armies to be off together: the Third Army north of Chalons, the Fourth and Fifth, in co-operation via Clermont in the Argonne on Verdun. The First Army must also go back, direction Soissons—Fère en Tardenois; possibly farther, even to Laon—La Fère.

"He then drew the lines to be reached by the Armies on the map of the Chief of the Staff of the First Army, General Kuhl, with charcoal.

"A new Army would be collected at St. Quentin. Thus new operations could be commenced.

"General Kuhl remarked that the First Army was in the midst of an attack; a retreat was a very ticklish matter, as the troops were thoroughly mixed up and thoroughly exhausted.

"Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch stated that, nevertheless, nothing else was possible. He admitted that a retreat out of the fight in progress in the direction ordered was not feasible, only perpendicularly to the front, not farther east than Soissons, with the left wing behind the Aisne. He

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emphasized that these instructions would hold good whatever further information might come in. He had full powers.

" The Deputy Chief of Staff of the First Army, Colonel von Bergmann, was present at this conversation."

Thus ends the First Army account. Colonel Hentsch's statement traverses it in several particulars, and adds that Colonel Bergmann came in " much later," after the discussion with von Kuhl, and that the account of his visit was entered up by the First Army not at once, but on the 10th. Those who know how and when War Diaries during a retreat are written will probably believe Hentsch; more especially as we are told that there is nothing about his visit in the Second Army War Diary.

Hentsch's account is that " on account of the *panics* behind the front," it was not until about midday that he reached First Army Headquarters at Mareuil (sixty miles as the crow flies from Montmort, so he did not make more than ten miles an hour).

" I do not know what interchange of information and intentions had taken place between First and Second Armies meanwhile. In any case, General von Kuhl received me in the village street with the words, ' Well, when the Second Army goes back, we can't remain here.' The intentions of the Second Army must, therefore, have become known to the First Army by this time—about 12.30 p.m."

He then discussed every possibility thoroughly with General von Kuhl, who was alone.

" The situation of the First Army about midday was such that the left wing had *already* received the order to go back to the line Crouy—Coulombs.* The possibility of the Second Army holding the line of the Marne was, therefore, out of the question; it must go farther back if its flank and rear were not to be enveloped by the British on the 10th at latest.

" My question, whether the Second Army could not be assisted at once was replied to in the negative, on account of the situation on the left wing.

" General von Kuhl then said that ' the position of the right wing was favourable; the IV. and IX. Corps were attacking and had prospect of a success. More was not yet known.' "

But Hentsch adds :—

" I know, however, for certain that just at this time a report from the IV. Corps came in that it could not carry out the attack, as it was itself attacked by strong forces. I also know for certain that I asked

* That is, across the Ourcq and to face south against the British. Crouy is on the Ourcq about ten miles north of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where the British 4th Division, the left of the B.E.F., crossed the Marne, and Coulombs is three miles east of Crouy.

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General von Kuhl if the First Army would not be in a position to support the Second with its whole force next day (10th of September), if it succeeded in defeating its own immediate enemy on the 9th. This was negatived on account of the state of the Army." *

After discussing every possibility, Hentsch used the powers given him and gave the order for the First Army to retreat. He further states :—

" I am firmly convinced that on my return to Supreme Headquarters on the 10th, they thoroughly concurred in my arrangements."

This seems confirmed by the fact that O.H.L. issued no orders until 1.15 p.m. on the 10th, after Hentsch's return, and then merely *put von Kluck until further notice under von Bülow.* The next orders, timed 5.45 p.m., directed von Bülow to go back behind the Vesle.

Von Kluck's hints that, but for the orders given him to retreat, he would have been able " to exploit the success already commenced against Maunoury " and then turn against the British Army, " if, after the fight at Montbertoin, it ventured to push forward," † seem to have little to justify them. We have seen that there were panics behind the front where the B.E.F. was attacking ; ‡ that the left wing of the First Army had been ordered back before Hentsch's arrival, and that part at least of its right wing was unable to get forward.

No reinforcements from the East, from Antwerp or elsewhere reached the Germans on the Aisne until the 13th, when the VII. Reserve Corps from Maubeuge, followed by the XV. Corps from Alsace appeared. They could not have reached the Marne so soon even as the 13th.

No one can say with certainty what would have happened in a battle of 1914 if something that was not done had been done ; but it would appear that the decision made by von Bülow and acted on by Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, saved the German Army from a greater disaster than it actually suffered. Fighting with both flanks enveloped, its front broken, enemy cavalry in its rear, its supply of ammunition nearly exhausted, without organized lines of communications, in a hostile country, and with no reinforcements

* Von Kluck, p. 123, says that Hentsch gave the reasons : " shaking clear of Maunoury, reorganization of the Corps (divisions and brigades were mixed up), replacing ammunition and supplies, sending off the Train, arranging for security of communications : all measures taking up much time."

† " Der Marsch auf Paris," p. 123.

‡ It was covered by four German cavalry divisions with 9 Jäger battalions, the 5th Division, and Kraewel's Composite Brigade.

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in sight, it was, to say the least of it, in such an unfavourable strategical situation that there was only one course: retreat.

Germans are now consoling themselves by arguing that if they had won the battle of the Marne, it would have made no difference in the result of the war. Professor Delbrück has said that the peace terms that the German Government would have offered in September, 1914, would have been so fantastic that France must have gone on fighting. We can leave the Germans with this consolation for the failure of their General Staff to handle in war time larger bodies of troops than they were permitted to practise with in peace—and take warning to ourselves.*

* Since the above article was put in print the following additional information has been published in Germany:—

(1) "At Second Army Headquarters the order for the retreat was given without consultation with the two neighbouring Armies, and only after an aeroplane report had come in of the advance of five long columns against the Marne between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Château Thierry. [Five British divisional columns and a French cavalry column, directed on Azy, were moving against this section of the front on the morning of the 9th of September, 1914.] Generaloberst von Bülow then sent a wireless message to the First Army that he was beginning the retreat behind the Marne between Damery and Epernay. Before this happened Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch had left to arrange the retirement of the First Army to the north-east." (*See* Suevicus in *Wissen und Wehr*, p. 449, 1920.)

(2) "Hentsch, in the portion of his report that had not yet been published, has expressly written: 'I was charged in case of necessity to order the retreat of the whole army to the line St. Menehould—Rheims—Fismes—Soissons. I was expressly given full powers to issue orders in the name of the Supreme Command. . . . In the case of the First Army I drew attention to the full powers conferred on me, and ordered the retreat in the name of the Supreme Command.'" (*See* Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Lobnitz, formerly of the Great General Staff, in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 25th of September, 1920.)

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# THE FRENCH PLAN OF OPERATIONS, AUGUST, 1914*

*TRANSLATION*

CONTRIBUTED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

## PLAN 17†

NOTE.—Each Army Commander received on the 7th of February, 1914, a copy of the section of this document that referred to his command; their receipts for it are kept in a special file by the 3rd Bureau of the (French) General Staff.—BELIN.‡

### DIRECTIONS FOR THE CONCENTRATION

*General Situation.*—From a careful study of information obtained it is probable that a great part of the German forces will be concentrated on the common frontier. They may cross this frontier in places before our general operations can be developed.

*Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief.*—Whatever the circumstances, it is the C.-in-C.'s intention to advance, all forces united, to the attack of the German Armies.

The action of the French Armies will be developed in two main operations: one, on the right, in the country between the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul; the other, on the left, north of a line Verdun—Metz.

These two operations will be closely connected by forces operating on the Hauts de Meuse and in the Woëvre.

*General Distribution of the Forces in the Theatre of Operations.*—The First and Second Armies will at first operate between the Rhine and the Moselle below Toul, prolonged west of that place

* An article on the German plan of campaign in the West will appear in the April number of the *Army Quarterly*.

† This plan was in force when hostilities commenced. It is translated from Appendix III. of "La Bataille de la Frontière (Août, 1914) Briey," by M. Fernand Engerand, who was given access to it by the Minister of War. This book is reviewed in "Notes on Foreign War Books."

‡ General Belin, General Joffre's First Chief of the Staff.



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by the Marne—Rhine Canal, and the line Vaucouleurs—Gondrecourt.

The Fifth Army and the Cavalry Corps will operate north of the line Verdun—Metz.

The Third Army will act as link between these two operations.

The Fourth Army will provisionally be placed in the second line ready to move up either to the south or to the north of the Third Army; an alternative detrainment of part of this Fourth Army has consequently to be provided for, and eventually a change in the composition of the other Armies.

The two groups of Reserve Divisions, which will be at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief will at first be placed in rear of the wings of the general front

### First Army

5 Corps (VII., VIII., XIII., XIV., XXI.); 2 Cavalry Divisions (7th and 8th); 5 Regiments of Heavy Artillery (six batteries of 120 L., six batteries of 155 C. T. R.); and the two groups at Epinal.

*General Idea.*—This Army will attack in the general direction Baccarat—Sarrebourg—Saarguemines—the right of the main body following the crest of the Vosges, and the extreme right advancing into the plains of Alsace so that the right of whole battle front may rest on the Rhine.

By this advance it will be able to co-operate with the offensive of the Second Army which is to move in the direction of Château Salins.

It may be called upon to move out from the Meurthe on the 12th day of mobilization. As a preliminary measure, the First Army will, as early as possible, be in a position to drive back the enemy from the eastern slopes of the Vosges, north of the Schlucht, but at the same time it will avoid becoming engaged with any strong forces in the Alsace plains.

A part of this Army will advance as early as possible, on the order of the Commander-in-Chief, into Upper Alsace by the Belfort gap, the pass of the Schlucht and the intermediary passes, in the general direction of Colmar.

*Special Idea for the Group operating in Alsace.*—The order to advance into Alsace may be given by the Commander-in-Chief any time after the fourth day of mobilization,

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## MAP TO ILLUSTRATE PLAN 17.




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The part of the First Army to carry out this operation will consist of the VII. Corps and the 8th Cavalry Division.

Its special idea is to hold in Alsace, by attacking them, any enemy forces which may attempt to advance on the eastern slopes of the Vosges, and to assist the removal of that part of the population of Alsace that has remained faithful to the cause of France.

### Second Army

5 Corps (IX., XV., XVI., XVIII., XX.); 2 Cavalry Divisions (2nd and 10th); 1 Regiment of Heavy Artillery (3rd Regiment); six batteries of 120 L.; seven batteries of 155 C. T. R.; 1 group of four batteries of 120 L. (of the 4th Regiment). 2nd Group of Reserve Divisions (59th, 65th, 70th). Headquarters: Neufchâteau

*General Idea.*—This Army is to be ready to attack in the general direction Château Salins—Sarrebruck. For this purpose, it will make use of the Nancy bridgehead, for the protection of which it will be responsible. Its dispositions will be made so that it can at first occupy a front Lunéville—Grand Couronné de Nancy, from which line it may be called upon to advance on the 12th day of mobilization.

It should be possible to send the 2nd Group of Reserve Divisions to the area north of Nancy as they detrain, so as to oppose any possible operation of German forces coming from Metz and to assure protection of the left flank of the Second Army.

### Third Army

3 Corps (IV., V., VI.); 1 Cavalry Division (7th); 1 Regiment of Heavy Artillery (part of the 2nd Regiment); 3 batteries of 120 L.; 3 batteries of 155 C. T. R.; 3 groups of four batteries of 120 L. (of the 4th Regiment). 3rd Group of Reserve Divisions (54th, 55th, 56th). Headquarters: Verdun.

*Zone of Operations.*—To the south, bounded by the line Lerouville (inclusive)—Hauts de Meuse.

To the south-east by the line Girauvoisin—fortress of Toul (inclusive)—the Moselle above Toul.

To the north by the line (inclusive) Villosne sur Meuse—Haraucourt—Ecurey—Damvillers—Romagne sur les Côtes.

*General Idea.*—The Third Army forming the connecting link

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between the main operations to be carried out on the right bank of the Moselle, to the south, and north of a line Verdun—Metz, to the north, will be ready either to force back on to Metz and Thionville any enemy forces which may have advanced from that direction, or to prepare the preliminary investment of Metz.

It will be responsible for the protection of the Hauts de Meuse on which its operations will be based. For this purpose, it will employ the group of Reserve Divisions and the heavy artillery which are allotted to it to hold the positions the occupation of which has been planned. The same units are intended to enable the Army afterwards to organize, as mentioned above, the investment of Metz.

It will be ready to make a general offensive from a line Domvère en Haye—Vigneulles les Hatton Chatel—Ornes any time after the 12th day of mobilization; it will at first co-ordinate its movements on the right with the Second Army and on the left with the Fifth Army.

Consequently, it will be necessary for it to keep a considerable force always in reserve in order to extend, according to circumstances, the operations of the Second Army on the right bank of the Moselle or those of the Fifth Army in the northern Woëvre.

### *Additional Directions for the Third and Fifth Armies*

1. The II. Corps will be responsible for organizing the south-eastern front, that is to say the high ground of Ire-le-Sec, between the Loison (Lametz district) and the Othain (about Marville).

2. The organization for defence of the Hauts de Meuse from Ornes to Damvillers along the Côtes de Romagne and De Murimont will be carried out by the Third Army. These heights will be defended by any available units of the IV. Corps, which will be relieved as soon as possible by the 54th Reserve Division.

3. The 4th Infantry Division covering the northern Woëvre will have a detachment (six companies of the 120th Regt.) in the Azannes district to keep touch with the fortress of Verdun until the arrival of the IV. Corps.

In the event of the force covering Spincourt (18th Battalion of Chasseurs à Pied) being compelled to withdraw before the arrival of this brigade (*sic*) it will retire on the detachment about Azannes to co-operate with it in holding the Côte de Romagne.

4. From the moment the brigade of the IV. Corps arrives near Azannes, the Hauts de Meuse to Damvillers (inclusive) will come in the zone of operations of the Third Army.

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The limit of the zones of operations of the Third and Fifth Armies may, in addition, be modified before the time (12th day of mobilization) when the main body of the Fifth Army reaches the Meuse, in accordance with the situation which may arise out of the events of the first days of the campaign in the northern part of the theatre of war.

NOTE.—The field works to be constructed in order to organize the defences that are desired, will be studied in peace time. As regards the positions north-east and south-east of Montmédy, the projects have been undertaken by the II. Corps; as regards those along the Hauts de Meuse, from Ornes to Damvillers by the VI. Corps. The projects will be sent to the IV. Corps.

### FOURTH ARMY

3 Corps (XII., XVII. and Colonial); 9th Cavalry Division; Heavy Artillery; three batteries of 155 C. T. R. of the 2nd Regiment. Headquarters: St. Dizier.

*General Idea.*—This Army will at first be, temporarily, in second line and ready to move on the . . . day of mobilization, with the objective either to advance into the southern Woëvre between the Second and Third Armies to co-operate ultimately in the operations of the Second Army, or to move northward west of the Meuse to the left of the Third Army, in the direction of Arlon.

### FIFTH ARMY

5 Corps (I., II., III., X., XI); 1 Cavalry Division; Heavy Artillery; one Regiment (six batteries of 120 L., seven batteries of 155 C. T. R.); one group of four batteries of 120 L. (of the 4th Regiment); 2 Reserve Divisions. Headquarters: Rethel.

*Zone of Operations.*—From the Argonne Forest to a line Vervins—Hirson. Headquarters: XI. Corps at Ville sur Tourbe; X. Corps at Vouziers; III. Corps at Amagne; I. Corps at Aubenton; II. Corps covering force, at Stenay; of Reserve Divisions, 53rd at Neufchateau, 69th at Sissone, 51st at Vervins.

The northern boundary of the zone of operations of the Fifth Army will vary according to circumstances and cannot be laid down beforehand.

*General Idea.*—This Army is to operate against the right wing of the enemy forces. The theatre of operations may be limited, to

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begin with, to the territories of two belligerents; or it may extend at once into neutral territory (Luxembourg and in particular Belgium).

In the first case it will operate northward at once. The Third Army advancing from the Hauts de Meuse and the Montmédy bridgehead. It will deploy in the general direction of Thionville and Luxembourg, endeavouring to force northward any enemy forces in front of it. It should hold a part of its force in reserve behind its left wing to protect itself against any enveloping movement the enemy may attempt by violating Belgian territory in the immediate proximity of the frontier. It will also be prepared for a strong offensive against Thionville with its active corps or for the investment of that place with the Reserve Divisions at its disposal.

The Cavalry Corps, concentrated at first south-east of Mézières, will march on Montmédy to support the II. Corps and afterwards to co-operate in the action of the left of the Fifth Army.

In the alternative case, that of the enemy violation of neutral territory, the Fifth Army will move north-eastward for an advance into Belgian Luxembourg by way of the Neufchâteau and Florenville districts, with an échelon on its left, as before, for flank protection. This movement will, however, be carried out only by order of the Commander-in-Chief.

In this case, the Fourth Army, moving northward by the left bank of the Meuse, will take up a position on the right of the Fifth Army and move between it and the Third Army in the direction of Arlon.

The Cavalry Corps will form the left of this mass of manœuvre.

Consequently, the Fifth Army should at first be so disposed in depth that it can march either to the east or to the north-east and cross the line of the Meuse on the . . . day of mobilization.

Whatever the circumstances, it will be responsible for the protection of the Hauts de Meuse, north of Verdun (sector Azannes—Damvillers), and the bridge-head of Montmédy and will employ its Reserve Divisions for this purpose.

### 1ST GROUP OF RESERVE DIVISIONS

(Headquarters: Vesoul)

*General Idea.*—(1) To deploy facing east in the event of a violation of Swiss territory.

(2) To move north-eastward as a support to or eventually as part of the First Army, with the principal object of covering the right of the operations of that Army, and assisting in the investment of Neuf Brisach and Strasbourg.

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### 4TH GROUP OF RESERVE DIVISIONS

(Headquarters : Sissonne)

*General Idea.*—To deploy either facing east or south-east, or else facing north-east as support to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies, or as part of the mass of manœuvre of the left wing.*

### CAVALRY CORPS

1st, 3rd, and 5th Cavalry Divisions

(Headquarters : Charleville, Aubenton, Poix Terron)

*General Idea.*—The Corps will be at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, who is responsible for the initial covering arrangements.

In the event of the commander of the Cavalry Corps ascertaining that the enemy has crossed the Franco-German frontier in the Northern Woëvre sector, or that the neutrality of Belgium or of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been violated, he will immediately assemble his three Cavalry Divisions east of Mézières.

He will hold them in readiness either, in the first case, to march on Montmédy to support the II. Corps or, in the second case, to advance into Belgium.

The movement will only be carried out by order of the Commander-in-Chief; but in either case no unit must enter neutral territory before receiving the express authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

In the second eventuality, such dispositions will have to be made as will enable the Cavalry Corps to advance at once, on receipt of the order, to meet the enemy's columns, more especially those moving through Belgian Luxembourg, south of the difficult country Houffalize—Saint Hubert. Its mission will be to reconnoitre these columns and delay their advance. It may employ all or a part of the 145th Infantry Regiment as a support.

The 148th Infantry Regiment, which will also come under its orders, will move as rapidly as possible on Dinant, to occupy the Meuse bridges between the fortress of Namur and the frontier, in the event of the Belgian Government not having already arranged for this.

* No zone of operations was indicated for this group, but on the map its billeting area was marked in rear of the Fifth Army, from Bourgogne (inclusive) to Vervins (inclusive) with Sissonne as headquarters.

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# THE WAR OFFICE LIBRARY

By F. J. Hudleston, C.B.E., Librarian, War Office

The present Librarian of the War Office can never pass down the Duke of York's Steps without a feeling of gratitude to His Royal Highness. First, because it is pleasant, after going through the atmosphere of solemn and portentous gloom which always seems (to him) to emanate from the portals of the Athenæum, to be reminded of one whose life was, as a Royal Prince's should be, distinctly cheerful. Secondly, because when, many years ago, he was looking through the "Inquiry into the Conduct of the Duke of York," he was, as a constant reader of Pickwick, delighted to find in the list of witnesses three very familiar names, Wardle, Dowler and Lowten, names which Dickens surely must have taken from this source. And thirdly, because it was through the initiative of the then Commander-in-Chief, "the best who ever ruled the Army," * that the War Office Library ever came into existence. Writing in June, 1804, to Mr. Pitt, the Duke of York recommended the "formation of a deposit for military knowledge," one section of which was to be a military library. There are still in the Library many books with the label "Military Depot, Q.M.G.'s Dept.," and there still exists the first catalogue "Printed from Stone in the Year 1813; Written with Chymical Ink by J. Wyld, Draftsman."

This catalogue has on its title-page a manuscript note signed Lindenthal, Major-General.† "There is besides this another catalogue kept by myself for the purpose of knowing the price of each book, with the date when and where it has been purchased or otherwise procured"—an excellent practice which is maintained to this day in the War Office Library. The Library at this date consisted of a respectable number of historical works and books of travel; a few, chiefly French, as is natural, dealing with military

* Mr. Fortescue.

† Lieut.-Gen. Lewis Lindenthal, K.C. (Knight of the Crescent). He was originally in the Austrian service and was with the Duke of York in Flanders, Sir C. Stuart at the taking of Minorca, and Sir Ralph Abercromby in Egypt.



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science and a very fair collection of the classics, mainly translations. This last is the only branch that has not grown. The writer can recall only one instance of their being consulted. This was during the Boer War when he was asked by one in authority for information as to the Carthaginian practice of crucifying unsuccessful commanders: the old copy of Livy proved on this occasion that it had been worth preserving, but, happily, "no action was taken in the matter." It is interesting to note that while at the present time there are more books in the Library in German than in any other foreign language, in 1813 they did not number a score.

The next catalogue is that printed in 1864, a classified catalogue of some merit except for the fatal heading "Miscellaneous," where one sees such odd concatenations as "Baths and Wash-houses for Labouring Classes" followed by "Cæsaris Opera Omnia"; and "Iliad, The," in immediate conjunction with "Inebriating Liquors, Philosophical and Statistical History of." This last work is shown as issued to the Ordnance Survey Department, Dublin, as is another singular book to find in a military catalogue, "Health, Temperance and Morals, Hints on." Perhaps a study of intoxicating liquors led to the necessity for "Hints on Temperance." But what is more extraordinary is that at this time there were only two books in the War Office Library on Waterloo, which rather suggests that at this time Waterloo meant to the average British officer of the day little more than a stopping place between Aldershot and Pall Mall: in any case it throws a sinister light on the interest taken in military history at this date. Nor is Tactics well represented with only twenty works, of which two are editions of Ælian and one Cataneo's "Briefe Tables of rankes in battayle" dated 1574. The heading Strategy (then vaguely known as The Art of War) does not occur. There was, at this time, a good collection of works on Artillery and on Fortification, and particular attention appears to have been paid to the topography and resources of Russia * and Turkey. There are only three books dealing with Japan, but Theology is represented by twelve. Two of these, "The Crimes of the Clergy," and "An Attempt to Draw Aside the Veil of the Saitic Isis," are credited to the Ordnance Survey Dublin, a department which would seem to have had a very catholic taste in literature.

The next catalogue, an authors' catalogue, was printed in 1878. This is chiefly remarkable for one of the most delightful errors it

* Due perhaps to the fact that at the time of the Crimean War, the Cabinet, as was admitted by the Duke of Newcastle before the Sebastopol Committee, was as ignorant of the topography of the Crimea as, say, of the Island of Atlantis.

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has ever been the good fortune of the writer, who has waded through the pages of many catalogues, printed in many lands, to have discovered. A Dutch official publication " Aanhangsel op de handleiding," etc. (*i.e.* Supplement to the Guide to, etc.) is attributed to a writer with the very singular name (even for Holland) of Haanhangsel Op. Apart from this gem the 1878 catalogue does not call for any particular notice, unlike its successor a classification catalogue printed in 1883. This is a lamentable instance of misplaced energy. It was based upon an adaptation of the decimal system of classification of Dr. Dewey, an American bibliographer—a system which has acquired considerable popularity in the United States. Roughly speaking, instead of putting your book under a subject heading you " think of a number " as children say. Thus, to take an instance, if 354 stands for the armies of the world, 354·736 may stand for the United States Army and 354·7368 may stand for the Pay Department of that Army. It is, in fact, a kind of " This is the house that Jack built " method of classification. It seems, on the whole, simpler to call a spade a spade (or even a something shovel) than to label it with a row of digits each, like the word Basingstoke * " replete with hidden meaning."

By 1883 the Library had grown considerably, especially in its collection of bound sets of military periodicals in all languages, of which it has a very fine collection. Waterloo, however, was still badly represented with only twenty-six works—at the present day there are in the Library over a hundred and fifty dealing with it. There was at this date an excellent collection of publications—since largely increased—dealing with the Franco-German War, beginning of course with the Prussian Official History which might well have inscribed on its title-page, " I am right and you are right and all is right as right can be," so remarkably free is it from any hint that anything ever went wrong for Moltke and his soldiers. On the other hand, the collection of works on the American Civil War was at this period somewhat scanty, due probably to the theory held by German writers of that day that there was little to be learned from it. It may be noted that by this time the Library had been purged of Theology with the exception of a first edition (1650) of Fuller's " A Pisgah Sight of Palestine and the Confines thereof." It should perhaps be added that the General Staff did *not* make use of this for the operations against the Turks during the European War.

By this time (1883) with Hamley, Verdy du Vernois (in an English translation), and Home setting an example, British officers had

* According to the author of " Ruddigore."

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begun to publish their views on strategy and tactics, and in general to write *De re militari*. It is difficult to estimate the debt which English military literature owes to the Royal United Service Institution and the lectures and discussions held there. Without this stimulus it may well be doubted if we should ever have had any English military literature at all,* setting aside, of course, those who had a natural gift for writing such as, to mention a few names, Hamley, J. F. Maurice, Malleson, C. B. Brackenbury and his more famous brother Henry, and, perhaps the most famous of them all, though of a later generation, G. F. R. Henderson. At this time (1883) the Intelligence Branch was busily engaged in bringing out "Armed Strengths," those model encyclopædias of military information as to foreign armies, and in translating, not always of course for publication, books, pamphlets and articles from all languages. Indeed, the publications of the old Topographical and Statistical Department which by way of Intelligence Branch and Intelligence Department was to become a very important part of the General Staff, form a respectable library in themselves. A propos the early "Armed Strengths" a story, probably much exaggerated, is told which is too good to omit. It is to the effect that the first "Armed Strength" to be put on sale, found for some time only one purchaser whose name was naturally noted. Unfortunately, as in the case of the daughter of the dealer in ships' provisions, the only pupil to take lessons in acting from Mrs. Vincent Crummles, he "subsequently proved to be insane," though it is not recorded whether insanity prompted the purchase of the work, or was brought on by a perusal of it. Which only goes to show what little interest the public of the seventies and the eighties took in military literature.

At this period only those books were purchased for the War Office Library which were asked for by officers in charge of the various sections: the annual supplements to the 1883 catalogue are full of personal equations, and it is possible from a glance at them to have a pretty shrewd idea whether the officer at the head of any particular section was a sapper or a gunner. A natural result of this method of selection was that the Library did not subscribe (because no particular section was interested in this particular subject) to such

* But it is very interesting to note that a Swedish author, Gen. Tingsten, in a recently published book, "Strategins Grunder," alludes to the English General Lloyd (1728–1783) as the "father of the writers on strategy." Lloyd's work is rather a queer mixture. It is probably the only book on the Art of War which has a chapter entitled "Of Women and their Influence on the Human Heart." Which is as though Hamley, who, in addition to the "Operations of War" wrote a delightful novel called "Lady Lee's Widowhood," had included in the former work a chapter on the "Minor Tactics of Widows."



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indispensable works of reference as the "Dictionary of National Biography" and the "Oxford English Dictionary."

The present catalogue (1906–12) consists of three parts, an authors' catalogue, a catalogue of official works, annuals, army regulations and periodical publications, and a subject index. Accession lists to Parts I. and II. are issued monthly, and a decennial supplement was printed in 1916. An annual supplement to Part III. is brought out early in each year. In addition there is in the Library a card catalogue which is brought up to date each month and an interleaved copy of Parts I.–III. in which the accessions are pasted as they are published. The subject index with its annual supplements is the largest military bibliography in existence in Great Britain. And lastly, as in all libraries, there is the memory of the librarian, his deputy and his assistants.

Books in the War Office Library are for the use of "Officers and Officials of the War Office and are not to be removed from the vicinity of London." *Inter arma silent leges:* during the European War the vicinity of London included regions as far as Baghdad, and several books had the unusual experience of being taken to Paris by aeroplane. The Library contains at present over one hundred thousand books and pamphlets, and grows at the rate of about two thousand five hundred volumes a year. Owing perhaps to the fact that there has never been in the War Office a branch solely devoted to the compilation of military histories this particular branch of military literature, especially as regards campaigns prior to that of 1870, was for many years the weak point of the Library. Second-hand booksellers' catalogues are received from all over the country and carefully examined in order that gaps may be filled. It was, for example, only recently that Shaw Kennedy's * "Notes on the Battle of Waterloo" (published in 1865) was purchased second-hand and added to the Library. There is a vacant shelf hard by the thirty-two volumes of the "Correspondance de Napoleon Ier." waiting to be filled with the Commentaires. Another gap waits for a really satisfactory life of Wellington, which remains to be written: there are two living authors (both civilians by the way), either of whom could do this to perfection: their names will readily occur to the reader.

The Library has now a very good collection of books, in all languages, dealing with every branch of military art and administration, of the regulations of the armies of the world, and of bound sets of military periodicals. The principles of strategy ("get there fust

* An A.Q.M.G. at Waterloo.

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with most men ") * are eternal, and so is the stream of books written to prove this. Of these books, as they appear, the greater number are added to the library. Any military library should have in fact as its motto " Fas est et ab hoste doceri," every nation in the world being regarded as a potential enemy, not even omitting the most insignificant.

The Library possesses few bibliographical rarities: there are no incunabula,† its earliest printed book being dated 1573. This is Peter Whitehorne's " Certaine wayes for the ordering of souldiours in battelray, and setting of battayles, after divers fashions, with their maner of marching: and also figures of certayne newe plattes for fortification of townes, etc.," The author had sound views on St. Barbara's arm, " how much," he writes in a full chapter, " the artillerie ought to be esteemed of the armies nowadays ": he also tells his readers how to make " balles of mettell to throw among men in battelraye, or otherwise, which breaking shall doo wonderfull hurte," and he is careful to point out " these balles after they are fired and well kindeled, and having blowen a little must be quickly throwen, least they hurt such as would hurtle them." He ends his little book with a solemn warning, which many others have repeated and which his countrymen have persistently neglected, " to make accompte of fayre weather of the tempest to come." There is in the Library a good collection of fanciful views of " the tempest to come " in the shape of pamphlets written after the style of that garrulous grandfather's tale, Chesney's " Battle of Dorking " (1871); the Library possesses, however, an earlier work of the kind, this being a " History of the sudden and terrible Invasion of England by the French in the month of May, 1852." The anonymous author of this work is not without humour: the aldermen of London were drowned in brewers' vats of hot turtle soup in Smithfield, Lord Brougham escaped by loudly proclaiming himself a French citizen, and £10,000 was offered as a reward for the body of the Editor of Punch, dead or alive. We had, it seemed, ample warning, but when Parliament met they talked " like old women of the Law of Nations and Declarations of War," with the result that the French under General Changarnier landed without opposition near Newhaven and, close to Reigate, annihilated Lord Hardinge's force of 15,000 men and 5000 police preparatory to sacking London, where the only monument spared was the " equestrian monstrosity " at Hyde Park

* Gen. Forrest.

† For the benefit of the uninitiated it should be hastily explained that this word has not (as it vaguely suggests) anything to do with cradles, but means books printed before 1500.

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Corner, the French having too much good taste to meddle with it. The invasion appears to have been facilitated by the fact that the fleet of the Admiral at Portsmouth consisted only of "the Admiralty yacht and two steamers."

There is a large collection of works giving the history of the many invasions and attempted invasions of these Isles and a larger dealing with the measures of defence against invasion. Of these one of the most interesting is Bruce's "Report on the Arrangements which were made for the Internal Defence of these Kingdoms, when Spain, by its Armada, projected the invasion and conquest of England; and application of the wise proceedings of our ancestors, to the present crisis of public safety" (1798). This is a very rare and interesting work and goes into great detail. It gives the "quotas of men furnished by the Council, Bishops, Lords and several Counties"; the "somes of money" expended, not omitting such items as "allowed to every soldier 12*d.* to have them the more willinge to make the more haste"; the names of certain Captaynes (and fine old names they are, *e.g.* Ingelbie, Bosvile, Tempest, Bellasis, Elerker); lists of ships among which (as the Society Paragraphists say) may be noted *The Virgin Godsaver*, the *Barque Buggans*,* the *Tobie*, the *Dreadnaughte*, the *Black Dogge*, the *Guyft of God*; the rate for footmen, consisting of breade, beere, wyne, beeif, butter, cheese, biskett; and it even mentions in "A perfect Collection of all the able Personnes for Service from the age of 17 yeares to 60, as well Englishe as Strangers, resident within their severall Wardes in the Citie of London," the number of those who were "suspected in Religion." It is gratifying, but at the same time rather humiliating, to note that there is no mention of Conscientious Objectors—Queen Elizabeth would no doubt have had a very short way with any such. The "total in brieffe of the forces as they were mustered in Arms" came to 155,489.

A branch of military science which has been singularly neglected by British soldier writers is military geography. This is curious † because (to express military geography in its lowest terms) to be able to guess or deduce what is taking place "on the other side of the hill" is not more important than knowing the nature and slope of the hill and also whether there is not, as the American attaché said at Colenso, "a way round." The very phrase "military geography"

* It is quaint to think of a Spanish naval grandee, with a name as long as his pedigree, being attacked by the *Barque Buggans*.

† Col. Hon. H. A. Dillon writing in 1811 points out very truly, that the mortality in Walcheren might have been avoided had the nature of the soil and "the effect of the atmosphere in superinducing and repelling disease" been known in England.

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does not seem to have come into use until the nineteenth century. The first professor of this science appears to have been C. A. Stutzer, who, in 1804, was appointed to the chair of Military Geography and Military History in the "Academy for Young Officers in Berlin." Hitherto in Prussia military geography had been regarded as "Eine Art von Geheimwissenschaft." Apparently the earliest work on the subject is G. Veturini's "Lehrbuch der Militair-Geographie der östlichen Lander am Niederrhein," published in 1800. There are, of course, earlier works dealing with military geography, though not so entitled, *e.g.* "The Martial Field of Europe" (1694), by the industrious A. Boyer, Gent., who also "digested" (to use his own term) the reign of Queen Anne into annals and also compiled an excellent French-English Dictionary. A similar and more detailed work than the "Martial Field" is the "Theatre of the Present War in the Netherlands and upon the Rhine" (1745), which contains plans of the fortified towns in this "bloody country"—the phrase is Mr. Boyer's—which would have delighted the heart of Uncle Toby. In 1850 there was published an excellent little pamphlet by Colonel J. R. Jackson on the "nature, object and importance of military geography," and of recent years there have appeared "Outlines of, and Introductions to, Military Geography," but there is no work in English which can rank with "Niox" or "Marga," the standard French works on this subject, but now—they were both published in the eighties—hopelessly out of date. Here is an opportunity for an enthusiast who has industry, time, and we fear it must be added, money, to spare.

The Library already possesses about five thousand books and pamphlets dealing with the European War, and this section will naturally grow enormously. Experiences, reminiscences, regimental records, diaries * (gastronomic and otherwise) have already appeared in large quantities, and in twenty years or so there will be the red tab records, the authoritative General Staff official histories compiled in the historical sections of the various combatants, and the diligent non-professional reader, as he compares them, will no doubt be inclined to wonder if they treat of the same war, so different will be the points of view, so remarkable the discrepancies. It takes a long time to dissipate the fog of war. Finally, some hundred years hence the archives of the Public Record Offices of the various countries will, as they say at the cinema, be released, and then, to

* In reading some of the war revelation books one is inclined to wish that the *obiter dictum* of Stareleigh, J., "What the soldier said is not evidence," still held good.

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use a vulgar phrase, the band will play. Some learned military historian of the twenty-first century will get a glimmer of the truth, will write a book about it and will probably nurse a grievance against the authorities for the rest of his distinguished career. "What is truth? said Jesting Pilate, and did not wait for an answer," probably because he understood what a very long time it takes to get at it. Who, for example, can be certain what General Cambronne said at Waterloo? Is it a fact that Bazaine was playing billiards while St. Privat was being fought? What did Frederick the Great's mule think of Frederick the Great? Why did Wellington leave 18,000 men under Colvile at Hal? And what would Wellington have said if, as has been suggested by an Italian writer * on Waterloo, Colvile had, on his own initiative ordered them to take part in the battle? This last, however, is "not beyond conjecture"—it would have been something pretty violent.

Even while the war was in progress, and its issue and exact duration doubtful (except to the Editor of a weekly paper) there was a very large output of books and pamphlets dealing with various aspects of it. Owing to the shortage of paper most of these were printed on paper that would in time of peace have been put to a humbler use, and it is probable that in course of time many of them will powder away to dust. This perhaps is as well. In addition to books and pamphlets published at home during the war, the Library possesses a large collection of German propaganda literature which will in the future be interesting to the student in the same way that bilge-water † is, presumably, interesting to the analytical chemist.

A minor result of the war, so far as the interior economy of the War Office Library is concerned, is that, previous to 1914, the Librarian considered it more seemly that the numerous lives of Napoleon and Wellington should be severely separated on the shelves. Now, happily, they rest cheek by jowl, and should there be, by dead of night, another Battle of the Books, the biographies of Blücher, Gneisenau, Schwarzenberg, even though aided by Moltke's "Militärische Korrespondenz" would meet their Waterloo, or rather let us say their Marne. Even "Our Military Expert" could not go wrong in forecasting the result of a contest between the little corporal in alliance with "the long-nosed beggar"—*contra mundum*.

It will be remembered that that tiresome Rosa Dartle-like child,

* Gen. Pollio.

† But, as the late Dr. Garnett, sometime Keeper of the Printed Books in the British Museum once remarked to the writer, "It is difficult to say what is rubbish to-day: it is impossible to say what will be regarded as rubbish in a hundred years' time."

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Little Peterkin, on an historic occasion pestered his unfortunate grandfather Kaspar with reiterated inquiries as to the causes of, and ultimate benefits likely to accrue from, the War of the Spanish Succession. The exasperated ancient, exhausted with a hot day's heavy toil, peevishly replied that " he could not tell." How different from modern writers ! The number of works dealing with the causes of the European War is legion, and of these the Library possesses a great quantity, including of course the book which, it might be argued with reason, had some considerable influence in bringing about the war. Had Admiral Mahan's " Influence of Sea-Power upon History," a work which is stated to have had very great weight in (what were then) high quarters in Prussia,* never been written, there might never have been a German Navy, and therefore possibly no world-war. And as the German Navy had in 1914 no history, and no traditions, no doubt some learned professor is now evolving out of his inner consciousness an erudite volume upon the " Influence of History upon Sea-Power."

Finally, it should be said that nowadays the War Office Library never casts out a book, though, of course, it occasionally has experience of borrowers who display a certain reluctance to return books they have borrowed. It is a standing rule in libraries that, if you get rid of a book as obsolete or useless, you will be asked for that book within a week. And so, if any one who reads this has written a book or pamphlet on military matters, and cares to present a copy to the War Office Library, he (or she) can rest assured that it will rest on the shelves in good and sober company, will, when it has fallen to bits from frequent perusals (as no doubt it will), be decently rebound, and finally may be of service to the student of a hundred years hence. Always provided, of course, that the millennium has not arrived in the interval, and the War Office been transmitted into a Peace Office.

Which, all things considered, seems improbable.

* In Mr. C. C. Taylor's recent " Life of Admiral Mahan " the author quotes a telegram (26th of May, 1894) from William I. and R. " I am just now, not reading, but devouring Captain Mahan's book, and am trying to learn it by heart." This rather reminds one of an unhappy individual in the " Spoon River Anthology " whose ambition, as a young man, was " to memorize the Encyclopædia Britannica." His end was not fortunate.

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# THE BATTLE OF MERCKEM

## The 17th of April, 1918

*(Based on a Paper communicated by the General Staff of the Belgian Army.)*

### Introduction.

About the 25th of March, 1918, when the great German offensive was in its full tide of success, it was believed by the enemy's Higher Command that a withdrawal of the whole Allied line must inevitably take place within a short time. Accordingly, preparations were made on all the front northward from the Scarpe as far as the coast to ensure that any such withdrawal should be rapidly followed up. Ludendorff's anticipations in this respect, however, were disappointed. A few days later it became clear that the offensive would fall short of its principal objectives, and that other operations must be taken in hand. Accordingly, on the 9th of April, a secondary attack was begun in the Lys valley, and was crowned with such rapid and extensive success that it was decided to push it forward with all available forces. Reinforcements, however, reached the field in time to permit of the British defensive front being reconstituted on the line of hills covering the eastern edge of the coastal plain.

The German Higher Command thereupon decided not only to continue the drive already in course, but also to extend the zone of operations into the area north of Ypres, hoping to render that place untenable. Two simultaneous attacks were projected, the one towards Bailleul, the other towards Poperinghe ; and it was intended to exploit to the full any success gained, so as to envelop the British Second Army in the Ypres salient. These operations were referred to in German orders and instructions as the " Tannenberg Scheme," but, unlike its prototype, it was destined to meet with a serious setback at the hands of the British and Belgian Armies.

### The Field of Battle.

The terrain on which the battle of Merckem was fought extended from the southern shores of Blankaart Lake in the north to the



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Ypres—Thourout railway in the south. In the neighbourhood of this railway at Langemarck was the point of junction of the British and Belgian Armies.

Generally speaking, the battle ground rises gradually towards the south-east from the flooded water meadows of the Yser valley by way of Merckem, Bixschoote and Langemarck, to unite at Zonnebeke with the main ridge overlooking the ruins of Ypres from north and east. Eastward from the Merckem—Langemarck line the ground also forms a terrace-like upward slope, culminating beyond Houthulst forest in the famous crests of Clercken and Passchendaele.

The country round Merckem, like all the ground in the heavily shelled Flanders battle area, had been hammered and riddled by constant artillery bombardment into a crater-field, covered with water-filled shell-holes. Digging to any great depth was impossible; but some shelter for troops was afforded by the old German concrete dugouts. These were, however, often dangerous to their occupants, as their entrances faced the wrong way, and they also formed excellent targets for the hostile artillery, which knew their whereabouts to an inch.

The various little streams flowing into the Yser, running as they do from south-east to north-west, cut up the ground into a series of parallel ridges, forming good successive lines of defence. The Steenstraat—Dixmude road traverses these positions at right-angles, while a second road, running parallel to the general lie of the ridges, crosses the first at Kippe cross-roads, just within the Belgian lines. Kippe cross-roads formed the first objective of the German attack on the 17th of April, and the road thence to Steenstraat the general axis of direction for the further advance.

The general lie of the ground was thus by no means ideal for defensive purposes. Even at Merckem it had not been possible, in the three months which had elapsed since the Belgians took over the line from the French at the end of 1917, to do much to strengthen the position by artificial means. Such trenches as existed had parapets little over six feet thick, and were usually unprovided with a parados, while the shelters were barely splinter-proof. In the Bixschoote—Langemarck area such defensive work as existed had to be abandoned on the night of the 15th–16th of April, when the front was withdrawn some distance to the rear in order to conform to the British retirement in the Ypres—Armentières region.

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## The Belgian Position.


On the 16th of April the Bixschoote and Merckem sectors, against which the German attack was being prepared, were held respectively by the 10th and 3rd Belgian Divisions.

In the former sector, held by the 10th Division, the right sub-sector, that of Weidendrept, was held by the 13th Regiment, and the left sub-sector, that of Kortekeer, by the 19th Regiment. The situation of this Division was no easy one, as it had only just relieved the 4th Division, which had been withdrawn from the line prior to taking over a part of the British front on the 17th of April. Moreover, only a few batteries were available to cover the Bixschoote sector. The Merckem sector was divided between the 3rd and 9th Divisions, the former holding the Steenstraat sub-sector with the 12th, 11th and 9th Regiments in line; the latter, that of Driegrachten, with the 1st Chasseurs à Pied and the 14th Regiment in line. Generally speaking, each regiment garrisoned the advanced position with one battalion, which had orders to hold it as long as possible without support.

The Bixschoote sector, which had only recently been taken over by the Belgians, had been organized by the British for offensive purposes only; so that the trench system existed only in outline. In the left (Kortekeer) sub-sector, skeleton lines of observation and of resistance existed; but in the right (Weidendreft) sub-sector, from Craonne farm to the Ypres—Thourout railway, the lines of observation and of resistance were one and the same. The line of observation commenced at Craonne farm and ran by Cimétière and Alésia farms, the Carrefour de Londres and Islande farm to Victory farm. The line of resistance ran from Langemarck station, held by a mixed British and Belgian post, by Denain, Montmirall, Champaubert and Mondovi to Gourbi farm.

The forward defensive zone in that part of the Merckem sector with which we are concerned, extending from just north of Kippe to Draaibank, was organized as follows: (1) a general line of observation; (2) a first line of isolated strong points—at Honoré, Jesuitengoed, Aschoop, and Kippe farms; (3) a support line running from Mazeppa farm by Hibou, Obusiers, and Hermine farms, Verbrandesmis village, and Kasteel Britannia to La Guepe and Aviateurs farms; (4) a line of unfinished redoubts, of which the principal ones were named Draaibank, Langewaade and La Villa.

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### The German Attack on the 17th of April.

As already mentioned, the right of the Belgian line in the Bixschoote sector had been withdrawn some little distance to rear on the night of the 15th–16th. Next morning, as soon as the Germans noticed this withdrawal, they occupied the abandoned trenches and pushed forward contact patrols up to the new Belgian defensive line. Apparently the results of this reconnaissance led the German Higher Command to believe that the retirement already begun would be further continued, and it was decided that the projected attack should be delivered as soon as possible while the enemy was still within reach. No doubt was entertained that it would be as successful as those which had previously taken place on the British front; "The Belgians," ran a German order, "will be overwhelmed before they know where they are." This confidence, however, did not prevent the greatest care in the preliminary preparations, nor the allotment of a considerable force to the operations in hand. There were assembled for the attack twenty-three battalions in first line (the 6th Bavarian and 1st Landwehr Divisions, together with the 5th Marine and 10th Infantry Regiments), while the 83rd and 233rd Divisions and part of the 19th Division, in support, and the 13th Reserve Division, in reserve at Lichtervelde, were held ready to exploit the first success. A strong force of artillery, consisting of the 1st Landwehr Divisional Artillery, the 18th Artillery Regiment, two batteries of 10 c.m. guns, one battalion and two batteries of 15 c.m. howitzers, a battalion of 21 c.m. mortars, the trench artillery of the 6th Bavarian and 19th Reserve Divisions, a reinforced minenwerfer battalion and specially selected machine-gun detachments, prepared and supported the advance of the infantry.

### The German Attack in the Bixschoote Sector.

Early on the morning of the 17th, then, the Germans, under cover of a violent bombardment, launched an attack against the thinly held front of the Belgian 19th and 13th Regiments. The latter, although at first, as has already been explained, without effective artillery support, put up a sturdy defence; but the Germans, in spite of heavy losses, succeeded in overrunning several of the front line posts. They were unable, however, to exploit their gains in face of the increasing resistance of the defenders, who contested every yard of ground, and showed no signs of becoming demoralized. Meanwhile the fire of the Belgian artillery, reinforced by several

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additional batteries, and assisted by the British guns from the south, became more intense and effective, with the result that the original momentum of the attack died away, and the Germans were compelled first to seek shelter within the captured posts, and finally to abandon them entirely at the price of heavy casualties. The Belgians thereupon regained possession of their original line. The German attack in the Bixschoote sector, which they had regarded as a walk-over, thus ended in a complete repulse.

### The German Attack in the Merckem Sector.

Farther to the north in the Merckem sector, a short but intense artillery preparation was followed by the infantry attack at 8 a.m. The Belgian front line units stood ready to receive it; while the artillery counter preparation commenced at 7.30 a.m., and became intense at the moment of the assault. Both the German assaulting troops and their supports suffered considerably from the Belgian artillery fire. They were also checked for a time in front of the wire by the rifle and machine-gun fire of the defence. At length, however, they succeeded in crossing this obstacle at several places and in rushing the strong point of Kippe, where the garrisons of two Belgian posts had been completely put out of action. Pushing rapidly through the breach thus effected, the assaulting infantry swept forward in the direction of Kasteel Britannia, overrunning on the way the Verbrandesmis redoubt and making prisoners its garrison, which consisted of a half platoon commanded by a second lieutenant. This handful of prisoners was sent off to the German lines by the way of the Kippe road; but as the Belgians came opposite the strong point of Aschoop, which was still holding out, they swung off towards it and, though some casualties were caused by the fire of the enemy's machine guns, nine of the men with their commander reached the strong point safely and brought a welcome reinforcement to its garrison. Meanwhile the Germans had succeeded in capturing Hermine farm in the support line, and also Verte farm; the Belgians had an aid post at the latter place, and the doctors, stretcher-bearers and chaplains belonging to it were all taken prisoners. Observing the loss of this locality, the artillery of the defence at once opened fire on it and drove both Germans and Belgians to seek cover.

All the efforts of the Germans to extend their hold southward along the front line of defence were checked for one and a half hours by the stubborn resistance of the garrison of the strong point at Aschoop. The Belgians here withstood all the enemy's frontal

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attacks, and only abandoned the work when the German machine-gunners, who had worked round to their rear by Verbrandesmis and Hermine farm, opened fire into their backs, which were exposed as the position was unprovided with a parados. As soon as the Aschoop strong point had fallen, strong forces of the enemy advanced from the direction of Bultenhoek and attacked Jesuitengoed farm frontally. Menaced already in flank and rear, the defenders could put up but little resistance and were quickly overwhelmed. The first and support lines on a front of some 1200 yards in a south-easterly direction from the Kippe—Steenstraat road were thus in German hands by midday. The Bavarians, pushing forward against the Belgian third line, advanced, in face of the heavy fire of the defence, up to the wire of the Langewaade redoubt; here, however, their attacks were definitely checked, despite the efforts of the supporting troops, who were pushed forward in large numbers under cover of the captured works, to carry them forward.

### The Belgian Counter-Attack.

Even before noon, however, the Belgian counter-offensive had begun.

The most noteworthy feature of this counter-offensive was the fact that it was carried out entirely by the battalions in the forward defensive zone, supported only by one battalion sent up from reserve. To the rapidity and vigour of the Belgian infantry attacks and to the close and effective support offered by the artillery must be attributed the complete success gained in the face of far superior numbers of the enemy, and the recovery in a few hours' fighting of the whole of the positions lost in the morning.

The counter-attack was launched first on the northern flank of the breach formed by the German assaulting troops; good progress was made, Kasteel Britannia and Kippe strong points being re-captured by 1 p.m. and Aschoop strong point a little later. The Belgian attack was then extended farther to the south and Verte and Hermine farms and Verbrandesmis redoubt were recovered about 3 p.m. The Germans, however, maintained a stubborn resistance around Honoré and Jesuitengoed farms and it was not till 7.30 p.m. that these localities were entirely wrested from them. The Belgians had already recovered the trenches of Jesuitengoed redoubt, but the keep, a large pill-box, for some time defied all their efforts. A bold piece of individual work eventually placed them in possession of it. A patrol of three men under a corporal, which was sent out from the

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Jesuitengoed trenches towards Honoré farm, found that their route led them round to the rear of the pill-box. The corporal, realizing that the attention of the Germans was entirely concentrated on the assailants in their front, seized his chance to creep round their rear and surprise them by a shower of bombs at close range. When the Belgians who were engaged upon the frontal attack saw the situation, they closed in upon the Germans, and the latter surrendered.

At 9.30 p.m. the whole of the lost ground was again in Belgian hands. Not only had the twenty-three German battalions, which took part in the attack, suffered a complete repulse at all points at the hands of eight Belgian battalions, but they had left behind in the hands of the defence 20 officers and 759 other ranks as prisoners, 7 heavy and 53 light machine guns, and 1 grenatenwerfer with hundreds of rounds of S.A.A. and a quantity of matériel. Numerous dead were left lying both in " No Man's Land " and within the Belgian lines.

The battle honour of Merckem was, by order of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, inscribed on the rolls of honour of all units which took part in the battle. In addition, he decorated with the Order of Leopold the standards of the 9th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Chasseurs à Pied, to which fell the greatest share of the day's burden and glory.

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# THE TACTICAL TRAINING OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER*

By Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, D.S.O., South Staffordshire Regiment

There is one lesson of the Great War which has perhaps not received the attention it deserves. It is that the personal command in battle has passed, for all practical purposes, from the senior officer. Battalion commanders—even company commanders—can rarely do more than direct in the modern battle; the personal command, that is to say, the leading of the troops by voice, signal and example is now mainly in the hands of the platoon commander. This state of things is a natural result of the enormous increase in the power and range of modern weapons. In self-protection the infantry has adopted looser and deeper formations; wide dispersion of troops in small bodies, each under its own leader, directed by senior officers from the rear, has been proved both in attack and defence to be the only true antidote to massed artillery and machine-gun fire. For better or for worse, it would appear that the time has passed for a personal coup on a big scale in battle. No longer is it likely that a great commander will be able to hurl himself into the battle at the head of his massed reserves, confident that his presence and the magnetism of his personality will spur his troops to efforts which will stem disaster or confirm victory. In the future tactical successes against a powerful enemy will only be gained by armies whose junior officers are battle leaders of the highest order. These officers must have power of command, initiative, the self-confidence born of a sound knowledge of the principles of war and thorough training in their application. They must be prepared to be isolated for long periods from their superiors and make momentous decisions on their own responsibility.

* It is recognized that it is neither possible nor desirable to teach strategy and tactics separately, but in this article, for the sake of conciseness, the phrase "tactical training" is used to cover both. The article is written primarily from the infantry point of view, but probably the greater part of it is equally applicable to all arms.



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The British Army is fortunate in being able to draw on the finest material in the world for its officers. The Great War has shown that the genius for leadership is still latent in the youth of the British Empire. But this very gift confers a grave responsibility. The troops who follow the British officer with unquestioning confidence must not be sacrificed to his ignorance of the principles of war as applied to modern battles. It is the duty of every junior officer to master these principles thoroughly, and to study their application so that when he is called upon to lead his men in battle, he may achieve the best results with a minimum of casualties. But it is neither fair nor desirable to expect this knowledge to come from individual and unaided study. It is absolutely essential for the future efficiency of the British Army that the tactical training of our junior officers should be carried out on methodical and uniform lines.

Before going further, it will be useful to examine how this question was dealt with before the war. Destructive criticism by itself is of little value. Nevertheless, while the Army is still in the melting-pot of reconstruction, recognition of weak points in our pre-war training methods may lead to their avoidance in the future.

The great weakness in our system of training officers for war lay in its lack of uniformity and organization. The amount of time and trouble devoted to this form of training varied to an extraordinary degree in different units and different stations. Aldershot, always in the forefront of military efficiency, provided an excellent scheme of organized training. Other large military stations at home and abroad followed its example with varying degrees of success. But at the smaller stations, particularly the one battalion stations abroad, unless a unit was blessed with a commanding officer of exceptional ability and energy, its officers could obtain little or no organized instruction in the higher arts of their profession. These small stations, scattered throughout the world, are rendered necessary by our obligations as a great Empire. But it is useless to deny that the dull routine of garrison duties, the lack of competition and the limited outlook lead to stagnation amongst all except the most active-minded enthusiasts.

It is true that promotion examinations served to some extent as a stimulus to military study, but these examinations can hardly be said to have formed a real test of military efficiency. With a few weeks cramming any officer of average intelligence could scrape through the tests for promotion to lieutenant, captain or major.

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Unless working for the Staff College there was neither inducement nor necessity for an officer to make a systematic study of the art of war and to fit himself for high command. But the Staff College was for the few; only men of exceptional ability or unlimited capacity for work could hope to enter it during the years of fierce competition preceding the war. It is not unfair to say, therefore, that in the old days an officer who carried out his regimental duties adequately could spend twenty-five or thirty years in the Army without ever being seriously tested in his knowledge of the principles of war and their application under modern conditions.

Suggestions for the future may be grouped under two headings: first, those affecting any schemes for training which may be initiated by the War Office; and, secondly, those affecting the methods of training which may be carried out personally by senior officers within their units or formations.

It is suggested that every year a comprehensive scheme of tactical training for officers should be issued by the War Office and carried out in every combatant unit in the Army.

A campaign for study throughout the Army should be selected annually, and every officer should be required to write a paper on the lessons of that campaign. These papers should be carefully sifted and corrected in units and formations, and a proportion of the best of them forwarded to the War Office. Prizes might be awarded for the best papers sent up and the list of prize-winners published in Army Orders. The spirit of competition, a sure stimulus to good work, would thus be introduced.

It is also suggested that promotion examinations should be abolished. In their place central schools should be established for junior officers on the lines of the Senior Officers' School at Woking. Every combatant officer should, after ten years' service, be required to undergo a searching course of several months at this school, special attention being devoted to tactics. Officers failing to show a reasonably high standard of knowledge and efficiency should be compulsorily retired with the gratuity of a thousand pounds to which they are entitled after ten years' service. Such a scheme would have the following definite advantages :—

(1) A uniform standard of tactical knowledge and general efficiency would be ensured throughout the Army.

(2) Only thoroughly competent officers would reach the senior ranks.

(3) An officer would be tested when he has had time to settle



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down. After he has reached the age of thirty a good officer is unlikely to deteriorate, and conversely an indifferent officer is unlikely to improve. It is important not to judge young officers too strictly during the first few years of their service. It must be remembered that as a subaltern Napoleon himself committed military crimes of the gravest nature. He not only went absent without leave for two months, but also played a prominent part in an insurrection against the government he was nominally serving. It is not suggested that young officers should necessarily indulge in serious escapades in order to show their genius, but at the same time some allowance must be made for youthful errors.

(4) It would be possible to dispense with the services of officers who had shown themselves unsuited to a military profession at an age when they would still be young enough to make a fresh start in life, and would provide them with a small but useful capital.

These suggestions may be fairly criticized on the score that they interfere unduly with the responsibility of commanding officers and senior commanders for the training of the officers serving under them. But decentralization, if carried to excess, is bound to lead to lack of uniformity. If such a vitally important matter as this branch of training is left entirely in the hands of commanding officers, the results will vary enormously according to their personality, instructional ability and energy. Within a general scheme for the whole Army, there should still be plenty of scope for commanders to supervise and influence the tactical training of their own officers, while the fact that the system upon which such training should be carried out has been definitely laid down would preclude the possibility of this side of an officer's education being neglected to the dangerous extent to which it has sometimes been in the past. The School of Musketry at Hythe has succeeded in establishing a uniform creed of musketry throughout the Army. Commanding officers look upon it as a valuable help in training their officers, and not as an encroachment upon their rights. Why should not the same principle be applied with equal success to the study of tactics?

It is a difficult matter to deal in a short space with such a wide subject as methods of teaching. The following suggestions no more than touch the fringe of the subject, but it is hoped that they may be worth consideration by those engaged on the important and difficult task of training the young officer.

The teaching of tactics must be carried out on a carefully thought out system and by specially skilled instructors, if the best results are to be obtained. It is a grave fallacy (and by no means an un-

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common one) to think that any officer of twenty years' service, armed with a copy of *Field Service Regulations*, a blackboard and a piece of chalk, is a competent tactical instructor for young officers. The vital factor which must always be borne in mind is that the study of tactics is not an exact science. The dogmatic methods of the schoolmaster are bound to fail. It is not important to impress a mass of facts on the student's brain, whereas it is important to train his brain to approach every tactical problem in the light of certain guiding principles.

It is a mistake to think that officers gain much tactical knowledge from the usual routine training carried out by a unit in peace time. During such training the officer's mind is centred on the training of his men to the exclusion of almost any other thought. The platoon commander, advancing to a peace-time attack, is probably much too much engrossed in the awkwardness of Private Smith, or the failure of Private Brown to manipulate his bolt with dexterity, to devote much attention to the tactical aspects of the situation. If trained troops are available and can be spared for the sole purpose of training officers, most valuable work can be carried out. But any attempt to combine the training of troops and the instruction of junior officers is bound to lead to unsatisfactory results.

The easiest, and in many respects the most effective, method of instruction is by tactical exercises without troops. In such exercises the young officer can devote the whole of his thoughts and energies to the problem to be solved; there is an opportunity for him to develop original ideas. He is not cramped and obstructed at every step by the out-of-bounds notice boards which destroy the realism of most operations carried out with troops in cultivated areas. In exercises of this kind, however, everything depends upon the instructor and his method of teaching. In all solutions the principles as laid down in *Field Service Regulations* must be rigidly observed. But within those principles there is nearly always room for initiative and originality. There can be no sealed pattern solution for tactical problems. There may be wrong solutions which, because they sin against the unchanging laws of war, would lead to disaster on active service. But otherwise everything is a matter of opinion, and, because a student's solution does not agree with his instructor's, it by no means follows that it is wrong. The whole object of the instructor should be to train his students to approach the problem on the right lines. Provided they do so, he should treat their solutions with the greatest respect, discuss them freely with their authors, and, while giving his own solution and the reasons

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for it, he should forbear from setting it up as a sealed-pattern example. Work to be of any value must be the free product of knowledge, thought, and personality; attempts to produce something that will fit in with the personal ideas of some one else are of no value whatsoever. Junior officers should be taught to think in large bodies of troops. The British Army must always be ready to expand rapidly. Such expansion brings great opportunities to the regular officer who has prepared himself for high rank, and the late war has shown that under certain circumstances the right type of young officer may rise to the command of a battalion or even a brigade after a few months' campaigning.

It is most important that tactical training should begin as soon as an officer joins his regiment and should not be postponed until his full training in regimental routine has been completed. The great majority of officers join their regiments full of enthusiasm for their profession. The most should be made of this enthusiasm; it should not be damped by months of unrelieved monotony on the barrack square and the rifle range. No soldier is likely to deny the importance of drill and musketry, but it must be remembered that the handling of troops in battle surpasses in importance all else in the training of an officer. There is no real reason why a young officer from the beginning of his military career should not be trained on all-round lines. Yet it is the rule rather than the exception to hand over the training of the newly joined officer for many months to the adjutant and the sergeant-major. These are most necessary and efficient cogs in the military machine, and their work is almost invariably of priceless value to their units and to the Army as a whole. But the nature of their work is liable to make their military outlook narrow, and it is undesirable to leave the newly joined officer entirely in their hands. First impressions are a matter of importance, and no young officer should be allowed to think that the whole horizon of military life is bounded by the barrack square and the rifle range. It is certain that this early training has in some cases blunted enthusiasm, dulled imagination, killed originality of thought. Mere efficiency in regimental routine will not be sufficient in the rapidly changing conditions of modern war. Tactics and armament changed more radically during any one year of the Great War than in the whole twenty-two years which covered Napoleon's career as a soldier. If our young leaders are to hold their own in the battles of the future, they must be men of imagination, ready to adapt their thoughts and actions to every rapid turn of military progress. Battles of the future will be a contest between new weapons and new

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tactics. In such a struggle only men of bold and original thought can hope to succeed.

Every thinking soldier recognizes the supreme value of the study of military history, and young officers must be given every encouragement and help in this matter. But it is important to avoid creating a pedantic and unpractical type of officer, full of historical precedent and the theory of his profession, but slow and halting when faced with the task of handling troops. The best antidote to this is training in the rapid solution of tactical problems on the ground. Sports and games of every description also play an important part in this connection. The good athlete and the keen sportsman are nearly always men of quick decision and energetic action. There is plenty of time in the life of the average officer for routine duties, training in the higher arts of war, study of military history and sport. Each has its own particular value, and the training of the officer is not complete without a wise combination of them all.

After a few years with his regiment, an officer should be sent for periodical attachments to other arms. It is difficult to gain from books a complete knowledge of the organization, tactics and point of view of an arm other than one's own, yet such knowledge is of vital importance when it comes to war. An army divided into watertight compartments will, under the strain of active service, be rent by quarrels bred of ignorant criticism and lack of sympathy. Knowledge of the difficulties of others leads to breadth of view and wholehearted co-operation.

To sum up, it must be freely recognized that a high standard of tactical training will be required of officers if the British Army of the future is to hold its own in the race of military progress. It is the duty, therefore, of every officer from the moment he joins his battalion to lose no opportunity of fitting himself for leadership in battle. But he cannot achieve the desired result without help and guidance, and a heavy responsibility rests on all commanding officers in this matter. In every fighting unit of the British Army there should exist an organized scheme of training capable, within a reasonable period, of turning the newly joined officer into a competent fighting leader. Once this is achieved we can face the future with complete confidence, certain that in the next war we shall be able to draw on a great body of highly trained junior officers, confident in their own knowledge and worthy of the trust of the men they lead in battle.

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# DETACHMENTS AND THEIR COMMANDERS

To be called upon to fight at the same time in many quarters of the globe is no new experience for the British Navy and Army, even if between August, 1914, and November, 1918, the exigencies of a world war may have taken our soldiers and sailors into regions to which the British flag had never till then penetrated. If our first encounter with the German Armies took place on ground familiar to Marlborough's men, if the communiqués and despatches which told the story of the fighting in Flanders were full of names already famous in the annals of our Army—reminiscent even of the days of the Edwards and Henries—the bulk of our more distant fighting was accomplished on unfamiliar ground. Gallipoli and Macedonia, the banks of the Euphrates and of the Tigris, of the Jordan and of the Piave, the great inland waters of East Africa and the shores of the White Sea were fresh fields to our regiments, while there were some few units which fared yet farther afield, into parts of the world even more unfrequented by our troops in the past. The Hampshire and Middlesex battalions which penetrated far into Siberia, the Indian units which made their way to Merv, the Midlanders of the Thirteenth Division, who distinguished themselves by their defence of Baku,* have all added pages to the story of our Army which are remarkable even in its varied annals.

The difference in this respect between the present and the past is, however, after all, only one of degree, not of kind. In almost every one of our great wars against European powers, the Crimean War perhaps alone excepted, it has been the lot of our soldiers to fight in many lands, not in Europe only. Even when the elder Pitt met the French at their own game of "conquering America in

* The story of one of the three battalions which shared in this extraordinary adventure has been well told in the "History of the 7th (Service) Battalion Prince of Wales' (North Staffordshire) Regiment," written by Captain L. R. Missen, M.C., and published by W. Heffer and Sons, of Cambridge. As Captain Missen says: "Old Regular regiments in their hoary history have travelled much and seen many strange lands, but very few battalions in the short span of four years had such wanderings and adventures." His little volume, though rather disappointingly brief in its narrative of the battalion's first ordeal by battle on Sari Bair, gives a good account of its doings in Mesopotamia and on the Caspian Sea.



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Germany," and beat them handsomely at it, our soldiers had to fight in the East and West Indies, on the West Coast of Africa, on the St. Lawrence and in the Philippines. It has always been the task of those who have been responsible for our military policy to seek to reconcile conflicting demands for men and money from different theatres of war, though never perhaps have these claims been so manifold, so conflicting, or so vigorously urged, as in the "First World War." This fact is made very clear by Colonel Repington, in his extraordinarily outspoken and indiscreetly candid diary.* He traces the history of the prolonged struggle waged between those who maintained, as he himself did consistently, that only by the overthrow of the main German Armies in France and Flanders could victory be reached and the advocates of dispersion, of sending armies to "many theatres where success, no matter how brilliant, could not have brought Germany to her knees." The problem was an old one, and had certain individuals to whom it fell to direct our strategy had the advantage of having made some elementary study of British naval and military history we might have achieved victory sooner, at a less terrible cost, and without such bitter moments of anxiety as the months of March and April, 1918.

One of Marlborough's chief difficulties lay in having to adjust the demands of the campaigns in Flanders and in the Spanish Peninsula, whilst among the factors which prevented him from achieving decisive victory in 1711 was the taking away of veteran battalions for an expedition against Quebec. This venture, even if it had been successful, would not have affected the resisting power of France any more than the advance upon Mosul in 1918 directly influenced the forcing of the line of the Sambre. The War of the Austrian Succession affords illustrations of the same principle. It is a war which has been unduly neglected by military and even more by naval historians, and consequently the appearance of a really authoritative work on it † is a welcome addition to our naval history. During the years 1739–1748 the divergent views as to the right policy to be pursued led to a failure to use to full advantage the strength of the British Navy and to the neglect of traditions the soundness of which had been established in previous wars. That there were failures and errors in execution is not to be denied, but it was in the council chamber that the worst mistakes were made. The politicians responsible for the higher direction of the war

* "The First World War," by Colonel C. à Court Repington. London: Constable & Co., 1920.

† "The Navy in the War of 1739–1748," by Rear-Admiral Richmond. Cambridge University Press, 3 volumes.

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wavered irresolutely between different opinions, failed to decide on a definite line of policy or to strike the balance between the conflicting claims and advantages of different theatres of war. Failure to concentrate, dispersion of inadequate forces on ill-advised sporadic ventures, have been the besetting sins of amateur strategists at all times. The temptation to fall into these errors is all the stronger when, as in the case of the British Empire, there are many points to be considered and guarded, or when in a world war opportunities for promising strokes seem constantly to present themselves.

Throughout the war which until 1914 was the greatest and most widespread of all our wars—the struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France—the habit of dispersing our forces was peculiarly in evidence. Of the British Army's part in that great conflict Mr. Fortescue has for years past been telling the story in ample detail and with great enthusiasm for his subject. In his two new volumes he is mainly dealing with the final expulsion of the French from the Spanish Peninsula, with Wellington's invasion of southern France and with the Waterloo campaign, but it is remarkable to find how, even in these final stages, the efforts of England were far from being concentrated on the maintenance and reinforcement of Wellington.* Quite apart from the war in America, on which no considerable force was employed till after the close of the Peninsular War, one finds British troops engaged not only in the subsidiary operations on the east coast of Spain, but in attacking Genoa, in co-operating with Bulow's Prussians in Holland, in garrisoning Stralsund as well as Sicily and the Ionian Islands, to say nothing of the Cape, India and the West Indies, as present at an action against Davout's Hamburg garrison in the autumn of 1813, and even as represented, albeit only by one rocket battery of the Royal Artillery, at the great "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig. Wellington, it is true, was able to defeat Joseph at Vittoria, to repulse Soult's great effort to relieve Pampeluna in the hard-fought battles of the Pyrenees, to force his way over the Bidassoa and to win important victories on French soil at the Nive, the Nivelle, Orthez and Toulouse, but he was none too strong for the tasks assigned him, and it may be questioned whether these minor enterprises, like Bentinck's descent on Genoa, should not fall under the same lash which Mr. Fortescue in earlier volumes has so unsparingly applied to the futile policy of "frittering" followed by Pitt and Dundas, and inherited from them by the misnamed "Ministry of All the Talents." Certainly this dispersion

* "A History of the British Army," vols. ix and x, 1813–1814 and 1814–1815, by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue. London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.

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of forces, this inability to frame a policy on sound lines and then to follow it unflinchingly, helped to protract the war and to bring England more than once into serious danger.

Strategical principles, however the difficulties of applying them may vary, remain the same from one generation to another, and the same errors may be calculated to produce the same results. If there had been a Colonel Repington in the days of Pitt and Dundas, and if we possessed his diary of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, it may be confidently stated that the main lessons to be drawn from it would not be dissimilar from those to be learned from the pages of "The First World War." Colonel Repington's volumes are full of sound and pungent criticism of strategical error, but unfortunately he has also thought it necessary to describe the kind of life he himself led during the war and has thus given a wholly unfair impression of what social life in London really was in those strenuous years. These details, in our opinion, are not only in the worst possible taste, but seriously detract from the value of a book the main purpose of which is presumably to be a serious warning to his countrymen.

In spite of his failings, however, Colonel Repington deserves gratitude for the soundness of his strategical teaching, both before and during the war. He was no advocate of the "easy way round" because it appeared easy; he was unsparing in his efforts to make the country realize to the full the seriousness of the situation and of the efforts which must be made to achieve success; he did not promise victory without losses; he exposed the unwisdom of the many efforts which were made to divert our forces from the vital front; he was insistent on the necessity for organizing our resources; he showed courage and patriotism, readiness to take risks, to do what few others dared to do; he never sacrificed his convictions to his convenience, and his teaching of principles and his exposition of passing events were of real value.

On no point, perhaps, is his teaching so well worth examination and careful consideration as in connection with the extension of our operations into subsidiary theatres of war. His grasp of the paramount importance of "security" on the Western front did not lead him to overlook the importance of such a subsidiary theatre as Egypt; he recognized that the defence of Egypt was of vital importance, that the Turks had to be kept from interfering with that artery of Empire, the Suez Canal, that, if we had to maintain large forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was better to worry the Turks than to stand still, but that until we could feel confident about our position in the West, until our numbers and our munitions were sufficient to

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give real assistance to our over-burdened French Allies, the time was not ripe for embarking on any additional enterprises of any magnitude. In any attempt to appreciate our national policy and strategy the very disproportionate character of the burden borne by France in the early part of the war must not be overlooked. In spite of the splendid work of our troops, Regular and Territorial, between the retreat from Mons and the arrival of any appreciable number of " New Army " divisions, it was not until the war had been in progress for over eighteen months that our frontage in France and Flanders was more than a relatively insignificant fraction of the Allied line. Yet for all our unreadiness to put our full weight on the Western front, when Loos was fought we were employing in other theatres of war nearly a third of the divisions which had then gone overseas from the United Kingdom, from India and from the Dominions, and with the Salonica undertaking and the transfer of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions from France to Mesopotamia, the proportion was increased before the end of 1915. Fortunately, partly through the German decision to make their main effort against Russia, no direct evil results followed from this running of risks.

The principles by which the making of detachments—only another way of describing the undertaking of subsidiary operations—should be governed, have been well and forcibly stated by General Bird in a work of real value and interest, in which it is pleasant to notice that the majority of the examples quoted have been deliberately taken from British rather than from foreign wars.* Our military history is certainly rich enough to justify to the full General Bird's departure from precedent. His book is well arranged and written and well supplied with maps and plans: it is unfortunate that its high price must put it beyond the means of the majority of young officers. General Bird justly remarks that " the history of the higher direction of war is that of one long struggle between the principle of concentration of force and the powerful interests that make for its dissipation." He shows that it is essential to consider whether the effect likely to be produced by the action of a detachment will " compensate for the absence of the troops from the main area of operations and for the risk of defeat in detail," that the main purpose of a diversion is to compel the enemy " to lay out a larger proportion of his forces in meeting them than is involved in making them," or to achieve some definite object which will bear directly on the attainment of the main objective. He points out further that it

* " The Direction of War: a Study of Strategy," by Major-General W. D. Bird, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920.

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has not been primarily by " local successes in distant theatres " that the British Empire was won. Judged by this standard it is a little difficult to justify some of the distant expeditions on which our amateur strategists so readily embarked from time to time against the advice and warnings, as Colonel Repington shows, of their responsible military advisers. General Bird might perhaps have emphasized in this connection the influence which the great increase in the material requirements of modern armies, apart from their increase in size, has had in making the problem of supporting campaigns in several different theatres more difficult than ever. Colonel Repington is clear on this head. He shows how largely the question of supply enters into the problem. Of any distant expedition it must be asked whether it is possible to make it in any degree self-supporting. Nothing stands out more clearly from the pages of Sir C. E. Callwell's valuable biography of General Maude * than the care which that great Commander took to develop the local resources of Mesopotamia, thereby not merely reducing the local strain on the long line of communications between Basra and Baghdad, but also diminishing the calls of the Mesopotamian Force upon the heavily taxed ocean transport services. Colonel Repington quotes a long and most interesting letter from General Maude, dealing amongst other things with this problem of using local resources : " it is one of the first principles of war," the General writes, " to live on the country as far as possible," and the letter shows his appreciation of the seriousness of the shipping problem and his care that his own operations should above all advance the general cause. And it was not only the Mesopotamian campaign which turned mainly on questions of supply and transport. Colonel Repington frequently expresses his disapproval of the Salonica expedition ; from first to last he has not a good word for the venture. One of the main grounds in his indictment is the strain which the maintenance of the Allied Army in that quarter involved both on the transport service and on the Navy, which had to protect its sea communications. Quite apart from the formidable character of the hostile positions, the transport difficulties all but prohibited offensive operations. Three tons of shipping to every man employed in the expedition were needed to keep it supplied, and there was an intimate connection between the Salonica venture and the submarine question. The Mediterranean, as he points out, gave the submarines an exceptionally good chance, and it is interesting to realize that naval opinion was

* " Life of Sir Stanley Maude," by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell. Constable & Co.

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opposed to the retention of the force. Certainly the criticism that the Salonica Army was " too strong for defence, and not strong enough to attack " is one which it seems impossible to meet. As one reads Sir Archibald Murray's narrative of his two attacks on Gaza in the spring of 1917,* one cannot but reflect how different their result might have been had the two divisions of the B.S.F. which were dashed to pieces about the same time against the appallingly strong Bulgarian positions south-west of Lake Doiran been available for the Palestine front. There may have been some justification for the original dispatch of troops to Salonica, there may have been some justification, chiefly on political grounds, for the retention of an Allied Army in Macedonia, but after the experiences of the autumn of 1916 it was a dubious policy to attempt a serious offensive on that front, and though the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Salonica must bear the main share of the responsibility for the way in which General Milne was called upon to carry out a single-handed offensive against the strongest portion of the Bulgarian front, it was an offence against the principle of concentration of effort to undertake simultaneous subsidiary offensives in Mesopotamia, Macedonia and Palestine, to say nothing of German East Africa.

When General Allenby accomplished the task for which Sir Archibald Murray had had neither enough guns nor enough men, the reinforcements which made the difference had been mainly taken from Salonica. General Allenby is also among Colonel Repington's correspondents, and in a most interesting letter, written shortly before the great blow which pierced the formidable entrenchments between Gaza and Beersheba, he explains how he had declared that he would not attempt anything on a big scale until he got all the men and materials he considered necessary, and would not try a minor operation unless required to relieve pressure elsewhere. Another letter written after the capture of Jerusalem and the defeat of the great Turkish counter-attack is inspired by the same power to look beyond the local situation. " As regards operations in this theatre, balanced against those in the West," he writes, " I recognize that the West is the essential battle-ground, where victory will be decisive. Make sure of victory there. If, however, you undertake further operations here and in Mesopotamia, they must be carried out with adequate forces. A set-back here, now, would be disastrous." These letters are an ample justification for the claim put forward by Mr. W. T. Massey in his recent volume on the campaign in Palestine,†

* " Sir Archibald Murray's Despatches." J. M. Dent & Co., 1920.
† " Allenby's Final Triumph," by W. T. Massey. London: Constable & Co., 1920.

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that General Allenby's strategy was " based on a masterly appreciation of the situation, not merely in his own theatre of operations, but on the whole of the European fronts." Mr. Massey is perhaps not quite so well justified when he claims that the splendid victory in Palestine " precipitated the collapse of the Allies' enemies on all fronts " and " made the Allied victory certain." He seems to forget that over a month before the admirably planned, prepared and executed stroke of the 19th of September, 1918, Rawlinson's Fourth Army had broken through the German defences in front of Arras, that by the time Allenby's blow was launched his old Third Army was through the Drocourt—Quéant line, and that the Germans had been thrust back behind the Hindenburg line after a retreat not " according to plan," as in 1917, but according to the plans of the Allied commanders. But this pardonable particularism notwithstanding, Mr. Massey has produced an agreeably and lucidly written account of a dramatic and brilliant operation, which is all the more to the credit of the Commander-in-Chief and his troops, because the composition of the Army had undergone such a complete change since its equally dramatic and brilliant capture of Jerusalem. General Allenby had still his seven infantry divisions, but, instead of a mere sprinkling of Indian regiments, he had only thirty British battalions out of a total of nearly a hundred battalions, and of his Indian infantry over twenty units were new formations, his old battalions having been drawn upon extensively to build up his new units and replenished by copious drafts of raw recruits. By the systematic training of his remodelled army, by the equally systematic wearing down of the enemy by constant raids and bombardments, General Allenby paved the way for ultimate victory, no less than by his careful organization of commissariat, communications and every other branch of his rearward services. To the victory which Mr. Massey describes so clearly and effectively two other men had also contributed. The work of Sir Charles Monro in developing the resources of the Indian Empire certainly deserves to be more widely known and appreciated. Most soldiers, all who have any connection with India and the Indian Army, have some idea of it, but it is no exaggeration to say that had a similar effort only been made a year earlier the end of the war might have been greatly accelerated. The policy of " knocking out the Turk " was a very different proposition when it could be undertaken largely by Indian and African troops, less suited for the Western Front than for the more congenial climatic conditions of the East; when, in other words, it no longer represented a serious drain on British man-power. In the same way,

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without Sir Archibald Murray's systematic advance across the Sinai Desert to the gates of Gaza, without his railway, his pipe-line bringing " the waters of the Nile to the borders of Palestine," without all his other preliminary work, General Allenby's conquest of Palestine would have been impossible. To the excellence of that " spade-work " General Allenby in his Despatches has paid an ample tribute, which is legitimately prefixed by General Murray to the collection of his own Despatches which he has just published.

These Despatches, as originally given to the public in the *London Gazette*, were incomplete ; a good deal had to be omitted for fear of giving information to the enemy, and it is a great advantage to have the full and " unedited " text. The solid work which General Murray accomplished in preparing the way for the victories of his successor was a notable achievement. His repulse of the Turks at Romani, his brilliant *coups* at Magdhaba and Rafa, were well planned and executed, and he evidently only just missed an even more substantial success in the first battle at Gaza. But the question which most forcibly suggests itself is whether, in undertaking his offensive against Gaza with less than the five divisions which he had declared he required for carrying his offensive forward beyond El Arish, General Murray was not incurring undue risks. General Bird says very aptly that the commander of a detached force is " entrusted with a mission whose successful fulfilment demands qualities far above the ordinary." The study of our subsidiary operations confirms the opinion that the task of the commander in a secondary theatre of war has its own peculiar difficulties. It is hard enough for those at the centre of things to adjust the balance between the conflicting claims of the main theatre and the subsidiaries, even when they have all the facts before them. It is even harder for the commander in a distant quarter, face to face with the difficulties and the possibilities of his own task, to look beyond his own immediate problems. As Sir Stanley Maude wrote in the letter to Colonel Repington to which reference has already been made, " one is rather apt to become centred in one's own immediate surroundings as if they were the whole thing instead of being merely on the fringe of this whole world war." Sir Ian Hamilton,* too, is perfectly frank about another difficulty which besets the commander of a detached expedition, especially when he is fully convinced, as Sir Ian was, of the practicability of the enterprise committed to him. Naturally it is his duty to form an accurate and candid estimate of the exact

* " Gallipoli Diary," by General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B. Edwin Arnold, London, 1920.

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requirements of his enterprise and to place it before the authorities at home. But there is an inevitable temptation to paint the situation fairly cheerfully lest too dark a presentment of the expedition's prospects should cause it to be abandoned. As he says, a commander is in the dilemma of having to " steer a course between an optimism that deprives us of support and a pessimism that may wreck the whole enterprise." The commander who makes too many difficulties and demands may find that these produce instructions to abandon all offensive operations: the commander who finds that he is not given what he has demanded as necessary, yet, nevertheless, endeavours to carry through his full programme, runs considerable risks. That in war some risks, sometimes considerable risks, must be run is a mere platitude, but it must be admitted that General Allenby in declining to attempt the attack on the Beersheba—Gaza position unless he got the force he considered requisite, showed himself a sounder strategist than his predecessor who, though he had always stated that five divisions would be required, nevertheless attempted a serious offensive, first with three divisions and then with barely four. There were no doubt weighty reasons for continuing the successful policy which had cleared the Turks out of Sinai and freed the Suez Canal from all menace, and General Murray's Despatches show conclusively that the War Cabinet's orders displayed a bewildering vacillation. The orders of the 1st of April, 1917, which urged him to pursue his operations " with all energy " and yet refused additional troops, may not unfairly be criticized as showing a desire to run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds, and Colonel Repington's criticisms on the recall of General Murray are not without some justification. Without fuller detail as to the actual cause of the failure of the second battle of Gaza, it would be premature to attempt more than a provisional judgment. Still to have fought the battle does seem, even on General Murray's own showing, to have been more than the strategical situation warranted—an example of a commander in a subsidiary theatre running a bigger risk than was prudent for no adequate object. Even so, this failure should not be allowed to obliterate all memory of General Murray's previous record of success.

Of all the subsidiary ventures the Dardanelles expedition was that which came nearest to a major operation, and it has associations and a dramatic character which are likely to cause historians to dwell upon it. But its peculiar importance lies in the fact that it was the secondary operation most closely connected with the struggle against the principal member of the hostile coalition. The expedition was

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mainly undertaken to relieve the pressure upon the Russians, the attempt, that is to say, to put the Turkish Army out of action was only a means to an end, not the end in itself. To undertake such an adventure in view of the precarious situation which existed in France at the time was admittedly a dangerous proceeding. Only three days before the Australians and New Zealanders endured their baptism of fire at Gaba Tepe, the Canadians had gone through the even worse ordeal of poison gas at St. Julien and on the Gravenstafel Ridge north-east of Ypres. At the same time success at the Dardanelles might have been decisive, and this at a time when decisive success was not yet within reach in the West. This is Sir Ian Hamilton's main argument in his Diary, argued with so much force and persuasive power that in order to preserve any balance of judgment the reader must turn to Lord French's Despatches to see how difficult it was as things then stood in the West for us to make any adequate provision for the needs of the Dardanelles. Yet ten thousand more shells or another twenty aeroplanes could never have broken down the deadlock in France in 1915, while they might have made all the difference at the Dardanelles, especially if available in the days immediately following the landing before the Turks had had time to dig themselves in securely. A little extra force applied at the right time might have meant an open road to Constantinople, for it is clear that, despite the warning given by the naval attack, the unexpected success of our landing considerably surprised the Turks. But the gallant force which achieved the apparently impossible at Cape Helles on the 25th of April had suffered too severely to be able to accomplish anything more without immediate reinforcements, and it had even been denied the normal ten per cent. of first reinforcements.

To criticize Sir Ian Hamilton for an unreasonable and over-daring optimism, and to blame him for not adopting the advice conveyed in General Hunter-Weston's original appreciation, to abstain from committing his forces to the hazards of an opposed landing, is to be wise after the event. It is too much to expect of the commander of a force sent to carry out a task which presumably the higher authorities at home had reason to believe practicable, that he should attempt nothing. The main arguments in favour of such a step are admirably stated in General Hunter-Weston's appreciation to which Sir Ian Hamilton refers. The conclusion that "if this expedition had been carefully and secretly prepared in England, France, and Egypt, and the naval and military details of organization, equipment and disembarkation carefully worked out by the General

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Staff and the Naval War Staff, and if no bombardment or other warning had been given till the troops, landing-gear, etc., were all ready and dispatched, the forcing of the Dardanelles would have been successful," sums up the case pretty correctly. Even in face of the enormous handicaps against which the leaders of the expedition had to contend, a sufficient measure of success was achieved to justify Sir Ian Hamilton's preference for the daring rather than the prudent course, and then, for want of sufficient weight immediately behind the original force to drive home promptly the initial success, the advantage could not be maintained. Pitchforked into his command without the time to study his problem, to frame his plans and to estimate his requirements, Sir Ian Hamilton's position was not unlike that of the commanders to whom, as Mr. Fortescue has shown, Pitt and Dundas were in the habit of saying, " Here are some men, take them and go somewhere and do something." A hasty and ill-considered decision committed the country to a second enterprise, the developments of which could not be foreseen, when our available men and munitions were still unequal to the demands of the principal theatre of war.

One defence of the Dardanelles adventure is that if the energies of the Turks were absorbed in warding off an attack at the gates of Constantinople, they would have no time or troops to spare for any enterprises against Egypt or the Canal. This may be admitted, but surely, if that were so, Sir Ian Hamilton should have been put in sole command of the forces in Egypt, his base. As it was the maintenance of a separate command in Egypt was one main cause of the Dardanelles failure. A couple of picked brigades of Indian regulars from Egypt would in all probability have given Sir Ian Hamilton Achi Baba on the fateful 28th of April, and their retention in Egypt, which was in no real danger of attack at the time, was unnecessary. Later on Sir Ian was informed that he should look on the forces in Egypt and his own as a whole, but his first " attempt to act on the assumption that Egypt and its army " were his produced cries of distress from Egypt and alarms about the Senussi, with the result that reinforcements which were wanted for the Dardanelles were diverted to Alexandria, The relation in which the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force stood to the " Force in Egypt " was hardly fair to the commander of either. A multiplication of separate commands was an evil and not an unavoidable evil. Sir Ian Hamilton says justly, " were we both sealed-pattern saints we'd be bound to fall foul of one another working under so perverse a system." Each commander was naturally concerned for his ability to carry out his



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own task. Wellington, as Mr. Fortescue points out, has summed up the whole position in such cases in a nutshell. Writing of the arguments between himself and the Duke of York as to the withdrawal of depleted battalions from the Peninsula for reorganization at home and their replacement by stronger but unseasoned units, Wellington states that he would have much preferred to retain his hardened veterans and to have united the weakened units in provisional battalions. He goes on to say, however, that while the Duke of York was responsible for the whole Army and for the service of the Empire, he himself had nothing to consider but his own force. If questions were left to his discretion, therefore, he would naturally decide them in the fashion most favourable to himself, but if he were sent a positive order, he would cheerfully obey it. This undoubtedly goes to the root of the matter. The commander in any particular theatre can see no more than his own case; he is bound to represent it as strongly and convincingly as he can; he cannot know, and therefore cannot judge, the needs and possibilities of a front of which he has no experience. It is for the central authorities to decide between the conflicting claims, since they alone can know enough of the facts to enable them to judge dispassionately between them. It is for the local commander to bear in mind that his theatre is but one among many; that, if the arguments he has put forward have not carried the day, it is because other and stronger arguments have prevailed; that it is his task to make the best coat he can out of the cloth which has been assigned to him. But all the more is it important that those responsible for the decision between the conflicting claims should make their decision on the advice of skilled and responsible professional advisers, trained and properly equipped for their task, that in the most difficult, most responsible and most hazardous of all decisions the levity of ignorant amateurs should not prevail over the weighty judgments of experienced men, based on ripe study and competent appreciation of the lessons of history.

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# NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE stream of French and German books on the war shows no sign of abatement. The most important book of the quarter is M. Fernand Engerand's "La Bataille de la Frontière (août, 1914) — Briey" (Bossard, 7.50 francs). M. Engerand, who is *député du Calvados*, was the *rapporteur* of the Parliamentary Commission which inquired into the loss of the Briey Basin, from which France drew 83 per cent. of her iron ore. The Commission examined Maréchal Joffre and other high officers on oath. M. Engerand, very naturally fearing that the public were not likely to read its *Procès verbaux* and *Rapport*, has provided a careful summary of the proceedings. With the permission of the Minister of War, he has printed as an appendix a number of most important historical documents:—the French General Staff plans of Concentration No. 16, 16 *bis*, 16 ter, the celebrated No. 17 (which was the plan in force in August, 1914), and the "directives" to the Army commanders, which were attached to it; General Joffre's Instructions, which are really operation orders, issued in August; extracts from army war diaries, etc. We are at last, therefore, in possession of General Joffre's "intention," which hitherto has only been known to the public in a garbled form. As a translation of Plan 17 appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly*, it is not necessary to deal in detail with this portion of M. Engerand's book in these Notes. Interpreted by the help of the "directives" to the armies and the evidence of the generals given before the Commission, the plan may be thus summarized: The French First and Second Armies were to attack south of Metz, and the Fifth north of it; the Third Army was to connect the two attacks and arrange for the investment of Metz as the attacks progressed. How the French Fourth Army was to be employed depended on the action of the enemy. If he moved into Belgium, it was to co-operate with the Fifth Army; if he merely covered his frontier, it would go to the support of the right attack. So far so good. But the Commission found, and the information issued to the French Armies by G.Q.G. from time to time clearly proved,



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that the Intelligence Section was lamentably to seek before hostilities commenced: not only in its appreciation of the probable German plan but in the number of German divisions that would be put into the field. Further, it continued in error for days after the attack on Liége. It would seem that it had been skilfully hoodwinked by the Germans, who palmed a bogus plan on the French agents in 1912. On the 6th of August, General Joffre informed armies that "It may be concluded that the Germans are carrying out a plan of concentration, drawn up two years ago, of which we have got to know." This precious plan gave the forces to be employed against France, not as seven armies with seventy-two divisions, as they proved to be, but four armies with fifty-two divisions. Though General Lanrezac, in an official letter, dated the 31st of July, 1914, pointed out the probability of the German attack extending westward across the Meuse, and that his Army, from the direction it was ordered to take, would not be able to deal with this case, G.Q.G. persisted in its belief that the Germans would not cross the Meuse, refused absolutely to credit that their main attack would be made on that wing, and stuck to its original plan. Even on the 21st of August the official information issued to the armies (and to Sir John French) placed the forces likely to oppose Lanrezac's Army, the Belgians and the British, at seven or eight corps and four cavalry divisions. The actual numbers were twelve and five respectively, without counting the Third Army of four corps, which attempted to take Lanrezac in flank. It is sad to relate that the French Commander-in-Chief and his staff, instead of admitting that they had made a miscalculation, placed the blame for their ill-success on the shoulders of the *éxécutants* of their plans. Many generals and others were removed from their posts, including, as is well known, General Lanrezac. Moreover, Joffre wrote to the Minister of War that, "in spite of their numerical superiority (*sic*), our troops have not shown the qualities in open warfare that were expected from them." There is much in the book that is deserving of study, and its price puts it within reach of all.

"Le Plan XVII. Étude Stratégique" (Payot, 6 francs), anonymous, is worth reading in conjunction with M. Engerand's book, as it shows more clearly than anything yet published, how Joffre modified his original plan. On the 11th of August General Lanrezac asked permission to send his I Corps towards Givet to cover his left. Authority was given on the 12th to send it towards Philippeville with the mission "to oppose any attempts of the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and Namur." On the evening of

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the 13th orders were sent to the First and Second Armies to move on the 14th to carry out the scheme laid down in Plan 17. For the left of the Army only certain precautions were directed. Thus the "attack with all forces united" had ceased to hold good. On the 14th General Lanrezac paid a long visit to the General-in-Chief to impress on him again the danger to the left, and the necessity for the Fifth Army to make its advance farther to the west than in the "Plan", should, as he argued, the enemy pass the Meuse. It apparently had no effect. But on returning to his headquarters General Lanrezac found the G.Q.G. Intelligence summary which alluded to the German northern mass of manœuvre being concentrated between the northern part of Luxembourg and the region of Liége. This gave him another opportunity of appealing to Joffre. On the morning of the 15th the latter gave him permission to prepare to move the III and X Corps after the I Corps to the neighbourhood of Givet. At 5.30 P.M. definite orders for the move were despatched. For meantime news had come from the Belgians, through the Governor of Maubeuge, that 200,000 Germans were about to cross the Meuse below Visé. On the same date, as if to confirm Lanrezac's suspicions, the I Corps was attacked at Dinant. Lanrezac was further directed to hand the balance of his Army, the II Corps and two Reserve Divisions, to the Fourth Army, receiving in exchange two African Divisions and the XVIII Corps of the Second Army from the General Reserve. And he was told to co-operate with the British and Belgians. The Fourth Army instead of the Fifth now had to advance on Neufchateau. The Third Army was to shift into the place of the Fourth; it was relieved of its task of covering Metz. This was handed over to an Army of Alsace, formed of six Reserve Divisions (two taken from the Third Army) under General Maunoury, who had originally been detailed to watch the Italian frontier. The "Plan" was now so far changed that the Third and Fourth Armies were to attack the enemy's central group, whilst if his northern group tried to pass westward it was to be met by the Fifth Army, British and Belgians swinging north-eastward. On the 19th news from the Belgians, who were attacked on the Gette, revealed the German plan, but not its entire magnitude. The author makes a number of criticisms, and is somewhat severe on the late arrival of the B.E.F.

Next in importance to M. Engerand's book comes "Mémoires du Général Galliéni. Défense de Paris, 25 août, 11 septembre 1914" (Payot, 16 francs).

This is an account, with copies of orders, situation maps—in

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fact a war diary—of the critical days of August-September, 1914, written up by the general himself and completed in June, 1915. It has been published by his children as it stood in 1916. It is somewhat unpleasant reading for the British Army, and gives a different account of the author's visit to the British G.H.Q. on the 4th of September to that in Lord French's "1914." In spite of General Galliéni's representations, though General Maunoury's Army on the left of the British went forward on the 5th of September, the Expeditionary Force made a whole march to the rear on that day. Thus on the night of the 5th, the British were on an average fifteen miles from the position assigned to them by General Joffre as their jumping-off line for the great attack of the 6th of September, which opened the battle of the Marne. The movement to the rear, we learn from a despatch from the French Mission at G.H.Q. to General Joffre and Galliéni, was due to the "counsels of prudence" given to Sir John French by his Chief of Staff. M. Poincaré, the ex-President, in his anniversary article on the Marne (*Le Matin*, 5th of September, 1920), refers to this incident, and courteously explains it as due to the fact that "at this time the two Allied commands did not speak the same military language."

General Galliéni had great difficulty, it appears, in convincing General Joffre that he could turn and need not go behind the Seine; but he did in the end persuade him. M. Poincaré, who as President of the Republic at the time, is in a position to speak with authority, in the article just quoted, gives General Galliéni full credit for the initiative in the matter. He states that before the General issued his 9 a.m. order on the 4th and telephoned to Joffre, he had telegraphed to the Government that "a favourable occasion to be seized seemed to have arisen." M. Poincaré adds "it is therefore certain that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Paris had spontaneously from the first minute, a very clear vision of the great battle to be delivered." The book is undoubtedly a record of definite historical importance.

"Galliéni parle," written by General Galliéni's secretaries in a Boswellian manner, which came out first and was mentioned in the "Notes on Foreign War Books" last quarter, should be read after the General's own story. It is much more free spoken than his very soldierly narrative.

M. Mermeix, who was one of the Press correspondents at French Headquarters, is already the author of two very interesting books: "Joffre. Première crise du Commandement" and "Nivelle et Painlevé. La deuxième crise du commandement," giving a

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popular account of the events leading up to Maréchal Joffre and General Nivelle relinquishing command of the French Armies. He has now written two volumes on " Le Commandement Unique " (Ollendorff, 7 francs each). The first deals with the Western front, the second with Salonica. The state of affairs in the Balkan theatre has already been authoritatively described by General Sarrail, whose book " Mon Commandement en Orient " was referred to in the last number; M. Mermeix shows us the machinery at work among the Allied Governments which obstructed the operations of the general to whom they had agreed to give *le commandement unique*, and how they intrigued for his removal. It will be recalled that there was a separate commander for the French troops under Sarrail, and there was no doubt about the latter's nominal position. The volume on the Western front is of much greater interest. It shows how, though Sir John French was at first very independent, in consequence, as the author points out, of the instructions given him by the Secretary of State for War, that after the battle of the Marne, there were never any further difficulties of command during Sir John French's tour of office as Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. This is ascribed to the influence which General Foch acquired over him. When Sir Douglas Haig took over in December, 1915, it is asserted that he did not readily accede to General Joffre's wishes, but nothing in proof of this is advanced, and the joint plan for the battle of the Somme goes to disprove it. M. Mermeix admits that Sir Douglas Haig had a far larger army than his predecessor ever commanded, and therefore had claims to more independence. He further shows that he was quite prepared and agreed to accept General Nivelle's orders. Then the French Government spoilt all chance of *le commandement unique* in 1917 by themselves discrediting and removing their own general, without having any one of sufficient reputation at the time to make Allied Commander-in-Chief. The lamentable failure, as history has always shown, of a council instead of a Commander-in-Chief endeavouring to exercise command, is then described. " Better one mediocre general than two good ones," as Napoleon said, is quoted with approval. The book is well worth study, for though the author does not, of course, tell us the whole truth, he points out many of the difficulties and especially the language difficulty. This, at any rate, ought not to obtain in the next generation.

A most amusing book, which has, not unnaturally, caused a good deal of annoyance to the officers who served at Grand Q.G., is Jean de Pierrefeu's " G.Q.G. Secteur I." (two volumes, 4.50 francs each).

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The author, who is a literary critic, was employed at French Headquarters to write the daily press communiqués, and became acquainted with much that went on in staff circles. Though he had served in the ranks and had been wounded, and when appointed to his new post in 1915 wore a uniform of a sous-lieutenant, he was an absolute civilian as regards a knowledge of staff work and the ways of staff officers. The result is a most amusing chronicle and picture gallery of the members of the French Staff. There has been no such clear account of the inner life of a staff since Larpent in his diary (and he also was a civilian, Judge-Advocate General of Wellington's Army) noted things that a soldier would regard as matters of course and never record for posterity. There are full details of Joffre's daily life; how he went to bed at 10 p.m. whatever the situation was, and always locked the door of his room; his simple tastes; his economies and love of presents, and, of course, his capacity for silence. When General de Castelnau was appointed Chief of the General Staff, Joffre took him each day for a walk in the Forest of Chantilly after *déjeuner*, sat for a quarter of an hour on a bench and had a siesta and then returned; but never spoke. When a colonel of artillery, Carence, came to press the importance of manufacturing heavy guns, Joffre listened to him for an hour and a half, then gave him a friendly tap on the shoulder and said, " Ce sacré Carence, he has always had such a love of artillery. That's good," and sent him off.

The simple life at G.Q.G., its messes; how rank didn't matter —except in a stranger—when everybody looked at his sleeves before speaking, and the unceremonious way in which high officers were relieved of their posts, are well described. General Debeny, when Chief of Staff at G.Q.G., only heard of his appointment to the First Army when

" one afternoon, on returning to his office after a ride, he found on his table an *avis de mutation*."

There is a good deal about General Pétain, of whom one knows so little. There are details of how he settled the mutiny in 1917. There were " less than a dozen executions," we are told.

" He visited 86 divisions, discussed the situation first with the senior officers, then with the subalterns and N.C.O.'s, and then interrogated some of the old soldiers."

M. de Pierrefeu denies the political origin of the trouble, and considers it was due to the miserable conditions under which the French soldiers lived, which Pétain immediately set about to improve. His

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one weakness seems to have been maintaining old friends who had become inefficient in their posts.

Those who want to know how the G.Q.G. was organized, and who did the work, will find full details.

The same author's "La Deuxième Bataille de la Marne, 15–18 juillet, 1918" (Rénaissance du Livre, 2.50 francs) is disappointing. It does not describe the battle of the Marne, but discusses in an amateurish way the whole strategy of the war in the West. One then notices a small sub-title "Les étapes d'une victoire."

General Dubail, successively Commander of the French First Army, and of the Group of Armies of the East, and Governor of Paris, has commenced publishing his "Journal de Campagne," Vol I., 1re Armée (Fournier, 18 francs). It deals with the period from the 28th of July, 1914, to the 5th of January, 1915. As the daily record of an army commander's thoughts and doings it is difficult to summarize it. Roughly it is a story of having to hold an ever-lengthening front with fewer and fewer troops, as corps were sent West. It impresses one with the author's tremendous activity in visiting corps, divisional and even lower commanders, in exhorting them to greater efforts, and in distributing praise and blame. It is plain from this diary, as General Palat and M. Victor Margueritte have already told us in their books, that General de Castelnau got the praise for holding on in Alsace that was almost entirely due to General Dubail. On the 2nd of September the former Commander "envisage l'obligation d'un mouvement de repli." Dubail sent an officer to him to point out the disastrous consequences. On the 7th of September his liaison officer

"found General de Castelnau very sad and preoccupied. He had just heard of the death of one of his sons and the evacuation of the heights of St. Geneviève had been reported to him. General Anthoine, his Chief of Staff, had prepared (and typewritten) the order to retreat, and was going to direct the authorities of Nancy to leave the town."

Fortunately, the liaison officer, Captain Dussange, was able to persuade the Second Army Commander to wait a little before signing. He consented, and some hours later it was ascertained that the Germans were not at St. Geneviève at all.

"La Bataille de France (21 mars—11 novembre, 1918)," by Louis Madelin (Plon, 10 francs), is a pleasantly written book, but it

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is not military history, rather one long panegyric of Maréchal Foch. The author, who is a well-known historical writer, with pre-war works " crowned by the Académie française," was officially attached to the Information Section of French G.Q.G., and had access to the records. He merely tantalizes us by quoting small portions of, or referring to, Maréchal Foch's directives, *e.g.* " The General-in-Chief indicated five operations to be executed promptly "—and he enumerates three. He speaks of a Mémoire of the 24th of July being " luminous and firm in tone," but does not give it to us. The enemy's forces opposing the various Allied Armies are not mentioned. There are excellent coloured maps showing the ground gained in the various German offensives and the " stages of victory " of the Allies. One of the latter marks clearly that the British front on the 11th of November, 1918, was longer than the French front in the fighting zone between Pont à Mousson (near St. Mihiel salient) and Holland. That the weight of the German Armies also was opposite the British will be found in a situation map, giving the position of the enemy's divisions, in Lieut.-Colonel Boraston's edition of Lord Haig's Despatches.

" Ludendorff," by General Buat, the present Chief of the General Staff of the French Army (Payot, 6 francs), will be of value to those who desire to study the methods of the great German organiser, without wading through his own dull, egotistical book, in original or in its expensive English translation. No maps are provided, but there is no difficulty even without them in following General Buat's clear explanation of the German strategy. The author is not inclined to give the British much credit. As regards March, 1918, he says, " All the efforts of the Germans were then directed to Amiens, to which the French barred the route." His account of the loss of Mount Kemmel is :

" In a last effort, on the 25th of April, the Germans seized Mount Kemmel, but were not able to push farther. Once again French divisions arrived in time to limit the progress of the attacks."

General Buat has also just published a pamphlet " L'Armée Allemande pendant la guerre 1914–1918 " (Chapelot, 2 francs). It gives with a running commentary the strength of the German Army at various periods of the war, with diagrams showing the transfer of divisions from Germany to the different fronts and from one theatre of war to another. It is founded on the great work, " Composition et l'historique des divisions allemandes," gradually

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pieced together during the war by the Second Bureau of the État Major (Intelligence).

Ludendorff himself has published a second volume, entitled "Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit, 1916–1918" (Mittler, 54 marks). It is merely a reprint of a number of minutes, memorials and letters written by Hindenburg-Ludendorff to the Government, Departments of State, etc., on an enormous variety of subjects from peace-feelers and shipping down to decrease of the birth rate and drying of vegetables. It is an attempt to show that the General Staff left nothing undone which might assist to win the war.

The only documents of military interest included are the G.S. Memorandum of December, 1912, in which a demand for the increase of the Army by three army corps, etc., was made, and copies of General Ludendorff's tactical pamphlets: General Principles of the Construction of Positions, Defence in Trench Warfare, Attack in Trench Warfare and the Artillery Battle Manual (portions only). These pamphlets are already known to us, as they were captured and translated in 1917–1918.

In "Bis zur Marne 1914" (Stalling, 3 marks), General Tappen, who 1913–1916 was Head of the Operations of the Great General Staff and of the General Staff of the Field Army, attempts to explain away some of the blunders of August-September, 1914. His pamphlet has not had a good reception in Germany, and its statements have been freely contradicted and criticized. Until the original documents are published, it is not possible to accept all that he avers. The principal and most curious statement—made to explain why two corps were taken from the striking wing on the 26th of August to send to Russia—is that on the 25th of August the Supreme Command thought that a decisive victory over the French and British had been gained, and ordered *six* corps to Russia. The Guard Reserve and XI. Corps, which had been besieging Namur, were immediately free to go, and were sent off; the V. Corps got as far as the railway of Thionville; then it was discovered that the war in France was still going on, and the orders were countermanded, except those of the two corps mentioned above from the Second and Third Armies. Incidentally, he states that the Tannenberg manœuvre on interior lines was not really improvized, but had been frequently practised at war games; it was merely a question of whether the Niemen or the Narew Army should be struck first. The Russian cipher used in wireless was so simple that there was no difficulty in reading it, so that the German Staff always knew the higher orders issued by their opponents

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It may be noted that von Bülow's book on the Second Army, 1914, has been translated into French under the title of "Mon rapport sur la bataille de la Marne" (Payot, 6 francs), and that a French translation of von Hausen's book on the Third Army is announced.

Four German Corps Commanders have published their reminiscences. Von Moser (XIV. Reserve Corps) in his "Feldaufzeichnungen" (Belser, 12 marks) is especially interesting, as he was watching the Belgian coast in 1917 and was at Cambrai. Gossler (VI. Reserve Corps) was, according to his "Erinnerungen" (Korn, 9 marks), mainly at Verdun, but he held Vimy Ridge during the winter of 1916–1917, and says that we should never have captured it if the measures that he advocated had been carried out. Von Morgen's "Meiner Truppenheldenkämpfe" (Mittler, 15 marks) is mainly concerned with Russia. He commanded the 3rd Reserve Division and the I. and IV. Reserve Corps, was, of course, at Tannenberg, and only came west at the beginning of 1918 to the Lille and Cambrai areas. Von François (I. Reserve Corps), in a book entitled "Marneschlacht und Tannenberg" (Scherl, 72 marks), provides a short narrative of the battle of the Marne from official records, and then gives an excellent account of the early operations in the East at which he was present.

"Generalfeldmarschall von Mackensen. Von Bukarest bis Salonika" (Lehmann, 5.40 marks), by one of this Commander's staff officers, is not an account of his military operations, but of his occupation of Rumania after the peace of Bukarest, May, 1918; the return of his troops to Germany after the collapse of the Empire; his internment with his staff in Hungary; and his transfer to Salonika under French guard. Not until the 17th of November, 1919, was he allowed to return to Germany. It is not altogether pleasant reading and the *Feldmarschall* appears at times to have been treated with scant courtesy. Allowance, however, must be made for German irritation at being on the losing side, and it should be borne in mind that at the revolution German officers lost the right to be addressed in the third person and other even less important privileges.

"Um Riga und Oesel," by R. Brandt (Belhagen u. Klasing, 3.60 marks), is unfortunately only a war correspondent's account of the fighting at Riga and the landing at Oesel. There is a vivid account of the crossing of the Duna in the face of the Russians. Heavy artillery opened at 6 a.m.; at 6.30 a.m. massed trench mortars joined in, and at 9 a.m. the advanced guards crossed in pontoons at

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three places. They were "richly provided with flame-throwers, machine guns and all the latest close fighting devices."

The landing at Oesel was a "walk-over." The Russians, "their cockades painted over with red paint and with red silk ribbons on their breasts," were all fast asleep except a few gunners. These opened fire only after the advanced guards had landed and quickly stopped. There are some excellent photographs. One shows ten pinnaces full of men being towed ashore on a calm morning in the midst of profound peace.

The first volumes of two important German naval official books have appeared: the "Admiralstab's Krieg zur See 1914–8" (Mittler, 60 marks), Vol. I., dealing with the war in the North Sea from the beginning of hostilities to the beginning of September; and "Die Deutschen U-Boote," Parts I. and II., taking the story of submarine warfare up to October, 1915 (Mittler, 5 marks and 6.15 marks). An extract from the former was quoted in "From a Student's Scrapbook" in the last number of the ARMY QUARTERLY to the effect that the Chief of the General Staff did not want naval plans upset in order to stop the transport of the B.E.F. to France where it could be dealt with. The only phrase of military interest in the U-Boat story is:

"The men entrusted with the conduct of the war made a fatal error when they planned to overthrow an Alliance which included England by operations on land only."

The book seems largely directed to exhibiting to the Germans that in the next war, if plenty of U-Boats have been built and are put in at once, Britain will easily be beaten.

"Die Deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege" (Mittler, 38 marks) is an account of the operation of the German air forces compiled by twenty-nine officers from official sources, under the editorship of Major G. P. Neumann. It has been very fully reviewed in *The Times* (13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of September, 1920).

"La Guerre Roumaine, 1916–1918," by M. Djuvara (Berger-Levrault, 10 francs), is political, not military, history. The military operations only take up 24 pages out of 344, and are sketched in broadest lines. A good account from the Rumanian side has not appeared yet, so far as is known.

"La Victoire des Alliés en Orient (15 septembre—13 novembre, 1918)," by Constantin Photiades (Plon, 7.50 francs), is not, as the name of the author suggests, an account of the defeat of the Bulgarians

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from the Greek side. He is, it turns out, a French novelist and critic who has written on George Meredith. He was with the Salonika Army, and was present at the Victory fêtes at Paris on the 14th of July, 1919, when a representative party of the Army of the Orient marched under the Arc de Triomphe. Among the names of battles inscribed in the pilons, they looked in vain for their own fights, but only " Skra de Legen " and " Pogradec " could be found. He has therefore written an account of their victories that all can understand, in order in some way to repair the " cruel injustice."

Only two Italian war books have come to notice. " Il Processo di Cadorna," by Ezio Gray (Bemporad, 4.50 l.), a defence of the general by an author who claims that he is not a personal friend or dependant. He thinks that Cadorna has been unfairly treated, that Italy should be more grateful to the man who reconstructed her Army, made it possible for her to enter the war and fought the eleven battles that helped to prepare " the final defeat of the most ancient military Power in Europe and the most determined foe of United Italy." The other is " Note di Guerra," by Generale Luigi Capello (Fratelli Treves, 20 l.), who commanded the Italian Second Army up to the battle of Caporetto. His first volume, the only one that has yet been published, covers the period from the opening of hostilities, May, 1915, to the capture of Gorizia by his army in August, 1916. It is a good sketch of the operations with useful comments, sufficient for the general reader.

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# SHORT REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

*History of the British Army*, Vols. IX. and X. By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE. With separate volume of Maps. (Macmillan. £4 4*s*. net.)

THESE two volumes cover the years 1813–15, and include accounts of the final phases of the Peninsular War (Victoria, St. Sebastian, passage of the Bidassoa, etc.), and of the advance to Bayonne and Toulouse; of the American War (Canadian frontier and expeditions against Washington and New Orleans); of minor campaigns (Graham's expedition to Holland; Bergen op Zoom; Bentinck in Italy; Leghorn and Genoa); and, in conclusion, of the Waterloo campaign. There are besides chapters on home affairs and the course of Napoleon's campaigns, which serve as a general framework to the narrative; and a chapter on the organization and nature of the British military forces and institutions, 1803–1814.

It has been impossible in the short time available before going to press to read all the 1000 odd pages (uncut) with proper care, and this review is necessarily a somewhat incomplete one. Like the previous volumes, Nos. IX. and X. seem more adapted for the general reader than for the military student; though they serve as an admirable introduction to the study of the military history of the campaigns, and from that point of view should be read by every young officer. To older ones they are, as are all the volumes, a useful book of reference, particularly as regards the minor campaigns about which there are no readily accessible accounts. But although the facts may generally be relied on, the judgments and deductions should not be accepted "without much reservation," to use the words of the author's appreciation of the Duke of Wellington that is referred to below. For instance, we cannot agree that Wellington was "decidedly the first director of a battle of his time." We may freely admit this with the qualification *defensive* battle; but from the nature of the campaigns he carried on, and perhaps in consequence of the characteristics and number of his troops, he never fought even one great offensive battle, hardly a defensive-offensive one (like Austerlitz), and in this respect cannot, we think, be compared with Napoleon.



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Mr. Fortescue complains of prejudice in others: "There are times when Napier's political bias makes him positively childish," he says. To a student, it seems a case of the mote and the beam: the bias of the author against Napoleon, Pitt, Gneisenau and Prussians generally, and to a certain extent against Wellington and in favour of the Duke of York, Lord Liverpool and certain others, seems characteristic. He cannot leave Pitt alone even in 1813, and writes, 'Liverpool had wisely and rightly abjured Pitt's system of great spasmodic effort, followed by helpless collapse, in favour of a policy of steady, even, and sustained effort."

Volume IX. commences with an account of Napoleon's campaign in Russia, 1812. Considering that it is called a history of the British Army, it seems strange that there is no mention of Sir Robert Wilson, British Commissioner with the Russians. His influence on the course of events was considerable, and his book, that of an eye-witness, is the most vivid account of the extraordinary and ghastly events of the great retreat and advance.

It is well that we should be reminded in these days of comparative quiet of the riot and outrage that went on at home whilst our soldiers were overseas fighting Napoleon, "the whole being directed by a secret organization so perfect that the movements could not be foreseen, nor could evidence be gathered as to the actual perpetrators of outrage. . . . Five regiments of cavalry were required permanently to maintain order in the disturbed districts of (three counties) alone; and since the tumults over the dearness of food extended as far south as Truro, it is not surprising that the Government felt unwilling to weaken the British garrison much further (to reinforce Wellington)."

The index confuses Colquhoun Grant, the cavalry brigadier, with his namesake, the Intelligence officer, lumping them together as "Major-General Colquhoun Grant," and in the text it is not made clear that they were two separate persons. Nor does Mr. Fortescue refer to the story that the Intelligence officer was well out in front of the British Army, with agents in Paris, in June, 1815, and that his message to Wellington that Napoelon was moving, sent on the 13th, was stupidly held up by General Dornberg, who commanded the outposts at Mons. Not hearing from Grant, the Duke is said to have disregarded rumours and reports received from others (*vide* the Autobiography of Sir James Mcgrigor, the principal medical officer of the Army).

We looked in the index to see what was said about the patient work of the Royal Navy in keeping communication open past the

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coast of France to the Peninsula, and found only two complaints about the insecurity of maritime communications; the first entry, p. 100, seems a misprint for p. 105, as there is nothing on p. 100 about the Navy. On p. 105 we are told that the Navy "had evidently grown slack and careless." It would be fairer to say it was over-confident, and attempted, and did, much with inadequate means; for there had been the usual expensive economy after Trafalgar as after other victories.

Mr. Fortescue is at pains to examine Wellington's complaint to the Prince Regent in April, 1815, on his arrival in Flanders, post-haste from Vienna: "I might have expected that the generals and staff formed by me in the last war would have been allowed to come to me again, but instead of that I am overloaded with people I have never seen before." He decides that "Wellington's sweeping statements on this, as on some other topics, should not be accepted without much reservation." The present reviewer happens to have examined this question when at the Staff College, and investigated, with the help of the "Dictionary of National Biography" and War Office records, the careers of the officers in question. The Duke had good reason for his complaint; he settled matters by leaving the young gentlemen of fashion undisturbed and bringing over his old team, some forty officers in all, to do the work. The results of the investigation were submitted to the Commandant Staff College, Sir Henry Hildyard (whose grandfather was one of Wellington's men). He made the remark that "By June the Duke had got his old staff back again, it was of the staff he found in Flanders that he complained."

Mr. Fortescue considers that Wellington at Waterloo "was not at his best, otherwise he would not have left 16,000 men at Hal during the battle. This last matter constitutes a mystery which will never be cleared up." He does not give any account of Wellington's bases and lines of communication.

Hamley says, "the Allies were obliged to dispose their forces so as not only to interpose on the main lines to Brussels, but also to protect the roads (and canals) which linked them to their bases." The Duke's bases were Antwerp and Ostend behind Hal; and getting across his opponent's lines of communication was one of Napoleon's most successful operations. This is at any rate one clue.

A study of the campaigns of which the author writes, with the assistance of a friend with knowledge of staff work and organization, would clear up many things which seem mysterious to him. He would not then write such comments on Napoleon, as on an occasion



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when his supply service broke down, as: "Any fool can fill a magazine; but it needs a great organizer to carry the food from the magazines to an army in the field." Without transport even the greatest organizer can do little. To organize a park or wagon line of communication is simple; how to do it can be found in many books on war: from Cæsar's Commentaries to Callwell's "Small Wars."

The thirty maps supplied are in colour and very beautiful, but some of them, however, are merely hachured without a single height marked to give the relief, *e.g.* those of "St. Sebastian," "the Passage of the Bidassoa and the Nivelle," besides others.

Mr. Fortescue in a somewhat pathetic preface complains of the small monetary reward that he has earned by his labours on the ten volumes of the "History of the British Army." We venture to suggest if they were broken up, like Scribner's series on the American Civil War, into small volumes, each dealing with one of the longer campaigns or a collection of smaller ones, without a serial number on the back, that there would be a better sale.

J. E. E.

*Forty Days in* 1914. (Second Revised Edition.) By Major-General Sir FREDERICK MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B. (Constable. 21*s*.)

Since Sir F. Maurice wrote this book nearly two years ago, a number of German commanders: von Kluck, von Bulow, von Hausen, etc., and several French generals: Galliéni, Lanrezac, Percin, to mention the best known, have published accounts of their share in the events of the first forty days of the war. He has therefore been able in his revise, which is double the length of his original work, to substitute facts for intelligent conjecture. He particularly brings out the ignorance of the Germans of the places of landing, strength and movements of the B.E.F. in August, 1914; the German superiority in numbers at Mons; and the breakdown of the German machinery of command. He is able to show from both French and German evidence that his original view was correct: that one of the most decisive factors in the issue of the battle of the Marne was the advance of the British columns on the morning of the 9th of September; and that it had far more to do with the victory than Foch's counterstroke with the 42nd Division at Fère Champenoise, which, it is now admitted, never took place at all.

General Maurice's book may be recommended as by far the best in English on the opening phase of the war.

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*With the Indians in France.* By General Sir JAMES WILLCOCKS, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., LL.D. Constable. 24*s*.

The author commanded the Indian Corps from its first landing in France in September and October, 1914, up till September, 1915—that is, for all but two months of the time that the Corps formed part of the British Expeditionary Force. The book is based on his personal diaries and papers, and forms an essential supplement and pendant to the official history of the Indian Corps, written by Col. Merewether and the present Lord Chancellor. It will be found, therefore, as might be expected, that the narrative has running through it a strongly personal note, and that it must be regarded as a plea for a juster and fuller recognition of the difficulties and achievements of a formation put together hurriedly for the occasion and sent overseas to fight in an alien land, under an unfriendly sky, against a foe far more formidable from every point of view than any ever met by any Indian Army in history.

Sir James Willcocks gives a clear and succinct narrative of most of the engagements and battles in which his men fought, although the earlier part of the story up to the battle of Neuve Chapelle is told in greater detail than the remainder. He is eloquent on the subject of the difficult problems that constantly confronted him, partly caused by the nature of the fighting and the lack of preparation on the part of the British Empire for a war of unprecedented nature and magnitude, and partly from the shortsighted policy pursued in quarters where the peculiar needs of the Indian Corps were imperfectly understood and insufficiently met. It is evident, however, that the author's attitude is influenced less by any spirit of personal bitterness than by the feeling that owing to these things the spirit of his troops was impaired and their fine qualities deprived of their full scope.

It is an undoubted fact that the general popular ignorance of the Indian Army led first to an exaggerated estimate of what might be expected of Indian troops in the face of entirely novel and difficult conditions of warfare and then to a sense of disappointment and disillusion which found vent in much ill-natured and undeserved criticism of their actual performances. Something of this temper still persists to-day, and one can only hope that the deeds of gallantry performed by Indian troops in France, with which Sir James's book bristles, and the tale of Indian casualties—28,800 during General Willcocks's year of command—may finally dispel the last traces of this injustice to our gallant Indian brothers-in-arms.

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*Adventures in Wars of the Republic and Consulate.* By A. MORRAU DE JONNÈS. Translated by Brig.-General A. J. ABDY, C.B., C.B.E. Murray. 18*s*.

The author of this work describes his experiences of fighting on land and sea, commencing with the campaign of 1792 in Brittany against the Chouans, and including the siege of Toulon, the sea-fight of the 1st of June and the expeditions to San Domingo, Martinique and Dominica. The most interesting portion of the book for English readers is, however, the account of the mutiny at the Nore and of the two expeditions to Ireland. The author was present at the Nore as a delegate of the French Republic, but was unsuccessful in inducing the leaders of the rising to carry their action through to its logical conclusion and hand over the British fleet to the French. The main impression left in the mind of the reader by the story of the first expedition is the ease with which the French squadrons escaped the vigilance of the British fleet on both occasions, and the incapacity of the French leaders to seize the opportunities presented them by fortune. The book can be recommended as a useful complement to the military and naval history of the times, and as filling up many gaps in that history which have hitherto been uncharted land for most students.

*Memoirs of the Count de Rochechouart*, 1788–1822. Translated by FRANCES JACKSON. John Murray. 16*s*.

The Count de Rochechouart was a French *emigré* who, after undergoing the extremes of poverty and friendlessness during the years of his boyhood and early youth, was finally adopted by the Duc de Richelieu, afterwards head of the first Bourbon ministry subsequent to the battle of Waterloo, who at the time held a high position as Governor of Odessa under the Tsar Alexander II. The Count's narrative gives an excellent and vivid account of the expansion of the Russian Empire among the semi-barbarous Cossack and Kirghiz tribes of the Caucasus and the Crimea; but the main interest of the book for military readers begins with his participation in the Campaign of 1812, in which he served in the Corps under Tchitchakov; some fresh light is thrown on the escape of Napoleon's Grand Army from apparently certain destruction at the Beresina, for which Tchitchakov is usually held largely to blame. Subsequently the author served as *aide-de-camp* to the Tsar throughout the War of Liberation and was engaged in many highly confidential missions, including several to Bernadotte of whom he gives

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a clear and very attractive portrait. Appointed Commandant of Paris after the entry of the Allies in 1814, De Rochechouart then left the Russian service and joined the French Royal Guard. One of his duties—by no means a welcome one—was the carrying out of the death sentence on Marshal Ney; of this incident he gives a full and detailed narrative which, in several important particulars, corrects the accounts hitherto accepted. The Count's public career ended with the death of his protector and friend, the Duc de Richelieu, in 1822. His narrative, which is well translated, throws fresh and valuable light not only on the social life of the time, but on many points in the history of the later Napoleonic Wars.

*Experiences of a Dug-Out*, 1914–1918. London: Constable & Co., Limited. 1920. 18*s*. net.

Some passages of this book have already appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine*, but it contains a good deal that is new and much that is interesting. Sir C. E. Callwell is not only a military historian of considerable repute, but the various posts which he occupied in the War Office during the war enable him to speak with authority upon the matters of military policy to which he mainly alludes. His criticisms are invariably just and reasonable, and his conclusions —especially his remarks with regard to one of the lessons of the war taught to all the belligerents, "that newly-organized troops, or troops of the militia type such as our Territorials of pre-war days . . . do not make really effective instruments in the hands of a commander for a considerable period after embodiment"—although generally obvious to soldiers, are worthy of more public attention than they are likely to obtain.

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## LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

NOTE.—All books received are acknowledged in this list, and the inclusion therein does not necessarily preclude a book from further notice in the Review.

"A Subaltern in the Field." By E. C. Matthews (Lieut., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry). Published by W. P. Spalding.

"A Hospital Letter-Writer in France." By May Bradford. Published by Methuen & Co., Ltd.

"Memoirs of the Count De Rochechouart." Authorized translation by Frances Jackson. Published by John Murray.

"Allenby's Final Triumph." By W. T. Massey. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.

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"The Direction of War." By Major-General W. D. Bird. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"The First World War, 1914 to 1918." Personal Experiences of Lieut.-Col. C. A. Court Repington, C.M.G. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.

"The Tunnellers of Holzminden." By H. G. Durnford. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"The New Age Encyclopædia." 2 Vols. Edited by Sir Edward Parrott, M.A. Published by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.

"Merlin's Isle." A study of Rudyard Kipling's England. By W. Worster. Published by Gyldendal.

"The History of the 2/6th (Rifle) Battalion, 'The King's' (Liverpool Regiment), 1914–1919." By Capt. C. E. Wurtzburg, M.C. Published by Gale & Polden.

"War Services of the 62nd West Riding Divisional Artillery." By Colonel A. T. Anderson. Published by W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd.

"The History of the 7th (Ser.) Bn. Prince of Wales's (North Staffordshire Regiment), 1914–1919." By L. R. Missen, M.C. Published by W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd.

"The Navy in the War of 1739–48." By H. W. Richmond, Rear-Admiral. 3 Vols. Published by the Cambridge University Press.

"Ribbons and Medals." By Commander Taprell Dorling, R.N. Published by George Philip & Son, Ltd.

"Outline of the Development of the British Army." By Major-General W. H. Anderson, C.B. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd.

"Forty Days in 1914." Second Revised Edition. By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.

"Gallipoli Diary." By Sir Ian Hamilton. 2 Vols. Published by Edward Arnold.

"Small Craft." By G. H. P. Muhlhauser, Lieut. R.N.R. Published by John Lane.

"Quatrains of Omar Khayyam." By O. A. Shrubsole. Published by E. Marlborough & Co.

"History of the British Army." By the Hon. J. W. Fortescue. 3 Vols. Published by Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

"With the Indians in France." By General Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.

"Adventures in Wars of the Republic and Consulate." By A. Moreau de Jonnès. Translated by Brig.-Gen. A. J. Abdy, C.B., C.B.E. Published by John Murray.

"First Italian Book." By Ernest Hatch Wilkins, Ph.D., Litt.D. Published by the University of Chicago Press.

"Giacosa Tristi Amori." By Altrocchi & Woodbridge. Published by the University of Chicago Press.

"Experiences of a Dug-Out." By Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, K.C.B. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd.

"Letters on Amphibious Wars." By Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B. Published by John Murray.

"The Victory at Sea." By Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, United States Navy. In Collaboration with Burton J. Hendrick. Published by John Murray.

"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace." American Foreign Policy. Based upon Statements of Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States and Publicists of the American Republics. With an Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"Syllabus of Training for Territorials." By Brevet Lieut.-Col. P. R. Worrall, D.S.O., M.C. Published by Gale & Polden.

"Palestine Reclaimed." By Redcliffe N. Salaman, M.D. With an Introduction by the Hon. W. Ormsby Gore, M.P. Published by George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.

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# FROM A STUDENT'S SCRAPBOOK

## The German General Staff and a Long War

" Generalfeldmarschall Graf Moltke expressed himself as follows on the 14th of May, 1890 (he was then 90 years of age) :—

" ' When the next war, which has been hanging over our heads like a sword of Damocles for more than ten years—when the next war breaks out, no one can say how long it will last. It may be a seven-years war, it may be a thirty-years war.'

" On the other hand, his spiritual heir, Generalfeldmarschal Graf Schlieffen, took exactly the opposite view when he said :

" ' Long drawn out wars are impossible in an age when the existence of a nation is founded on the uninterrupted continuation of trade and industry : the delicately geared machinery that has been brought to a standstill must be got going again by a rapid decision.' . . .

" The possibility of lengthy European wars, that as far as purely military conditions go was quite thinkable, was roundly rejected by the Chief of the General Staff on economic grounds. . . .

" The German General Staff did not prepare for a long war. It put all its money on one card, and that card was a course of unstemmed victory of the German Army."—" Kritik des Weltkrieges " (by an anonymous German General Staff Officer), pp. 67–68.

## Why Germany selected 1914

" The Tzar to M. Nekludoff, 1911 : ' Listen to me, Nekludoff : do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war as a rule ; I shall do all in my power to preserve for my people the benefits of peace. But at this moment, of all moments, everything that might lead to war must be avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years, in fact till 1917. . . . Though if the most vital interests and the honour of Russia were at stake, we might, if it were absolutely necessary, accept a challenge in 1915.' "—Nekludoff's " Diplomatic Reminiscences," p. 45.



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## Why Sir John French did not accept General Galliéni's Proposal to move Eastward on the 5th of September, 1914

"Colonel Huguet (Chief of the French Military Mission at British Headquarters) to the Military Governor of Paris.

"'Melun, 4th September, 8.15.

"'I have the honour to send you Captain Bastidon, who carries the message that I have just sent to G.Q.G.

"'Melun, 4th September, 8.

"'The Field Marshal, who yesterday afternoon seemed very desirous to move eastward to disengage the left of the Fifth Army, has modified his decision under the influence of counsels of prudence given him by his Chief of the General Staff.

"'In principle, the troops will rest to-day, but are ordered to hold themselves in readiness to start at short notice to begin their retreat behind the Seine.

"'The movement will be executed in three stages:—the first will bring the rear guards on to the front Maupertuis (south of Coulommiers), Faremoutiers, Tigreaux, Chanteloup. If the Sixth Army debouches eastward from Paris, the British Army will still be able to support its right.

"'But if the left of the Fifth Army is thrown back too much eastward, or if the advance becomes too pronounced, the British Army will be obliged to continue the movement of retreat on the left bank of the Seine, holding Corbeil with its left, Melun with its right.

"'The British G.H.Q. will remain at Melun to-day, the 4th.'"

—"Mémoires du Général Galliéni. Défense de Paris," p. 224.

## Foch at Arras, 5th of October, 1914

"On the 5th of October, 1914, during the 'Race to the Sea,' the French Tenth Army was so heavily attacked and so short of ammunition that its commander, General de Maud'huy was considering the abandonment of Arras and a retreat. At this juncture, General Foch arrived, deputed by General Joffre to give a decision in his name. He entered Tenth Army Headquarters 'like a gust of wind,' and, extending his arms, said to General de Maud'huy:

"'I embrace you for all you have done, and for all that you will do; you hear what I say, *for all that you will do!*'"

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"He then ordered the staff out of the room with a 'clear out,' they only heard the following, when he raised his voice :—

"'I won't hear anything! You understand! I won't hear anything. I am deaf! I only know three ways of fighting—Attack—Hold on—Clear out. I forbid you to do the last. . . . Choose between the first two.'

"General de Maud'huy subsequently ordered a general attack and the situation was saved.

"Next day, General Foch reappeared, and said :

"'Get smashed to the last man, but hold on like lice. No retirement. Every man to the attack.'"—Ct. Marcel Jauneaud (on the staff of General de Maud'huy) in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15th of August, 1920, pp. 835 and 846.

## The Dismissal of Foch in 1916

"The question of the removal of General Foch from his command greatly pre-occupied me, and quite recently I happened to meet one of the three or four officers who lived on terms of intimacy with Joffre. I questioned him, and he told me that at the beginning of December, 1916, whilst walking in the forest of Chantilly with the Generalissimo, the latter said to him suddenly, 'It seems that Foch is really ill?' The officer began to laugh, and with his habitual free-speaking which his chief liked, replied, 'What you, too, General? I thought it was only the staff of General de Castelnau who believed in Foch's illness.' Joffre smiled a little, but said nothing. Some days afterwards the order appeared, signed by General Pellé, which put Foch at the disposal of the Minister of War. General Foch came to Chantilly and made such a violent scene with Joffre that his voice could be heard in the neighbouring rooms. It is said that Joffre stammered in reply, 'Vous êtes limogé, je serai limogé, nous serons tous limogés.'"—"G.Q.G. Secteur I.," by Jean de Pierrefeu (Editor of the daily G.Q.G. Communiqué, 1915–18), vol. i. p. 166.

## The Germans and Camouflage

"As regards concealment from aeroplanes (*Fliegerdeckung*), we had learned as good as nothing (in peace time). Even in the war we followed haltingly and hesitatingly behind our adversaries. Actually, we only learned 'camouflage' (the French word is used in the original) from the English, after our losses had made us wise."—Generalmajor G. von Gleich in "Die alte Armee und ihre Verwirrungen," p. 19.

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# APPENDIX

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## I. THE ARMY

### 1. ARMY COUNCIL

Rt. Hon. W. L. S. Churchill, M.P., *Secretary of State for War* (*President of the Army Council*).
Rt. Hon. W. R. W. Visct. Peel, G.B.E., *Under Secretary of State for War* (*Vice-President of the Army Council*).
Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ir. Rifles, *p.s.c.*, *Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.
Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master General of the Ordnance*.
Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff*.
Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces*.
Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *Quarter-Master General to the Forces*.
Rt. Hon. Sir A. Williamson, Bt., M.P., *Financial Secretary* (*Finance Member*).
Sir J. Stevenson, Bt., *Surveyor-General of Supply*.
Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.; Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B., *Secretaries and Members of Council*.

### 2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

#### *Secretary of State for War*

Rt. Hon. W. L. S. Churchill, M.P.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.* | Lieutenant-General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |

#### *Chief of the Imperial General Staff*

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., Col. R. Ir. Rifles, *p.s.c.*

#### *Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff*

Lieutenant-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Military Operations.* | Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Military Intelligence.* | Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Staff Duties.* | Major-General Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |



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## *Adjutant General to the Forces*

Lieutenant-General G. M. W. Macdonogh, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Organisation.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) I. L. B. Vesey, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Mobilisation and Recruiting.* | Major-General B. F. Burnett-Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Personal Services.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) Sir B. E. W. Childs, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Director-General of Graves Registration and Enquiries.* | Temp. Major-General Sir F. A. G. Ware, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director-General Army Medical Service.* | Lieutenant-General Sir T. H. J. C. Goodwin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

## *Quarter-Master General to the Forces*

Lieutenant-General Sir T. E. Clarke, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

## *Deputy Quarter-Master General*

Major-General Sir G. F. Ellison, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Movements and Quartering.* | Colonel (Temp. Major-Gen.) R. S. May, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Remounts.* | Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. N. Birch, K.C.M.G., C.B., Col. Comdt. R.A. |
| *Director of Supplies and Transport.* | Major-General Sir E. E. Carter, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.* | Major-General Sir H. D. E. Parsons, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Director-General Army Veterinary Service.* | Major-General L. J. Blenkinsop, C.B., D.S.O. |

## *Master General of the Ordnance*

Lieutenant-General Sir J. P. Du Cane, K.C.B., Col. Commdt. R.A.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director of Artillery.* | Brigadier-General B. R. Kirwan, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director of Fortifications and Works.* | Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B. |

## *Under Secretary of State for War*

Rt. Hon. W. R. W. Visct. Peel, G.B.E.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Director-General of Territorial and Volunteer Forces.* | Colonel (Terr. Army) (Temp. Major-Gen. in Army) A. F. G. B. Earl of Scarbrough, K.C.B., T.D., A.D.C. |
| *Director-General of Lands.* | Sir Howard Frank, K.C.B. |

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*Finance Member*

Rt. Hon. Sir A. Williamson, Bt., M.P.

*Joint Secretary of the War Office and Accounting Officer.*

Sir C. Harris, G.B.E., K.C.B.

*Directors of Finance.* Sir W. P. Perry, K.B.E., C.B.; H. H. Fawcett, Esq., C.B.; J. B. Crosland, Esq.

*Surveyor-General of Supply*

Sir J. Stevenson, Bt.

*Director of Army Contracts.* J. A. Corcoran, Esq., C.B.

*Director General of Factories.* H. Mensforth, Esq., C.B.E.

*Joint Secretary of the War Office*

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., C.V.O.

*Assistant-Secretary.* Sir B. B. Cubitt, K.C.B.

*Chaplain-General.* Rt. Rev. Bishop J. Taylor-Smith, C.V.O., D.D.

*Judge Advocate-General.* Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

## 3. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

### A.—Cavalry Regiments

| Regiment. | Station. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Life Guards | Windsor | Lt.-Col. Hon. E. S. Wyndham, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd Life Guards | Hyde Park Barracks, S.W. | Lt.-Col. Hon. A. F. Stanley, D.S.O. | |
| Royal Horse Guards | Regent's Park, N.W. | Lt.-Col. Lord Tweedmouth, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. H. J. Williams, D.S.O. | to Edinburgh 1920–21 |
| 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) | Palestine | Lt.-Col. C. S. Rome, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards | Sialkot | Lt.-Col. C. L. Rome, D.S.O. | |
| 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. C. F. Hunter, D.S.O. | |
| 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) Dragoon Guards | Colchester | Lt.-Col. H. Combe, D.S.O. | to Palestine 1920–21 |

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## Cavalry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Station. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers) | Athenry | Lt.-Col. H. Sadler. | |
| 7th (Princess Royal's) Dragoon Guards | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. B. G. Clay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st (Royal) Dragoons | Ballinasloe | Lt.-Col. H. A. Tomkinson, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys) | Redford Barracks, Edinburgh | Lt.-Col. W. M. Duguid-McCombie, D.S.O. | to Palestine 1920–21. |
| 3rd (King's Own) Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. W. T. Wilcox, C.M.G. | |
| 4th (Queen's Own) Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. W. Neilson, D.S.O. | |
| 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers | Risalpur | Lt.-Col. H. A. Cape, D.S.O. | |
| 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons | Rhine | Bt.-Col. B. Vincent, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | to York 1920–21 |
| 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars | York | Lt.-Col. H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. G. M. Mort, D.S.O. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers | Longford | Lt.-Col. F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 10th (Prince of Wales's Own Royal) Hussars | Hare Park, Curragh | Lt.-Col. A. G. Seymour, D.S.O. | |
| 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars | Egypt | Lt.-Col. W. J. Lockett, D.S.O. | |
| 12th (Prince of Wales's Royal) Lancers | Curragh Camp | Lt.-Col. C. Fane, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 13th Hussars | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. J. J. Richardson, D.S.O. | |
| 14th (King's) Hussars | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. R. V. K. Applin, D.S.O. | to Rhine 1920–21 |
| 15th (The King's) Hussars | Dublin | Lt.-Col. F. C. Pilkington, D.S.O. | |
| 16th (The Queen's) Lancers | Egypt | Lt.-Col. C. E. St. J. Harris-St.-John, D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 17th (Duke of Cambridge's Own) Lancers | Buttevant | Lt.-Col. B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 18th (Queen Mary's Own) Royal Hussars | Secunderabad | Lt.-Col. E. C. Jury, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal) Hussars | Muttra | Lt.-Col. A. W. Parsons, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 20th Hussars | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. M. E. Richardson, D.S.O. | |
| 21st (Empress of India's) Lancers | Meerut | Lt.-Col. O. W. Brinton. | |

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## B.—Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery

*Allotment of Batteries to Brigades.*

| Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. | Batt. | Brig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 37th | 23 | 12th | 45 | 31st | 67 | 20th | 89 | 16th | 111 | 24th | 133 | 20th |
| 2 | 13th | 24 | 7th | 46 | 10th | 68 | 14th | 90 | ,, | 112 | ,, | 134 | 32nd |
| 3 | 37th | 25 | 35th | 47 | 30th | 69 | 6th | 91 | ,, | 113 | 25th | 135 | ,, |
| 4 | 4th | 26 | 17th | 48 | 36th | 70 | 34th | 92 | 17th | 114 | ,, | 136 | 1st |
| 5 | 37th | 27 | 32nd | 49 | 12th | 71 | 36th | 93 | 18th | 115 | ,, | 137 | 8th |
| 6 | 12th | 28 | 9th | 50 | 34th | 72 | 7th | 94 | ,, | 116 | 26th | 138 | ,, |
| 7 | 4th | 29 | 31st | 51 | 10th | 73 | 5th | 95 | ,, | 117 | ,, | 139 | ,, |
| 8 | 13th | 30 | 10th | 52 | 15th | 74 | 6th | 96 | 19th | 118 | ,, | 140 | 16th |
| 9 | 30th | 31 | 35th | 53 | 2nd | 75 | 3rd | 97 | ,, | 119 | 27th | 141 | 26th |
| 10 | 17th | 32 | 33rd | 54 | 10th | 76 | 9th | 98 | 1st | 120 | ,, | 142 | 36th |
| 11 | 1st | 33 | ,, | 55 | 33rd | 77 | 6th | 99 | 20th | 121 | ,, | 143 | 15th |
| 12 | 35th | 34 | 7th | 56 | 34th | 78 | 11th | 100 | 23rd | 122 | 28th | 144 | ,, |
| 13 | 17th | 35 | 22nd | 57 | 37th | 79 | 6th | 101 | 21st | 123 | ,, | 145 | 20th |
| 14 | 4th | 36 | 33rd | 58 | 35th | 80 | 15th | 102 | ,, | 124 | ,, | 146 | 1st |
| 15 | 36th | 37 | 27th | 59 | 18th | 81 | 5th | 103 | ,, | 125 | 29th | 147 | 3rd |
| 16 | 30th | 38 | 14th | 60 | 3rd | 82 | 8th | 104 | 22nd | 126 | ,, | 148 | 21st |
| 17 | ,, | 39 | 19th | 61 | 14th | 83 | 11th | 105 | ,, | 127 | ,, | | |
| 18 | 3rd | 40 | 25th | 62 | 3rd | 84 | ,, | 106 | ,, | 128 | ,, | | |
| 19 | 9th | 41 | 31st | 63 | 5th | 85 | ,, | 107 | 23rd | 129 | 31st | | |
| 20 | ,, | 42 | 2nd | 64 | ,, | 86 | 32nd | 108 | ,, | 130 | 12th | | |
| 21 | 2nd | 43 | 24th | 65 | 28th | 87 | 2nd | 109 | ,, | 131 | 19th | | |
| 22 | 34th | 44 | 13th | 66 | 4th | 88 | 14th | 110 | 24th | 132 | 13th | | |

### Stations of Units.

*Royal Horse Artillery.*

| Brig. | Battery. | — | Brig. | Battery. | — |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | H.-Q. Egypt | 3 | D | Lucknow |
| | A | Mesopotamia | (*con.*) | J | Secunderabad |
| | B | Egypt | | F | Mesopotamia |
| | M | Egypt | 4 | | H.-Q. Newbridge |
| 2 | | H.-Q. Risalpur | | | |
| | K | Risalpur | | N | S. John's Wood |
| | C | Meerut | | I, L | Newbridge |
| | H | Sialkot | 5 | E, G, O | Aldershot |
| 3 | | H.-Q. Lucknow | | | |

*Royal Field Artillery.*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | H.-Q. 11, 146 (H) | Kilkenny | 3 | 18, 62, 75, 147 (H) | Rhine |
| | 98 | Waterford | 4 | 7, 14, 66 | Shorncliffe |
| | 136 | Fethard | | 4 (H) | |
| 2 | 21, 42, 53, 87 (H) | Fermoy | 5 | 63, 64, 73, 81 (H) | Bordon |

The following moves will take place during trooping season, 1920-21 :—
M Battery from Egypt to Palestine.

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*Royal Field Artillery—continued*

| Brig. | Battery. | — |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | 69, 74, 77 | Ewshott |
| | 79 (H) | |
| 7 | 24, 34, 72, | Bulford |
| | 60 (H) | |
| 8 | 137, 138, | Deepcut |
| | 139, 8 (H) | |
| 9 | 19, 20, 28, | Deepcut |
| | 76 (H) | |
| 10 | 46, 51, 54, | Black Sea |
| | 30 (H) | |
| 11 | 83, 84, 85, | Palestine |
| | 78 (H) | |
| 12 | 6, 23, 49, | Edinburgh |
| | 130 (H) | |
| 13 | 2, 8, 44, | Mesopotamia |
| | 132 (H) | |
| 14 | H.-Q. 38, | Colchester |
| | 61 (H) | |
| | 68, 88 | Ipswich |
| 15 | 52, 80, 143, | Larkhill |
| | 144 (H) | |
| 16 | 89 90, 91, | Palestine |
| | 140 (H) | |
| 17 | H.-Q. 92, | Mesopotamia |
| | 10 (H) | |
| | 13, 26 | |
| 18 | H.-Q. 59, | Kirkee |
| | 93, 95 (H) | |
| | 94 | Belgaum |
| 19 | 39, 96, 97, | Mesopotamia |
| | 131 (H) | |
| 20 | H.-X. 67, | Bangalore |
| | 145 (H) | |
| | 99, 133 | Secunderabad |
| 21 | H.-Q. 101, | Meerut |
| | 148 (H) | |
| | 102 | Ambala |
| | 103 | Agra |
| 22 | H.-Q. 104 | Lahore |
| | 35 (H) | |
| | 105 | Jullundur |
| | 106 | Ferozepore |
| 23 | H.-Q. 107, | Winchester |
| | 108, 100 (H) | |
| | 109 | |
| 24 | H.-Q. 110, | Jubbulpore |
| | 111, 43 (H) | |
| | 112 | Kamptee |
| 25 | H.-Q. 40 | Fyzabad |
| | 113 | Lucknow |
| | 115 | Bareilly |
| | 114 (H) | Allalhabad |
| 26 | H.-Q. 116 | Jhansi |
| | 141 (H) | |
| | 117 | Cawnpore |
| | 118 | Nasirabad |
| 27 | H.-Q. 119, | Nowshera |
| | 120, 37 (H) | |
| | 121 | Peshawar |
| 28 | 122, 123, | Black Sea |
| | 124, 65 (H) | |
| 29 | H.-Q. 135, | Rawalpindi |
| | 126, 128 (H) | |
| | 127 | Parachinar |
| 30 | 9, 17, | Kildare |
| | 16 | Leitrim |
| | 47 (H) | Newbridge |
| 31 | H.-Q. 41, | Cahir |
| | 45, 129 (H) | |
| | 29 | Clonmel |
| 32 | H.-Q. 134, | Hyderabad, Sind |
| | 86 (H) | |
| | 27 | Chamam |
| | 135 | Karachi |
| 33 | 32, 36, | Dundalk |
| | 33, 55 (H) | Dublin |
| 34 | 22, 50, 70 | Brighton |
| | 56 (H) | |
| 35 | 12, 25, 58, | Bulford |
| | 30 (H) | |
| 36 | H.-Q. 48 | Newbridge |
| | 142 (H) | |
| | 71 | Kildare |
| | 15 | Coolmoney |
| 37 | 1, 3, 5, | Aldershot |
| | 57 (H) | |

Following moves of Brigades will take place during trooping season, 1920–1921 :—

23rd Brigade from U.K. to India.
13th „ „ from Mesopotamia to U.K.
11th „ „ from Palestine to U.K.

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## C.—Royal Garrison Artillery (Mobile Armament)

*British Mountain Artillery.*

| British Mountain Artillery Brigade. | British Mountain Batteries. | — |
|---|---|---|
| I. | 1, 2, 3, 4 .. .. .. | Bulford |
| II. | 17, 5, 7, 9 .. .. .. | Shoreham |
| Unbrigaded Batteries— | 6 .. .. .. .. | Waziristan |
| | 8 .. .. .. .. | Kalabagh |
| | 10 (late 26th Batt. R.G.A ) .. | Jutogh |
| | 11 (late 31st Batt. R.G.A.) .. | Quetta |
| | 12 (late 35th Batt. R.G.A.) .. | Khyra Gali |
| | 13 .. .. .. .. | Mesopotamia |
| | 14 .. .. .. .. | Mesopotamia |
| | 15 .. .. .. .. | Palestine |
| | 16 .. .. .. .. | Not yet formed |

*Royal Garrison Artillery Brigades.*

| Brig. | Batteries. | — | Brig. | Batteries. | — |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | H.-Q. 1 | Egypt | 6 | H.-Q. 22 (H), | |
| | 2 (H) | Malta | | 21 (H) | Roorkee |
| | 3 (H), 4 (H) | Gibraltar | | 24 | Nowgong |
| 2 | H.-Q. | Delhi | | 23 (H) | Peshawar |
| | 5 | Mesopotamia | 7 | 25, 26 (H), | |
| | 6 (H) | Rawalpindi | | 27 (H),28 (H) | Moore Park |
| | 7 (H) | Delhi | | | Fermoy |
| | 8 (H) | Allahabad | 8 | H.-Q. 30 (H), | |
| 3 | H.-Q. 10 (H), | | | 31 (H),32 (H) | Exeter |
| | 11 (H) | Multan | | 29 | Rhine |
| | 9 | Nowgong | 9 | 33, 34 (H), | |
| | 12 (H) | Ferozepore | | 35 (H),36 (H) | Bordon |
| 4 | 13, 14 (H), | | | | |
| | 15 (H), 16(H) | Shoeburyness | 10 | H.-Q. 37 | |
| 5 | 17, 18 (H) | | | 38 (H) | Larkhill |
| | 19(H), 20 (H) | Tallaght | | 39 (H),40 (H) | Lavington |

## D.—Royal Engineers

### Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, Chatham
Electric Light School, Gosport
Training Battalion R.E., Chatham
Depot Battalion R.E., Chatham
Reserve Mounted Depot, Aldershot
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot
4th Field Troop, Egypt
2nd Co. (Field), Egypt
3rd Co. (Fortesss), Dover
4th Co. (Fortress), Gosport
5th Co. (Field), Aldershot
7th Co. (Field), Rhine
8th Co. (Railway), France
9th Co. (Field), Colchester
10th Co. (Railway) France
11th Co. (Field), Aldershot
12th Co. (Field), Limerick
13th Co. Survey, York
14th Co. (Survey), Edinburgh
15th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
16th Co. (Fortress), North Shields
17th Co. (Field), Curragh
19th Co. (Survey), Southampton
20th Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
22nd Co. (Fortress), Isle of Wight
23rd Co. (Field), Aldershot
24th Co. (Fortress), Malta
25th Co. (Fortress), Malta
26th Co. (Field), Black Sea
27th Co. (Fortress), Bermuda
28th Co. (Fortress), Malta
29th Co. (Army Troops), Black Sea
30th Co. (Fortress), Plymouth
31st Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
32nd Co. (Fortress), Ceylon
33rd Co. (Fortress), Cork
34th Co. (Fortress), Guernsey
35th Co. (Fortress), Pembroke
36th Co. (Fortress), Sierra Leone

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**Stations of the Head Quarters of Units**—*continued.*

38th Co. (Field), Moore Park
39th Co. (Fortress), Sheerness
40th Co. (Fortress), Hong Kong
41st Co. (Fortress), Singapore
42nd Co. (Army Troops), Palestine
43rd Co. (Fortress), Mauritius
44th Co. (Fortress), Jamaica
45th Co. (Fortress), Gibraltar
49th Co. (Fortress), North Queensferry
54th Co. (Field), Black Sea
55th Co. (Field), Black Sea
56th Co. (Field), Bulford
57th Co. (Field), Bulford
59th Co. (Field), Curragh
613th Co. (Fortress), Belfast
1st Pontoon Park, Chatham
Experimental Bridging Co., Christchurch
Special Brigade Co., Porton
Camouflage Experimental Section, Salisbury

## E.—Infantry Regiments

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Coldstream Guards | Chelsea | Lt.-Col. J. E. Gibbs, M.C. | |
| 2nd ditto | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 3rd ditto | Wellington Barracks | Lt.-Col. C. J. C. Grant, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Grenadier Guards | Wimbledon | Lt.-Col. B. N. Sergison Brooke, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Chelsea | Lt.-Col. Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Tower of London | Lt.-Col. Lord H. C. Seymour, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Irish Guards | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. Hon. T. E. Vesey. | |
| 1st Scots Guards | Wimbledon | Lt.-Col. R. S. Tempest, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Windsor | Lt.-Col. B. H. S. Romilly, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Welsh Guards | Warley | Lt.-Col. Hon. A. G. A. Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders | Poona | Lt.-Col. H. H. G. Hyslop, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Claremorris | Lt.-Col. W. J. B. Tweedie, C.M.G. | |
| 1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment | Ballyshannon | Lt.-Col. E. I. de S. Thorpe, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Secunderabad | Lt.-Col. G. D. Jebb, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Berkshire Regiment | Mesopotamia | Bt.-Col. S. G. Francis, D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. W. B. Thornton, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Border Regiment | Karachi | Lt.-Col. H. Nelson, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Castlebar | Lt.-Col. G. de la P. B. Pakenham, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |



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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Cameron Highlanders | Rawalpindi | Bt.-Col. N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Queenstown | Lt.-Col. G. C. M. Sorel-Cameron | |
| 1st Cheshire Regiment | Rathdrum | Lt.-Col. B. H. Chetwynd-Staplyton, *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. A. Crookenden, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Connaught Rangers | Jallundur | Lt.-Col. H. R. G. Deacon, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dover | Lt.-Col. H. F. N. Jourdain, C.M.G. | |
| 1st Cornwall's Light Infantry, Duke of | Ballykinlar | Lt.-Col. T. H. F. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. R. M. Wetherell, C.M.G. | |
| 1st Devonshire Regiment | Waterford | Bt.-Col. E. D. Young, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Quetta | Lt.-Col. J. P. Law, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Dorsetshire Regt. | Londonderry | Lt.-Col. A. L. Moulton-Barrett, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Bangalore | Lt.-Col. F. W. Radcliffe, C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Dublin Fusiliers | Bordon | Lt.-Col. C. N. Perreau, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Bt.-Col. C. Bonham Carter, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Durham Light Infantry | Rhine | Lt.-Col. H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. E. Du. P. H. Moore | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 1st Essex Regiment | Kinsale | Lt.-Col. F. W. Moffit, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. A. P. Churchill | |
| 1st Gloucestershire Regiment | Tidworth | Bt.-Col. F. C. Nisbet, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Ahmednagar | Lt.-Col. R. P. Jordan, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Gordon Highldrs. | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. C. J. Simpson | |
| 2nd ditto | Maryhill | Lt.-Col. P. W. Brown, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Hampshire Regiment | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. A. E. Andrews, O.B.E. | |
| 2nd ditto | Cork | Bt.-Col. C. N. French, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Highland Light Infantry | Egypt | Lt.-Col. R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | to U.K. 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Edinburgh | Lt.-Col. J. C. Grahame, D.S.O. | to Egypt 1920–21 |
| 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal | Sialkot | Lt.-Col. J. N. Crawford, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Woolwich | Lt.-Col. G. C. Grazebrook, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Irish Fusiliers, Royal | North Persia | Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd Irish Fusiliers Royal | Dover | Bt.-Col. H. L. Knight, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Irish Regiment Royal | Rhine | Bt.-Col. A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Chakrata | Lt.-Col. G. A. Elliot, M.C. | |
| 1st Irish Rifles, Royal | Parkhurst, Isle of Wight | Lt.-Col. H. R. Charley, C.B.E. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. A. D. N. Merriman, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Kent Regiment, East | Fermoy | Lt.-Col. R. McDouall, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Multan | Lt.-Col. W. H. Trevor, D.S.O. | to Mesopotamia 1920–21 |
| 1st Kent Regiment, West | Agra | Lt.-Col. G. D. Lister. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. C. E. Kitson, D.S.O. | |
| 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps | Armagh | Lt.-Col. R. G. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Portsmouth | Bt.-Col. H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Mhow | Lt.-Col. B. J. Majendie, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | Quetta | Lt.-Col. Sir H. Wake, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Lancashire Fusiliers | Dublin | Lt.-Col. C. de Putron | |
| 2nd ditto | Lahore | Lt.-Col. C. J. Griffin, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, East | Blackdown | Lt.-Col. J. E. Green, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Killarney | Lt.-Col. W. H. Traill, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, Loyal North | Malta | Lt.-Col. F. W. Woodward, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. R. E. Berkeley, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Lancashire Regiment, South | Dublin | Lt.-Col. D'O. B. Dawson. | |
| 2nd ditto | Pembroke Dock | Lt.-Col. H. C. Herbert, O.B.E. | to Palestine 1920–21 |
| 1st Lancaster Regiment, Royal | Dublin | Bt.-Col. H. R. Headlam, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Maymyo | Bt.-Col. O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C. | |
| 1st Leicestershire Regiment | Athlone | Lt.-Col. E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Delhi | Lt.-Col. B. C. Dent, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Leinster Regiment | Madras | Bt.-Col. E. T. Humphreys, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Colchester | | |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Lincolnshire | Tipperary | Lt.-Col. R. H. G. Wilson | |
| 2nd ditto [Regiment | Poona | Lt.-Col. C. Toogood, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Liverpool Regiment | Bantry | Lt.-Col. L. M. Jones, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Khartoum | Lt.-Col. F. Hyslop, C.B.E. | |
| 1st Manchester Regiment | Ballincolig | Lt.-Col. F. H. Dorling, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. B. A. Wright, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Middlesex Regiment | Gravesend | Lt.-Col. R. M. Heath, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. F. E. Swainson | |
| 3rd ditto | Rhine | Bt.-Col. W. D. Wright, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 4th ditto | Gibraltar | Lt.-Col. O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Munster Fusiliers | Plymouth | Lt.-Col. J. A. F. Cuffe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. H. S. Jervis, M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Norfolk Regiment | Belfast | Lt.-Col. F. C. Lodge, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. W. F. L. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Northamptonshire Regiment | Templemore | Lt.-Col. H. R. H. Drew, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rawalpindi | Lt.-Col. L. G. W. Dobbin, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Northumberland Fusiliers | Bordon | Bt.-Col. C. Yatman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. E. M. Moulton Barrett, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment | Blackdown | Bt.-Col. J. C. Harding-Newman, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. R. J. F. Taylor, C.B.E. | |
| 1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry | Limerick | Lt.-Col. F. H. Stapleton, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Lichfield | Lt.-Col. E. R. Clayton, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Rifle Brigade | Mesopotamia | Bt.-Col. A. T. Paley, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 2nd ditto | Killybegs | Lt.-Col. W. E. Davis, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | to India 1920–21 |
| 3rd ditto | Portsmouth | Lt.-Col. J. Harrington, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | Quetta | Lt.-Col. W. W. Seymour, *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Royal Fusiliers | Kilworth | Lt.-Col. C. J. Hickey, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Umballa | Lt.-Col. M. P. Hancock, D.S.O. | to Aden 1920–21 |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Royal Fusiliers | Plebiscite Area | Lt.-Col. E. B. North, C.M.G, D.S.O. | |
| 4th ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. H. A. Walker, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Royal Highlanders | Allahabad | Lt.-Col. S. H. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Rhine | Bt.-Col. A. G. Wauchope, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Scots, Royal | Rangoon | Bt.-Col. G. G. Loch, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Ennistymon | Lt.-Col. H. E. P. Nash, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Scots Fusiliers, [Royal | Bordon | Lt.-Col. F. E. Buchanan. | |
| 2nd ditto | Black Sea | Lt.-Col. R. K. Walsh, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Scottish Borderers, King's Own | Bombay | Lt.-Col. A. J. Welsh. | |
| 2nd ditto | Devonport | Lt.-Col. H. D. N. Maclean, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Scottish Rifles | Curragh | Bt.-Col. J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Kuldana | Lt.-Col. R. Oakley, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Seaforth Highlanders | Fort George | Bt.-Col. N. A. Thomson, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Agra | Lt.-Col. L. Holland, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Shropshire Light Infantry | Aden | Lt.-Col. H. M. Smith, D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Curragh | Lt.-Col. J. Meynell, C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Somerset Light Infantry | Holywood, Belfast | Lt.-Col. A. H. Yatman, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Palestine | Lt.-Col. W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 1st Staffordshire Regiment, North | Curragh | Lt.-Col. T. A. Andrus, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Egypt | Lt.-Col. E. V. Fox, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Staffordshire Regiment, South | Singapore | Bt.-Col. L. B. Boyd-Moss, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Cork | Lt.-Col. A. H. C. James, D.S.O., M.V.O. | |
| 1st Suffolk Regiment | Jubbulpore | Lt.-Col. F. T. D. Wilson. | |
| 2nd ditto | Colchester | Lt.-Col. A. S. Peebles, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Surrey Regiment, East | Sheffield | Lt.-Col. C. C. G. Ashton, O.B.E. | to Palestine 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Aldershot | Lt.-Col. R. H. Baldwin, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Surrey Regiment, Royal West | Londonderry | Lt.-Col. H. C. Whinfield. | |
| 2nd ditto | Bareilly | Lt.-Col. E. B. Mathew-Lannowe, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Sussex Regiment, Royal | Rhine | Bt.-Col. J. B. Wroughton, C.B., C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Jamaica | Bt.-Col. A. E. Glasgow, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |

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## Infantry Regiments—*continued*

| Regiment. | Location. | Commanding Officer. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Wales Borderers, South | Dunslaughlin | Lt.-Col. A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Jhansi | Bt.-Col. C. W. Pearless, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Warwickshire Regiment, Royal | Chatham | Bt.-Col. H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Khanspur | Lt.-Col. D. A. L. Day. | |
| 1st Welch Fusiliers, Royal | Lucknow | Lt.-Col. J. B. Cockburn, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Limerick | Lt.-Col. C. C. Norman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Welch Regiment | Ferozepore | Lt.-Col. L. I. O. Robins. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. H. J. B. Span, D.S.O. | |
| 1st West Riding Regiment | Palestine | Lt.-Col. R. K. Healing. | |
| 2nd ditto | Collinstown | Lt.-Col. R. N. Bray, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Wiltshire Regiment | Dublin | Bt.-Col. R. D. F. Oldman, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Hongkong | Lt.-Col. J. R. Wyndham. | |
| 1st Worcestershire Regiment | Nasirabad | Lt.-Col. H. A. Fulton, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Dublin | Lt.-Col. H. A. Carr, D.S.O. | |
| 3rd ditto | Chabattia | Bt.-Col. G. W. St. G. Grogan, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C. | |
| 4th ditto | Rhine | Lt.-Col. M. R. Walsh, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st York & Lancaster Regiment | Tidworth | Lt.-Col. G. H. Wedgwood, D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. G. E. Bayley, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 1st Yorkshire Light Infantry | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. H. E. Trevor, C.M.G., D.S.O. | |
| 2nd ditto | Plymouth | Bt.-Col. J. B. G. Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* | |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment | Palestine | Lt.-Col. C. V. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O. | to India 1920–21 |
| 2nd ditto | Rathkeale | Lt.-Col. G. B. de M. Maris, D.S.O. | |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment, East | Mullingar | Lt.-Col. T. A. Headlam. | |
| 2nd ditto | Mesopotamia | Lt.-Col. D. Mathers, D.S.O., O.B.E., D.C.M. | |
| 1st Yorkshire Regiment, West | York | Bt.-Col. G. D. Price, C.M.G. | |
| 2nd ditto | Peshawar | Bt.-Col. T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O. | |

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## 4. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME

### A.—Aldershot Command

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General F. R. Earl of Cavan, K.P., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., M.V.O. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General S. E. Holland, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *1st Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *1st Division.* | Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, K.C.B., *p.s.c. q.s.* |
| *1st Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *2nd Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *3rd Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General A. C. Daly, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 1st Division.* | Brigadier-General W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *2nd Division.* | Major-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *5th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General H. C. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *6th Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O |
| *C.R.A. 2nd Division.* | Brigadier-Gen. H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G |

### B.—Eastern Command

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | General Lord H. S. Horne, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt., R.A., A.D.C. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General C. W. Gwynn, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Sir A. F. Sillem, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c., q.s.* |
| *4th Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General N. W. Haig, C.B.,C.M.G. |
| *4th Division.* | Major-General Sir C. D. Shute, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *11th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General J. Campbell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *12th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General A. H. Marindin, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 4th Division.* | Brigadier-General S. F. Metcalfe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *54th (East Anglian) Division.* | Major-General Sir S. W. Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Essex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. C. Da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. J. M'Neill, D.S.O. |
| *East Midland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel T. W. Visct. Hampden, C.B., C.M.G. |

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EASTERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *C.R.A. 54th Division.* | Brevet-Colonel H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *44th (Home Counties) Division.* | Major-General Sir J. R. Longley, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Surrey Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. H. Mangles, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Kent Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Middlesex and Sussex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. J. Ross, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 44th Division.* | Colonel Sir H. B. White-Thompson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |

C.—IRISH COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Forces in Ireland.* | General Rt. Hon. Sir C. F. N. Macready, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Sir W. H. Rycroft, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *3rd Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. A. Weir, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *1st Division.* | For H.Q. Staff, *see* Aldershot Command. |
| *15th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. T. C. Carter-Campbell, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Londonderry Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General W. H. L. Allgood, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *5th Division.* | Major-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B. |
| *13th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General T. S. Lambert, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *14th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General P. C. B. Skinner, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Galway Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General J. G. Chaplin, D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 5th Division.* | Brigadier-General R. A. C. Wellesley, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *6th Division.* | Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *16th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General C. H. T. Lucas, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *17th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. H. W. Higginson, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *18th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 6th Division.* | Brigadier-General E. H. Willis, C.B., C.M.G. |

D.—LONDON DISTRICT

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.* | Major W. H. Diggle, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.* |

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LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Colonel in charge of Administration.* | Lieut.-Colonel R. Luker, C.M.G., M.C., *p.s.c.* |
| *56th (The London) Division.* | Major-General Sir C. E. Pereira, K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *1st London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. S. de E. Coke, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *2nd London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. Maxwell, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D. |
| *3rd London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. L. G. Anley, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. 56th (The London) Division.* | Colonel J. A. Tyler, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *47th (The London) Division.* | Major-General Sir N. M. Smith, V.C., K.C.B. |
| *4th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel F. G. Lewis, C.B., C.M.G., T.D. |
| *5th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. B. Hubback, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *6th London Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. T. Buckley, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *C.R.A. 47th (The London) Division.* | Colonel H. E. T. Kelly, C.B., C.M.G. |

E.—NORTHERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir F. I. Maxse, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., *q.s.* |
| *General Staff Officer 1st Grade.* | Colonel R. W. Hare, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *q.s.* |
| *Brigadier-General i/c Administration.* | Brigadier-General H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *10th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. W. J. Dugan, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Yorkshire and Notts Mounted Brigade.* | Brevet-Colonel L. W. de V. Sadleir Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Midland Mounted Brigade.* | Colonel D'A. Legard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *50th (Northumbrian Division).* | Major-General Sir P. S. Wilkinson, K.C.M.G., C.B. |
| *Durham Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. R. Cumming, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Northumberland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. P. A. Riddell, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *York and Durham Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel B. G. Price, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 50th (Northumbrian) Division.* | |
| *49th (West Riding) Division.* | Major-General H. R. Davies, C.B. |
| *1st West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel E. L. Mackenzie, C.I.E., D.S.O. |
| *2nd West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Sir G. A. Armytage, Bt., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *3rd West Riding Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. M Withycombe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |

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NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *C.R.A. 49th West (Riding) Division.* | Colonel E. N. Whitley, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *46th (North Midland) Division.* | Major-General Sir A. R. Hoskins, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Lincolnshire and Leicestershire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. Gordon, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Staffordshire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel V. W. de Falbe, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *The Sherwood Foresters (Notts and Derby) Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *C.R.A. 46th (North Midland) Division.* | Colonel Sir S. H. Child, Bt., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O. |

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B. K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *General Staff Officer 1st Grade.* | Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. St. John, C.M.G. D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General in charge of Administration.* | Brigadier-General J. A. Strick. |
| *51st (Highland) Division.* | Major-General E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Argyll and Sutherland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Sir W. M. Thomson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C. |
| *Cameron and Seaforth Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. W. Sandilands, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Black Watch and Gordon Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel G. S. G. Crauford, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C. |
| *C.R.A. 51st (Highland) Division.* | Colonel H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *52nd (Lowland Division).* | Major-General Sir P. R. Robertson, K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *South Scottish Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. H. W. Pollard, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Royal Scots Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel I. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Scottish Rifles and Highland Light Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. M. Findlay, D.S.O., T.D. |
| *C.R.A. 52nd (Lowland) Division.* | Colonel G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O. |

G.—SOUTHERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General General Staff.* | Brigadier-General H. H. S. Knox, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |

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SOUTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Major-General in charge of Administration.* | Major-General Hon. Sir A. R. Montagu-Stuart Wortley, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *2nd Cavalry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *3rd Division.* | Major-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *7th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General G. V. Hordern, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.* |
| *8th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *9th Infantry Brigade.* | Brigadier-Gen. E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *C.R.A. 3rd Division.* | Brigadier-General L. C. F. Oldfield, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *48th (South Midland) Division.* | Major-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Warwickshire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. Mudge, C.M.G. |
| *Gloucestershire and Worcs. Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *South Midland Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel A. J. F. Eden, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 48th (South Midland) Division.* | Colonel A. T. Anderson, C.M.G. |
| *43rd (Wessex) Division.* | Major-General Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Devon and Cornwall Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel Hon. L. J. P. Butler, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *South Wessex Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. G. Braithwaite, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Hampshire Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel L. F. Philips, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *C.R.A. (Wessex) Division.* | Colonel G. H. W. Nicholson, C.M.G. |

H.—WESTERN COMMAND

| | |
|---|---|
| *General Officer Commanding.* | Lieutenant-General Sir H. de B. De Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.* | Colonel R. J. F. Hayter., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Brigadier-General i/c Administration.* | Brigadier-General Sir C. C. M. Maynard, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *53rd (Welch) Division.* | Major-General C. J. Deverell, C.B., *p.s.c.* |
| *North Wales Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel W. R. N. Madocks, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Welch Border Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel H. J. Brock, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *South Wales Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel O. de L. Williams, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 53rd (Welch) Division.* | Colonel A. D. Kirby, C.B., C.M.G. |

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WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *55th (West Lancashire) Division.* | Major-General Sir R. W. R. Barnes, K.C.B., D.S.O. |
| *North Lancashire Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel R. G. Parker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Liverpool Infantry Brigade.* | Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C. |
| *South Lancashire and Cheshire Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 55th (West Lancashire) Division.* | Brevet-Colonel C. E. G. G. Charlton, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *42nd (East Lancashire) Division.* | Major-General T. H. Shoubridge, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.* |
| *Manchester Infantry Bgde.* | Colonel H. C. Darlington, C.M.G., T.D. |
| *East Lancashire and Border Infantry Brigade.* | |
| *Lancashire Fusiliers Bgde.* | Colonel M. L. Hornby, C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *C.R.A. 42nd (East Lancashire) Division.* | Colonel W. B. R. Sandys, C.B., C.M.G. |

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Guernsey and Alderney District.* | Major-General Sir J. E. Capper, K.C.B. |
| *Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.* | |
| *Jersey District.* | Major-General W. D. Smith, C.B. |
| *Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.* | |

## II. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

### 1.—Air Council

| | |
|---|---|
| *President of the Air Council.* | The Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for Air. |
| *Vice-President of the Air Council.* | The Rt. Hon. the Marquess of Londonderry, K.G., M.V.O., Under Secretary of State for Air. |
| *Members.* | Air-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff; Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., Controller-General of Civil Aviation; Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., Director-General of Supply and Research. Sir James Stevenson, Bt., Additional Member; Rear-Admiral Sir C. F. Lambert, K.C.B., Additional Member; W. F. Nicholson, Esq., C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry. |

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## 2.—Air Ministry

| | |
|---|---|
| *Secretary of State for Air.* | The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P. |
| *Parliamentary Private Secretary.* | Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon, M.P., M.C. |
| *Air Secretary and Private Secretary.* | Group Captain A. J. L. Scott, C.B., M.C., A.F.C. |
| *Assistant Private Secretary.* | Flight-Lieutenant G. W. Dobson, O.B.E. |
| *Under Secretary of State for Air.* | The Rt. Hon. the Marquess of Londonderry, K.G., M.V.O. |
| *Private Secretaries.* | Hon. O. E. Vesey, C.B.E.; P. J. Oldfield, Esq. |
| *Secretary of the Air Ministry.* | W. F. Nicholson, Esq., C.B. |
| *Assistant Secretaries of the Air Ministry.* | H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., D.S.O. |
| *Finance Department :—* | |
| *Assistant Financial Secretary.* | W. A. Bland, Esq., C.B. |
| *Director of Finance for Personnel.* | J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E. |
| *Director of Finance for Material.* | B. E. Holloway, Esq. |
| *Director of Contracts.* | J. M. Spaight, Esq., O.B.E. |
| *Directorate of Lands (Joint Service for War Office, Ministry of Munitions, and Air Ministry) :—* | |
| *Director-General of Lands.* | Sir H. Frank, Bt., K.C.B. |
| *Controller of Lands.* | E. H. Coles, Esq. (Dep. Dir.-Gen.). |
| *Chief Valuer and Compensation Officer.* | Colonel H. F. Cobb, O.B.E. |
| *Department of the Chief of the Air Staff :—* | |
| *Chief of the Air Staff.* | Air Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Private Secretary.* | Captain T. B. Marson, M.B.E. |
| *Director of Operations and Intelligence.* | Air Commodore J. M. Steel, C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Director of Training and Organization.* | Air Commodore P. W. Game, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Director of Personnel.* | Rear-Admiral Sir C. F. Lambert, K.C.B. |
| *Director of Equipment.* | Air Commodore C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. |
| *Director of Medical Services.* | Group Captain (acting Air Commodore) M. H. G. Fell, C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Director of Works and Buildings.* | Major-General Sir Andrew M. Stuart, K.C.M.G., C.B. |

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## Air Ministry—*continued*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Department of the Director General of Supply and Research :—* | |
| *Director-General of Supply and Research.* | Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Secretary.* | A. R. Wolbrom, Esq. |
| *Director of Research.* | Air Commodore H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Design).* | Wing-Commander E. F. Briggs, D.S.O., O.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Airships).* | Wing-Commander T. R. Cave Brown Cave, C.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Armament).* | Wing-Commander J. L. Forbes, O.B.E. |
| *Deputy Director of Research (Instruments).* | Wing-Commander A. D. Warrington Morris, C.M.G., O.B.E. |
| *Director of Aircraft Supplies.* | Mr. R. P. Wilson, C.B.E., M.Inst.C.E., M.I.E.E. |
| *Director of Aeronautical Inspection.* | Brigadier-General R. K. Bagnall-Wild, C.M.G., C.B.E. |
| *Department of the Controller General of Civil Aviation :—* | |
| *Controller-General.* | Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G. |
| *Private Secretary.* | N. I. Smith, Esq., M.B.E. |
| *Controller of Information.* | Major-General E. D. Swinton, C.B., D.S.O. |
| *Controller of Communications.* | Group-Captain L. F. Blandy, D.S.O. |
| *Controller of Aerodromes and Licensing.* | Brig.-General F. L. Festing, C.B., C.M.G. (acting). |
| *Director of Meteorological Office.* | Dr. G. C. Simpson, C.B.E., F.R.S. (acting). |

## 3.—Air Commands

### A.—UNITED KINGDOM

#### (a) Inland Area

The Inland Area comprises all units in Great Britain, with the exception of those units comprising the Coastal Area, Cranwell, and Halton Camp Command.

*Headquarters :* Hillingdon House, Uxbridge.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgenarch, Uxbridge.
*Telephone No. :* Uxbridge 231/2/3/4/5/6.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Air Vice-Marshal* .. .. | Sir John Maitland Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding. |
| *Group Captain* .. .. | Philip L. W. Herbert, C.M.G., C.B.E., Chief Staff Officer. |

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**Inland Area—*continued***

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 1 Group* .. .. | Kenley. |
| No. 24 Squadron .. .. .. | „ |
| „ 39 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| „ 25 „ .. .. .. | Hawkinge. |
| „ 1 Stores Depot .. .. .. | Kidbrooke. |
| „ 3 „ „ .. .. .. | Milton. |
| „ 4 „ „ .. .. .. | Ruislip. |
| The Packing Depot .. .. .. | Ascot. |
| "Q" Stores Depot .. .. .. | Feltham. |
| Medical Stores Depot .. .. .. | Kidbrooke. |
| Armament and Gunnery School .. | Eastchurch. |
| Central Pay Office .. .. .. | Woking. |
| General Services Pay Officer .. | Trafalgar House, W.C. |
| *Headquarters, No. 3 Group* .. .. | Spittlegate. |
| No. 207 Squadron .. .. .. | Bircham Newton. |
| „ 2 Flying Training School .. | Duxford. |
| „ 3 „ „ „ .. | Digby. |
| „ 5 „ „ „ .. | Shotwick. |
| „ 6 „ „ „ .. | Spittlegate. |
| Aeroplane Experimental Establishment | Martlesham Heath. |
| M.T. Repair Depot .. .. .. | Shrewsbury. |
| *Headquarters, No. 7 Group* .. .. | Andover. |
| No. 4 Squadron .. .. .. | Farnborough. |
| School of Army Co-operation .. | Old Sarum. |
| Air Pilotage School .. .. .. | Andover. |
| Central Flying School .. .. .. | Upavon. |
| No. 1 Flying Training School .. | Netheravon. |
| School of Photography .. .. | South Farnborough. |
| Experimental Section, R.A.E. .. | „ „ |
| Electrical and Wireless School .. | Flower Down. |
| School of Balloon Training .. .. | Larkhill. |
| Record Office .. .. .. .. | Blandford. |
| *Units Directly under Area Headquarters :—* | |
| R.A.F. Depot .. .. .. .. | Uxbridge. |
| Central Band, R.A.F. .. .. .. | „ |
| Record Office Detachment .. .. | „ |
| School of Physical Training and Drill | „ |
| Air Ministry, M.T. Section .. .. | War Office Garage, Ebury Bridge Road. |
| Inland Area Medical Headquarters .. | Uxbridge. |
| Central R.A.F. Hospital .. .. | Finchley. |
| Medical Officers' School of Instruction and Research Laboratory .. .. | Holly Hill, N.W. |
| Aviation Candidates and Invaliding Medical Board .. .. .. | Hampstead. |

**(b) Coastal Area**

The Coastal Area comprises Stations, etc., as follows: Calshot, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport, Isle of Grain, Cattewater, North Queensferry,

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(b) Coastal Area—*continued*

Donibristle, Leuchars, Smoogroo, Felixstowe. Also all Aircraft Carriers and Units afloat in Fighting Ships in Home Waters and all Airship Stations.

*Headquarters :* 33–34 Tavistock Place, W.C. 1.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgenarch, Westcent, London.
*Telephone No. :* Museum 7840.

*Air Vice-Marshal.* Arthur V. Vyvyan, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

*Group Captain.* Charles R. Samson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 10 Group* .. .. | Lee-on-Solent. |
| No. 210 Squadron .. .. .. | Gosport. |
| „ 238 „ .. .. .. | Cattewater. |
| School of Naval Co-operation and Aerial Navigation .. .. .. | Calshot and Lee-on-Solent. |
| *Headquarters, No. 29 (Fleet) Group* .. | North Queensferry. |
| R.A.F. Base .. .. .. .. | Leuchars. |
| (*a*) No. 203 Squadron .. .. | „ |
| (*b*) „ 205 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| Coastal Area Aircraft Depot .. .. | Donibristle. |
| *Units Administered Direct by Area Headquarters.* | |
| R.A.F. Airship Base .. .. .. | Howden. |
| Marine and Armament Experimental Establishment .. .. .. | Isle of Grain. |
| No. 230 Squadron .. .. .. | Felixstowe. |
| Inspector of Recruiting R.A.F. .. | Henrietta Street, W.C. |
| H.M.S.'s *Argus*, *Furious* and *Ark Royal*. | |

(c) No. 11 (Irish) Wing

This Command comprises all units in Ireland. For operations these units are controlled by the General Officer Commanding, Irish Command.

*Headquarters :* Baldonnell, Clondalkin, Co. Dublin.
*Telegraphic Address :* Airgroup, Dublin.
*Telephone No.:* Clondalkin 22.

*Group Captain.* Ian Bonham Carter, O.B.E., Officer Commanding.

*Squadron Leader.* Frederick Sowery, D.S.O., M.C., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| No. 100 Squadron .. .. .. | Baldonnel, Castlebar, and Aldergrove. |
| „ 2 „ .. .. .. | Fermoy and Oranmore. |
| Irish Stores and Repair Unit .. .. | Baldonnel. |

(d) Royal Air Force Headquarters, Cranwell

The Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Headquarters, Cranwell, is Commandant of the R.A.F. (Cadet) College and Cranwell Station.

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**(d) Royal Air Force Headquarters, Cranwell—*continued***

*Headquarters :* Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.
*Telegraphic Address :* Aircoll, Sleaford.
*Telephone No. :* Sleaford 64/5/6/7.

*Air Commodore.* Charles A. H. Longcroft, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding.

*Wing-Commander.* Arthur L. Godman, C.M.G., D.S.O., Assistant Commandant.

Units as follows :—

(*a*) R.A.F. Cadet College .. .. Cranwell.
(*b*) No. 2 School of Technical Training (Boys) .. .. .. .. ,,

**(e) Royal Air Force Headquarters, Halton**

Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Headquarters, Halton, is Commandant of No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) and Halton Station.

*Headquarters :* Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.
*Telegraphic Address :* Hedcuaros, Halton.
*Telephone No. :* Aylesbury 161/2 ; Wendover 72/4.

*Air Commodore.* Francis R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

*Group Captain.* Amyas E. Borton, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

(*a*) No. 1 School of Technical Training (Boys) .. .. .. .. Halton.

**B.—OVERSEAS**

**(a) Middle East Area**

*Headquarters :* Cairo.

*Air Vice-Marshal.* Sir William G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G. C.B., D.S.O., Air Officer Commanding.

*Group Captain.* Bertie C. G. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

This Command comprises Units grouped as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| Egypt Stores Depot .. .. .. | Alexandria. |
| ,, Engine Repair Depot .. .. | Abbassia. |
| ,, Aircraft Depot .. .. .. | Aboukir. |
| ,, Base Pay Office .. .. .. | Cairo. |
| *Headquarters, Egyptian Group* .. .. | Almaza, Cairo. |
| No. 70 Squadron .. .. .. | Heliopolis. |
| ,, 47 ,, .. .. .. | Helwan. |
| ,, 8 ,, .. .. .. | Helwan. |
| ,, 56 ,, .. .. .. | Aboukir. |
| *Headquarters Palestine Group* .. .. | Ismailia. |
| No. 14 Squadron .. .. .. | Ramleh. |
| ,, 208 ,, .. .. .. | Moascar. |
| ,, 216 ,, .. .. .. | Abu Sueir. |

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**Middle East Area—*continued***

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, Mesopotamian Wing* | Baghdad. |
| No. 6 Squadron .. .. .. | Baghdad. |
| „ 55 „ .. .. .. | Tanooma. |
| „ 30 „ .. .. .. | Baghdad, Mosul, and Kasoi. |
| „ 84 „ .. .. .. | Shaibah and Nasariyeh. |
| Aircraft Park .. .. .. .. | Baghdad. |
| Central Air Communication Section | Shaibah. |

*Survey Parties :—*

| | |
|---|---|
| Headquarters No. 1 African Survey Party | Kartoum. |
| „ „ 2 „ „ „ | Nairobi. |
| „ „ 3 „ „ „ | Pretoria. |

**(b) R.A.F. India**

*Headquarters :* Ambala.

*Air Commodore.* Tom I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G., Air Officer Commanding.

*Wing-Commander.* Reginald P. Mills, M.C., A.F.C., Chief Staff Officer.

This Command comprises all R.A.F. Units in India grouped as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| *Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing* .. | Peshawar. |
| No. 5 Squadron .. .. .. | Quetta. |
| „ 20 „ .. .. .. | Parachinar. |
| „ 27 „ .. .. .. | Risalpur. |
| „ 60 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| *Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing* .. | Ambala. |
| No. 28 Squadron .. .. .. | Ambala. |
| „ 31 „ .. .. .. | Mhow. |

The following Units are administered direct by Headquarters, R.A.F., India :—

| | |
|---|---|
| R.A.F. School .. .. .. .. | Bangalore. |
| (*a*) No. 1 Squadron .. .. .. | „ |
| (*b*) „ 3 „ .. .. .. | „ |
| Aircraft Depot .. .. .. .. | Lahore. |
| „ Factory .. .. .. | „ |

**(c) Mediterranean Group**

*Headquarters :* Malta.

This Command comprises all units in the Mediterranean Sea Area co-operating with the Navy.

*Group Captain.* Eugene L. Gerrard, C.M.G., D.S.O., Officer Commanding.

*Squadron Leader.* Harry F. A. Gordon, O.B.E., Chief Staff Officer.

Units as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| No. 202 Squadron .. .. | Alexandria. |
| „ 267 „ .. .. | Malta. |
| Seaplane Repair Base .. .. | Feneraki, nr. Constantinople. |

*Aircraft Carrier :*—H.M.S. *Pegasus.*

**(d) R.A.F. with the Army of the Rhine**

No. 12 Squadron .. .. .. Bickendorf.

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# Kenilworth Cigarettes

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*Manufacturers of High Class Cigarettes and Tobacco.*

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